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A Border Scouts and a POW at Sandfontein - Lt. W.G.B. Austin's story 6 years 6 months ago #56173
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Wilfred Graham Bertram Austin
Trooper, 4th Company, 1st Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry Trooper, Provisional Mounted Police Lieutenant, Border Scouts – Anglo Boer War Lieutenant, 1st South African Mounted Rifles – Prisoner of War at Sandfontein, G.S.W.A. Lieutenant, (A.D.C. to the G.O.C.) 3rd Brigade, South African Infantry – German East Africa - Queens South Africa Medal with clasps Cape Colony, Orange Free State and Transvaal to 9855 Pte. W.G.B. Austin, 4th Coy. 1st Imp. Yeo. - Kings South Africa Medal with clasps South Africa 1901 & 1902 to Lt. W.G.B. Austin, Border Scouts Wilfred Austin was an interesting man – not content with wiling away his time with the Imperial Yeomanry and Provisional Mounted Police during the Boer War he took the fight to the Boers as a Lieutenant with the Border Scouts – a little known but illustrious unit. From there he joined the ranks of the Permanent Force and was one of the few officers taken prisoner at Sandfontein early in the German South West campaign. Once released he saw service in German East Africa as the Aide-de Camp to General C.A.L. Berrange before succumbing to malaria which led to his early demise at the age of 40. 
Austin sporting his Boer War medals Born in the Parish of St. Stephen in Paddington, London on 6 July 1879 he was the son of Francis Bertram Austin, a Gentleman and his wife Lila Elizabeth. At the time of his baptism on 16 August 1879 the family lived at 69 Richmond Road in Paddington. A mere two years later at the time of the 1881 census the Austin family found itself in the Llandaff district of Cardiff in Wales. Mr Austin was a Marine Surveyor by profession with his wife, a good eleven years younger than him, a Decorative Artist. It was from his mother that Wilfred inherited his ability to sketch and draw which would serve him well in later life. Aside from a 1 year old Wilfred at 32 Ely Road in Cardiff were his siblings Charles (12); Lilian (10); Frederick (7) and servants Catherine and Sarah. Ten years later at the time of the 1891 Wales census the family had moved to 3 Pembroke Terrace in Cardiff. Mr Austin was absent from home with his wife the Head of the household. Older brother Charles was an Architect with Frederick a trainee Engineer and 11 year old Wilfred at school. Mrs Austin appears to have been running a dressmaking business from home with as many as four employees on site along with the servant, Louisa Bates. The 19th century in Victorian Britain was drawing rapidly to a close but wasn’t planning to go quietly. There was a last twist to the century’s tail coming in the form of a war between the Empire and the two obscure Boer Republics in far-away South Africa. Hostilities were declared on 11 October 1899 and, initially, with very few troops on the ground, the British forces experienced a number of embarrassing reverses. A call went out to colonial outfits to be raised as well as a call for the creation of an Imperial Yeomanry – comprising civilians who, in a burst of patriotic fervour, were streaming into recruiting offices to “to their bit.” At the age of 20 years and 6 months and no doubt bored with his lot as others around him went to war, Austin, a Clerk by occupation, enlisted at Cardiff with the Glamorgan Imperial Yeomanry. Completing the attestation papers on 10 January 1900 he was one of the first to sign up. Confirming that he still resided in his father’s house he claimed to be a Militia member of the 3rd Volunteer Battalion of the Welsh Regiment. Physically he was tall at 5 feet 8 ½ inches in height weighing 131 pounds with a fresh complexion, grey eyes and light brown hair. The Doctor having found him fit for service he was assigned no. 9855 and the rank of Private with the 4th Company of the 1st Battalion, Imperial Yeomanry. Sailing almost immediately for the war Austin commenced operations in South Africa on 28 February 1900 and was to spend 1 year and 152 days in Yeomanry uniform before taking his discharge at Green Point camp in Cape Town – where he had been stationed at the Base Depot towards the end - on 29 July 1901. His service with them had taken him into the Cape Colony and Orange Free State in pursuit of an, oftentimes, elusive foe. Austin’s Proceedings on Discharge form confirmed that he had taken his discharge at his own request and that his Conduct and Character while with the Colours had been Good. Mention was also made that he had a scar on his chin. Now without a unit Austin joined the ranks of the Provisional Mounted Police with no. 244. The P.M.P. were active in the Orange Free State – an “Invitation to Colonials” appeared in the Bloemfontein Friend newspaper, and was read in all colonial commands, inviting volunteers for the new Provisional Mounted Police : — "A limited number of men are required for enrolment in a Provisional Mounted Police Force for employment in the districts of the Orange Free State occupied by the British troops. Volunteers are now called for from colonial corps from all portions of the British Empire which are now serving in South Africa. Engagements for the force will be for three months, to be extended (with the man's consent) to six months, if found necessary later. Men joining this force will revert to their corps if found unsuitable for police duties, and also on completion of any limited engagement. Men enrolling in the Provisional Mounted Police Force who are found suitable for police duties have first claim to the appointments in any permanent police force which may be created in this State when the country is settled; appointments carrying non-commissioned rank will be reserved for those members of the Provisional Mounted Police Force