TOPIC:

Early Life of the Scheurkogel Brothers

Arie and Ockert Scheurkogel were two brothers from the Carolina Commando who fought side by side during the Anglo-Boer War, most notably at the Battle of Spioenkop—where their unit suffered the highest casualty rate of any regiment. They served under their brother-in-law, Veldkornet Andries Jacobus Viljoen, who was wounded at both Ladysmith and Spioenkop. All three remained active in the Commando throughout the war.


 
Family Origins and Early Life


Abraham Scheurkogel: A Teacher Turned Farmer

Their father, Abraham Scheurkogel, was born on December 1, 1823, in North Brabant, Netherlands. He arrived in South Africa in 1853 and married Maria Zijbella Coetzee in Natal on March 16, 1857. A qualified teacher with experience in Java, Abraham was appointed as a schoolteacher in Potchefstroom on July 6, 1857.

At the time, Potchefstroom’s youth had gone without formal education for three years, leading to unruly behavior that even prompted legislative concern. Abraham was granted use of the church for teaching and provided a house. However, his strict disciplinary methods—particularly his use of corporal punishment—led to conflict. A complaint from State Attorney J. Visage, a prominent figure and former Voortrekker, accused Abraham of mistreating his daughter. Despite appealing to the Executive Council, Abraham was dismissed on November 16, 1857.

Family Growth and Movement

Despite his dismissal, the family remained in Potchefstroom for five more years. Their first son, Arie Abraham, was born on January 28, 1858, and baptized in the same church where Abraham had taught. In 1862, their daughter Adriana Maria Margaretha was born—she would later marry Veldkornet Viljoen. The family moved to Wakkerstroom, where another daughter was born in 1863. Abraham briefly returned to teaching in 1865 but soon retired due to continued dissatisfaction with his methods, turning instead to farming.

Their youngest son, Ockert Jakobus, was born on October 7, 1869. The two brothers, Arie and Ockert, were born 11 years apart.


Settling at Rietfontein Farm

Between 1870 and 1880, the Scheurkogel family settled on Rietfontein Farm, about 5 km east of present-day Machadodorp in what is now Mpumalanga. At the time, the area was part of the Lydenburg district. Here, the family finally found stability and success in farming.








The First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881)

Arie, born in 1858, was of age to participate in the First Anglo-Boer War. He may have been involved in the Siege of Lydenburg, which lasted from January 6 to March 31, 1881. Lydenburg, founded in 1849, was a key town on the trade route to Delagoa Bay (now Maputo Bay).

When the British 94th Regiment left Lydenburg for Pretoria, a small detachment of 50 men under Lieutenant Long remained behind. As tensions rose, townspeople requested to form a defense force, but Long refused. He fortified Fort Mary, a makeshift stronghold of thatched huts and stone walls, and held out against Boer forces for three months.

Despite being outnumbered and under constant fire, the garrison resisted surrender. Notable moments included:

- The fort being set on fire and quickly extinguished.
- Water supplies being cut off and later restored.
- Heroic actions by Warrant Officer Parsons, who threw grenades into Boer positions.
- The bravery of Mrs. Long, the only woman in the fort, who cared for the wounded.

Peace was declared on March 30, 1881. The Boers withdrew, and the British soldiers, though initially unruly, were later commended. Lieutenant Long resigned but was praised for his leadership and the garrison’s endurance.


Legacy

The Scheurkogel family’s journey—from Dutch immigrants to South African farmers and soldiers—reflects the transformative history of the region. Their story continues in the next chapter, where we follow the formation of the Carolina Commando and their role in the Second Anglo-Boer War and most notably at the Battle of Spioenkop.

Origins and Early Structure

The Carolina Commando was formed in the eastern Transvaal district of Carolina in 1894—previously part of the Lydenburg Commando—, a rugged and remote region with a strong sense of independence and local identity. By the late 1890s, the Commando had been organized into three wards (wyke), each led by a veldkornet. In 1899, H.F. Prinsloo was elected as Kommandant, replacing David Joubert, who had chosen to remain in the Volksraad.

In 1899 the number of potential fighters is illustrated in the following breakdown:



Total potential fighters: 427

From this data, it becomes evident that the maximum theoretical strength of the Carolina Commando could have been around 506 men, assuming every eligible male was available for service. However, after accounting for the elderly, the infirm, and others unable to serve for various reasons, the actual number of men available for active duty likely never exceeded 400.

For reference following the war a total of 198 medals were awarded to the men of the Carolina Commando.

Thus, the Carolina Commando was one of the smaller units among the Boer fighting forces composed of farmers, tradesmen, and their sons—many of whom had grown up in the shadow of the First Anglo-Boer War and were now ready to defend their republic once again.

The Prinsloos and the Scheurkogels

Among the families in the Commando related to this story were the Prinsloos and the Scheurkogels:

Kommandant H.F. Prinsloo was a respected leader known for his courage and calm under fire. His brothers, Bill and Chris Prinsloo, served under him.

Arie Abraham and Ockert Jakobus Scheurkogel, sons of Dutch immigrant Abraham Scheurkogel, were raised on Rietfontein Farm near Machadodorp following their earlier nomadic upbringing. Arie may have served in the First Anglo-Boer War during the Siege of Lydenburg. Both brothers joined the Carolina Commando and fought at Spioenkop under their brother-in-law A.J. Viljoen in Ward III.

Their brother-in-law, Veldkornet A.J. Viljoen, was married to their sister and was the veldkornet of Ward III. He would be wounded at both Ladysmith and Spioenkop.

Disclaimer: The following text is a translation of the thesis by F. J. Grobler, originally written in April 1960. Please note that this translation has not undergone formal quality checks or verification and may contain errors. If you notice any inaccuracies, kindly let me know so I can make the necessary corrections.

