TOPIC:

Thank you for clarifying, Mark.

Source: A military history of Perthshire, 1899-1902

The war in the west was well waged by the two rival commanders, Kekewich and Delarey. Both Boer and British generals were born leaders. Both tempered daring with caution, both knew when to risk much and when to risk nothing. Colonel Kekewich commanded the unshaken confidence, the respectful affection, and the loyal devotion of all ranks of his force, not only because they saw him for what he was—the best type of English gentleman—but because they well knew that the greater the emergency, the greater would prove the resources of their leader’s generalship. Delarey was an enemy worthy of Kekewich: the Stonewall Jackson of the Boers—Puritan—born strategist—a chivalrous but uncompromising enemy—he inspired the respect of the British almost as much as the enthusiasm of the Dutch, and emerged from two and a half years of incessant warfare with the finest reputation of any of his countrymen.

The column commanded by Colonel R. G. Kekewich, composed of five companies of the Derbyshire Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Wylly (approximately 400 men), three guns of the 28th Battery Royal Artillery, one pom-pom of “ G” and eight squadrons of mounted men (about 560 in all), had been operating in the Magaliesberg district throughout the month of September 1901 . The mounted troops were composed of six squadrons of the 1st Scottish Horse under Major Duff (8th Hussars), and two squadrons of the 7th Imperial Yeomanry. Major Blair (King’s Own Scottish Borderers) was second-in-command of the 1st Scottish Horse, and the squadrons of that regiment were commanded as follows:—

A Squadron, Captain H. G. Field.
B Squadron, Captain J. P. Lambert.
C Squadron, Captain R. H. Dick-Cunyngham (21st Lancers).
D Squadron, Captain P. M. Rattray.
J Squadron, Captain P. N. Field.
K Squadron, Captain I. R. Mackenzie. 

Of these six Scottish Horse Squadrons, two (C and D, under Dick-Cunyngham and Rattray respectively), although they had landed at Durban in July, had practically never yet been under fire, inasmuch as throughout September Kekewich’s column had taken part in those “combined operations” and “closing- in movements” which for the most part characterised the 1901 period of the war. Stragglers from various commandos had been captured, but the column had for several weeks continuously trekked through the Magaliesberg country without any serious engagement.

On the 28th of September Kekewich was at Waterval, but left that spot at 5 A.M. on the 29th, arriving at noon on that day at the point where the road from Rustenberg to Zeerust crosses the drifts over the Selons River and joins the road from Waterval. The veld at this place is marked on the maps “Moedwil (639)" and the camp was pitched at mid-day at a point some 400 yards to the east of the drift over the river, and on slightly rising ground. The camp at Moedwil was set in an open space, roughly speaking, about 1400 or 1500 yards square, completely surrounded by bush of varying degrees of thickness, and beyond the bush bounded on north and west by the Selons River, which had here cut itself deep into the soft soil (see sketch). The camp faced west and its left rested on the Rustenburg-Zeerust main road. The mounted troops were on the right (the Yeomanry being on the extreme right), the guns were in the centre, and the Derbys on the left. Of the outposts the Derbys were responsible for the south-western, southern, and south-eastern aspects, while the mounted men took up a semicircular line covering western, north, and north-eastern sides, and joined hands with the infantry both at the drift over the river and on the road to Magato's Pass. The posts held by the mounted men were formed by one squadron of Yeomanry and C Squadron Scottish Horse, the latter being thrown out about six hundred yards to the right rear of the camp as a detached post:



A=Imperial Yeomanry.
B=Scottish Horse.
C=Artillery and Pom-pom.
D=Derbyshire Regiment.
E=Transport.
F=C Squadron, Scottish Horse.
G=Line of advance of Steinkamp and Osthinzen.
H = Line of advance of Van Tonder, Plessis, and Boshoff.
J = Line of advance of Fowrie and Coetzie.
K = Line of advance of Van Heerden and Kemp.
L=Direction of first Boer attack.
o = British picquets.
x = Positions the Boers intended to take up.
• = Those they actually took up.

The ground behind the camp was fairly level, but it fell gently away in front towards the Selons River, rising again beyond it, and the alternative of placing his outposts on the near or far side of the river-bed offered itself to the commander. Outposts placed beyond it would see more, but would have to be pushed far out, and would thus be much more exposed than if posted on the camp side; and again outposts on the right bank of the river would in places be somewhat too near the main body to give timely warning of attack. The latter alternative was the one chosen by Colonel Kekewich, but he gave orders that each picquet was to send out a patrol an hour before daylight, and that two special patrols, each a troop strong, were to move out in north-westerly and southwesterly directions respectively, at 4 A.M. One Derby picquet was to hold the main drift over the Selons River, and another was posted on the further bank.