who may possess the necessary educational qualifications. Pay, etc. — Men volunteering for this force from the Mounted Colonial Corps will bring with them their uniform, arms, and equipment, including saddlery. A Government horse will be provided by the State for each man. Consolidated pay will be issued, which "will include regimental pay at present rates, and allowances in lieu of free rations and forage. Officers commanding Mounted Colonial Corps are requested to call for volunteers from their own corps, and will forward a list of the officers, non-commissioned officers and men offering their services, whom they can thoroughly recommend to the Military Governor of Bloemfontein, so as to reach him not later than noon on 20th April, 1900 Owing to the nature of the duties which the "Provisional Mounted Police Force will be called upon to perform, only the most reliable and steady non-commissioned officers and men should be recommended for the appointment. N.B. — Candidates for the African corps will find a knowledge of the Dutch language a great advantage, but this knowledge is not compulsory. In cases where men have a knowledge of Dutch, officers commanding will record the fact when forwarding their recommendations. — (Signed) B. Duff, Colonel, A.A.G. for C. of S." Austin must have decided on the minimum of three months service before parting ways with the P.M.P. Where to next? The war raged on and had entered the second or guerrilla phase characterised by small highly mobile Commandos who sniped at and raided isolated British patrols and lines of communication before galloping off with their booty. Austin betook himself to the Border Scouts enlisting with them on 12 November 1901. His leadership qualities being recognised he was commissioned as a Lieutenant with immediate effect. But who were the Border Scouts? Raised at Upington in May 1900 they were initially a local defence force, and in September all the white troops in the district were withdrawn to nearby Prieska. The men were all half-castes, chiefly descendants of Boer farmers and native women; many of them were well-to-do farmers having large herds, others were hunters in the Kalahari Desert. All could ride and shoot. Their knowledge of the country and excellent eyesight made them invaluable as scouts. In November 1900 the regiment was increased to 300; in January 1901 to 500; and shortly afterwards to 8 squadrons —total, all ranks, 786. The north-western district of Cape Colony, which the regiment patrolled, extended from Oomdries Vlei on the south to Rietfontein on the north, a distance of 400 miles; and from Prieska on the east to Ookiep on the west, about 350 miles. Kenhardt and Upington, two towns about the centre of this vast area, were garrisoned and entrenched. After a few encounters the enemy fled into Griqualand West, and the north-west district remained quiet for many months. A troop of the Border Scouts were long stationed at Prieska for scouting and despatch-riding. The distance between Upington and De Aar is just over 300 miles, from which railway junction all supplies had to be drawn—a big undertaking when the convoy required an escort of 300 or 400 men to bring it safely through; and the convoy was of little use when it arrived, as the escort had consumed half the stuff on the road out, and well-nigh the other half was required by the escort when taking back the empty waggons. The officer commanding the Border Scouts frequently requested to be permitted to live on the country, in the same way as the Boers did, and thus do away with convoys and transport, but this was not allowed. In November 1901, by which time Austin had joined them, the Border Scouts were ordered to return to the north-western district, as several commandos had moved north. On this trek they had a running fight with Van Reenan's commando, but owing to the horses being in a miserable condition only two prisoners were captured. They arrived in Upington in December, after having been as far south as Piquetberg Road Station. On one occasion they had been snowed-up for three days in the hills near Sutherland. The regiment received no pay during the time it was on column, and Major Birkbeck (4th Scottish Rifles), the commander, found on his return to Upington that all communication between that place and De Aar had been cut for several months. The wire was down for miles, and post-carts had been captured by the enemy, while there was hardly enough food for the garrison for one month, apart from the civilian population; lastly, there were not twenty pounds of money in the town. Meat rations became the order of the day, and remained so until the corn ripened at Keimeos, on the banks of the Orange, thirty miles from Upington. At this time there were about 600 rebels under arms in the district, while several commandos were being pushed into it by the columns in the south. On one occasion at this time 60 Border Scouts, under Captain Bracy Ramsbotham, DSO, did a good piece of work. They had gone out to get sheep, and, hearing of the enemy, they succeeded in ambushing a party of 80 Boers under Conroy. The enemy fled, almost after the first volley, being completely surprised. They left 15 dead and 8 severely wounded. The regiment not having drawn any pay for many months, and the authorities stating it was impossible to get money safely through, Major Birkbeck decided to make his own money. A block stamp was cut out of wood to represent a jackal, as that animal's skin was worn on the men's hats. Underneath was written, "Issued by Paymaster Border Scouts, pay to Bearer"; then signature, John Birkbeck, Major, OCBS. The notes were issued for £5, £2, 10s, and 2s on cloth, and as few of the men could read, ink of a different colour was used for each value. Cloth, like everything else, began to run out, so that in the end blinds, bed-sheets, and table-cloths were