PLAN of OPERATIONS
[See Q15100]
Very reluctantly, therefore, I decided to divide my forces. By the 10th November I had definitely determined upon my plans. These were to send Lord Methuen with one full division to advance along the western railway to Kimberley, throw into it a few naval guns of long range, which the Admiral had kindly placed at my disposal, together with their crews and a reinforcement of a battalion and a half. This done, he was to return immediately to the Orange River, bringing with him such of the natives and non- combatants as Colonel Kekewich might wish to send out of the town. I considered that Kimberley, thus strengthened, would be perfectly safe against any attack, and would be, so to speak, off my hands until the time should come for the general advance. My information was that Cronje was in the neighbourhood of Mafeking, and that the largest force by which Lord Methuen was likely to be opposed did not exceed 4,000 men. I gave him a supply-column sufficient to carry five days’ supplies. Five days’ supplies can always be made to last for seven, and men can always carry one extra day’s rations. Hence I hoped that on arrival at the Modder Lord Methuen would be able to leave the railway and approach Kimberley by whatever route might scorn(? appear/appeal) to him most advantageous. A sufficient force of mounted men I could not give him, for I had none to give.
So much for the Western Railway and for Kimberley. As to the Midland Railway, the hostility of the Dutch districts of Graaf Reinet and Cradock was such that I abandoned the idea of using it for a time, and withdrew from it most of the rolling stock. But to hinder the advance of the Boors then at Colesberg upon these districts I placed General French in command at Naauwpoort, with orders further to train the Cavalry Division, as it should arrive, in the work required of it. He was not to attempt an engagement, but to teach his men to manoeuvre, and by harassing tactics to worry the Boers, if possible, out of Colesberg. The Eastern Railway I held as far north as Queenstown, where I placed General Gatacre in command to cover East London and the English settlers in King Williamstown and the adjacent districts. His instructions were to run no risks, to raise as many Volunteers as he could, and to worry and obstruct the enemy as much as possible. On Lord Methuen’s return from Kimberley it was my design that he should clear the northern districts of Cape Colony by working from Orange River eastward, and seize the bridges for the ultimate advance. I arranged accordingly for the accumulation of supplies for him at Orange River, De Aar, Port Elizabeth, and East London, so that he should open now lines of supply as he moved eastward. The work of clearing accomplished, he was to concentrate at Bethulie for an advance on Bloemfontein.
For the work in Natal I appointed General Clery with three brigades.
It will be observed that these operations, if successful, would have restored the situation to that which existed before the opening of the war, and upon which the whole plan of the campaign, as formulated in England, had been based. Had the two colonies been garrisoned according to a systematic scheme of defence, as I recommended in July, 1899, no such operations would have been necessary. I need hardly add that if the enemy had chosen to press their advantages, and to advance boldly both in Natal and Cape Colony during the fortnight that followed the 30th October, it would have been extremely difficult for me to have prevented them, from sheer lack of troops. As it was, I could only hold the all-important crossing at Orange River Bridge, and make a show of protection on the Eastern Railway by leaving my bases in Cape Colony unguarded.
GENERAL SITUATION 22ND NOVEMBER—DEPARTURE FOR DURBAN
[See Q15126]
On the 9th November the first troops arrived from England, and by the 20th a sufficient number had disembarked to ward off the peril that had hitherto hung over us. On that day Lord Methuen was almost ready to proceed on his march upon Kimberley; Naauwpoort had been occupied just in time on the 18th; and General French was at De Aar organising a flying column to operate against the Boer commando at Colesberg. Queenstown was held by General Gatacre with a battalion and a half, besides Volunteers. In Natal, where General Clery had assumed command, General Hildyard with his whole brigade had reached Estcourt, and Lyttelton’s and Barton’s brigades had either arrived at Durban or were on their way thither from Cape Town. One and all of these forces were sadly deficient in mounted men, but that I could not help. On the 22nd, after leaving an appreciation of the situation with General Forestier-Walker for his guidance, I embarked for Natal, where the Generals had from the first urgently requested my presence.