Assembly at Kwaggafontein (4 to 5 October 1899)

As tensions with Britain escalated, the Carolina Commando was officially mobilized.

On 4 October 1899, 350 men of the district assembled at Kwaggafontein Farm, just outside Carolina. This gathering marked the Commando’s formal entry into the Second Anglo-Boer War.

The men arrived on horseback, by wagon, and even on foot, bringing with them rifles, ammunition, and supplies.

Kommandant Prinsloo finalized the unit’s structure, and J.C. Fourie Jr. was appointed as his adjutant.
Veldkornet A.J. Viljoen led Ward III, which included the Scheurkogel brothers.

After the election of officers, attention turned to selecting corporals within the various Wards. The formation of these corporalships was largely organized by mutual agreement among the burgers. Companions grouped together based on practical arrangements for transport and support. For example, one man might provide a wagon, another a few oxen, and a third the necessary draught animals. Typically, each wagon served between five and ten men.

Some burghers brought their own tents, while others used hides for shelter. For those who lacked their own means of transport, wagons and oxen were made available to ensure everyone could travel.

Most burghers owned their own horse, saddle, and bridle. Wealthier individuals often had additional horses and even “agterryers” or rear riders. However, there were also poorer burghers who did not own horses. Where possible, the government provided mounts for them. Due to a shortage of horses, some men had to travel on foot and were assigned to wagons designated for their transport.

To ensure fairness, a committee of three non-officer burghers was elected to appraise the value of the wagons, oxen, and horses.

On 5 October 1899, at Kwaggafontein, Commandant Prinsloo gathered all the mounted burgers and rode out to meet the arriving General Schalk W. Burger. Upon reaching the designated meeting point, the officers arranged the burgers in two lines along either side of the road, each man standing proudly in front of his horse.

Commandant Prinsloo rode ahead to greet the General personally. Together, they proceeded between the rows of burghers, who erupted in enthusiastic cheers and cries of “Hurrah! Hurrah!” as the General passed by.

The General then delivered a brief but impactful speech—his reputation as a compelling speaker was well known, and his words clearly left an impression on those present.

After the address, the General and Commandant Prinsloo took the lead, riding at the front, while the burghers, still in formation, followed behind in an orderly procession.

Early Campaigns / Siege of Ladysmith / Prelude to the Battle of Platrand

From Kwaggafontein, the Commando moved east to the Swaziland border to guard against potential British incursions through Swazi territory.

Shortly thereafter, General Schalk W. Burger departed for Natal with a force of 250 men, consisting of 170 from Lydenburg and 80 Carolina burghers. The Carolina contingent was led by W.H. de Villiers of Ward II. Meanwhile, the Carolina men from Wards I and III remained behind.

In early December 1899, the Boer High Command was forced to redeploy all available forces to the Natal front to defend the extended Tugela River line against General Buller’s advancing British forces. At that time, approximately 550 men were stationed idly along the Swaziland frontier.

In December 1899 Commandant Prinsloo received orders to proceed to Natal; he was accompanied by Veldkornet’s A.J. Viljoen (Ward III), A.J. de Lange (Ward I), and the majority of the Carolina burghers, all of whom were directed to reinforce the Boer positions near the besieged town of Ladysmith.

At Ladysmith just south of Modderspruit, near the North-East station, lay General Joubert’s main camp. Positioned to the east of him were General Schalk W. Burger’s forces, consisting of Lydenburgers and Carolina Commandos.



During a war council meeting held on 3 January 1900, it was resolved to launch another offensive against Ladysmith. The main thrust of the attack was to be directed at Platrand, a strategically important ridge located two to three miles southwest of the town. It was believed that if this position could be captured, the British defenses would be significantly weakened and exposed, potentially forcing the surrender of the town’s garrison.

It was also agreed that a simultaneous attack needed to be made on the Town to prevent reinforcements from being sent to the Platrand; this task was handed to the Carolina Commando’s.

The assault was scheduled for the night of 5 to 6 January 1900, with all Boer commandos positioned around Ladysmith ordered to participate in the operation.

The Battle of Platrand (6 January 1900)

The Battle of Platrand, also known as the Battle of Wagon Hill, was one of the most intense engagements of the siege. On 6 January 1900, the Boers launched a coordinated assault on the British defensive positions on the Platrand ridge, just south of Ladysmith.

Preparations for the attack had to be carried out with utmost secrecy to ensure complete surprise for the British forces. On the night of 5 January 1900, under the cover of darkness, the Boer burghers stealthily advanced toward the Platrand.

By around 3 a.m. on the morning of 6 January, they reached the summit of the ridge and launched a sudden and intense assault. The British sentries were caught completely off guard. The surprise was total, and the Boers capitalized on this initial advantage, inflicting significant losses on the English.

Despite the ferocity of the attack, the British were well entrenched and managed to hold their positions. In some areas, the opposing forces were so close that they could have hurled stones at one another.

The Carolina Commando had been tasked with attacking the eastern approaches to Ladysmith to prevent British reinforcements from reaching Platrand.

On the night before the attack, the Carolina commando, under the command of Veldkornet A.J. Viljoen, approached Ladysmith from the northeast. They left their horses behind the nearest ridges and advanced on foot, taking up positions in ditches approximately 200 to 300 paces from the nearest houses. The British were entrenched on the outskirts of the town.

At dawn on 6 January, Viljoen’s men opened fire. However, they could not dislodge the British from their fortified positions without exposing themselves to heavy fire. It was never the intention of the Boer High Command for the Carolina burghers to storm the town. Their objective was to engage the British forces within Ladysmith and prevent them from sending reinforcements to the main battle at Platrand.