commandeered and torn up to make into money. £45,000 worth was issued and in circulation. It was the current coin of the district, the Post Office and Savings' Bank accepting it. In January 1902 General Smuts came into the district to organise the Boer forces: he had the commandos of Maritz, Latagan, Conroy, and Louw. The Border Scouts were now divided as follows: 350 at De Aar for convoy duty, 50 at Prieska, 150 at Kenhardt, and a like number at Upington. The only other troops at these last two towns were Native Town Guards, each 100 strong, armed with very old rifles, mostly useless. Conroy seized this opportunity to reap the harvest at Keimeos, for the ripening of which Upington had been wearying. News came that he was cutting the wheat and building trenches on the kopjes. He had with him about 100 men. The same evening Major Birkbeck marched for Keimeos with 100 of the Scouts mounted on half-starved horses. He arrived at Keimeos while it was still dark; dividing his force, he crept up the kopjes occupied by the enemy. At the first sign of dawn Captain Tabuteau shot a Boer who stood up within a yard of where he himself was hiding, and in a few seconds it was found that Boers and Border Scouts were lying mixed up amongst the rocks. No one could move an inch. Unable to move, both parties lay still all day, and when it was dusk orders were shouted to the Scouts to fix bayonets and be ready to charge: a previous signal had been arranged and a place to reassemble fixed. The latter signal having been given after dark, and the Scouts having reassembled, some men were sent into the village of Keimeos: they found that the Boers had fled. Captain Tabuteau remained out with 50 men, the others returning to Upington; 3 Boers were buried on the following morning. The Border Scouts lost 2 mortally wounded, and 20 others slightly wounded. The regiment now brought in and stored at Upington 1500 sacks of grain—a task which could not have been accomplished but for the marvellous scouting which prevented all interference with the working-parties or enabled them to beat off the attacks. Much has been heard lately of the qualities needed in scouts. A British officer who served with this regiment says that the men could always tell whether distant dust was made by ostriches, springbok, locusts, or mounted men, and never made a mistake in their judgment. If a party of horsemen had passed over the road they could roughly estimate the number, and could tell how many horses were ridden and how many led. They travelled by night as easily as by day, always going straight across country and never on the track. Not a waggon of any sort accompanied the regiment, the blanket being under the saddle and an overcoat strapped in front. They carried no cooking-pots nor food, as when on trek they only used meat. Spare ammunition was carried on horses. The regiment's record is one of which they had every reason to be proud. They lost 1 officer killed and 1 wounded, 19 non-commissioned officers and men killed and over 100 wounded, but not a single man ever surrendered, although many times an unwounded man lay by a wounded comrade till dark. Not a single despatch rider was caught, although several got in only on wounded horses or on foot. These despatch riders had to cross from Kenhardt to Upington and Prieska once or twice a week, often on starved horses. Curiously enough, no man of the regiment died of disease. As can be gauged from the above the Scouts had proved themselves a force to be reckoned with. The war over on 31 May 1902 Austin took his release from the Scouts receiving both a Queens and a Kings Medal for his efforts in the conflict. Free to go about his business he took up a position as a Draughtsman in the Surveyor- General’s Office in Cape Town. On 19 June 1905 the Acting Surveyor-General wrote that, “I certify that Mr Wilfred Graham Bertram Austin is especially qualified to perform the duties of a Draughtsman in this Department and that so far as I am aware the qualifications for such office are not ordinarily possessed by Civil Servants, or by candidates who have passed the Civil Service Examination, or are not possessed in a sufficient degree by any available person now holding any office.” This letter was the precursor to a request, made on the same day, requesting that Austin be appointed at a salary of £180 per annum as a Temporary Draughtsman. At this time Austin was living in Middelburg in the Karoo from whence he journeyed for the interview. Thus it was that with effect from 1 July 1905 he was a Civil Servant. Quite how long this lasted in not known. Most likely yearning for a bit of action Austin next enlisted as a Gunner with Prince Alfred’s Own Cape Field Artillery on 14 February 1906 with no. No856 taking his discharge on 9 February 1907 in order to join the Mounted Branch, Cape Mounted Police on 2 July 1907 as a Private with no. 1951. This too was short-lived as on 1 July 1908 he attested as a Constable with the Dismounted Branch of the C.M.P. with no. 72. In 1909 he would appear to have been posted to Vryburg in the Northern Cape, an area with which he was familiar from his days in the Border Scouts from there he transferred back to the Mounted Branch of the C.M.P. with his original number on 1 May 1910. On 1 April 1913 he was posted to 'E' Squadron of the 1st South African Mounted Rifles. The time for marriage had now dawned and he tied the nuptial knot in the Dutch Reform Church in Cape Town with Magdalena Maria Wilhelmina De Villiers on 12 November 1913. He had already, by this time, joined the 5th regiment of the South African Mounted Riflemen stationed at Headquarters in Kimberley. A photo group which appeared in the Nonquai – December 1913 edition – shows that he had been recently promoted from Corporal to Lieutenant on the staff of Lt. Colonel Berrange with whom he was to have a long association. 
