TOPIC:

Herbert John Edwards – Mentioned in Dispatches

Private, 1st Battalion, Devonshire Regiment

- Queens South Africa Medal (Elandslaagte/Defence of Ladysmith/Belfast) to 3910 PTE H. EDWARDS. DEVON: REGT

Herbert Edwards was born in the Parish of Withycombe Raleigh in Exmouth, Devon in 1874 the son of John Job Robinson Edwards, a Mariner, and his wife Anne. At the time of the 1881 England census, a 7 year old Herbert was at home, 19 Charles Street, along with his parents and younger siblings George (5), Maria (3) and Richard (1).

Ten years later, at the time of the 1891 England census, the family had moved one down to 18 Charles Street and Herbert, now 17, was a Groom/Domestic Servant. Brother George (15) was a Waiter. A swathe of new arrivals since the last census had ensured that the house was a bustling one with Maria (13) joined by the newcomers Ellen (9), Mary (7), Kate (6), Ethel (4) and Mabel (2).

It was little wonder then that, on 13 March 1894, in order to avoid the clamour at home, he attested for service with the Devonshire Regiment at Exmouth. Confirming that he was a Labourer by occupation he was 18 years and 4 months old and had never lived outside of his parental home. He was still a serving member of the Devon Artillery (W.D.R.A.) and was 5 feet 7 inches in height with a sallow complexion, hazel eyes and light brown hair. He weighed a slender 128 lbs and had a number of tattoos – tattoo marks on the back of his left forearm and hand and a tattoo spot on the front of his left forearm. He also sported a number of scars – three on his forehead, one on his left cheek and one under his left jaw. There was also a white scar on the side on the left side of his back.

Assigned no. 3910 and the rank of Private he commenced service with the Colours. First sent to India with his regiment where he participated in the Tirah Campaign, he was deployed to South Africa, garrisoned in Ladysmith, on 21 September 1899. The Devons had, along with a number of other regiments, been posted to South Africa in anticipation of war with the Transvaal and her ally, the Orange Free State. This eventuality came about on 11 October 1899 with the Boer Commandos invading Natal and the Cape Colony overnight.


Devons at Elandslaagte

The first action fought in the Natal theatre was that of Talana at Dundee. A pyrrhic victory for the British forces, the Devons were not involved. Their chance to encounter the Boers came a day later, on 21 October 1899, at Elandslaagte – a little-known and rather nondescript railway station between Dundee and Ladysmith. Accounts of the battle abound but, for the purposes of this article, I have decided on the version contained in the official history of the regiment – the Record of a Regiment of the Line by Colonel M. Jacson. His account read thus: -

“By next day (day after Talana) a detachment of Boers had reached the neighbourhood of Modder Station and had taken up a position near Elandslaagte. This detachment consisted of some 650 Boers, with two guns, under the leadership of General Koch, who was charged with the task of cutting off the retreat of the forces at Glencoe and Dundee, and who had been sent forward for that purpose. General Koch had at the same time practically joined hands with the Free State Boers, who were in the neighbourhood of Bester's Station on the Ladysmith-Harrismith line.

In order to reoccupy Elandslaagte and to secure General Yule's line of retreat, Sir George White ordered out a force consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, of which four companies of the Regiment formed a part, under the command of General French. These companies went out in the morning by train under Major Curry, and detrained near Modder Station.


Map of Elandslaagte showing dispositions of the various forces engaged

At 1 p.m. further reinforcements were sent out to General French, and the three remaining companies of the Regiment were ordered to proceed by train to Modder Station to join the wing under Major Curry. The seven companies were then under the command of Major Park.

The Boers occupied two cones of some low hills overlooking Elandslaagte railway station. General French's artillery came into action on some high ground 4400 yards distant from the Boer position, and between the two forces was an open undulating plain affording little or no cover, and across which the attack had to be delivered.

The Gordon Highlanders and Manchester were to attack round the Boers' left flank, whilst the Devons were to make a frontal attack. From the nature of the position which they had taken up, no commanding positions affording flanking fire and protection to their flanks were obtainable by the Boers. These were open and could be easily threatened by the cavalry and the mounted infantry. The Boers had two guns in position on one of the two cones, and with these guns they did good execution, knocking over a limber of one of French's batteries at the second shot, and practically before his guns came into action.

