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Hendrik Roets - a POW at the battle of Paardeberg 2 years 5 months ago #79227

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Hendrik Adriaan Roets

Burgher, Generaal P. Cronje (Potchefstroom Commando

- Anglo Boere Oorlog Medal to BURG. H.A. ROETS

Hendrik Roets was born in Potchefstroom in the Western Transvaal on 24 May 1870. At the age of 22, on 1 March 1892, he wed 20 year old Elizabeth Johanna Christina Pretorius, with the consent of her parents. It was noted that Hendrik hailed from the Rietfontein district of Potchefstroom, whilst his bride was from the Bronkhorstfontein area on the outskirts of the same town. Bronkhorstfontein was to feature large in the Roets family’s future as it was on this farm that Hendrik earned his living.

A little over seven years later, the Anglo Boer War broke out on the world stage. This conflict, between the Dutch-speaking Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal on the one hand and the might of Imperial Britain on the other, commenced on 11 October 1899 but, for some weeks prior, word had gone out to the Commando structures in both Boer Republics to mobilise their members. As a resident of Potchefstroom and a Burgher on the voters roll of the Transvaal, Roets was one of those who would have saddled his horse, packed some food for the trip and, together with his Mauser rifle and ammunition (if he was one of those who had been encouraged to buy a Mauser from the Transvaal Government) and headed to the market square in town where the Commandos congregated before leaving for the front.

Under the command of that seasoned veteran, General Pieter Arnoldus Cronje, the Potchefstroom Commando was a sizable one with many Wards being represented in its ranks. Students of the Boer War are always at pains to be able to position a man at or near a particular action or battle and, in the case of Imperial and Colonial troops, this is an impossibility unless they were commended for some reason or another, wounded or Killed in Action. Those who follow the tracks of members of the Boer forces are more fortunate, if the combatant applied for the Anglo Boere Oorlog medal he was entitled to, he was required to list the actions in which he participated. This was then verified by his direct officer and, where possible, comrades who were at the same place at the same time.

In Roet’s case, he completed his Vorm B whilst his memory of events was still fresh. Approved on 21 July 1921, his medal was posted to his Kampstraat, Potchefstroom address, just down the road from where the infamous Robie Leibrandt of WWII fame lived. Among the battles he lists were the Siege of Mafeking, Modder River, Magersfontein and Paardeberg where, along with 4000 other Burghers, he was taken Prisoner of War on 27 February 1900, on the surrender of General Cronje.

In the early days of October, one of the largest forces the Boers were ever to put into the field, assembled at various camps on the border close to Mafeking. Numbering between 9000 and 11000, this force comprised the Marico, Lichtenburg, Wolmeranstad, Rustenburg and Potchefstroom Commandos. Shortly after war was declared this force crossed the border, cutting the line north and south of Mafeking, they proceeded to close access to the town, effectively laying siege to its inhabitants and the meagre number of Imperial troops stationed there under the command of Colonel Baden-Powell. Much has been written about the immense effort undertaken in defence of the town by these men and I do not propose to add to the story. Suffice it to say that, like the other two major sieges the Boers were committed to, not much was done in the way of full-frontal assaults with a view to taking the town by force. A watching brief by the surrounding Boers was more the order of the day and, it is felt in many quarters, that opportunities to affect the town’s surrender which presented themselves were largely ignored.

This had the effect of tying-up large numbers of Burghers whose fighting presence could have been put to much better use elsewhere. Eventually sanity, partially, prevailed and the numbers investing Mafeking were reduced and the men sent to theatres to continue the struggle elsewhere.

This was a necessary move as, with the influx of British troops entering South Africa, the Boers, who were never able to field more than 35 000 to 50 000 men, were starting to be hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned. Lord Methuen was making his way from the Cape to relieve Kimberley and it was to combat and retard his advance that Roets and many others under Cronje and De la Rey, were sent in the direction of Modder River where they prepared to resist the advance of Methuen’s force. Cronje, along with 1200 men from the Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp Commandos, had arrived on 25 November and there can be no doubt that this was when Roets entered the fray as well.

In preparation for the battle, De la Rey ordered his men to entrench in the plain, not on the hilltops where they were vulnerable to British artillery fire. They were instructed to dig trenches along the bank of the Modder River, at the Riet River junction, astride the wrecked railway bridge south of Modder River station.




On 28th November 1899 Methuen’s army marched at dawn. The British command discounted any Boer resistance south of Spytfontein a station twelve miles north of the Modder River crossing. The British high command also neglected to carry out any adequate reconnaissance to see where the Boers were and where the British might expect to meet resistance. Nevertheless Lord Methuen himself on 27th November rode up to inspect the Modder River Railway Bridge which the Boers had destroyed. He saw nothing of the Boers. A reconnaissance up to the Modder River would have revealed the extensive Boer positions to the British and enabled Methuen to attack with a proper plan, perhaps with a river crossing above or below the Boer positions, instead of blundering into them as he did.

The Boers destroyed the railway bridge and built trenches along the north bank from the area of the Rosmead hotels and bungalows to the railway line and then further east onto Twee Rivier. Some 8,000 Boers occupied four miles of entrenched positions on both sides of the river. On the south bank the Boers built a line of trenches in the wooded strip along the river bank. Half of the Boers were Free Staters on the right under Prinsloo, the other half Transvaalers under Cronje and De la Rey. The Boer artillery, commanded by the German Major Albrecht, comprised seven field guns and a heavy gun positioned some two miles in the rear.