War clouds which had been gathering for some time between Germany and Britain finally burst onto the international stage on 4 August 1914. South Africa wasn’t slow to lend support – a few days later the Prime Minister, Louis Botha, so recently at loggerheads with the British, now came out in support of them and was tasked with invading the German territory of South West Africa. But first there was the matter of an internal rebellion to deal with – Boers in the Free State and Western Transvaal, unhappy that they were now being called on to fight for a foe who was only twelve years prior their mortal enemy, took up arms against the government. Heartrending as it was the rebellion pitted brother against brother in some instances and General Botha is recorded to wept at how his “volk” were tearing themselves apart. Whilst this was on the go the small force of South African Mounted Riflemen who had infiltrated German South West Africa were having quite a time of it. The battle at Sandfontein is seldom remembered and it is an exception when a general history of the war dedicates a single line to the skirmish. Even in South Africa the action is largely forgotten although, it represents the Union's first active participation in the war in any numbers and although ending in a defeat for Colonel Grant's men, the soldiers of the Union, Austin included, were able to go into captivity with their heads held high. One can wonder if the South Africans would have abandoned Sandfontein and its wells if they had realised in time just how outgunned they were. Traditionally Boer Forces would never hesitate to mount up and do a runner, there was no shame in leaving the battlefield when they thought that there was a chance of the enemy turning their flank or cutting off their path to the open veldt. At Sandfontein every element of the Boers worst tactical nightmare became reality. A body of men pinned down on a desolate kopje, cut off, thirsty, watching helplessly as the enemy killed their horses one by one. Although the men fought bravely the only possible successful outcome for the Union Troops would have been a timely withdrawal, but this was not to happen. Driving the attackers off was not possible and the position was not defendable for any length of time, especially after the Union's two artillery pieces had run out of ammunition. The battle was lost the moment the possibility of withdrawal was lost. To gain a better understanding of what the Zandfontein disaster was all about liberal reference is made to a work compiled by J.E.M. Atwell on the subject entitled “The Fighting Police of South Africa.” Zandfontein, in what was once known as German South West Africa, is a group of three wells situated on the route from Steinkopf in the Cape Province to Warmbad in German Territory. The road crosses the Orange River at Ramans Drift, the former being the boundary between British and German soil. The distance between Ramans Drift and Warmbad is about 45 miles and the Zandfontein wells are to be met with about midway between these points, making their possession to an invading force a necessity and a measure of the utmost importance. In September 1914, a British column known as the A Force, under the command of Brig.-General H.T. Lukin, C.M.G., D.S.O., seized the drifts on the Orange River at Homs, Ramans, and Gudaus, and also the Zandfontein wells, prior to a general advance into the hostile territory. On September 25th the wells were garrisoned by a squadron of Police under the command of Capt. E.J. Welby, who had as troop leaders under him Lieuts. Grahame, Cowely, Owen, Gwatkin and Northway making a total combatant strength of 120 all ranks. On the evening of the 25th it was decided to reinforce the Zandfontein detachment by despatching a force from Ramans Drift. This force, under the command of Lieut.-Col. R.C. Grant, left the drift at about 6.30 p.m., and was comprised of the following: One section of the Transvaal Horse Artillery of two 13-pounder quickfirers under Lieut. F.M. Adler; one Machine Gun Section of two guns of the Police under Lieut. Butler; three troops of Police under Capt. P.E. Hale, with Lieuts. Scott, Clements and Austin. No Rations were issued to the details of the column before leaving the drift, reliance being placed on the transport being able to keep close up with the advance. The total strength of this reinforcement was 122. The eventual junction of the reinforcements and the detachment at Zandfontein resulted in an available combatant strength of 237 all ranks. 
Having nothing to fear on the south eastern border owing to the inactivity of Maritz, the Germans concentrated a large force of about 2000, four batteries of artillery and machine guns, at Warmbad, in close proximity to Zandfontein, who at dawn seized all the commanding points at Zandfontein. Such was the position at Sunrise on the 26th, when the reinforcements under Grant first sighted the Zandfontein Kopjes after an arduous night march from Ramans Drift, where only one halt was made of short duration and both men and animals were done up. The reinforcements sighted the wells at a distance of three miles, and unsuspectingly continued their march into the trap laid for them. There was nothing to indicate that large bodies of hostile troops were in the vicinity. The advance, rear and flank guards had met with no opposition or seen anything to arouse suspicions. The column arrived at the wells at 7.30 a.m., and formed up prior to watering the tired animals. No sooner had Col. Grant assumed command than desultory rifle fire was heard to the north east, and a few minutes later the patrol under Sergt. Spottiswood was seen retiring before superior numbers of the enemy, whose mounted troops now emerged on the plain in large numbers, both from the direction of Homs Drift and Warmbad. It was thought the enemy were merely attempting some harassing tactics, and troops were sent to the assistance of Spottiswood. Colonel Grant and his Adjutant, Lieut. Wakefield, proceeded to the summit of a kopje, and on arrival there it was found that the attack from the north-east was more serious than was at first thought. Enemy mounted troops came pouring out from the ridge on the Homs Drift Road. The troops under Lieuts. Cowley, Owen and Grahame were now ordered into position around the base of the main kopje, the latter on the northern face and the two former on the eastern side. The fire from these units and of the troops under