General French's force, now considerably augmented, marched off at 2.30 p.m. The 1st Devon Regiment was formed in company column at fifty paces as a reserve to the Manchester Regiment, After proceeding about a mile heavy firing was heard on the right front, direction was changed half- right, and the Regiment was then ordered to form for attack on the left of the Manchesters, and to take up a front of 500 yards. Three companies were placed in the firing line and supports under Major Park, and four companies in reserve under Major Curry. At about 3.15 p.m. the firing-line reached the top of a low hill, and came in sight of the enemy's position distant about 4400 yards. Here a halt of a quarter of an hour was made, and at 3.30 p.m. orders were received by the Regiment to make a frontal attack on the position, to advance to within effective rifle range, and to then hold on till a flank attack by the Manchesters and Gordons came in on the right. The ground between the Regiment and the position sloped slightly up to the foot of the low rocky hills, on which the enemy was posted. There was no cover of any kind, except a few ant-heaps, in the first half of the distance.

The firing-line advanced keeping intervals and covering a front of about 600 yards, the centre being directed on to a conical hill at the back of the enemy's camp. The reserve followed in column of companies, in single rank, at fifty paces distance between companies. The enemy's guns opened on the Regiment at once with shrapnel, but most of the shells went high, only one striking the reserve companies. A steady advance to about 1200 to 1300 yards from the position was made, when, the rifle fire becoming rather heavy, fire was opened by section volleys. The light was bad, and it was very difficult to see the enemy or estimate the distances. In a few minutes the supports reinforced, and the firing-line then pushed on to the foot of the slope, and established itself in a shallow ditch 800 to 900 yards from the position. Here it held on, firing sectional volleys, till the flank attack appeared on the hill, apparently about 500 yards from the position.

An advance by companies from the right was then ordered, and, the reserve reinforcing, a further 200 yards was gained. Some bugling and shouting was then heard on the hill. A rush to 350 yards was now made, and, after a short pause to allow the men to get breath, bayonets were fixed and the position charged, four companies assaulting the detached hill on the left, the remaining three companies assaulting the hill on which the enemy's guns were. F and G Companies were the first to reach and take possession of the guns, the Gordon Highlanders coming up on the right shortly afterwards. The companies then moved on down the reverse slope and opened fire on the retiring enemy. On the detached hill only five of the enemy were found alive, and they showed a white flag as the hill was charged.

The Regiment was then re-formed, and held the detached hill during the night. During the three hours it was under fire, the battalion kept line and intervals carefully throughout, and adjusted sights and fired as steadily as if on parade. It is to the perfect steadiness of the men and the absence of all crowding that the very small losses from the enemy's fire, which at all times was heavy, can be attributed.”


Map showing dispositions

Maurice in his official History of the War was more descriptive of the events as they unfolded: -

“At 4.30 p.m. the infantry rose and moved forward. On the left the Devonshire, with three companies covering some 600 yards in front, and four companies in reserve, in column, with 50 paces distance between the single ranks, steered upon the tall cone which marked the right-centre of the Boers. Their march led them at first downhill into the broad bowl which lay below the foot of the kopjes, a hollow as smooth as a meadow but for the infrequent ant-hills. Shrapnel began from the first to burst over the battalion, but the soldiers pressed steadily onward until, at a point some 1,200 yards from the enemy, severe rifle-fire began to play upon them, and they were halted to reply to it. Their section volleys soon beat heavily about the Boer right, and pinned the burghers to their sangars. A little later, the Devonshire firing line, now stiffened by the supports, advanced again down the bullet-swept slope and gained a shallow donga about 850 yards from the crest. Here Major C. W. Park disposed his battalion for a musketry fight. He had carried out the first part of his orders, and it was necessary now to await the development of the attack in progress against the other flank. With some loss, therefore, the Devonshire lay within close range of the hostile lines. So briskly, however, did they engage them, that the attention of a great part of the Boer force was drawn to that direction, and for a time the simultaneous movement against the other flank proceeded almost unnoticed.