At 7 P.M. on the 29th the supply column with refugees and prisoners, under an escort of one company of the Derbys, J Squadron Scottish Horse [Less Captain P. N. Field, who took over command of A squadron] and a half squadron of Yeomanry left the column for Naaupoort to “fill up" and the force in camp that evening resolved itself into four companies of the Derbys and one maxim, six and a half squadrons of mounted men, three guns of the 28th Battery and one pom-pom; in all, about 900 men and 800 rifles.

The night passed quietly, and at 4.15 A.M., while still quite dark, a patrol moved out from the Devon Yeomanry picquet, on the extreme left of the line held by the mounted troops. Suddenly at about 4.30 some rifle shots were heard coming from the north-west; the patrol had sighted Boers in the river-bed, had immediately opened fire in order to arouse the camp, and had then retired on the picquet, one man being taken prisoner. The first shots were followed by a loud outburst of fire from the same direction, a general alarm was given, and Colonel Kekewich turned out immediately. His orders were immediate and simple, and from first to last, according to the testimony of many who saw him, he was blessed with a complete coolness and decision which were in themselves the ingredients of victory. The situation which he now had to face was actually as follows :—

Delarey, foremost and astutest of the leaders of the Dutch, had effected a sudden concentration of the western commandos, amounting to about 1100 men. A force under Kemp and Van Heerden, working south, was to occupy higher ground some 5000 yards to the east of the camp, and there to join hands with Steinkamp and Osthuisen pushing round by the north, while the main body under Delarey himself, with Fourie, Coetze, Van Tonder, Plessis, and Boshoff, was to drive home an attack through the river-bed on to the front of the camp, and force the British to retire into the arms of Kemp. Delarey purposed to repeat the tactics of Komspruit, and the deep scrubby valley which like a python enveloped two sides of the slope on which Kekewich’s camp stood, lent itself to his plan. Collecting some 900 men in the river-bed, he pushed them up into the scrub which everywhere fringed the right bank, and only waited for daylight to come to open a murderous fire.

The first brunt of the attack now fell on the unfortunate picquets, and especially on those of the mounted men who were responsible for the north-western and western sides of the camp; these men at once found themselves enfiladed and all but engulfed in the firing line of the Boers. Point-blank fire was brought to bear on them from both flanks, and two of the Yeomanry picquets were in a few minutes all but annihilated. The enemy also pushed up the river and overwhelmed the Derby picquet at the main drift—every man but one being either killed or wounded.

The alarm having been given, the officers hastily collected their men and led them forward to the nearest spot, clear of the horse lines and tents, from which a field of fire could be obtained. By 4.45 A.M., and before darkness had fully given place to twilight, every unit had turned out of camp, with the exception of a small party of the Derbys, left behind to guard the ammunition.

The camp, however, which stood on the skyline of the rising ground, came under a heavy fire from west and north-west as the light increased, and many horses and men were hit. The fire was so hot that in a few minutes one of the field-guns was out of action—the detachment being all shot down—and the pom-pom is said to have jammed. Colonel Kekewich gave an order for some of the horses to be saddled up in order to be able to pursue the enemy later, but, to quote the words of one who took part in this attempt—“ It was almost hopeless. All the men who were worth their salt were already in the firing line ; moreover the horses were dropping like shelled peas. ... In one troop-line there stood thirteen horses ” (of the Scottish Horse). “ Of these, twelve were hit (eight, if I remember right, being killed), and the thirteenth was so panic-stricken that it was found impossible, even after the fight, to saddle him.” It was in several fruitless attempts to carry out this order that most of the casualties occurred among the officers and men of the Scottish Horse. Colonel Kekewich himself was hit twice (in the right shoulder and left side) but never discontinued directing operations.

The volume of fire directed on the tents and horses at this period of the fight far exceeded that which was turned upon the men in the firing line, for these were now lying down on the slope and were hardly visible; hence for the most part the Boer fire passed over their heads until broad daylight came, when the attacking force could better see where the defenders of the camp lay. On the other hand, when the full light of day came, our men could get a better view of the enemy, and so did more execution.