The skirmish continued throughout the day, undeterred even by a heavy afternoon rain shower. Later that afternoon, Viljoen and his men withdrew without suffering any casualties. A.J. Viljoen himself sustained a minor head wound, but it was not serious. The rest of the Carolina burghers emerged from the engagement unscathed.

Redeployment to Spioenkop (Prelude to Battle)

Following General Buller’s failed frontal assault at Colenso on 15 December 1899, his forces were steadily reinforced with fresh troops and artillery. By early January 1900, he had amassed over 30,000 soldiers south of the Tugela River.

Meanwhile, the Boer forces remained entrenched in their defensive positions, anticipating Buller’s next offensive. During this period of relative inactivity, many burghers requested leave to return home, which increasingly strained the ability of Boer officers to adequately man all defensive positions.

On 17 January 1900, the Commandant-General issued instructions to all magistrates to ensure that all burghers in their districts—whether on leave or at home—returned to their commandos without delay. Two days later, he reiterated earlier orders to all commandants and veldcornet’s, strictly prohibiting the granting of leave to burghers. He even went so far as to threaten the imposition of martial law on officers who failed to enforce these directives.

Meanwhile, General Louis Botha mobilized a force of 3,000 men positioned south of the Tugela River.

General Sir Redvers Buller shifted his focus westward, aiming to cross the Tugela River and relieve Ladysmith. The Boers, under General Louis Botha, anticipated this and began reinforcing their positions.

Movement to the Tugela Line

In the second week of January 1900, following the failed attack on Platrand; the Carolina Commando was ordered to move west to reinforce the Boer flank at Spioenkop arriving by mid-January 1900.
They were joined by a small contingent of Lydenburgers.

The small group of Carolina burghers who departed for Natal with General Schalk W. Burger had, up to this point, gained considerable experience in warfare. It was a preview and baptism of fire for the great events that were to follow.

Since they were so few, they could not play a leading role anywhere, but after the Battle of Platrand, the entire commando under Kommandant Prinsloo made its presence felt in an undeniable manner. Until this point, they had suffered no losses, but from here on, they would make sacrifices, which only inspired soldiers could offer, for the freedom of their country.

Positioning at Spioenkop

Commandant Prinsloo was tasked with defending the sector stretching from the neck between the Tweelingkoppe (Twin Peaks) to the smaller hill just to its left, approximately 300 Carolina burghers were responsible for defending their assigned positions in this sector.

This area fell under the broader command of General Burger. The main Boer laager was positioned a few miles to the rear, while a forward tented camp was established at the northern base of the hills, where General Burger was also stationed. The original Lydenburg camp had been left behind at Ladysmith, and only about 100 Lydenburgers remained with General Burger and the Carolina burghers.

Reinforcements were requested from the Vryheid Commando, and on 17 January, Commandant S. Grobler responded by dispatching burghers to support General Burger. The exact number of Vryheid burghers who arrived is unknown, but 70 of them were positioned on Spioenkop to serve as a guard against a potential British occupation of the summit.

Two wagons travelled daily between the rear and forward camps. It is likely that the hilltops to the right and rear of the main position were left undefended, as their steep slopes facing the Tugela River were considered too difficult for the British to scale.

On the right flank of General Botha, the Free Staters were positioned, and to their left, the various Transvaal commandos took up their positions. On the left flank, General Schalk Burger was in command, extending from Brakfontein all the way to Spioenkop.



It remains unclear who was responsible for defending the right-hand Twin Peak and the ridge extending from it toward Alwynkoppie. It is possible that the Carolina forces held this position, or perhaps the 100 Lydenburgers were stationed there, which is why I included it in their sector in the figure.

However, it is also quite likely that the hill and the adjacent ridge (Spioenkop) were left undefended. Their steep slopes on the Tugela side may have led the defenders to believe that an English assault from that direction was improbable.

On January 23, vkt. Steenkamp from Rustenburg arrived with 50 men as reinforcements for Gen. Burger. As we will see later, these 50 Rustenburgers played an important role in the battle on the hill the following day.

That same evening, a small group of Heidelbergers also arrived at Gen. Burger.

On the river side of the Carolina sector, at the foot of the hills, a series of trenches were dug by the Boers, as well as halfway up the crest. These trenches were completely exposed to the bombardment of the English cannons on Bosrand and had to be evacuated soon after.

The smaller hill to the left of the Twin Hills has a dip resembling a shallow neck, and here a Maxim gun and a Krupp cannon were positioned.

Estimated Number of Carolina Burghers at Spioenkop

The exact number of Carolina burghers present at Spioenkop remains uncertain.

According to a report by the Commandant-General on 14 January 1900, approximately 200 men from Carolina had already been dispatched from Ladysmith. A subsequent communication on 17 January indicated that additional Carolina burghers would be sent the following morning to reinforce those already present. Based on this, it is reasonable to estimate that around 300 Carolina burghers may have been positioned at Spioenkop.

The well-known photograph of the Carolina Commando, shown below in the sequence of images, was taken sometime between 14 and 24 January 1900 near the Carolina Commando tent camp.







Note: This period coincides with the Spioenkop Campaign, which began on 17 January 1900 and culminated in the Battle of Spioenkop. For a detailed account, refer to Rob Davidson’s excellent work, The Spioenkop Campaign.

It is plausible to assume that the photograph was taken prior to the commencement of the campaign on 17 January, as it seems unlikely that the burghers would have posed for a photograph while nearby ridges were under bombardment and infantry assault.

Therefore, it is assumed that the photograph depicts the initial group of 200 Carolina burghers, taken near their tent camp between 14 and 17 January 1900 before the main engagement began.