About 5.30 p.m. the line of battle had arrived at the foot of the kopjes; then, swinging slightly towards the left, so as to envelop still more the flank of the enemy above, all supports and reserves being now absorbed, it began to make head upwards, still by short rushes. It was now nearly dark; rain burst down on them in a torrent: the men, breathless from their eager pace, began to slacken somewhat in their difficult progress up the hill-sides. At this moment Colonel Hamilton, who had previously ridden to where the Devonshire still held fast the Boer right with their volleys, hurried back to the main attack. He at once ordered the "charge" to be sounded, and running to the front, himself led the last onset. The Devonshire simultaneously leaped from the donga where they had lain more than an hour, and, advancing by companies from the right, reached the base of the final kopje. For an instant they halted to gain breath and fix bayonets, then, coming to the charge, assaulted the portion before them, and carried it without a check, four companies swinging to the left against the northernmost kopje, and three moving straight upon the main hill whereon stood the enemy's artillery. Here, as occurred all along the Boer line, though many fled at the sound of the charge, many stood and continued shooting at the troops until the latter were within twenty yards of them. Below the main crest a bitter contest was also maintained, for as at Talana, many Boers, seeing the soldiers determined to win the summit, pressed forward to oppose them, and lay firing behind the rocks until their assailants were almost upon them. Some acting thus were made prisoners; some escaped to the rear at the last moment; many were shot down as they ran. The assault poured on unchecked, the two guns falling to the converging Devonshire. At 5.55 p.m. the infantry held all the upper part of the hill.”

As can be seen from the above, the Devons bayonet charge played a crucial role in the British success that day. Forced by circumstance to spend a cold and wet night on the battlefield, the Devons returned to Ladysmith the next morning.

It wasn’t long before they were back in action – Jacson’s History once more: -

“The Free State Army had by now come across to the east, and were in the neighbourhood of Modder Station, and on October 24th a column was again ordered out with the object of assisting General Yule's force in from Dundee. This column consisted of the 5th Lancers, 19th Hussars, Natal Carbineers, Border Mounted Rifles, Imperial Light Horse, Devons, Liverpools, Gloucesters, 60th Rifles, and twenty guns, in all about 5500 men. The enemy was found posted on Tinta Inyoni Mountain, on the summit of which they brought a gun into action and fired on to the head of Sir G. White's force, which was in column of route on the road, but without doing any damage. The action began at 8.30 a.m.

At the commencement of the action the battalion was in reserve, and was ordered to extend and lie down at the foot of the first slope facing the enemy's position, and some 300 yards north-west of the railway line, sending scouts to the crest of the ridge to watch the front. Four companies were shortly afterwards ordered to advance in attack formation, forming their own supports, and to place themselves on the left of the Gloucester Regiment, which was in front of the Regiment at the time. The Regiment was then on the extreme left of the firing-line. The four companies of the reserve worked round under cover to a small nullah about 300 yards on the left and then advanced up it. The firing- line advanced, under slight rifle fire, across a rocky plateau till they gained a small ridge overlooking the front, and opened fire by section volleys on to a ridge about 800 yards in front, from which a rather heavy fire was coming.

The Maxim gun under Lieutenant Price- Dent came into action in rear of the left of the line and fired at the enemy to the left front. The enemy's fire from this ridge was soon silenced, and from that time the only objective the line had was a few scattered Boers and their horses on the rear slope of the high hill to the left front, some 2000 yards distant. The reserve was deployed into two lines of double companies on and below a small ridge of rocks some 250 yards in rear of the firing-line. At about 2 p.m. the retirement commenced, and the battalion gradually followed the Liverpool Regiment and became rearguard. Ladysmith was reached about 3.30 p.m., after a sixteen-mile march in torrents of rain.”

The Battle of Ladysmith or Nicholson’s Nek aka the battle of Farquhar's Farm was fought on October 30th, 1899. The whole army was ordered out at 3 a.m. The battalion formed part of the reserve brigade under Colonel Ian Hamilton and did not play a prominent role in what turned out to be a disastrous day for the garrison.

By the 3rd November the Boers had encircled Ladysmith, effectively besieging the town. The Devons were ordered to take up the two posts of Cemetery Hill and Helpmekaar Hill. These were the most eastern kopjes of the defences. They skirted the Helpmekaar road and were immediately under Bulwana and Gun Hill. These were distant only some five thousand yards, and dominated by Devon Post. The battalion was distributed as follows: three companies on Helpmakaar Hill, two companies on Cemetery Hill, with three companies in reserve near the road and river-bed immediately beneath Cemetery Hill. Devon Post received its first shells on the morning of the 3rd, These were aimed at the tents of the reserve companies, which were rather ostentatiously pitched on the plain by the river-bed under Cemetery Hill. The shells were fired from a high-velocity 3-inch gun on Bulwana. The tents were immediately moved closer under the hill, where they were out of sight from Bulwana. The Boer guns were then trained on to the working parties, and some fifty shells were burst in the works (just commenced and affording little cover) on Helpmakaar and Cemetery.