Lieuts. Clements and Gwatkin soon had the effect of checking the enemy's initial intention of rushing the position from that side. After the full strength of the enemy to the north east had revealed itself the troops under Clements and Gwatkin were withdrawn to man the northern face of the kopje. About the same time the troop under Capt. Hale was recalled from the Ramans Drift Road in order to reduce their defensive perimeter. This troop, under Lieut. Scott, finally took up a position among some sangars at the extremity of the spur that jutted out from the main kopje to the south west. The remaining troop, commanded by Lieut. Austin, occupied the rest of the ridge overlooking the wells, and between Lieut. Scott's troop and the kopje. Events now occurred in such quick rotation that it is difficult to describe them in their proper sequence. While the enemy were being engaged in the north east the unexpected appearance of a body of troops advancing on the wells from the direction of Ramans Drift riveted the attention of all on the south western face of the kopje. Seeing that the column under Col. Grant had only just traversed it, it was thought that surely this could not be a hostile force. However, a diversion from the north-west removed all doubts as to the character of the movement in the south-west. Lieut. Northway, with a patrol of half a dozen men, was now observed retiring slowly before an extended line of enemy skirmishers, who had entered the plain from the main Warmbad Road. Line after line of mounted troops advancing in rear of the skirmishing line could be plainly seen driving Northway in. The latter made good his retirement, frequently checking the too bold advance of the enemy riflemen. Northway finally dismounted his men in some broken ground about five hundred yards from the western foot of the main kopje, and then sent his horses to join the remainder of his squadrons horses, which were still secured to the picket lines in the rear of the main well. About this time a patrol of the 2nd Squadron under Sergt. Major Barrett reappeared from the south-west, retiring in extended order. He safely made his way into the main position. No mention has yet been made of the section of the Transvaal Horse Artillery. On the appearance of the strange force on the Ramans Drift Road the guns were unlimbered between the walled enclosure and the main well, and between the latter and the kopje. The mule teams were grouped against the north east wall of the enclosure. Up to now no more than half an hour had elapsed since the arrival of Col. Grant's small column at the wells, and the time was about 8 o'clock. The times must be taken as merely approximately, as much as half an hour one way or the other. Before proceeding to describe the main engagement, which may be said to have commenced at 8 a.m. by the discharge of the first two rounds of our artillery, it is perhaps necessary to review the tactical position as it stood. The whole of the force at the wells was now disposed around the Zandfontein Kopje in such a manner as to deny the enemy access to the valuable water that lay at its foot. This disposition may give cause for the remark as to why no offensive movement was attempted. In South African warfare water has played a very important part, and such was the case here. Against the first body of the enemy that appeared to the north east an offensive movement was commenced, and would have continued except for the appearance of the enemy on the exposed flank and in rear of the wells. The position was being attacked simultaneously from four widely different points by hostile troops, any one of which was vastly superior in numbers to the detachments at the wells. The withdrawal from the water was impossible when it is considered that the nearest water was 20 miles away. An equitable adjustment of the tactical situation could only have been brought about two hours earlier by getting astride the main Warmbad Road and delaying the enemy in the defile to the north west, thus ensuring the safe retirement of the detachment guarding the wells. At 8 o'clock it might have been possible by leaving the water, abandoning the guns, transport and ambulance, and for the two hundred men to make a running fight of it to the west in the faint hope of evading destruction. At 8 a.m., as matters now stood, there was no doubt whatever that the situation of the force at the wells was quite hopeless tactically, and no amount of readjustment of the meagre numbers available could have brought about an improvement. After this digression the events that commenced at 8 a.m. may now be related. The rapidly advancing force to the south-west was still some four thousand yards distant when it was decided that it must be the enemy, and the order was given for the artillery to open fire. The gunners were not long in complying, and the simultaneous discharge of the two quickfirers echoed again and again among the surrounding hills, followed a few moments later by the burst of shrapnel. After a few shots the range was obtained, and the enemy at once opened well out and soon gained the shelter afforded by the lower range of hills to the south of Zandfontein. A new event now changed the whole complexion of affairs. A faint discharge of a gun was heard in the distance, and a shrapnel exploded over a building in rear of our guns. The gun teams were in the line of burst and a coloured driver and a mule were seen to fall. The animals were hastily transferred to the other end of the enclosure, and our guns were swung smartly round to meet this unexpected attack. Quite a stream of shells were now commencing to fall in and around the enclosure, close to which our guns had come into action, from which it could be inferred that at least a four gun battery was being utilised by the enemy. This battery came into action at a range of about four thousand yards, and occupied what is known as a semi covered position among the hills to the north-east. Our guns soon opened out on their new target, and, though outnumbered, the accuracy of their fire brought about a temporary cessation of the hostile fire. The enemy now commenced to find the range, and their shells began to drop with precision around our guns. While this artillery duel was in progress events in other portions of the position deserve attention. Immediately the enemy rifleman commenced to develop their initial attack from the north-east, the Machine Gun section under Lieut. Butler