Carolina Commandos Prepare for Battle

Up to this point, the English had not yet attacked the Carolina sector, except for the bombardment of Gen. Burger’s positions from Bosrand. Since the English assault on the right half of the Boer line was intense, the Commandant-General ordered Gen. Burger on the 22nd to send reinforcements to Gen. Botha, as all the Carolina burghers were stationed there.

In response, Commandant Prinsloo was instructed to go with 60 men to assist wherever Gen. Botha required them. Their mobility enabled Gen. Botha to rapidly reposition them to threatened areas. Had his forces not been so manoeuvrable, he would have found it impossible to repel the attack from such an overwhelming force.

General Botha investigates Spioenkop

General Botha recognized that Spioenkop was the key position in his entire line, and on the 21st, he requested General Burger to inspect the hill with a view to placing a cannon there. Such a cannon would then be able to fire at the enemy attacking Groenkop from behind and also bombard their camp. If it were possible to place a cannon there, General Burger had to ensure that the Vryheid burghers constructed a sufficiently strong fortification so that a Krupp cannon could be positioned.

By the evening of January 23, Commandant Prinsloo, along with his adjutant J. C. Fourie, set out to inspect the hill to determine whether a cannon could be placed there to relieve pressure on the Boer positions at Groenkop. This may have been in execution of General Botha’s order from two days prior to General Burger. Here, they met Commandant Grobler from Vryheid. The Vryheid burghers were positioned on the southern part of the hill. The two commanders discussed the feasibility of placing a cannon there and decided that one should indeed be installed.

Commandant Prinsloo likely reported the same to General Burger. In any case, the cannon was never placed there. It might have been done the next day had the English not occupied the hill overnight.

In the following chapter, we will delve into a detailed account of the Carolina Commando’s involvement in the Battle of Spioenkop, examining their role and contributions during this pivotal engagement.

Disclaimer: The following text is a translation of the thesis by F. J. Grobler, originally written in April 1960. Please note that this translation has not undergone formal quality checks or verification and may contain errors. If you notice any inaccuracies, kindly let me know so I can make the necessary corrections.

Bombardment of the Carolina Positions

In preparation for their planned assault on General Burger’s positions on 24 January 1900, the British launched a heavy bombardment the day before, with some shells even landing among their own tents.

On the same day, General Burger requested Colonel Trichardt to immediately send him a French cannon and a large Maxim gun, as he had identified a suitable location for them. This position was also approved by Major Wolmarans, and they had already started constructing fortifications for it. Whether Trichardt ever sent the cannons is unknown. It is possible that he did, and that these were the cannons Commandant Prinsloo positioned the next morning before the battle.

English Capture Spioenkop

Just as General Botha recognized Spioenkop as the key position, so did the English. The hill dominated its surroundings, and its strategic location meant that if the English could capture it and position cannons there, they could put the Boers at Groenkop under crossfire, thereby allowing the English to break through to Ladysmith.

On January 23, they were busy with serious preparations to carry out the decision made the previous day to occupy Spioenkop. The hill is very steep on the river side and almost impossible to climb. However, it extends in a long ridge toward the southwest, which was the only route by which the English could ascend, though even this was very difficult.

During the night of January 23–24, over 1,700 English soldiers climbed up the ridge to the summit under the command of General-Major Woodgate. Their progress was slow—not only was the terrain steep, but it was also a very dark night with a light drizzle falling. Mist covered the summit and partway down the slope, making navigation difficult and increasing the risk of getting lost.

Commandant Grobler and his seventy men were unaware of the danger creeping upon them. The enemy approached so silently that they were not detected by the outer sentries until they were nearly upon them. The Boers had to rely entirely on their hearing, as the dense mist made it impossible to see even their own hands.

When they finally became aware of the enemy, they fired into the darkness without aiming. The English responded with several hundred rifles and then charged with fixed bayonets. Against this, the small group of burghers stood no chance—they fled in haste, some without trousers, others barefoot, leaving behind their bedding, goods and personal belongings. Between three and half-past four in the morning, the hill was captured by the English without any losses, while one Boer was killed.

When the English realized that the Boers had retreated, they raised three cheers, signaling to their comrades below the hill that their mission had been successful. The shouting of so many voices at that hour of the night must have sounded quite alarming to those who were awakened by it. Immediately, they got to work.

Boers Take Countermeasures

When the Vryheid burghers were driven off Spioenkop in the early morning hours of January 24, they fled in different directions—some reaching General Botha, while a small group ended up in General Burger’s tent encampment. They looked dishevelled, bareheaded, barefoot, and without their rifles. They brought the alarming news that the English had taken the hill.

However, the camp was already in turmoil, as the gunfire from the hill had awakened the burghers.

When the report reached General Burger, he and Commandant Prinsloo immediately conferred and devised plans for swift action. They decided to send a small group of men ahead to scout the position on the hill, while another detachment was to seize Alwynkoppie before the English could occupy it.



Commandant Prinsloo then sent Corporal Abraham Smit forward with approximately 25 men to either hold the position or at least determine the situation there.

Following this, Commandant Prinsloo dispatched his adjutant, J. C. Fourie, and vkt. Steenkamp with orders to saddle up and lead their men to occupy Alwynkoppie.

Meanwhile, Commandant Prinsloo rushed to General Botha to discuss the matter and receive further orders.

After a brief consultation, he rushed back and then, along with his adjutant and vkt. Steenkamp with his 50 men, hurried to the base of Alwynkoppie, where the Commandant explained where they should take position.