De la Rey’s directions were that the British were to be permitted to approach within 400 yards of the Boer trench line before fire was opened on them, the idea being to spring an ambush.

Methuen’s force, numbering some 8000, marched out of Klokfontein at dawn on 28th November for the Modder River crossing, not expecting any serious Boer resistance until Spytfontein. The soldiers were seriously short of water and looked forward to reaching the river.




Information came in to Methuen as his men were under way that the Boers were in strength at the Modder River crossing. He considered that there was little he could do and his understanding was that the river was easily forded at a number of points. The British infantry deployed as they approached the river, the Guards Brigade on the right of the railway line and the 9th Brigade on the left. The Scots Guards took the right flank with the Grenadiers in the centre, 2nd Coldstream on the left next to the railway line and 1st Coldstream in support.

The river was about 300 yards wide where it became the Riet, above the bridge, and about 500 yards wide below the bridge. There were three usable fords over the river, one well to the right of the British line, one by the bridge and the third below the dam. There is no indication that the British discovered the whereabouts of any of these fords until after the battle. The first British troops to approach the Boer positions were the cavalry and mounted infantry on the right. They saw a body of Boers moving away and a Boer field gun opened fire on them.

The British infantry line advanced on the Boer positions, unaware of their presence. Instead of following Cronje’s instructions to let the British advance to within 400 yards the Free Staters opened fire at around 800 yards. The fire extended along the Boer line so that there was four miles of rifle fire blazing at the advancing British troops. The British infantry went to ground and began to return the fire. Although the trap had been sprung too early the British infantry were in a difficult situation, unable to withdraw or to advance, mostly in the open without cover in the blazing heat of the South African sun. Further east the newly arrived Klerksdorp and Potchefstroom commandos, under Andries Cronje, held the southern, and to some extent the northern, banks of the Riet up to the point where its sudden bend to the south completely covered that flank.

Methuen telegraphed to the 62nd Battery coming up from Belmont to press on with all dispatch. 2 companies of Royal Munster Fusiliers were ordered up from Belmont by train. The British batteries on the field worked forward and began a prolonged bombardment of the Boer positions, while the riflemen on both sides exchanged fire. The temperature rose to 110 degrees and the British troops lay in the open, few with any water. The movement and shell explosions disturbed innumerable ants nests, the ants adding to the discomfort of the soldiers lying among them.

At around noon the 62nd Battery arrived after a twenty-five mile march in which several horses died of exhaustion. The battery came into action on the left flank at a range of 1,500 yards. At Methuen’s request the battery moved up to 900 yards and resumed firing, incurring casualties. Once the Boer guns were silenced the battery withdrew out of rifle range only to be redirected to the British right flank where they were required to repeat the operation, firing six rounds a minute until the Boer guns there were silenced.

As the afternoon wore on the battalions on the left, the KOYLI and the North Lancashires, began to work their way to the left and up to the river. They stormed a farmhouse held by the Boers and moved forward to the river bank. A number of KOYLIs crossed the river above the dam by the Rosmead Drift only to be driven back to the south bank. Lord Methuen, immediately supervising the operation, was wounded in the thigh. He was removed to the field hospital and General Codrington took over command, although he was in no position to exercise supervision over the attack being conducted by the 9th Brigade.




Eventually some 400 men were on the north bank and began to force their way along the bank to the east. During the course of the British attack De la Rey called for a counter-attack from the Boers in the centre commanded by Cronje, but none was forthcoming.

At around 2pm a large party of Free Staters left the trenches on the Boer right and rode off to the east. And then at around 4pm there was a general retreat from the Boer trenches around Rosmead which extended along the Boer positions. By this time the British infantry on the right were virtually out of ammunition with no re-supply possible in the conditions of the battle.

Due to their exhausted state after a full day in the scorching sun under rifle and field gun fire the dazed British soldiers did not realize that the Boers were leaving the field and anyway were in no condition to follow them up. Many fell asleep and spent the night in their battle positions. The night was cold and greatcoats had been left in camp.

Initially the Boers abandoned their field guns and wounded on the battlefield but they returned during the night and retrieved both. On the morning of 29th November, the Naval field guns fired several rounds to signal a new crossing of the Modder River. There was no response from the Boer lines. The British troops crossed unopposed. The Boers, including Roets and his comrades, were gone. De la Rey and Cronje had withdrawn to the Magersfontein position 6 miles to the North of the Modder River to await the next attack by Methuen’s force, pressing on up the railway to relieve Kimberley.

Emerging unscathed from the Modder River fight, Roets was next in action at Magersfontein on 10 December 1899, the second battle of what became known as “Black Week” - Methuen had remained at Modder River until his army was built up by re-inforcements.




General Cronje, the Boer commander at Modder River, was inclined to take his army back to Spytfontein and defend the line of kopjes there. This was the decision taken at the meeting of senior Boer commanders. De la Rey, General Cronje’s subordinate at the Battle of Modder River was in Jacobsdal conducting the funeral of his older son Adriaan, fatally wounded during the fighting around Rosmead at Modder River on 28th November 1899. He consequently missed the meeting of senior Boer commandants at which the decision was made to withdraw to Spytfontein. On his return he persuaded Cronje that the right place to make the next stand was the line of kopjes at Magersfontein and that the position must be fortified with much greater subtlety than had been deployed at Modder River.