At about 5.15 a report was sent in to Colonel Kekewich to the effect that a large body of the enemy was working round from the north to the east or rear of the camp, and a strong body of the Derbyshire Regiment under Major C. N. Watts moved out eastwards to be ready for eventualities. Major Watts, however, found that this report was incorrect—the Boers apparently not being able to carry out this part of their original plan—and being joined by Captain Mackenzie with a few of the Scottish Horse, and by Major R. A. Browne of the Border Regiment (who with much foresight had collected all the servants, cooks, and orderlies in the camp), Major Watts followed the unbreakable rule of every successful soldier and “ marched to the sound of the firing.” Although he did not then recognise the fact, he thus eventually decided the day. Swinging his men round towards the north, he advanced with fixed bayonets against the enemy’s left, through the ground held by C Squadron, Scottish Horse. This squadron had repulsed two determined attacks of the enemy, but had not been strong enough to drive him back unaided; now, reinforced in this manner, it joined in an advance which was taken up all along the British line to north and northwest, and which at once became a most effective turning movement. The enemy's left, thus threatened, gave way, and this was the beginning of the end, for at 6 A.M. a general retirement of the Boers from the river-bed began. Picking up their horses, they galloped away towards the north and north-west, and only for a short distance did they come under the fire of our guns.

The last shot was fired at 6.15. The fight had been a costly one, some 25 per cent, of Kekewich’s column being killed or wounded—a fact which proves the intensity of the Boer rifle fire and the determination of the attack.

It is evident, however, that the patrols sent out before daylight precipitated matters and upset Delarey's plan. He had intended to delay his attack until Kemp and Steinkamp had worked round to the rear of the camp, and until day should be dawning, when—the camp being on the top of a slope against the skyline—few officers or men would ever have got out of it unhit. As it was, the attack took place before the Boer flanking parties had reached their destination; most of the British troops were in the firing line before dawn; and though, as has been seen, the casualties in camp became very heavy as the light increased, they were far less than would have been the case had the attack been launched twenty minutes later.

It is said that the quality most requisite to successful generalship consists in the faculty of acting normally in abnormal times of emergency. A quick decision and a prompt execution of the only possible course achieved at Moedwil an unqualified success for the defence, when the least vacillation or want of control would have caused an unmitigated disaster.

All the Scottish Horse did well that day, but a brief mention should be made of three Perthshire men who rendered especially good service-Major Duff, who by his able dispositions materially contributed to the victory; Captain “ Pete ” Rattray, who gallantly led out his untried squadron to where the fire was hottest; and Surgeon-Captain Kidd, who, though severely wounded early in the day, continued to attend to the wounded until 10 A.M., when he was obliged to give in through loss of blood. Two others should also be noted Lieutenant W. Jardine, who, in spite of having received two wounds, remained in command of his men, and Farrier-Sergeant Kirkpatrick, who pursued and killed Boshoff, the leader of the Boer scouts, who had got right into camp. Among those killed was an excellent non-commissioned officer, Scout-Sergeant William McGregor, from Weem.

The following tables show as nearly as can be ascertained the total casualties of the column, and the losses of the Scottish Horse in particular. It may also be mentioned that 327 horses and 185 mules were killed, and that 117 rounds of shrapnel, 800 rounds of maxim, and about 67,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition were expended.

CASUALTIES OF COLONEL KEKEWICH'S COLUMN AT MOEDWIL

Killed and died of wounds. Officers: 5, NCOs and men: 56. Total 61
Wounded. Officers: 21, NCOs and men: 110. Total 131
Grand total 192

CASUALTIES OF THE 1ST SCOTTISH HORSE AT MOEDWIL

Killed and died of wounds.

Captain H. A. F. Watson (Adjutant).
Lieutenants T. J. Irvine and H. N. C. Erskine-Flower.
17 NCOs and men.
Toral 20

Wounded.
Major C. E. Duff.
Major A. Blair, D.S.O.
Captains P. M. Rattray and P. N. Field.
Surgeon-Captain W. S. Kidd.
Lieutenants J. Stuart-Wortley, D. Rattray, W. N. Edwards, M. Prior, D.S.O., W. Loring, N. C. G. Cameron, and W. Jardine.
41 NCOs and men

Grand total 73

A very informative account of the action at Moedwil.
I note, in particular, the high ratio of killed in action to those men wounded. No doubt the casualties presented a much easier target against the skyline.
As inferred, it could have been disastrous had Kemp and Steinkamp reached their tactical positions as planned.

From Lord Kitchener's Mentions of October 8, 1901.
As noted earlier in this thread, Pte. W.Bees of the Derby's was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions during the defence of the camp.

Regards
IL.