Before departing with vkt. Steenkamp, Commandant Prinsloo ordered that the cannons be moved to specific positions he had designated. Upon his return, he personally oversaw their placement. A Krupp cannon was positioned on a small plateau on the northwestern slope of the right-hand Twin Hill, and a Maxim gun was placed on the ridge between Alwynkop and the right-hand Twin Hill.

Once the cannons had been placed, Commandant Prinsloo returned to the tent camp, where General Burger had meanwhile assembled 35 to 40 men. Around half-past six, Commandant Prinsloo took command of these men and hurried to Spioenkop to join the 25 soldiers who had been sent ahead earlier that morning under Corporal Abraham Smit.

It would have been dangerous taking too many of these burghers with Commandant Prinsloo would have left the defense vulnerable in case of an English attack. Corporal J. R. Kritzinger was instructed to keep 15 to 20 men ready at the tent camp while Commandant Prinsloo advanced to assess the situation on the hill. However, they didn’t stay long, as Commandant Prinsloo soon called for them.

The three groups that had gone to Spioenkop and endured the day’s hardships likely numbered around 85 men in total.

The capture of the hill was taken very seriously by the Boer officers. By five o’clock in the morning, intelligence services were already aware of the situation, as indicated by the following telegram: 'Report received that the enemy has taken the Vryheid position. General Burger is moving all available burghers there.'

At half-past six that morning, General Burger telegraphed the news to the Commandant-General. The Commandant-General responded immediately: 'Was the hill not yet fortified? Can you not, with all your burghers and the officers from the other side, retake the hill by force? Everything must be done!'

At eight o’clock in the morning, General Burger sent an urgent appeal to the Commandant-General. He was already deeply pessimistic and no longer believed that the Boers would be able to retake the hill, even though the battle had either not yet begun or had just commenced, as according to his telegram, the hill was still covered in mist.

Commandant Prinsloo Heads to Spioenkop

After Commandant Prinsloo and his men left the tent camp, they moved along the base of the ridge as quickly as the numerous trenches allowed. In the ravine that runs between Spioenkop and Alwynkoppie, they left their horses behind and proceeded on foot to ascend Spioenkop. In this ravine, the horses were safe, as the enemy could neither see them nor fire upon them.

Commandant Prinsloo climbed the hill in a mostly straight path toward a noticeable indentation in the ridge. Here, it flattened slightly and was still shielded from the enemy’s fire. At this point, he was joined by the burghers under Corporal Abraham Smit, who had advanced ahead earlier in the morning.

The corporal’s unit, which had been sent up early that morning, had left their horses at the foot of the hill and ascended on foot. It was still dark and misty. When they reached the top, the mist began to clear slightly.

As the enemy spotted them, they released a few volleys at them. In response, Corporal Smit ordered his men to retreat to the position where Commandant Prinsloo had led them.

Commandant Prinsloo then addressed his burghers roughly as follows: 'Burghers, we are heading into the enemy’s midst, and not all of us will return. Do your duty and trust in the Lord.' With the words, 'Come, Burghers,' they climbed further up the hill and launched the attack. The assault must have begun between eight and half-past eight.

When Commandant Prinsloo and his men reached the summit, they were in close proximity to the English, and on the right flank, they were even intermixed with them. The hilltop was not entirely flat. To Prinsloo’s right, there was a small depression, bordered on both sides by granite rocks, most of which were not taller than knee height. To the left of the depression, the rocks were slightly larger. The center of the Commandant’s position and the left flank were almost bare, with only a few scattered rocks.

When ascending the steep northern slope of Spioenkop, the hill transitions into a gentle incline before leveling off toward what was once the English trench line. This forms a natural curve connecting the steep slope to the flat plateau. As a result, the burghers still not see the English trenches from their position unless they stood upright or crawled forward about fifteen paces to find cover behind the loose rocks. Many burghers were hit by stray bullets in the process.

On the right flank, the burghers quickly realized that there was little cover on their side of the depression, and they attempted to storm through it to reach the rocks on the opposite side. However, they had not seen the English positioned in the depression and behind the rocks beyond it, and they consequently rushed straight into them. Friend and foe became entangled, sometimes shooting at each other from opposite sides of the same rock.

This is how C.J. Davel and one of the enemy lay on opposite sides of the same rock without Davel seeing the Englishman. J.H. Kilian just in time saw the Englishman aiming at Davel and shot him dead.

The English had the advantage of completely surprising the burghers, unleashing a deadly volley on them, who were effectively without cover. Losses on this flank were heavy, and within a short time, several men were killed, including Willem (Bill) Prinsloo, the Commandant’s brother, Jacob Malan and Theunis Breytenbach.

Meanwhile, Christiaan Prinsloo, another brother of the Commandant, was shot in both his legs. H. J. G. Korf was shot in both arms—his right arm was hit first, after which he shifted his rifle to his left shoulder and continued fighting while resting it on a rock. Shortly after, he was shot in his other arm, rendering him helpless.

The Commandant saw from the central sector how the burghers were being cut down, and when he noticed that his brother Christiaan was wounded, he rushed in under a hail of bullets and carried him out without being hit. This was an act of true heroism, rarely matched on any battlefield. The burghers were resolute, throwing everything into the fight despite the devastating enemy fire that mowed them down.

Eventually, the remaining burghers on the right flank hesitated when the English launched a charge. They were forced to retreat under the deadly fire, as there was no cover to protect them. They ran back to the plateau where the attack had started earlier. Commandant Prinsloo saw what was happening and immediately ran to them, urging them to take shelter behind the few ridges the hill offered, restoring their morale, and leading them toward the left where the other burghers were already engaged with the enemy. This quickly put them back in the front line.