The Boers seemed content to play a waiting game, hoping that the lack of food and the rising death toll through malnourishment and disease would do their work for them. This approach didn’t sit well with the more assertive elements among them and, after a Krygsraad, it was decided to launch an all-out assault on the town in an effort to force its surrender. The Boer attack of January 6th on the positions round Ladysmith commenced on Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and the Boers were not finally repulsed till after dark on the evening of the same day. As the great attack has been so ably described by various authors, it will suffice here to give a rough outline of what took place on Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill prior to the companies of the Devon Regiment reaching the latter place.


The Devons clearing Wagon Hill with a bayonet charge

The Boers attacked Wagon Hill at about 2.45 a.m., and amidst a good deal of confusion on the top, where a 4,7 gun was in the act of being mounted, gained possession of the front crest. Their attempt to take Wagon Hill itself failed. Reinforcements consisting of two companies Gordon Highlanders and three squadrons of LL.H. were sent to assist the 60th Rifles, the men of the I.L.H., and the detachment of Sappers already engaged with the Boers.

An hour later the attack on Cassar's Camp developed. The Manchesters were prepared for them, and one company Gordon Highlanders was sent to reinforce. The Boers, unable to advance against the front crest of Caesar's Camp, attempted to turn the flank of the Manchesters along the northern slopes. This attempt was foiled by the advance of the one company Gordon Highlanders, assisted by the 53rd Battery which had come into action on the plain below. The Rifle Brigade reinforced Caesar's Camp at about 7 a.m., and two more companies of the Gordons were sent there at about 2 p.m. By 10 a.m. the Boers had been pushed back off Caesar's Camp, and Wagon Hill was reported nearly clear. Wagon Hill was further reinforced by the 18th Hussars at 10 a.m.

At 1 p.m. the Boers, who had always hung on to their crest line, again attempted to rush Wagon Hill point, and though they gained a temporary advantage failed to establish themselves. Sir George White ordered that the hill should be cleared of Boers at all costs before nightfall, and he sent the 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars to support the troops already at Wagon Hill, and at the same time three companies of the Devons were ordered to proceed there with all dispatch.

At 10 a.m. the three companies of the Devons, which were in camp, commanded respectively by Captain W. B. Lafone, Lieutenant Masterson with Lieutenant Walker, and Lieutenant Field, the whole commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Park, had been ordered to proceed to the camp near Iron Bridge vacated that morning by the Gordon Highlanders, to be ready as a reserve if wanted. At about 3.30 p.m. these three companies received orders to proceed at once to Wagon Hill to reinforce Colonel Ian Hamilton's command and to push on, as help was urgently required. The Adjutant, Captain H. S. L. Ravenshaw, was sent back to camp to order rations and water to be sent out. Wagon Hill was reached at 4.45 p.m., and it was then ascertained that the 5th Lancers and 19th Hussars had already been merged into the firing line, and that a party of forty or fifty Boers were still in possession of the hill some 100 yards in front of the ridge held by the Imperial Light Horse, and directly in front of where the three companies were then halted under cover, that these Boers had been holding on all day there and inflicting great loss, and that our troops had been unable to dislodge them. Colonel Park was asked if he could turn them out by rushing them with the bayonet. He answered, "We will try."

After the three companies had been formed up in column with bayonets fixed and magazines charged, Colonel Park gave the order to advance at fifty paces interval in quick time, and when the top of the ridge was reached to charge the position occupied by the Boers. The charge took place in a blinding hailstorm, a time well chosen, as the hail was beating into the faces of the Boers. The men, before reaching the place where they formed up for the charge, were wet through, and had put on their warm coats which they had carried strapped on to their belts.

When the storm was at its height, Colonel Park gave the order to charge. Lieutenant Field, who commanded the leading company, rushed forward up the slope, shouting, "Company, double charge!” He was immediately followed at a distance of about ten yards by Masterson's company, which was immediately followed by Lafone's. As they got to the top of the crest they came in view of the sangar of rocks held by the I.L.H. At the corner of this they had to change direction half right, and the moment they reached it came under fire from the Boers. There was necessarily some crowding at this corner, owing to the change of direction, and the fact that the companies in their eagerness had followed so soon the one behind the other. There was, however, no halting, no dwelling here. On they went to reach their goal, 130 yards away, over perfectly flat open ground, fired into at short range from right, left, and front. Three parts of the way across Park directed the rear company more to the right, the position the Boers occupied being in a semicircle.