was ordered into position on a projecting knoll to the south east of the main kopje. The one gun under Sergt. Pizzey came into action almost at once against bodies of hostile riflemen who endeavoured to cross an open space about one thousand yards distant, in order to establish themselves amongst some rocky outcrops, which provided an easy approach for an attack on the main kopje. The fire from this gun together with the fire of the troops on that side of the position soon brought this movement to a standstill, and the majority of the enemy riflemen returned from whence they had emerged. In the meanwhile the remaining gun under Lieut. Butler himself was posted in a sangar, from where the plain to the west and the Ramans Drift Road could be commanded. The hostile artillery had now opened fire, and it was thought advisable to keep the machine gun pack animals and horses on the southern slope of the kopje, where they would be immune from shell fire from the north east. The majority of these animals were held by native horse holders, and stood in a compact group, when, without warning, an enemy machine gun from a position about 800 yards away, opened up on what must have been a splendid target. The natives abandoned the animals, and with a headlong rush sought refuge on the western slope of the kopje, where they remained under cover for the rest of the day. The horses then scattered in all directions, and soon fell victims to the murderous fire. Some succeeded in gaining the plain, where they started grazing between the opposing firing lines undisturbed by the fearful medley of sounds produced by the artillery, machine gun fire, and rifle fire. The hostile machine gun to the east, which was well concealed, now directed a searching fire over the south-eastern slopes of the kopje and the summit. It was one of these bursts that resulted in Lieut. Owen being dangerously wounded. It was subsequently found that this officer had permanently lost the sight of both eyes. The machine gun under Sergt. Pizzey endeavoured to cope with the hostile fire but with little success. Concealment was impossible, and Pizzey's gun was subjected to burst after burst of effective fire, with such effect that the gun was struck by a shower of bullets. The Continuous hostile machine gun fire from the east seemed to indicate that the enemy had many guns in action at this period. Their machine guns were well handled and their fire was one of the greatest factors in bringing about a situation that rapidly became more hopeless as the engagement progressed. The storm of bullets made any movement in the open impossible, and the control by fire of Unit Commanders was rendered very difficult. The cover on the kopje was very crude, comprised of sangars of loosely piled up stones and consequently far from bullet proof. Mention has already been made of the enemy's appearance on the plain from the north-west and of the driving in of the patrol of Lieut. Northway. On this side the enemy provided another bolt from the blue by bringing into action a second battery at about 8.30 a.m. The situation was critical as it was, but the arrival of a string of shells from this direction made the western and north-western face of the position a death-trap, not only for our two guns but also for the three hundred horses and mules that were collected at the foot of the kopje on this side. On the sandy flat at the foot of the kopje there was not a vestige of cover except that provided by the low wall of the enclosure, and a single small building which could not give security to more than a dozen men. Up to the present the animals had been sheltered from the hostile battery to the north-east by the northern slope of the Zandfontein kopje, but now the position of the horses and horse holders was indeed precarious. However, their destruction was deferred for the moment, as the enemy devoted all their attention to silencing our two guns. Immediately fire was opened from the north-west the one gun under Battery Sergt. Harris was turned on to the new target: the two guns were now almost tail to tail, firing at right angles to each other, and furnished with the stupendous task of engaging a battery each- themselves in a position that was perfectly open to gun fire. The range to this second hostile battery was somewhere about 3000 yards, and the enemy guns were clearly visible, with the result that the fire of our gun made things so uncomfortable that they withdrew behind the ridge in order to resort to the indirect and more orthodox method of applying their fire. For some considerable time the shooting of the enemy battery was indifferent, but gradually their fire became more accurate and completely enveloped our gun position in a shower of exploding percussion shrapnel. Our guns were exposed to a most deadly enfilade fire, against which the steel shields were of little value. The first casualties among the gunners occurred about this time, and the medical staff were now requisitioned. Headed by Captains Holcroft and Dalton, the S.A.M.C. doubled across the shrapnel swept area and succeeded in getting the wounded under cover of the wall of the enclosure, where first aid was promptly applied. The gun teams again came under fire, and under the direction of Lieut. Adler they were got away to the remainder at the foot of the kopje, where they were grouped, but not before several drivers and animals were hit. Attention must now be withdrawn from the guns in order to describe the events to the south west or Ramans Drift side of the position. The initial advance had been checked by our fire, but only temporarily, for gaining the shelter of the hills to the south parties of the enemy presently emerged from round the base in skirmishing order at a distance of about 1500 yards. Numerous trees and bushes dotted the plain on this side, and they were able to approach to within 300 yards of their objective. Collective fire was at once opened on these skirmishers by the troops under Lieut. Scott and Austin with some effect, as after the first line had been reinforced by several lines of riflemen their progress was slow. The machine gun under Lieut. Butler was instrumental in checking their advance to a great degree, though their work was difficult. Between 10 a.m. and 10.30 a party of the enemy suddenly appeared over a neck in the hills to the south, and with their rifles slung over their shoulders commenced to descend a rough path leading to a watercourse