In the central sector, the fighting was also intense, and cover was limited to a few scattered rocks. In the first exchange of fire, A. MacCallum Jnr was wounded, while Tobie van Niekerk, Cornelis Potgieter, Louw van der Merwe, Cornelis Meyer were killed.

J.H. Kilian and Major C.J. Davel, who had come here from the right flank, were wounded here, as were field cornets A.J. Viljoen and A.J. de Lange. In addition, Johannes Pretorius, Nolan Harries, Paul Meyer, and Cornelis McCallum, Frans van Heerden, C. Breytenbach, Izaak Smit and Pincham.

On the left flank, there was better cover, and as a result, losses here were not as severe. De Koker was killed on this side. Throughout the day, more burghers shifted toward the left flank, and some even moved to Alwynkoppie, where vkt. Steenkamp and his 50 men formed the far-left flank. From this position, they unleashed devastating fire on the enemy’s exposed right flank, maintaining it throughout the long day with destructive consequences.

During the morning, vkt. Steenkamp’s burghers were reinforced by 50 Heidelbergers, who had arrived the previous evening as reinforcements for General Burger.

Shortly after Commandant Prinsloo arrived on the hill, he summoned the corporals under Corporal Kritzinger. As they climbed the hill, Commandant Prinsloo instructed them to crouch and informed them that the enemy was very close.

Commandant Prinsloo Calls for Reinforcements

Louis Bothma was Commandant Prinsloo’s heliographer. He had set up the heliograph to the left and lower down, just behind the firing line. Shortly after the mist cleared in the morning, Commandant Prinsloo signaled to General Botha that approximately 1,200 English soldiers were on the hill; Carolina held the strategic position but was too few in number to maintain it, as their losses were increasing every moment.

General Botha responded that he had already dispatched 400 men and that the Commandant must hold the hill at all costs.

The battle-hardened Carolina burghers had to hold the line alone against the English forces for nearly two hours during the attack. C. J. Davel and H. J. van Wyk confirmed that they had fought alone on the hill for about two hours before reinforcements arrived.

On January 30, 1900, Commandant Prinsloo confirmed this fact in a letter to his wife. Meanwhile, the English gunfire continued unabated, claiming one victim after another.

The first reinforcements to arrive on the hill were approximately 30 Pretoria burghers under Commandant D. Opperman. Commandant Prinsloo instructed them to reinforce the Carolina burghers on the right flank, while he personally led a small group of Pretoria burghers to the left flank. In this way, their combined courage was demonstrated on both sides.

Many of the other reinforcements that General Botha had sent never actually reached the hilltop, choosing instead to remain in relative safety of the hill.

English Under Crossfire

From early on, the English left flank and front were heavily bombarded by rifle fire from Groenkop and also from the hill on the northwest ridge of Spioenkop. The Boksburg burghers under vkt. Alberts had taken this hill and performed valuable work in driving the enemy from Carolina’s right flank. However, the Boksburg burghers suffered heavy losses, as this was the only position where the English artillery posed a real threat.

The result was that General Botha ordered the evacuation of the hill later that day.

Another commando that distinguished itself on the hill was the Pretoria Town Commando under vkt. Zeederberg, which suffered 10 casualties out of 35 men. The German Corps and a portion of the Krugersdorp Commando under vkt. Jan Kemp also distinguished themselves.

Soon, the two cannons and the Maxim gun from the direction of Groenkop wreaked havoc on the English troops atop the hill.

Boer Artillery

But what was the positioning of the Boer cannons? Approximately 4,800 paces north-northwest of Spioenkop, behind the Boer right flank, stood a Creusot cannon. At a distance of about 3,600 paces, in nearly the same direction as the Creusot, was a Krupp cannon. Additionally, there was a Maxim Nordenfelt (Pom-Pom), seemingly positioned near the Krupp, though its exact location is unclear.

To the east, the Free State’s Krupp cannon, which used smokeless powder, stood alongside the Maxim gun that Commandant Prinsloo had positioned that morning.

North-east of Spioenkop, on a flat hill, was a heavy Krupp cannon under Major Wolmarans—this was the artillery piece that achieved the most success.

Major Wolmarans was positioned much lower than Spioenkop and was guided solely by signals from the heliographer Louis Botham to General Botha.

The Boers were so close to the enemy that a shot fired too short would have struck them. Nonetheless, Wolmarans took the risk, and his first shots landed just ahead of the Boers. Guided by Botham, he continued firing into the English positions, where he kept his bombardment steady for the remainder of the day. The cannons positioned on the right flank were also successful, causing substantial damage to the English. However, it seems the artillery from the left flank was not as effective.

Initially, the Maxim gun functioned excellently, but shortly before ten in the morning, General Burger reported to the Commandant-General that it was out of order.

From around nine or half-past nine in the morning, the English on the hill were subjected to a devastating crossfire from cannons and rifles, making their position untenable. The Boers were largely positioned in trenches where the English could not reach them, except for the Carolina burghers early in the battle. The opposite was true for the English, whose trenches did not protect them against the Boers’ crossfire.

General Botha had pulled reinforcements from various commandos and sent them to the hill. However, it is doubtful that 400 burghers ever made it to the summit, as many remained sheltered at the base.

English Artillery

The English forces on the hill faced further difficulties as their artillery proved utterly ineffective. Warren refused to bombard the hill because he believed that the English controlled its entirety and therefore did not want to risk firing upon his own men. Instead, he attempted to target the Boer cannons but was unable to determine their exact locations. As a result, his artillery fire was ineffective throughout the day and a complete waste of ammunition.

The only success the English gunners achieved was when they shelled the Boksburg burghers on the small hill at the northwestern extension of Spioenkop. When Warren did eventually fire upon Spioenkop itself, his shells exploded among his own troops.