The Boers’ extensive intelligence system across the whole of Cape Colony, built up during the years before the war and relying upon the substantial section of the Boer population in the colony prepared to assist the Boers of the two republics, enabled Cronje to form an accurate assessment of the length of time before Methuen would feel able to advance north up the railway line towards his target of Kimberley. This was around two weeks, giving the Boers sufficient time to build the required field fortifications at Magersfontein.

Methuen’s reinforcements having come up, he now commanded 11,000 infantry, 850 cavalry and mounted troops, 750 gunners with thirty guns and the naval personnel with four long 12 pounders and the 4.7 inch gun.

The next station on the railway line north of Modder River was Merton. At this point the line ran between two groups of kopjes. The Boers entrenched and held each of these groups. The prominent feature was Magersfontein Hill on the east side of the line. The Boers placed their guns and burghers equipped with the older Martini-Henry rifles firing smoke generating cartridges in prepared positions on the hills. Along the southern foot of Magersfontein Hill the Boers dug a trench on the flat ground about a thousand yards long. It followed the course of a dry stream and a barbed wire fence. A further barbed wire entanglement was added, simple by later standards, but still an impediment to advancing troops. Boers armed with the new Mauser rifles firing smokeless ammunition occupied this trench.

Further entrenched positions with gun emplacements were built on the higher reaches of the kopjes. The aim was to mislead the British into believing the Boer positions were all on the hillsides. Boer re-inforcments arrived from the besieging force at Kimberley and from Natal increasing the size of Cronje’s army to around 10,000 although the exact number is unknown.

Methuen had formed the view that he could not march round the Boer positions on either flank and would have to make another frontal attack up the line of the railway and made his arrangements for the attack on Sunday 10th December 1899, following divine service. There would be an artillery bombardment of the hills for two hours before sunset on the Sunday. The Highland Brigade would make a night approach march to the base of Magersfontein and attack up the hill at dawn, supported by the Guards Brigade and the fire of the British artillery.

The attacking column moved out of the British camp at 2pm on Sunday 10th December 1899. It is hard to see how the Boers can have been unaware of this move. The column was headed by a force of cavalry followed by the Highland Brigade, then the artillery and Guards Brigade in the rear. Towards the end of the afternoon the British column halted and the artillery conducted a two-hour bombardment of the slopes and tops of the kopjes. Initial shells fell among groups of worshipping Boers killing a number of them, it is reported

At around 6.45pm darkness fell and the bombardment ceased. The various formations bivouacked, the Highlanders opposite Magersfontein Hill, the Guards Brigade on their right and the artillery nearer the railway line, ready to resume the bombardment at dawn.

Methuen gave Major General Wauchope his final orders. The Highland Brigade was to be guided by Major Benson of the Royal Field Artillery. It is said that Wauchope was unhappy at the prospect of a night approach march and was uncertain as to the position of the Boers. He also objected to Methuen’s requirement that the Highlanders march in ‘quarter column’ or in lines of whole companies, one six paces behind the other, with the battalions in sequence, so that the brigade presented a narrow deep mass of men.

On reaching Magersfontein Hill the brigade was to deploy so that the 2nd Black Watch, the leading battalion, attacked the eastern end of the hill on the right, with 2nd Seaforths on their left, 1st Argylls on their left and the 1st Highland Light Infantry in reserve.

The Highland Brigade began the march at around 1am, leaving half an hour late. The formation was ‘quarter column’, so that the thirty-two companies of the four battalions were in lines one after the other, the lines six paces apart. The hundred soldiers in each line, marching shoulder to shoulder, held ropes to ensure the lines kept together. The officers and men had been told nothing of what was expected of them. They assumed they were to attack the Boer positions on the hills, but knew nothing further.

A strong light shone away to the right and another on the left. It did not seem to the Highlanders that these were British lights. In fact the Boers were alert and manned their trenches at 2am. All that had been necessary was to warn commandants and field-cornets to see that their men were in the trenches and ready to meet an attack before dawn. On the right Cronje had placed his brother Andries, with the Klerksdorp and some of the Potchefstroom burghers and sundry Free State contingents. In all there may have been 1500-2000 Boers west of the railway and on the hills behind who took practically no part in the next day's battle. The centre trenches were held by about 2500 men, mostly from Potchefstroom—men of Cronje's own commando on whose courage he could rely—under Commandants P. Schutte and Martins, and some Bloemfontein and Hoopstad Free Staters. On the left were the Ladybrand, Ficksburg, Senekal, Heilbron, and Kroonstad Free Staters under Ferreira, and the Lichtenburg, Wolmaransstad and Bloemhof Transvaalers under Commandants Vermaas, F. J. Potgieter and Tollie de Beer. Of these about 2000 probably took part in the action, though barely half that number were in their places when the battle opened.

It was beginning to get light when the leading line of the 2nd Black Watch encountered a long wire fence in their path and a patch of dense brushwood, obstacles that broke up their formation and took time and a great deal of noise to negotiate. At 4am Major Benson advised General Wauchope that the brigade should extend into open order. Wauchope understood his orders to be that he should keep the close formation until well up to the Boer positions. He himself described this as ‘madness’. As the battalions cleared the brushwood the order was given to go into extended order.