A perspective of the actions from a Major of the New South Wales Imperial Bushmen responding to the Moedwil incident -



Major H. H. Browne, Third Imperial Bushman, under date Magaliesberg Valley, October 6, sends to the Sydney "Daily Telegraph" the following graphic account of a recent battle in that locality : —

The thrilling accounts of guns captured and squadrons taken prisoners, &c., during the past few days will have most unpleasantly impressed those nearly concerned that the South African difficulty is still unsolved, and that the recent comparative inactivity of the Boers was but the prelude to more vigorous and effective measures to harass the British columns. Lulled into fancied security, the British, though much reduced, have been searching the scrub, kloof, and donga of this valley, whence 200 to 300 prisoners have been taken, all of whom were armed. They had spent their leisure in sniping at passing columns. For the first time the searching process has been thorough, and the result somewhat a surprise. When a likely area is approached an extended line is formed, consisting of 200 to 300 men at about ten paces interval, thus covering up front of a couple of miles. The line advances for five or six miles, and soon discovers a skulking enemy. A sharp cry of "hands-up," an uneasy approach of a scowling enemy, appropriation of his rifle, and another sniper is booked for Ceylon.

For some days past the prisoners have freely stated that a concentration of commandos, aggregating from 1,000 to 1,200 men, was to take place in the valley to attack our camps. These statements were, of course, not believed. However, a brisk engagement at Elands River, followed next day by a blistering fire from an apparently harmless kopje, convinced our column at least that Boers were more numerous than supposed. Three days later, before daybreak, all were startled by the distant boom of heavy artillery. When the sun rose a helio message conveyed the unexpected intelligence that Colonel Kekewich's camp had been attacked near Moedwill. The result had been over 180 casualties on our side, and the death of over 200 horses and mules. The enemy was finally beaten off. But at what price? - two officers and over 30 men killed, 30 more were too badly hit to recover, 27 officers and over 100 men wounded. Colonel Kekewich himself received two bullets, one in the shoulder and one in the side, just under the heart, luckily not serious. He was shot within 50 yards of the guns, whither he dashed when the officer commanding fell with a bullet through the stomach (probably from the same rifle). One gun section was wiped out to a man. The pom-pom went out of action with a broken trigger after a couple of rounds, leaving only three 16-pounders and a Maxim gun in action.

As the men dashed from their tents on the first alarm they ran for a few yards, then rolled over like rabbits, some to die at once, and others to writhe and wriggle in agony till death gave a merciful release. Others, though severely hit, and unable to move, gave warning shouts to their comrades. The total force in camp consisted of about 700, including 100 infantry, three 15-pounders, a pom-pom, and a Maxim. The camp was well chosen on a level rise above, and about 150 yards from a bend of the Selous River. Here a trickling chain of pools, and on the Rustenburg road, seven miles from Magata Pass. The river forms a sort of quarter circle on the south-east and south-west fronts of the camp, Elands drift, where the road crosses, being about the centre. A rough crest is formed to the upper ridge by a scattered rocky outcrop, clustering thickly at the drift, some 20 feet above water level. These rocks gradually terminate on the west side, where a flat, with scattered scrub, forms a sort of lower level, and ends in a clear, gradual slope extending some 500 yards to camp. It was commanded by two timbered ridges, distant some 1,200 or 1,500 yards. These ridges extended towards the upper and lower bends of the river. The camp was defended on three sides by the usual posts of 12 men, while in the rocks at the drift was a post of 12 from the Derbyshire Infantry Regiment, and in a ruined house across the river some 600 yards away on the left front was a detached post of 23 men and an officer. Unfortunately these men had only one bandolier full of ammunition, about 60 rounds. They were afraid to use it all during the attack, for fear the Boers might rush their position.

The attacking force was estimated at from 800 to 1,000 men. The Boer plan was that two commandos were to occupy the timbered ridges in the rear of the camp, whilst the remainder stole silently up the river. The rear commandos were to open fire first, and when the attention and forces of the camp were concentrated in that direction, the others were to rush the posts from the river. This would give them command of the camp from the rocky crest, where they would have the best cover within 150 yards, whence a scathing fire would reach every moving object. Had this plan been adhered to, the camp must have fallen, and we should have lost stores, guns, and many more lives. But all their calculations were upset by the patrol, as they were out before the rear commandos were in position, and when they heard the cry, "Hands up!" they bravely opened fire. Three out of the four were at once shot down. The Boers, who were by this time distributed along the river, rushed at the posts at the drift and on the west side, shooting down 11 out of 12 at each post. All honour to such brave men, who died at the call of duty to save their comrades. They occupied the rocks, and a decimating fire was at once directed on the camp. Bullets tore through the tents and horse lines, and maddened and wounded the animals, causing a number to break loose. These stampeded along the road towards Magata Pass, followed by no less a wild rush of 70 to 80 terror-stricken native drivers. This was mistaken by the commandos, who were just then approaching the ridges, for an attacking party, and they at once dashed back towards the river. They did not discover their mistake till the camp was well alert, guns in action, and Boer fire at the rocks getting somewhat under control.