General-Major Woodgate Shot

Before nine o’clock in the morning, General-Major Woodgate was fatally wounded. This caused confusion among the English troops on the hill, as they no longer knew who was in command. In fact, for a considerable time, there was no one officially in command. It was only around noon that Colonel Thorneycroft was appointed as Woodgate’s successor, but he would not learn of this until later that evening.

English Right Flank Under Heavy Fire

The fire on the English right flank was so intense that repeated charges were attempted to drive out the Boers, but all ended in failure. At one point, Colonel Thorneycroft led a charge with 40 men in an attempt to regain control of the hill’s ridge.

The Boer fire was concentrated on them, and they were shot down just a few steps away. The few survivors crawled back. Reinforcements for the British kept arriving, and by one o'clock, 1,800 more troops had joined. Despite this, the British position remained critical. Most of the officers and many soldiers were either dead or wounded. The Boer gunfire only intensified instead of slowing down.

The only route for British reinforcements was also under Boer fire. By noon, the British front lines had been destroyed or forced to retreat, and the main trench had become the new front line. The trench began to fill with the dead and wounded. Some soldiers had lost all morale and refused to lift their heads. Others sought shelter behind the trench walls. There was no provision for water, and many soldiers were nearly dying of thirst. The Natal sun beat down mercilessly on these already severely tested men. Under such conditions, it’s understandable that the British firepower began to weaken.

On the British right flank, where the fighting had been fiercest and the officers were already dead, the soldiers raised white cloths around one o'clock as a sign of surrender.

The Boers immediately ceased their fire and emerged from their positions to disarm the British soldiers. Jan Cilliers even jumped into the British trench and asked who the officer was. There was none, and the only non-commissioned officer was disarmed by the soldiers themselves. The soldiers stood up from the trench and surrendered. Friend and foe were intermixed. When Colonel Thorneycroft realized what was happening, he ran forward and refused to acknowledge the surrender. At that moment, he received reinforcements, rushed back, and established a position behind a cluster of rocks in the middle of the hill, immediately reopening fire.

The Boers dropped to the ground and returned fire, while the soldiers who had surrendered ran down the hill through the Boer lines. Some of them, as well as some Boers, were shot or wounded by the English, though no Carolina burgher was hit in this episode.

During this event, 178 English soldiers surrendered. Later that day, some soldiers raised white flags again, but the burghers ignored them.

Late in the afternoon, Commandant Prinsloo ordered fire to be concentrated on the most dangerous points and sent his adjutant and J. Brits to retrieve the body of his brother, Bill, who had fallen earlier that morning.

After this, the firing continued relentlessly until dark. The English continued bringing in reinforcements.

By the end of the day, a total of 4,500 English troops had occupied the hill. Meanwhile, General Botha no longer had reinforcements to send.

Throughout the day, the wounded were carried down to a small spring at the base of the hill, where they were treated as best as possible under the circumstances. It is difficult to explain why an ambulance was not available. Louis Bothma, the heliographer, stated that early in the morning, on Commandant Prinsloo’s orders, he had signaled for an ambulance, but it never arrived. Later, after sunset, Commandant Prinsloo sent him to go and search for one.

Attack on the Twin Peaks

At two o’clock in the afternoon on January 24, a battalion of soldiers under the command of Colonel R. Buchanan-Riddell crossed the Tugela River to capture the Twin Hills and thereby eliminate the crossfire on Spioenkop. This sector was defended by the Carolina burghers and a group of Lydenburgers under General Schalk Burger. Their numbers were severely depleted since Commandant Prinsloo, along with part of the Carolina burghers, was engaged in battle on the summit of Spioenkop.

The Boers subjected Buchanan-Riddell’s soldiers to heavy fire, but the uneven terrain over which the English advanced and the steepness of the hills provided a fair amount of cover for the attackers. Additionally, the assault was supported by heavy bombardment from the naval cannons on Bosrand.

General Burger reported to General Botha that he was being attacked by a strong force and requested assistance.

At half-past four in the afternoon, General Botha received word that the English were heavily threatening the Twin Peaks and that urgent reinforcements were needed. However, General Botha only had twelve men at his disposal, consisting of adjutants, the commander of the reconnaissance corps, messengers, and his assistant secretary.

Of these, he immediately sent ten men to assist, while the remaining two were dispatched to summon the Utrecht Commando to reinforce the Twin Hills and instruct the Free Staters to take over the Utrecht sector.

This meager support that General Botha could provide was, unfortunately, insufficient to save the hills, and by five-fifteen in the afternoon, both hills had fallen into English hands. Nevertheless, the Carolina burghers and the Lydenburgers put up a costly resistance.

The English losses here amounted to 27 killed and an unknown number wounded, aside from those who were hit before they even began ascending the hills.

General Burger and his burghers fled, abandoning their camp. The capture of the Twin Peaks was a significant loss for the Boers. The crossfire on Spioenkop was greatly reduced, and the English were now positioned behind the Boer fighters on Spioenkop.

The breakthrough to Ladysmith, for which General Buller had already sacrificed many lives, was now effectively an accomplished fact. However, General Buller never realized this and, under pressure from his superiors, the conquerors of the Twin Hills were ordered to withdraw across the Tugela River after dark. By midnight, they had crossed the river once more.

The Night After the Battle of Spioenkop

Let us return to Spioenkop and examine what transpired there that evening. When the fighting ceased after nightfall, Thorneycroft decided to withdraw his forces from the hill. His troops were utterly exhausted and nearly dying of thirst. The Boer forces were also so fatigued from the relentless combat and demoralized by the capture of the Twin Peaks behind them that they left the hill in small groups.