At this point the bright light on the left went out and a single rifle shot rang out. This appears to have been a signal and the Boers opened fire from their trench at the base of Magersfontein Hill, some four hundred yards from the advancing Highlanders, catching them still in close order, the rifle rounds ripping through their ranks. The Boers also seem to have had a system of tin cans attached to trip wires and were alerted by the noise of the cans banging together as the Highlanders made their way forward.

The Highland Brigade broke up in confusion, some attempting to assault the Boer positions, others falling back with the main body, going to ground and attempting to return the fire. Some were caught on the barbed wire and shot down. Many simply fled. The officers attempted to establish control of their men but largely without success.

The sun came up, revealing the Highland Brigade pinned to the ground in front of the Boer positions, where it stayed for the rest of the day. Whenever a soldier moved he attracted fire. Some rushes were made but no general advance was achieved.

It was the gunners who came to the relief of the infantry. The Howitzer battery came into action at around 4,000 yards, the field guns of 18th, 62nd and 75th Batteries RFA at 2,000 yards and the RHA G Battery from right up behind the infantry.

Such casualties as the Boers suffered in the battle were caused by the gunfire, but even so it was of limited effect against the well dug in Boers, particularly as it was not fully realized that the most damaging Boer fire was coming from the trench situated on the flat ground and not the hill positions.

After nine hours exposed to constant fire from the Boer trenches the highland regiments finally broke up and withdrew, suffering substantial losses as they rose from whatever cover they had found and made for the rear. The soldiers were halted, rallied by their officers and NCOs and brought back into support of the rest of the line. The Boers made no attempt to exploit this collapse, lacking the bayonets and swords necessary for an attack.

At around 5.30pm the Boer guns, which had not fired during the day, opened up on the British cavalry. This triggered a general withdrawal of the exhausted British troops who had been fighting all day in the blazing heat, with inadequate cover, under fire from opponents they could not see firing from hilltop and entrenched positions. Methuen accepted the inevitable and ordered his force back to the camp at Modder River.

The Boers had won and decisively. Having viewed the battles of Modder River and Magersfontein from the British perspective, I thought it would be refreshing to provide the Boer perspective for the battle of Paardeberg, the last one in which Roets and thousands of others were to fire a shot in anger. To this end, the work by Irishman, Michael Davitt, is quoted from extensively.

Having carried the day, General Cronje remained virtually inactive for over six weeks following the victory of Magersfontein. He strengthened his positions, elaborated trenches, and then waited for Methuen to move. While waiting for Methuen he forgot Roberts and England's resources.

The next encounter was to be Lord Roberts' show, and Methuen was not to be in it. The English, Commander-in-Chief's scheme of operations was skilfully conceived, and ably executed. He succeeded in creating the impression, both in England and among the Boers, that he was to strengthen the British army at the Modder River, and from thence to attack Cronje and cut his way, westward of Scholtznek, to Kimberley. Under cover of this impression Roberts withdrew General French from Colesberg, massed a huge cavalry force between Methuen and the Orange River; where their real destination was not suspected; and, when the plans were complete, let England's best cavalry officer go with his 5,000 horsemen and 30 guns, in a dash for Kimberley.




Nothing could well have been more careless than the scouting for Cronje's little army during the seven days following the fight with Macdonald up to the eve of French's advance. News had reached the Federal lines that suspicious movements were going on south of Methuen's encampment, but Cronje would not believe there was anything serious to be expected except by the way of Koedesberg. Roberts had, in fact, secretly withdrawn a great portion of the Modder River army southward to Belmont, for the purposes of his big plan of action; leaving Methuen with the remainder to carry on the tactical deception.

The position in which the Federal generals found themselves when their left was turned by French and Kelly-Kenny was this: Cronje's lines extended for a distance of about twenty-five miles west to the east, facing the Riet and Modder rivers; Magersfontein being midway between the two extremes. His headquarters were near Rondavels Drift, on the Modder River, at his extreme left. About a dozen miles east of this the road from Jacobsdal to Kimberley passes over the river at Klip Drift. Some ten miles, still east, another drift takes a road from Jacobsdal to Boshof over the same river, while east of a flat-topped hill, called Paardeberg, rising from the south bank of the Modder, another drift is situated through which a road, branching north from one between Bloemfontein and Jacobsdal, goes from Petrusburg to Koedesrand; this latter " rand " or ridge being north of the river, and commanding the passage of this last drift. The distance from this last drift to Cronje's headquarters, westward on the same river, would be about thirty-five miles.

North of Cronje's lines, behind Magersfontein, Generals Ferreira, Kolbe, and Du Toit were in command of the burghers investing Kimberley. A " Long Tom " which had been erected only a fortnight previously under the direction of Sam Leon and Villebois-Mareuil was at Kampersdam, near the waterworks which supplied the Diamond City.

By a singular coincidence Christian De Wet was at Jacobsdal, about twenty miles due south of Cronje's head laager, on February the 11th, and moved south towards Waterfall Drift, on the Riet River, that night with 500 men; almost at the very time that General French commenced his dash north for Kimberley with his 5,000 horsemen, by the way of the very same drift. De Wet's unerring military instinct took him on this reconnaissance without any definite knowledge of Roberts' design, and without orders from Cronje. He had heard of suspicious movements on the Free State border, west of Koffiefontein, and set out for that place. He reached the drift a few hours only before a patrol ahead of French's flying column arrived on the south side of the river. On the English general learning that the drift was defended he swung to the right to another drift, a few miles eastward, leaving some troops at Waterfall Drift to contain the opposing Boer force, while the main body of the column should cross over the more eastern passage. French took his whole column over here without opposition, and sending patrols ahead to guard against possible attacks on his left flank when passing Jacobsdal, he directed his course towards Klip Drift.