that ran at the foot of the hills. The range was only 1200 yards and the target a splendid one for collective rifle fire. The opportunity was soon taken advantage of, with the result that the Germans suffered many casualties. Some of them gained the shelter of the watercourse, whilst the rest hastily disappeared behind a knoll. Our machine gun and rifle fire at these longer ranges brought the hostile rifle fire attack to a complete standstill for a period of three hours, and the forward movement was only recommenced about noon under machine gun and artillery covering fire. Meanwhile the artillery duel continued without cessation. The enemy had by now gauged the position of our guns and directed such a deluge of fire on our two guns that one wondered that they remained in action as long as they did. At 10.30 a.m. the enemy scored a direct hit on the gun under Sergt. Major Harris, who was killed on the spot and the remainder of the gun crew were disabled. By this time the crew of the gun were greatly reduced by casualties, yet those who remained continued to work their gun with the greatest vigour. Our other gun, through being temporarily silenced, now opened out again, being worked by two spare files. Only a few rounds of ammunition were left. The guns continued action for another ten or fifteen minutes, and through the gunners sustaining a number of further casualties this unequal contest had to come to an end. The guns were now abandoned, and the few remaining details withdrew to the main kopje, where they continued the defence with their rifles. Before retiring, Lieut. Adler inflicted as much damage on the guns as to render them useless to the enemy. The two guns had been in action for three hours in an open position against four times their number, and were only silenced after the detachment had sustained casualties, which compelled them to abandon their two guns. Apart from the great volume of artillery fire the coming into action of an enemy machine gun on the Ramans Drift Road made the continuation of fire by our guns quite out of the question, and would have resulted in complete annihilation. They abandoned their guns none too soon, as the appearance of the machine gun made the position untenable, and the S.A.M.C. had to seek shelter with their wounded in the enclosure. Once inside they were compelled to remain with the wounded all that day on account of the hostility of the heavy fire on the kopje in the near vicinity. Now that our guns were silenced the hostile battery to the south-east ceased fire, whilst the other directed attention to the lines of animals which were grouped at the base of the kopje. The horse holders were soon compelled to leave their animals and seek shelter on the kopje itself, but this was not accomplished before several men were killed and wounded. About two hours shell fire sufficed for the total destruction of the horses and mules. Thus the defenders were rendered quite immobile by the destruction of their mounts. This wholesale slaughter was certainly the most heartrending incident of the day. The animals were quite indifferent of their fate and instead of breaking away seemed to collect and huddle together. About 11 a.m. the hostile artillery was seen moving across the plain to the south-west, evidently having been detached from the body of the enemy to the north west. Crossing the Ramans Drift Road, two guns quietly unlimbered on the plain to the south. They opened fire, which continued for two hours. By noon the enemy machine guns had established itself among the stony outcrops lining the Ramans Drift Road, and it was difficult to locate. By the cover of their artillery the enemy approached to within 600 yards of our position. Lieut. Butler with his machine gun endeavoured to suppress their fire, but he was silenced by a rain of shrapnel fire from the German guns. Our riflemen were now compelled to resort to sharpshooting, and by working in pairs did some admirable shooting, which time and again held up the German advance, although exposed to shell and machine gun fire. About midday distant machine gun fire was heard, but it grew fainter and fainter, showing that the attempt had failed. It was at noon that Colonel Grant was wounded by machine gun fire from the south, and the command devolved upon Capt. Welby. Late in the afternoon Col. Grant again assumed command. In the early part of the afternoon Lieut. Northway, finding himself in danger of being cut off, endeavoured to gain the main column with three men of his command. They were all killed by machine gun fire and the remainder of his patrol were captured by the enemy. Between 1 p.m. and 2 p.m. a distinct lull occurred. The enemy used the time for making new dispositions and having a meal. No such relief for our men. They had passed a sleepless night marching, and were hungry and thirsty. Owing to the sudden commencement of the action they had had no time to fill their water bottles. The heat of the sun on the ironstone rocks was terrific, and the situation was made almost unbearable owing to the absence of shade. At 2 p.m. the enemy again opened with their artillery, and they commenced a systematic search of the kopjes. The shelling was continued unceasingly throughout the afternoon, and although little material damage was caused excellent covering fire was provided for their skirmishers. The result of the artillery fire only accounted for two men being killed through a direct hit, though three thousand shells must have been directed on our position. By 5 p.m. matters became very critical for our troops. By this time the Germans had got to within three hundred yards of our position, and the only possible further progress to be made by them was an assault with the bayonet. This measure they seemed very averse to undertaking against our troops, they were relying on their artillery and machine gun fire to bring the action to a conclusive end. All kinds of fire at this period was very intense. About 5.30 p.m. the enemy advanced a section of mountain guns to within 1200 yards of the northern face of the kopje, and in conjunction with the other guns a terrific and concentrated bombardment on the summit of the kopje was commenced. The ten hours engagement thus entered on its last phase. The enemy now employed high explosive shell, and to those on the lower slopes of the kopje the summit appeared like an active volcano. The shells burst in salvoes of four at a time. Rocks of enormous