The situation in Natal was, indeed, far from comfortable. The Boers had passed south of the Tugela as early as the 1st November, and had now about 8,000 men in a strong position about 16 miles west of Estcourt, some 800 at Weenen, who were threatening the railway between Weston and Estcourt, and about 1,000 on the Blaaukrantz River north of Frere. On the 21st General Clery had reported that Estcourt was seriously threatened, and that he was apprehensive that the railway might be cut behind him. Our want of mounted men made it impossible to deal with so mobile an enemy as the Boers, and it was not until one party encamped on General Hildyard’s communications at Highlands that it was possible to strike at them. He seized his opportunity with great promptitude, and attacked them on the night of the 22nd-23rd. Tactically the attack was not wholly successful, but General Hildyard gained his object, for the enemy at once evacuated the position and retreated in two bodies through Weenen and Ulundi to the north of the Tugela.
ARRIVAL AT DURBAN, 2OTH NOVEMBER—PREPARATIONS AND PLANS
[See Q15142]
I was met by this welcome news when I landed at Durban at 7 p.m., November 25th, and on the 26th I reported it in a letter of that date. My original intention had been to send the Colonial troops (which from the moment of my arrival in South Africa I had been raising in Natal and Cape Colony) through Zululand to occupy a position near Helpmakaar, while I attacked on the line of the Tugela, and I had hoped by this operation to relieve Ladysmith without difficulty. I was encouraged in this design by the result of General Hildyard's action, which showed that a force of Boers, even though commanded by their Commandant- General in person, would not, even after a tactical success, hold their positions with our troops on both sides of them.
On arrival at Maritzburg I found this plan would be impossible. First, the number of Colonials raised was less than I expected. Next, owing to the effects of the rinderpest, it was practically impossible to obtain sufficient ox-waggons for such a supply-column as the advance through Zululand would have required. As it was, I was obliged in the Dutch districts to use my powers of impressment under martial law to obtain the waggons absolutely necessary even for a direct advance along the railway. In Natal the entire staff equipment of an army had to be created. The whole of the local staff, except the Ordnance officer, was with Sir George White in Ladysmith. My own staff had been dispersed for urgent duties in Cape Colony. It seemed, from such scanty information as I could get, that the garrison of Ladysmith could be maintained on full rations till the end of the year, and for an uncertain time longer in a state of increasing starvation.
On the 30th November Sir George White caught my flashing signals, and, having deciphered a fragment of a message from me, sent me his message numbered P 20. This I received on the 4th December. I interpreted it to signify that he was unable to take the field, and could make no plans. I therefore inferred that it was inadvisable for me to communicate my plans to him, but noted that he specially recommended me to advance either through Colenso or through Springfield. On the 7th December I succeeded in opening heliographic communication with Ladysmith, and I repeated my former telegram announcing the formation of the relieving force, but elicited no satisfactory answer.
On the 1st December I had written to General Clery that I inclined more and more to the project of crossing the Tugela at Potgieter’s Drift, but that we must first worry the Boers by bombardment and by every possible form of annoyance. But already a new element of danger had shown itself in the organisation of a Boer force, of uncertain strength, to attack Tugela Ferry from Helpmakaar. By the 4th December we had arranged for base hospitals, collected sufficient transport, established an intelligence department, formed a corps of guides, and compiled and printed a map. On that day I left Maritzburg for Frere (letter of December 2nd to War Office).
SITUATION IN CAPE COLONY
[See Q15176]
I now revert to Cape Colony, where during my stay at Maritzburg the situation had defined itself more clearly, and revealed increasing complications.
The western districts were passing under Boer control.
Barkly Bast was reported to be in open rebellion. Methuen, after two successes at Belmont and Enslin, had fought at Modder River an action by which he seemed to have been staggered. Ha had been wounded, but not severely. Reinforcements were reaching him, but he was not pushing on. Cronje appeared to have got to the south of Kimberley from Mafeking, but I thought that Methuen exaggerated the numbers opposed to him. He asked for howitzers, but none had arrived.