Christian De Wet held the Waterfall Drift on the Riet River successfully, and the detaining body of troops left behind by French retired eastward, after learning of the successful passage of the river by the flying column, and went north in its wake. De Wet understood clearly now what the enemy's movement was, and all which it meant to the Federal forces, and not possessing men enough to attack Roberts' flank on his march to Klip Drift, he resolved to wait and watch for the convoy which was bound to be somewhere in the rear of a huge army moving over a section of a country which could not be reached by railways, for commissariat purposes. He soon saw the English main column, division after division, on its way towards Jacobsdal, and, biding his time, he swooped down upon the huge convoy of near 200 wagons and 1,800 cattle as the long straggling train was split in two by crossing the Riet River, near Blaubarik. He shot the draft oxen and brought the whole string of vehicles and carts to a standstill. Troops were sent back from the rear of the English divisions to extricate the convoy from its situation, but De Wet had also been reenforced by Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, and 200 men with a pom-pom; Cronje having come up from Koffiefontein, and passed in between the tail of French's column and the head of Roberts' force. The 700 Boers under De Wet took positions on some kopjes at Blaubank, and the convoy was therefore at their mercy. After an engagement in which some fifty of the English were killed and wounded, the enemy retired, leaving nearly half a million pounds worth of provisions, ammunition, and necessaries in the hands of 'De Wet's small commando. He appropriated what could be taken away, and left the remainder to the farmers in the locality. He then Wheeled round, and followed in the rear of the British forces to Jacobsdal, drove the small English garrison out of the town which had occupied it the day before, and, believing that Cronje would try and get possession of the drifts eastward on the Modder on finding his left wing turned, he rode as rapidly as tired horses would allow across country towards Paardebreg in the hope of forming a junction with the Magersfontein army south of the river at that place, or north of it, with Ferreira and the burghers from Kimberley.

Cronje had been informed on Monday the 12th of February, that the enemy was in commotion south of Methuen's camp. It was rumour of this news which took De Wet south to Waterfall Drift. Cronje refused to believe in any serious movement of the English otherwise than westward of or along the railway line going to Kimberley. His right wing had been engaged with General Macdonald, and was this not evidence that the advance of Roberts was to be against his western positions? On Tuesday Commandant Froneman went to Klip Drift with about fifty men, but the general made no move. On Wednesday despatch riders dashed into the head laager with the news that the enemy had seized the two drifts to the east, and that other troops were coming up. " They will be in our possession to-morrow," was the general's reply and comment, and not a move was made. On Thursday, however, when the reality of the situation was forced upon him by the information that a huge cavalry force had swept northwest to Kimberley, while other forces had come up from Jacobsdal and held Klip Drift right between him and Bloemfontein, he began to realize the peril in which he was placed, with his left turned by French, Methuen still in front of his centre, and Lord Roberts advancing to throw himself between the Federal forces and the Free State capital.

These two days' fatal delay, and that unfortunate delusion which considered the English movement on his left as the feint and that on his right as the actual intention of the enemy were to cost the two Republics their independence—for a time.

During this Friday three men whose names will occupy a foremost place in the annals of this war were rushing for the hill of Koedesrand, and the drift over the Modder which the hill commands: Cronje, De Wet, and French, and it was the latter who won. After finding that Cronje had passed through Kelly-Kenny's lines French must have been wired to by Kitchener to race from Kimberley with his cavalry force for all they were worth so as to forestall the Federals in the possession of the hill and drift east of Paardeberg. Almost without rest for men or horses, after the long march from Ramdam, this most able officer rode out of Kimberley with a portion of his great column, and in a thirty miles' ride succeeded in reaching the goal of the ridge and drift as Christian De Wet, with his 700 or 800 exhausted horsemen, appeared on the south side of the river, to see the prize in the possession of his British rival.

Cronje, encumbered by baggage, women, and children, had taken the course along the river, and off-saddled on Friday night at Wolfe Spruit, midway between Paardeberg and the drift opposite Koedesrand. French passed him on the north early on Saturday morning, and blocked the way eastward, so that when the old general scanned the veldt ahead at sunrise on the 17th of February he saw the enemy's guns in position and found himself caught between two divisions of Roberts' army. Cronje's rear-guard had reached Paardeberg on Friday night after the successful fight with some of Kelly-Kenny's cavalry. Commandant Froneman, with some Cape Colony Volunteers and Free Staters, finding that the general had gone ahead, crossed the river with 200 wagons at Paardeberg Drift, insisting that this was the right movement to take in view of the immense forces of the enemy behind, and of the straight line of march leading from there to Bloemfontein. They were right and succeeded in joining hands with Christian De Wet the following morning on the south of where Cronje was now shut in between French in front, Kitchener, Kelly-Kenny, and Smith-Dorrien behind, and other forces available to block the way through the drift at Paardeberg. The day's delay in starting lost Cronje the position of Koedesrand, and the neglect to pass over the river at Paardeberg Drift closed the last avenue of safe escape for the army of Magersfontein.