The men were still falling rapidly everywhere, the gallant officers going down one after another as they stepped forward to steady their troops and gradually extended the firing line. One party of the Derbyshire's made a dash at the rocks near the drift. It was a brave and resistless charge over a clean slope swept by the bullets of the boldest of the enemy, and many dropped before half the distance was traversed, the defiant yell being hushed to a hoarse gurgle. As the foremost dashed up to the rocks, the Boer heart failed, and they fled in panic. The camp was saved, and the Boers broke in all directions.

The attack began at 4.30 a.m., and in about an hour the Boers were scattered. The shelling continued for several hours longer at scattered parties still hovering in the neighbourhood. The boom of the guns was plainly heard by our column fully 20 miles away. We were soon marching at our best pace to assist in case the attack was renewed. All was quiet on our arrival, and the melancholy duty of tending the wounded and burying the gallant fellows who had fought so well was well forward.

Every doctor in the column was hit, though fortunately not severely. In some of the tents fully 60 bullet holes were visible, while the 9-pounder guns here were plentifully bespatted with bullet marks. Seven Boer bodies, all without boots, were found, including that desperate fighting commandant Boshoff. About eight wounded, also several prisoners, were taken. They admitted to over 40 additional casualties.

One of the prisoners was found with a white flag tied to his rifle, and when he was loading his magazine he hoisted the flag, dropping it again to continue his fire when loaded. He was tried by court-martial and shot. The prisoner for execution is placed in a chair with his back to the firing party, who, at a few paces distance, fire a volley. Afterwards a blanket, a needle, a service, and a grave terminate the episode. Another of the prisoners was identified as one who had shot the wounded of the same column when cut up at Vlakfontein. He was shot on arrival at Rustenburg. The camp was most bravely defended, and Colonel Kekewich received commendatory messages for self and forces from headquarters.


Major Henry Hamilton Browne of the 3rd NSW Imperial Bushmen continues to talk about his experiences whilst in the Western Transvaal  -

.....It was while operating among these hills that our column went to the assistance of General Kekewich, not in time to prevent the disastrous attack on the morning of September 30, but in time to prevent a second attack which, from what could be learned, had been premeditated. Moedwill is a farm eight or nine miles west of Magator Nek, where the wagon road from Rustenburg to Zeerust crosses the Magaliesberg range. The column was camped for the night some distance from the spruit upon a rising slope. From what one could learn on the spot, an attack was expected, and it does not seem at all probable that the camp was surprised. One of the garrison at Nieuwpoort Nek told the writer that a few days previously a Boer doctor who visited the hospital and said there would be another Vlakfontein shortly. The Vlakfontein graves, with their tragic memories, lie on the crown of a slope of the wind-swept veldt, not many miles away.

In the early morning the Boers, many of them barefooted, crept along the spruit, overpowered and silenced the outposts, and rushed the camp. The tents were riddled with bullets right down to the curtain, and many a man was wounded as he lay in his blankets. Only those who visited the spot after the fight can realise the horrors of that early morning attack. The roar of the artillery as soon as daylight broke, the crack of the rifles were carried through the hills to our own camp some miles away. Pools of blood, still fresh when we arrived on the scene, marked where our brave "Tommies" rushed down to the banks of the spruit to meet the shock of the attack. So close did the enemy come that the brave and during Commandant Boshof was shot down in our own horse lines in the act of loosening the lead ropes with a view to stampede the horses.

Then when it was all over - the burial of the dead. We, New South Wales bushmen and all, went to pay our silent tribute of respect and admiration to these brave dead, who sleep under the shadow of these Magaliesberg hills. We were not sorry to leave that camp, with its tragic memories, for the smell of dead horses and mules floated down to the spruit and percolated through the natural miasma of the spot, striking the fear of enteric into many a heart. Our courses then lay towards Klerksdorp and the 1,000 daring men under Kemp and Delarey dispersed. No efforts of ours could locate the detachments into which the united commandos had split up.


Trev

Picture courtesy of Noonan's

QSA (2) Transvaal, South Africa 1901 (35495 Tpr: A. McIntosh. Scottish Horse)

Alexander McIntosh, 1st Scottish Horse, died at Rustenburg on 4 October 1901, of a severe wound received at Moedwil on 30 September 1901. He was born at Montreal, Canada, and attested for the Scottish Horse at Durban, Natal, on 26 August 1901, aged 22, a tin smith by trade.