The news of General Burger’s retreat toward Ladysmith caused confusion. The burghers were convinced that the English breakthrough to Ladysmith had been completed. Late that evening, General Botha wrote a letter to General Burger, urging him to rally his spirits and not lose hope.

Around midnight, a messenger returned, accompanied by Commandant Prinsloo, bringing the news that General Burger had fled and had abandoned his two cannons and ammunition at the lower part of the battlefield.

After dark, all the Carolina burghers left the hill. Commandant Prinsloo apparently went to see his wounded brother Christiaan in the field hospital. The commando had scattered; most had returned to their tents, where they succumbed to exhaustion and fell asleep. Others fled with General Burger, while some were preparing to escape.

During the night, Commandant Prinsloo returned on horseback and found his camp in disorder, on the verge of fleeing. He addressed the burghers and urged them to retake their posts, upon which some of them returned to their original Carolina positions. Others, exhausted, slept through it all and were unaware of what had transpired.

What happened on Spioenkop that night? Were there still Boers standing guard? The testimonies on this matter are highly contradictory. Major C. J. Davel, H. J. van Vyk, and J. H. Rust claimed that they were part of the guard. However, it is possible that they confused the Carolina sector with Spioenkop, as Commandant Prinsloo had indeed sent guards to the Carolina sector late at night.

Deneys Reitz asserted that Commandant Opperman and 20 men were the last to leave the hill after ten o’clock. Naudé, on the other hand, claimed that no Boers remained on the hill. Kemp stated that he was sent with 60 men by General Botha that evening to assist on the hill. By dusk, everyone was said to have left the hill except for Commandant Alberts and 15 Boksburgers. Furthermore, Kemp reported that the firing had ceased around nine o’clock in the evening and that he himself had stayed there until nearly daybreak.

Amery later claimed that the Boers were completely demoralized and in full retreat, with no one remaining on the hill.

From all this testimony, it is clear that while individuals like vkt Jan Kemp may have been present on the hill, there was no organized military operation. The commanding officers had all left the hill, assuming that the enemy had retained control of the battlefield. General Burger, in whose sector Spioenkop was technically located, had completely fled, which was likely the main reason no organized guard was posted for the night.

The Following Morning on Spioenkop

Early the next morning, Commandant Prinsloo and a few men returned to the hill to witness the scene of devastation. Before long, many others would also ascend the hill to confirm the incredible truth—that the enemy had retreated.

Behind the English trenches, the sight was horrifying. The trenches were filled with corpses, stacked on top of one another, up to three deep. Bodies were mangled beyond recognition due to the devastating bombardment by the Boer artillery the previous day. Severed limbs lay scattered around. It was a gruesome scene of death and destruction.

The wounded soldiers left behind on the hill during the night had to wait in their misery for the dawn of the new day to receive medical care.

Weapons and ammunition were scattered across the hill. General Botha instructed some burghers to collect them, resulting in 40 crates of ammunition and a substantial number of rifles falling into Boer hands.

Boer Losses

The Boers suffered significant losses, especially considering that they had no reserve units to fill the gaps. The total losses amounted to 58 killed and 140 wounded. The Carolina Commando contributed the most to these casualties. Cilliers stated that there were 55 dead and wounded, which seems to be roughly accurate and matches the number generally cited by the Carolina burghers. As far as could be traced, there were 14 confirmed fatalities and 43 wounded. These figures also include possible casualties from the Twin Peaks.

English Losses

The English forces sustained much heavier losses. Amery reported their casualties as 322 killed and 566 wounded, with nearly 300 prisoners of war, some of whom were also wounded. Maurice provided the following figures: 68 officers and 976 soldiers killed or wounded and missing from a total force of approximately 4,500 men.

In an interview with The Standard and Diggers' News, General Botha stated that he had instructed Commandant Pretorius of Heidelberg to count the enemy’s dead on the hill. He reported to the General that he had counted 650 corpses. Furthermore, General Botha declared that he had sent back 350 severely wounded enemy soldiers who had been left behind on the hill during the night.

Of course, this figure does not include those who were removed from the hill during the day or those who were only lightly wounded and managed to leave on their own. Additionally, 184 prisoners of war were captured.

The total losses, as reported by General Botha and Maurice, do not differ significantly, making it reasonable to estimate English fatalities at approximately 600, with an unknown number of wounded.

The role of the Carolina burghers in this battle is perhaps nowhere better described than by Amery: 'Where many on both sides showed conspicuous courage, the palm must go to the little band of Carolina men. Their losses, 55 out of a total of 88, or 62 percent, equal the best achievement of any corps on either side during the war, and the part they played that day was a splendid testimony alike to their valour and to the skill with which they had posted themselves.'

The day after the battle, Carolina buried its dead. The commando, as well as their families at home, were in mourning. Yet they could still hold their heads high, for never before had greater courage and self-sacrifice for their land and people been demonstrated. They were one of the smallest commandos in the Boer forces, but they performed great deeds that would be remembered as long as their nation’s history was recorded.

The burial was led by Rev. Erins van Ermelo at the Wagon encampment.

Despite efforts to locate the graves, their final resting place remain unknown.

The enemy, with its 30,000 men, was dealt a heavy blow by only 3,000 Boers. However, General Buller would not allow his army to remain idle and began rebuilding his force in preparation for another offensive. This was critical for British prestige and for the relief of General White and the besieged forces in Ladysmith. Over the next few weeks, Buller would focus all his attention on breaking through the Boer lines.

Legacy and Recognition

In recognition of their courage, the women of Carolina presented the Commando with a handmade Vierkleur flag and a letter of commendation. Kommandant Prinsloo raised the flag above his tent, and the Commando cheered with pride.