On discovering that the enemy held the Koedesrand and the drift opposite, Cronje was compelled to turn back towards another part of the river bank, where the rear of his retreating army was found after its almost continuous fight during Friday's march. The reunited force of some 4,000 men, finding themselves completely surrounded, began to entrench themselves on both sides of the river, but mainly on the north bank; the bed of the stream, which was in shallow condition at the time, being also used for baggage, and the shelter of the women and children.

This work was begun only on Sunday and had to be continued under a constant fire from the enemy's guns, firing from the northwest and northeast, supplemented by a cavalry attack in the afternoon, which was repulsed by the burghers despite the fatigue of the previous day's fight and arduous night's march. Major Albrecht had placed his few guns on the left of the hastily made entrenchments, and he gave such a good account of himself that the enemy paid heavily for the fruitless attempt to rush that part of the Boer lines.

On that Saturday, after the laager had beaten off two attacks upon its left flank, General Ferreira, who was behind the British lines, northwest of Paardeberg, with the burghers who had retreated from around Kimberley, sent a message to Cronje urging him to break through the English line in that direction before all their forces should come up from the south and west, and informing him that the enemy would be attacked from the northwest by Kolbe and himself at the same time; while two other forces east of Paardeberg, one under Commandant De Beer and one commanded by De Wet, would cooperate in a diverting movement. This was a thoroughly sound and practicable plan, but Cronje replied bluntly refusing to act as advised. The victor of Magersfontein had beaten off two assaults of the British that day, and he resolved to hold his ground. Commandant De Beer came in through the British lines late in the night of Saturday, and personally appealed to the general to act in conjunction with Ferreira and the other generals, assuring him that there were reinforcements coming from Bloemfontein under Philip Botha and De la Rey, which would sustain the carrying out of Ferreira's plan, and enable the combined commandoes north and east, with De Wet on the south, to put themselves between Roberts and Bloemfontein.

Early on Sunday morning Field Cornets Grobblaar and Douthwaite came through the lines with a message from De Wet and Philip Botha that there were enough men to the east, south of the river, to sustain the sortie if Cronje would only leave his baggage, women, and children, sally forth, and fight his way through. The minor officers in the laager, who were made aware of these messages, 'joined in backing up this suggestion, but were turned upon and told: "Are you afraid of the English? If you are, you may go!" Nothing would move him from his resolution to stay where he was.

He had intended moving his right eastward, to a deeper place on the bank, at Makous Drift, but he learned early on that Sunday that the spot had been occupied in an advance westward during the previous night by the enemy. That morning he heard guns directly south, and it was rumoured in the laager that De Wet had cut his way through from Petrusburg and was hastening to their relief. A dust-covered column was seen rapidly advancing from that direction, and they were allowed to take up position southwest of Paardeberg Hill, when, too late, they were discovered to be English. The circle of foes was now complete. The victors of Magersfontein were enclosed on all sides by a force of fully 40,000 men and 100 guns.

Cronje's courage and determination never wavered. He addressed the burghers at a religious service early that Sunday morning, and urged them to fight resolutely, that God was on their side, and that a relieving force from Bloemfontein would be sure to attack the English in the east and clear a way out for the entire laager. He then sent men across the river to entrench the south bank and awaited the attack which was coming. Down in the river bed, and in a hollow or donga to his right, the women, children, and transport were placed, while shelters were being dug in the banks of the river which were to offer better protection than the trenches on the top when the enemy's guns came into action. Nothing that could be done to enable the small force to defend itself was left undone by the indomitable old Boer, on whose fight against odds and fortune combined the whole civilized world was gazing in astonished admiration.

It was on the afternoon of this Sunday (February 18) that Kitchener's famous attack was ordered on what was believed by him to be a force and a position that could not possibly stand before such an absolutely overwhelming body of troops as he commanded. The enemy were conscious of being the masters of Cronje's doom, and it was resolved to lend a dramatic spirit of vengeance to the expected defeat and capture by employing the Highland regiments in the delivery of the main attack, in retaliation for the terrible punishment inflicted upon them at Magersfontein. It was not a spirit worthy of a true soldier, and resembled more that of a hunter who, failing to bring down a lion in his path, succeeds in driving him into a cage, and then takes an unworthy sportsman's pleasure in potting his imprisoned adversary from the vantage ground of safety. It deserved to fail and did.

After fully fifty guns from all sides had shelled the laager for hours, in such an incessant storm of lyddite and shrapnel as no modern battlefield has ever witnessed, the Highlanders and other regiments were let loose like bloodhounds from the leash upon the cornered quarry from the north, west, east, and south. On they came with bayonets glinting in the sun, in all the confidence of vast numbers and inspired by the belief that it would be a short rush, and then an Elandslaagte of British revenge. But the men in the trenches, though only a handful in comparison with Kitchener's legions, were not to lend themselves to pig-sticking on that Sunday, so easily as the Kitcheners and Kelly-Kennys believed. The old lion was caged, but he could strike through his bars, and the sun went down that Sabbath day, the 18th of February, after witnessing one of the most unequal battles ever fought; the Highlanders, balked of their vengeance, beaten again, and again demoralized, and the other regiments driven back with almost equal loss, with the enemy magnificently repulsed all along the line. The grim old lion of Potchefstroom had once again made a South African battlefield run red with the blood of his country's malignant foe. He had sustained the record even of Magersfontein, for his 4,500 Boers had faced, fought, and repulsed on that Sunday seven times their number of English assailants, having twenty guns to the Boers' one.