size were flung in all directions, and dozens of boulders were sent rolling down the slopes, placing the defenders at the base of the kopje in every danger of being crushed to death. The effect of the shellfire on the summit of the kopje in a short space of time altered its appearance. Colonel Grant, Capts. Turner-Jones and Geary, and Lieut. Wakefield (and Owen) were wounded. Meanwhile the enemy machine gun and rifle fire was redoubled, and though every effort was made to reply to it the situation was now recognised to be hopeless. Hemmed on all sides, without food and water, with no hope of being relieved, no good purpose would seem to be served by continuing a contest in which the defending side had held on to an untenable position for ten hours against a much superior force in men and guns. Shortly before 6 p.m. the raising of the white flag brought the action to a close. There was little or no demonstration on the part of the enemy. The last rays of the setting sun showed both sides making one dash for the well at the foot of the kopje, where British and Germans mingled together to quench their terrible thirsts. Every consideration was given the prisoners under the circumstances, an excellent example being set by Colonel Heydenbrecht, the German leader, who congratulated Colonel Grant on his gallant defence. At 8 o'clock that night the prisoners were marched off into the interior under a strong escort. The rank and file walked, whilst the officers were provided with horses. Captains Holcroft and Dalton, assisted by Lieut. Cowley, remained behind to attend the wounded. The British casualties amounted to sixty-seven, or twenty-two per cent of the force, sixteen were killed and died of wounds. The Germans published a casualty list of sixty, including fourteen dead, among whom was Major von Ruppart, one of the best known German officers. The enemy forces that took part in the action amounted to ten guns, four machine guns and 1700 rifles. The dead were buried the following day, the British being afforded the same honours as the Germans. So Austin was a Prisoner of War. A photo exists of those officers who were taken at Zandfontein and who were imprisoned. On the German surrender at Otavi on 9 July 1915 the P.O.W.’s were released and Austin returned home for a brief period of respite and recuperation only to be back in the thick of things early the next year. On 25 January 1916 he was appointed A.D.C. to Brigadier Berrange; General Officer Commanding the 3rd Infantry Brigade tasked with taking the war to Otto von Lettow Vorbeck, the wily German commander in East Africa. 
To this end he embarked for East Africa on 7 February 1916 attached to the Headquarters Staff. As was common for European combatants and men in what was essentially a tropical cess pit; Austin contracted Malaria which laid him low and necessitated his return to the Union. Once back in South Africa he was attached to the P.O.W. camp at Pietermaritzburg – the shoe was now on the other foot. So good was the work that he did here that he was recommended by the Officer Commanding the camp for “good works during the riots” – nothing is known about this but it can be safely assumed that there was an attempt by the German prisoners to disrupt camp life and Austin had played a role in containing the disruption. Austin stayed for the remainder of the war which ended on 11 November 1918 in Pietermaritzburg. He passed away at Grey’s Hospital in that city on 18 February 1920 at the age of 40 years and 7 months. His obituary in the Nonquai magazine January – July 1920 read thus:- “We regret to record the death of Lieut. W.G.B. Austin, 3rd S.A.M.R., which occurred at Grey’s Hospital, Pietermaritzburg, on February 18th last, from heart failure. The deceased saw service during the South African War from 1900 to 1902, being an active participant in the operations in the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony for which he obtained the Queens and Kings medals (two clasps to each). He joined the C.M.P. in July 1906, and subsequently transferred to the S.A.M.R. in which force he received promotion to commissioned rank in 1913. He was one of the S.A.M.R. officers present at Sandfontein, when the enemy surrounded the position and after severe fighting which resulted in casualties to sixty seven of the Union men (or twenty two percent of the force) the remainder were forced to surrender. Lieut. Austin was among the officers who spent several months in captivity before being released by the invading Union forces. In 1916 he was seconded for service to the S.A.I. Service Contingent and left for East Africa in January of that year as A.D.C. to Brigadier General Berrange, Officer Commanding the 3rd S.A.I. Brigade. A severe attack of malaria fever caused him to return. Lieut. Austin was an artist of considerable ability and his drawings frequently appeared in THE NONQUAI. A collection of his East African sketches was recently republished by us as a brochure entitled “Brain Waves”. One of his most delightful artistic efforts was a newspaper entitled the “Outjo Observer” which he was largely responsible for while a prisoner of war in the hands of the Germans in the South West territory. We extend to Mrs Austin our sincere sympathies in her bereavement.” Wilfred Graham Bertram Austin had undeniably made his contribution to the world. He was survived by his wife and two very young children – Katherine Lila born on 18 September 1914 and Francis De Villiers born on 25 July 1918 all who lived at St. Patrick’s Road, Scotsville, Pietermaritzburg. His wife, writing to the executor of the estate in May 1920 had this to add:- “You will see by the above address that I’m teaching in the Boys’ School (Paarl), as I got no pension from the government, although my husband’s health suffered from the effects of malaria contracted while on active service in East Africa. Perhaps if I’d known General Smuts personally I may have got something!” 
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A Border Scouts and a POW at Sandfontein - Lt. W.G.B. Austin's story 6 years 6 months ago #56184
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A Border Scouts and a POW at Sandfontein - Lt. W.G.B. Austin's story 6 years 6 months ago #56185
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A Border Scouts and a POW at Sandfontein - Lt. W.G.B. Austin's story 6 years 6 months ago #56225
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