ACTION OF MAGERSFONTEIN—CHANGE OF PLANS
Later on the same day, I received the intelligence of Lord Methuen’s failure at Magersfontein. I at once telegraphed that he must either attack Cronje or fall back to Orange River, since it would be better to lose Kimberley than to hazard the isolation of his force. I also telegraphed to General Forestier-Walker that, if Lord Methuen did retire, I regarded the first phase of the campaign as closed, and that both Methuen and Gatacre must take up tactical posts and prepare movable columns to operate around them. “ Through no fault of ours,” I said, “ the enemy had the initiative, and has used it well. We have staying power, and must now use that.” The fact was that on landing I found a desperate situation. I endeavoured to retrieve it by desperate measures. If these measures failed, we must fall back upon our staying power.
Lord Methuen’s misfortune, however, following as it did upon that of General Gatacre, sensibly affected my position. With an enemy disheartened by failure, I thought myself warranted, in the peculiar circumstances, in risking a flank march of fifty miles with an enormous waggon train, even though it might involve the uncovering of my communications. With an enemy elated by success, this was no longer justifiable. I, therefore, determined to try to force the direct road to Ladysmith, and reported as much by telegram to the Secretary of State on the 13th. In a letter to the Secretary of State of the same day, I added that, whether I succeeded or failed, the time had come, both in Natal and Cape Colony, to stand on the defensive until the winter, and to organise and train mobile troops. “ From my point of view,” I wrote —and I would respectfully call the attention of the Commission to the date on which these words were written—“ it will be better to lose Ladysmith altogether than to throw Natal open to the enemy.”
Holding such views, whether rightly or wrongly, I felt that my first duty was to keep Southern Natal clear of the enemy, and that, consequently, I must keep at least 10,000 men, or one- half of the force at my disposal, in Natal, in a fit state to defend the Colony. Necessarily, my powers were circumscribed by this condition; but I conceived that, with the active co-operation of Sir George White, I was still strong enough to extricate his force from its position at Ladysmith. His sick and wounded were safe, his men were inured to war, and, when once he started, his only care would be to force his way to the river, 16 miles down hill. My troops, on the other hand, were without experience of war; I had the whole care of protecting Natal upon my shoulders, and I should have to fight the whole way from the Tugela to Ladysmith up hill, and that a hill which offered extraordinary natural advantages to the defence. I decided, therefore, to effect a lodgment, if possible, on the other side of the Tugela, and, if I succeeded in doing this, to direct Hunter to take command of the Ladysmith garrison, and march along the watershed to Onderbrook, while I myself marched simultaneously upon the same point. From my knowledge of the Boers I felt assured that, if attacked at one and the same time by Hunter from the north and by myself from the south, they would never maintain their position. But until I had secured my lodgment on the other side of the river, I did not feel justified in calling upon the Ladysmith garrison to move. The risk to them would, I felt, be too great.
Careful reconnaissance had convinced me (and my judgment was borne out in my final advance) that a little to the west of the Colenso position, and on the north bank of the Tugela, there was a space large enough for me to bivouac my force in shelter from any fire from the north and west. This space I resolved to seize for my lodgment. For actual attack on the Colenso position Hlangwane Hill offered the best advantage, but the utilisation of Hlangwane involved bush fighting and a previous occupation of Monte Christo, or, in other words, an extension of my front along a line of five miles, and also involved a departure from the only roads along which Sir George White expected to be able to render me any assistance. I did not think that my men, raw as they were, were ready for bush-fighting, nor that I had troops sufficient for so extended and so isolated a movement. But the moment that I had effected my lodgment, my design was to attack and occupy the west side of the Hlangwane, so as to shelter my chosen position from fire from that side. This done, I should have summoned Hunter to me, and we should have attacked the Boers Simultaneously, as I have already explained.
On the 14th I received a telegram from the Secretary of State that General Warren had been directed, upon landing, to take command of Lord Methuen’s force, and that it was considered advisable for both Lord Methuen and General Gatacre to be employed on the lines of communication in future. I was not consulted as to this order, and it was directly at variance with an opinion I had given on the 6th. I could only construe it as an order for General Warren’s division, as well as its commander, to join Lord Methuen’s force, and I altered my instructions to that division accordingly, though I demurred to the supersession of Lord Methuen. On the same day I received a telegram from Lord Methuen to the effect that he would require more than a complete division to make a successful attack, and that he therefore elected to retire. But he evidently was confident of his ability to hold his own and maintain his communications; and I readily consented to General Forestier-Walker’s suggestion, received on the same day, that he should stand his ground and be reinforced by the 10th Brigade as soon as it arrived. On this same day I received welcome news of a successful little action fought by French’s force, and in congratulating him and his officers, I urged him above all to worry the Boers.
On that evening I assembled my commanders, and in the presence of them all explained to each his part in the dispositions for the morrow. Each commander with his. troops was to occupy a specified place, and to await the result of a general bombardment before leaving it.