During the progress of the main battle on the 18th, De Wet had made a furious onslaught upon the troops who had been sent south of the river to carry out Kitchener's plan of an all-round rush upon Cronje. He thus diverted a great deal of the enemy's attention from the laager to himself and had in the end to sustain a counter attack of a dozen guns upon his position and several attempts by infantry forces to dislodge him. He held his ground until night time, and was thus largely instrumental in helping Cronje successfully to resist Kitchener's movement to crush him by sheer weight of numbers and guns.

The Boers had lost very few in this battle, but a relatively large number had been wounded. For these there were no doctors or ambulance attendance. They were lying in the bed of the river or in the dongas, and this spectacle, with women and children close by, naturally tended to demoralize some of the burghers. Cronje asked Kitchener on Monday morning for an armistice to bury the dead, and to send his wounded to the Boer ambulance at Petrusburg. Joubert had accorded an even more accommodating armistice to General White after Modderspruit. It is believed that Kitchener was inclined to accede to these requests, but that Lord Roberts, who had now arrived on the scene, would not consent to either. This, however, was not the worst side of the English general's actions. His forces had arrested the whole of the Hollander ambulance at Jacobsdal and had refused to allow the doctors serving under the Red Cross ensign to pass through the lines to the Boer laager; the British actually using the Federal hospitals and ambulance appliances at Jacobsdal for their own wounded, while denying to their foemen the services of their own medical assistants and nurses! It is true that Lord Roberts offered to take Cronje's wounded over to his own lines for treatment by the English doctors, but no self-respecting foe could consent to this in face of such conduct as that at Jacobsdal, and while he still had a resolve to continue the combat. So the fight went on all Monday; Roberts, however, keeping his troops at a respectful distance from the range of the rifles which had driven back Kitchener's legions the previous day. The enemy turned all his batteries upon the laager by the river and awaited the double agency of an artillery fire which could not be answered by the Boer guns, and of the horrible conditions under which Cronje had to hold his ground, to effect what frontal attacks and revengeful charges had failed disastrously to achieve.

On Tuesday Major Albrecht's five guns were rendered useless by the breakdown of the artillery service and the want of ammunition. All the enemy's guns being beyond the range of rifle fire, and there being no further danger from Cronje's single battery, Lord Roberts saw that his opponent's situation was rendered quite hopeless, and he began to push his lines a little nearer.

A message was heliographed to Cronje from Petrusburg on Tuesday afternoon by Commandant Froneman, saying that Christian De Wet and Philip Botha were near, had beaten a portion of the enemy's force, and were in possession of a strong position to the southeast of the laager. They were expecting De la Rey and reinforcements, and would be able to render effective help if the laager would hold out. This intelligence revived the drooping spirits of the men, who, on finding their positions attacked again that afternoon by infantry charges from the northwest, fusilladed the troops back in the best Magersfontein manner. This was virtually the last assault delivered by Roberts. His 100 unanswered guns, the shambles in the bed of the Modder River, and the unnerving presence of women and children within an area where every shell that exploded compelled everyone to seek shelter, would do what bayonet charges could not effect.

All this time De Wet was hanging on to the flank of the enemy southeast of the river. He had gained a small kopje, from which a Krupp and a pom-pom enabled him to harass the English on both sides of the river considerably. A huge force was therefore directed against him on Wednesday, with the object of surrounding the hill, and capturing guns and men. Firing his two pieces up to the last moment, he called in his men, some 1,200 strong, sent out two lines of screening horsemen to the right and left, and then, forming his force into a wedge-like column with the guns in between, shot clean through the opening still left between the horns of the closing English circle. Andries Cronje, of Potchefstroom, with only 50 men, riding, firing, and retiring, as sharp shooters, held back the enemy's horsemen until De Wet and his guns were safe at Poplars Grove.

The following night the same force of burghers, led by their general, rode back again under cover of darkness, lay in wait until dawn enabled them to see the enemy's location on the hill which had been vacated on the previous day, and in a spur-gallop over the intervening ground attempted to retake the kopje. But the troops in position were too strong, and De Wet, losing only a very few men, wheeled back and regained his former ground.

On Thursday the pitiless bombardment of Cronje recommenced with the dawn and was maintained throughout the whole day. In the evening 100 men left the laager and crossed over to the British to surrender.

Alternate hope and depression came to the trenches during the 23rd. Froneman heliographed from the east to be of good cheer, and to hold out; that 3,000 burghers were about to attack the enemy to Cronje's left. No action followed the sending of the message, however, and a week's continuous combat in one of the most trying and desperate fights ever fought ended with more deaths, wounds, and desertions, as the night of Friday shut out the two forces from each other's view. But the nights did not stop the fighting. The English pushed their trenches from the east nearer and nearer until the British rifles were able to supplement the fire of their batteries with Lee-Metfords against Mausers from shelters which were built under cover of darkness.

Saturday ushered in the fiercest storm of projectiles yet turned upon the unfortunate laager. General Cronje estimated the number of guns at work against him that day at twenty-five batteries, all driving their shells and stinking lyddite into an area of about a mile within which the lines of the small army were now contracted. Not a move could safely be made in the trenches or holes in which the men had to crouch for protection, yet whenever an attempt was made to rush the trenches, the Mausers were there with the old death-dealing accuracy of fire.