Map showing where Devons were based in Ladysmith

The enemy held on, firing most heavily, until the charging lines were within fifteen yards of them, and then ran down the slope and disappeared behind a ridge of rocks some forty yards ahead, beyond which the ground was dead and fell steeply away to the front. Almost before the men could be secured in the position they had won, bullets began to come in quickly from the right and left, and the cover of the rocks had to be sought as several men were hit. A few of the Boers who had been dislodged also crept back to the low ridge of rocks in front and began firing, and it was at this time that Captain Lafone and Lieutenant Field were hit. Lieutenant Walker, Somerset Light Infantry, and about thirty -five men were hit during the charge. Colonel Park was then the only officer left, the three companies being commanded by non-commissioned officers.

The position won was held until the Boers retired under cover of darkness. The men were then placed in defensive positions, and picquets told off. The wounded were subsequently cared for and the dead left where they had fallen till daylight. Colonel Park described the fire of the Boers as like the crackle of a piece of gorse in a blazing fire. Half the survivors had their clothing shot through, and the majority of the killed were found to have been hit two or three times.

The strength of the force was 5 officers and 184 non-commissioned officers and men, of whom 3 officers and 14 men were killed and 1 officer and 34 men were wounded. Although the loss was great, viz. nearly one third of the total number, it is a matter of surprise that more were not hit during the run of 130 yards, exposed as they were for about three minutes to magazine fire at a point-blank range. It can be accounted for by the fact that the Boers crouching behind the rocks were rather below than above the level of the men, and their fire being consequently directed upwards, the bullets passed high and over the heads of the charging companies. This would explain why the majority of the killed were shot through the head.

Whilst the three companies were performing such gallant deeds on the southern defences, the three companies under Major Curry were holding their own on the northwest defences at Observation Hill. The Boers attacked this post heavily in the morning, and were supported by six field-guns, which were supposed to have been the Colenso guns of General Buller's army, shrapnel being continually burst with excellent precision over the defences. The account of the fighting which took place is told in Major Curry's own words: —

“The battle of Ladysmith (Wagon Hill) commenced between 2 and 3 a.m. on Caesar's Camp and soon we were engaged all round. The three companies which had proceeded to Observation Hill originally had just been relieved by three fresh companies. At about 4 a.m. Lieutenant Emerson reported to me that there was a party of Boers to his front, that he had fired on them, and that they had retired. I thought it was the usual picquet and that they had gone right back (it was too dark to see much); but such was not the case, for they had concealed themselves in a fold in the ground about 300 yards to our front. Their strength must have been between seventy and eighty. The enemy brought fire to bear on us from a 40-pounder howitzer, a field-gun, and a Hotchkiss on Surprise Hill, and from one or two field-guns on the hill to our right over Hyde's Farm. They pounded away all the morning, and brought a continuous rifle fire on our position as well. At about 9.30 a.m. I heard a rattle of musketry from our centre work, and when I went up there I found that the enemy, who had concealed themselves in the fold in the ground in the early morning, had advanced right up the hill and had got within a few yards of our sangars before being seen. We killed nine and wounded twelve. They retired again to their cover, where they remained for the greater part of the day, slipping away by ones and twos back to their position. At about 4 p.m. a tremendous thunder and hail storm came on, which blotted out everything. The fire, which had ceased as the storm came on, was not renewed. Our loss was two killed by rifle fire, when the Boers made their attack. Our sangars were frequently breached by the 40-lb. shell during the day, but there was no loss from shell fire."

These three companies were relieved by the Leicesters the next evening.

Another (shortened) version – from the website of The Keep Military Museum (Devons & Dorsets) – read as follows: -

'January 6th was to become a famous day in the Battalion's history. On that day the Boers launched a determined attack on the two tactical vantage points at Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill, a flat-topped hill running east and west on the south side of the township.

The Boers had crept up at first light, reaching the edge of the crest. Heavy fighting ensued with losses on both sides. At 4 p.m. Lieutenant-Colonel Park, commanding the 1st Devons, received orders to take his three remaining companies to the assistance of Colonel Ian Hamilton who was struggling to hold his position on Wagon Hill. The Devons were on the move within 10 minutes and reached Wagon Hill in a thunder storm at around 5 p.m. Here they learnt that around 50 Boers were holding a small ridge about 100 yards directly in front of the British line. They were expert shots and were forcing Hamilton's men to remain under cover. Hamilton and Park agreed that the only way to dislodge them was by bayonet. "Can you do it?" Hamilton reputedly asked Park. "We will try" was the reply. The men of the 1st Battalion fixed their bayonets and charged, cheering and shouting.