On the 1st December General Forestier-Walker reported that the Burghersdorp commando had occupied Steynsberg and were creeping south, and that Sir Alfred Milner was apprehensive of their occupying the Dutch districts. I replied by ordering French on the west and Gatacre on the east, each of them to close inward upon Middleburg and Henning Station respectively, so as to threaten the enemy upon both flanks.
On the 2nd December the enemy occupied Dordrecht, which, naturally made Gatacre, who was then at Putter’s Kraal, apprehensive for his right flank.
On the 5th Methuen reported 8,000 to 10,000 men in front of him.
On the 7th General Forestier-Walker reported that Methuen’s communications had been interfered with, and that the security of Gatacre’s right was more closely threatened.
On the 8th he reported that the enemy on Gatacre’s front and flank was increasing, but that French was holding his own and something more, and that Methuen had been reinforced and his communications restored.
On the 9th I telegraphed to General Forestier-Walker that I wished the bulk of the 5th Division, when it arrived, to land at Port Elizabeth, and proceed thence to Rosmead; but that one brigade and one battery should land at East London and proceed thence to such point as General Gatacre should direct.
On the 10th General Gatacre failed in an attempt to surprise Stormberg, and fell back, with some loss, to Bushman’s Hoek, I therefore changed my orders with regard to the 5th Division. On the same day I reported to the Secretary of State my views as to the arrival of a 6th Division. I also received from General Forestier-Walker a message to the effect that Mr. Rhodes had signalled, through the High Commissioner, his objections to my design for clearing non-combatants out of Kimberley. I replied that it was a question of keeping the flag flying in South Africa and not of showing favour to any set of capitalists.
On the 12th Lord Methuen fought his unsuccessful action at Magersfontein.
On the 13th there came disquieting news that the disaffection in the eastern border of Cape Colony was spreading to the native territories. If the natives became seriously restless, it was certain that the overland line of telegraph between Cape Colony and Natal would be intercepted.
DELAGOA BAY
[See Q15186]
Such, briefly, was the course of events in Cape Colony while I was preparing for my advance in Natal. I must premise, before entering upon the narrative of my operations, that I had, on the 3rd of November, urged upon the Secretary of State that the blockade of Delagoa Bay would be of essential service to me. I now pressed this suggestion again upon him on the 1st, and yet again on the 8th December, adding that the advantage would be cheaply bought, whatever the cost of pecuniary compensation to Portugal. The ends which I reckoned to attain by the blockade were these: The isolation of the Transvaal and the hopelessness of foreign intervention would be brought home to that State; its supplies of war material and of foodstuffs would be cut off; uneasiness and distrust would certainly ensue, and all the more, if I should succeed in inflicting a sharp blow on the fighting men of the Eastern Transvaal who lay before me; and thus, by the time that I had disposed of the Orange Free State, the Transvaal’s powers of resistance, both moral and physical, would have been so much impaired as to promise some hope of ending the war without a fight to extermination. Reverting now to Natal, I had definitely decided to move to the relief of Sir George White by way of Potgieter’s Drift. On the 7th I established proper heliographic communication with him, and told him that I expected to start with that object on the 12th, and that I should take five days. I repeated this message on the 9th, and, in reply to an inquiry from him on the 10th, I gave him, on the 11th, a forecast of my movements in detail, but warned him that I might meet with unexpected delay. On the 10th, Waschbank Bridge, on the line of the Boers’ railway communications, was successfully blown up by my directions. On the 12th, I moved General Barton’s brigade two miles beyond Chieveley, together with some Naval guns, in the hope that the latter might be able to shell the Colenso position. On the same day, I wrote to the Secretary of State that I had determined to leave this brigade in position before Colenso, and march, on the night of the 13th, with the remainder of my' force, upon Potgieter’s Drift, some twenty-five miles distant.