Dead men lay unburied, dead horses floated in the river, the wounded were uncared for, the water of the Modder was no longer drinkable; and it seemed as if no other trials could possibly be added to the sum of indescribable misery under which these few men still faced the fate of inevitable defeat rather than hoist the white flag. This Saturday evening Captain Danie Theron reached the laager after having passed through the English lines, swimming the river in his journey. He had gone on hands and knees for two miles after leaving his horse, so as to evade the patrols of the enemy before reaching the river's bank, being frequently within a few yards of British sentinels on his perilous mission. He brought messages from De Wet, Froneman, Botha, and Commandant Cronje, of Potchefstroom, in combined command of 4,000 or 5,000 men to the east, begging of General Cronje to attempt to cut his way through in that direction before all was lost. They pointed out that the enemy was commencing to feel the strain of the day and night fighting since the 14th, that their rations were not what would sustain the troops in a combative spirit, and that a dash through the line beyond which De Wet's forces were ready for a responsive attack would stand a good chance of succeeding.

Cronje now assented to the proposal which he had hitherto refused to entertain, and the burghers began to build a chain bridge over the swollen river—a rain-storm having helped the British shell-storm to drive the Boers from the shelter of the bed of the Modder—and a sortie to the southeast was to be attempted on Monday night. But fate had determined that the blunders of the previous week should entail their penalty. Some Kaffirs, who had attended to the horses and cattle, deserted to the British on Sunday morning while the Boers were engaged at prayers in the most protected part of the laager. The officers who had been in favour of the sortie all the previous week now seemed inclined to consider the whole situation absolutely hopeless, and to whisper the word " surrender." A prayer supplication to the Almighty was suggested in order to find inspiration as to which course was best, and this was supplemented by an impassioned appeal from the general to the burghers to fight on, and trust in God and in the efforts of their friends. On Sunday night the drooping spirits of the laager had been raised again, and all were ready to stake their last hope on the attempt which was to be made on the following night.




Monday morning, however, dashed this hope to the ground. The Kaffirs had informed the British of the work going on at the point in the river where the chain bridge was being made, and all the enemy's guns were turned upon this spot, making it impossible to carry on the task. Two shells aimed at this place fell among a group of burghers and literally blew the son of Commandant Andries Cronje to pieces, killing eight or ten more at the same time. This, together with the destruction of the chain bridge, deadened the spirit of further resistance in banishing the hope of any successful help from outside, and the burghers clamoured to Cronje to hoist the white flag. His men had at last, lost faith in his power to beat back the English, and he had to consent to the calling of a kriegsraad to decide the question of surrender. As a last resort he heliographed in the direction of Aasvogel Kop, where Theron had told him De Wet and Botha were waiting to help him, that it had been decided at a council of war to surrender on Tuesday if the outside assistance could not cut its way through. No answer came back. The council had voted for surrender, all excepting the general and Commandant Roos.

The total loss of the Federals in all the engagements from Klip Drift to Paardeberg, amounted to no more than 97 killed and 245 wounded. The men who surrendered numbered 3,919. Adding to these the number killed (97) and wounded (245) in the fighting up to the time of surrender, Cronje's total force on taking up position at Paardeberg was 4,261 men.

Of the surrendered, Hendrik Roets, along with his Veld Kornet, Hans Grobler of Hartebeespoort, Potchefstroom, was one. Like so many of his comrades in arms, he was sent down to Cape Town from where he boarded a ship bound for the island of St. Helena and incarceration.
The war having ended on 31 May 1902, Boer P.O.W.’s were gradually repatriated to their homes. A vast majority of those who had earned their living on the land found that their property and their homes had been destroyed by the British forces, thanks in the main to the “scorched earth” policy executed by Lord Roberts. Many were able to claim compensation for their losses and, although the amounts paid in relation to the amount claimed was almost never equal, some relief was possible.

Roets, having farmed Bronkhorstfontein with some success, put in his claim after his arrival back in South Africa. Of the £114 requested only £28 was paid out. The authorities noting that he was an, “ex-burgher captured and deported. Several of the items in this claim are disallowed, owing to insufficient proof of loss. Claimant is poor and requires assistance.”

Writing from Vereeniging on 24 September 1902, he stated that, “Appended I send list of goods for which compensation is claimed. The goods and household furniture was burnt on 2 December 1900, when my wife was taken from the farm.” His formal statement, taken on 7 October 1902, read as follows:

“I was on commando with General Cronje and was taken prisoner at Paardeberg and was sent to St. Helena whence I returned in the month of September (1902) and was therefore unable to send in a compensation claim earlier. My wife remained on the farm Bronkhorstfontein until 2 December 1900 when she was removed to Johannesburg (concentration camp) by the British.

When the troops removed her they set fire to the house and all articles mentioned in the claim were burnt with the exception of the horse which was removed by the troops. I have never recovered any of the articles I am claiming for.”

This must have been a bitter pill to swallow for Roets. His wife and two sons, Johannes and Rudolph, had been removed from their farm and sent to the Concentration Camp on the Turffontein Race Course in Johannesburg. They had arrived on 10 December 1900 and had been released a year later, on 19 December 1901, their destination being Vereeniging. Mercifully, unlike many others, all had survived the camps.
Hendrik Roets passed away in the Grasmere district of Roodepoort on 11 December 1945 at the age of 75. He was a widowed General Farmer by occupation at the time he passed away from Chronic Myocardial Degeneration.




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