The terrain was flat grassland with no cover. The Boers fired again and again, many Devons were hit but they were not deterred. When they reached within 15 yards of the Boers, the Boers turned and ran. However the battle was not over as the Battalion was exposed to cross fire on both sides.

By 5.40 p.m. the battle was still under way. Despite this and despite the torrential rain and hail the Devons hung on. Finally, when darkness fell, the Boers retreated. The Devons were victorious.”

Ladysmith was relieved on 1 March 1900 – 120 days after the siege commenced. The severely emaciated garrison needed time to recover and the Devons were only able to join Buller’s army as it marched north, expelling the Boers from Natal and venturing into the Transvaal, in early August where, later on that month, they were to fight in the last pitched battle of the war (the guerilla phase followed.)

This was the battle of Belfast or Dalmanutha (as favoured by the Boers.) Colonel Jacson takes up the account once more: -

“Briefly, the course of the two days' battle may be described as follows : —

While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the position north of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry division still further north to threaten the Boer line of retreat towards Pilgrim's Rest, and their right flank. Buller attacked the Boers' left with the intention of driving it in and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat. He on the first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the two forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and Dundonald's mounted brigade to watch the Boers' left, moved across their front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and made an attack at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight this was carried, and the Boers retired all along their line in the direction of Machadodorp.

It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the Regiment.

On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller's force was put in motion. The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about half a mile from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies under Captain Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their right flank, losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this ridge of high ground with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the Boers posted there off the hills. The advance guard companies then continued their march with orders to make Bergendal Farm their point, but not to go beyond it.

When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it was found that General Buller's main body had changed direction to the right and had gone east. On retracing their steps, the companies with great difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of Buller's force. Sir Redvers was now attacking the Boer left within a mile or two of his former camping ground. A message was then received stating that the Regiment was at that time a left flank guard to Buller's army, and that the former advance guard companies were to join the remainder of the Regiment.

The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were sangared on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in front of and below the high ridge over which his force had to advance. Buller made his dispositions behind this high ridge. The reverse slope was completely raked by the Boer fire, and no cover except that afforded by some ant hills was obtainable. The dropping bullets of the guns. These came under shell fire from the Boer guns and had some casualties, amongst whom was Colour-Sergeant Burchell, who was shot through the shoulder. Under General Buller's direct supervision one company was ordered forward. Immediately their four scouts showed over the crest line a storm of bullets met them, and they were all hit.

The four scouts were found dead on the second day afterwards by the Liverpool Mounted Infantry. Dusk found the companies posted as under:

Three companies extended on the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in support on the rear side of the hill. One company was extended on the ridge in the centre, whilst three companies were near the guns, three-quarters of a mile away on the right. One man was killed and one wounded just at dark by unaimed fire and by the last shots fired. The companies on the ridge retired to the crest of the hill after dark and took up an entrenched outpost line for the night. Rations were then issued for the following day.

The casualties of the battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2 prisoners. The next day the Devons were held in support and took almost no part in the decisive action which routed the Boer force. Before the end of the war the 1st Devons were to know the Belfast-Dulstroom-Lydenburg district well, as they remained in it till the spring of 1902. During a great part of 1901 the battalion was in columns under Major General W Kitchener and other commanders, which operated both south and north of the Delagoa Railway, and did very excellent work.

Edwards would not have been party to any action in the last few months of the war. He was despatched to India, along with his regiment with effect from 19 January 1902 – not before he was Mentioned in Dispatches in Lord Roberts’ dispatch of September 10, 1901. Although not mentioned for a specific action, it can be assumed that he was brought to the attention of his superiors between the relief of Ladysmith and a time after Belfast battle.

Things were going awry for Edwards in India, his unblemished record was about to be besmirched. His service record relaying the news that, from 20 to 29 August 1902, he was “In confinement awaiting trial by District Court Martial for striking his superior officer being in the execution of his office.” Having been found guilty he was imprisoned for 28 days with Hard Labour – returning to duty 27th September.

After 4 years and 49 days in the Far East, Edwards returned to England on 9 March 1906. Four days later he was discharged on expiry of his terms of engagement, having completed 12 years of service. He was destined never to enjoy a life out of uniform, passing away in June that year. Today his mortal remains lie buried in the St. Margaret and St. Andrew Churchyard in Littleham, East Devon.

Acknowledgements:
- Ancestry for medal rolls, census and death data
- FMP for Edwards Service Record
- Newspaper reports acknowledged in the body of this work
- Maurice, History of the South African War - Elandslaagte
- Jacson - Record of a Regiment of the Line