TOPIC:

There is an article by Pat Irwin of the SAMHS that states that researcher JS Maphalala is the only person who referred to source documentation and places the blame squarely on the shoulders of Shepstone.

Part extract from SAMHS Journal on Holkrans

Hugh/ Everhard

I have now done some more research into the Holkrans/Holkrantz Incident and my personal opinion is that it was, quoting the Leeds Mercury of 29 January 1903, an “ugly incident of the war” from which none of the three parties involved (British, Boers & Zulus) came away from with credit – the possible exception being the Boers who taken almost by surprise managed to kill nearly an equal number of Zulus.

Firstly to quote another paragraph from Pat Irwin’s SAMHS article:

“After the engagement, a British Commission of Enquiry was convened which, according to Maphalala, after ignoring some of the crucial evidence – not surprising given the sentiments of the time – concluded that the Boers had been killed because they had been ill-treating the amaZulu and thus brought reprisals upon themselves. Amongst the crucial evidence not taken into account was that provided by some of the Boers and that Magistrate Shepstone was not only complicit in allowing Sikobobo to proceed to Holkrantz, when in terms of the prevailing armistice, British troops should have prevented the attack, but also that the three prisoners were taken on instructions of Shepstone. Another item ignored was the Boer contention that relations between the Zulus and the Boers were good prior to British interference and arming of the Zulus. Boers testified to the Commission that despite being alone on their farms while their men were away on commando, no Boer women or children had been attacked, harmed or ill-treated by the Zulus. Maphalala also makes no mention of any Boer insults as suggested by some writers.”

That the Zulus did not harm any Boer women or children whilst their men were away is to the Zulus credit but is not necessarily evidence that there was a good relationship between the Boers & Zulus – in fact there was a bad relationship between the two with both parties seeing each other’s livestock as fair game, admittedly the situation was not helped by the British supplying arms to the Zulus.

Maphalala obviously perused the British Commission of Enquiry report (or Lt-Colonel A G Mill’s Report as I previously referred to it). From the evidence of the newspaper cuttings I supplied, the report referred to the insult delivered to Chief Sikobobo by Jan Potgieter as contributing to the Zulu attack but Maphalala seems to either ignore or overlook this by making no mention of it in his thesis.
Here is another report of the incident included in an online paper entitled “Zululand And The Anglo- Boer War (1899-1902)” by A de V Minnaar of the Institute for Historical Research (Human Sciences Research Council). (Today Anthony Minnaar appears to be an Academic Associate in the Criminology and Criminal Justice Department of the University of Limpopo.)

"The Holkrans Incident

"In February 1902 Gen Louis Botha returned to the Vryheid district and renewed efforts were made by British columns to apprehend him. On 5 March 1902 Gen Hamilton arrived in Vryheid with a large force and asked Dinizulu [King of the Zulu Nation] to send 250 men to join his column to help in the work of capturing Boer livestock. With Sir Charles Saunders’ permission, an impi led by Dinizulu’s uncle, Ndabuko, Ndabankulu and Dinizulu’s white secretary, Gilbert, were sent to assist Hamilton. When the force reached Ngenetsheni the impi was placed under command of a British intelligence officer, F J Symmonds. The Zulu were instructed to march alongside the British column, collect livestock and take prisoner any Boer commandos they intercepted. During these operations Dinizulu’s Zulus were joined by an impi of the Qulusi chief Sikhobobo. These operations in March precipitated a complete breakdown in the relations between the Vryheid Boer commando bands and the Qulusi, who had provided valuable intelligence to Dinizulu’s spies throughout the war and had joined with the Zulu force accompanying Gen Hamilton’s column.

"At the end of April the greater part of the Vryheid and Utrecht commandos, on the orders of Gen Botha burnt down Chief Sikhobobo’s kraal at Qulusini, seized 3,800 head of cattle and 1,000 sheep and goats, and drove the chief and his people to seek shelter with the British garrison at Vryheid. It was only a matter of days before this attack on the Qulusi was avenged. On the evening of 5 May 1902 Sikhobobo informed the magistrate at Vryheid, A J Shepstone, that he was taking a party of men outside the town to try to recover some of his stolen cattle. That night a Qulusi impi of 300 men attacked a commando of seventy Boers under Field-Cornet Jan Potgieter laagered at Holkrans (Ntatshana), some twenty kilometres north of Vryheid. The Zulus surrounded the Boer laager intending to surprise them but a premature shot gave the Boers some warning. Nevertheless the Zulus used the darkness to creep in close and practically wipe out the commando. In this attack 56 Boers, most of them local farmers, were killed and 3 taken prisoner while all the cattle at the camp were driven off. The Zulu impi suffered the loss of 52 killed and 48 wounded."

The references the author gives at the end of these two paragraphs are:

T Warwick, Black People and the South African War, p.91
Maphalala, Participation of Zulus in the Anglo-Boer War, pp. 118-119
Bulpin, Shaka’s Country, p.262
T. Pakenham, The Boer War (London, 1979), p.567.

Thus we can see Maphalala’s thesis is wide ranging and only a small part is devoted to the incident in question. I can’t help wondering if the “39 source references” Pat Irwin reported were used by Maphalala covered the whole of his thesis rather than just two pages.

We need to take another look at Lieutenant-Colonel George Arthur Mills (GAM) and his sketchbook. GAM, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, was mentioned in Lord Robert’s first despatch (Gazetted 8 February 1901) – as “a capable, zealous Officer, who has not been fortunate in having chances offered to him, but will, I think, prove worthy of the first chance that comes”.

GAM was mentioned in Kitchener’s last despatch (Gazetted 18 July 1902).

“Nothing whatever of importance has happened during the past month on the Natal frontier, where Lieutenant-Colonel G. A. Mills has assumed command of the column hitherto under the charge of Colonel Colville. This force has, since the middle of April, remained in observation of the local-Boers who are still frequenting the Utrecht district. Six prisoners and some horses and stock were taken by Colonel Mills at Holkrantz (123) on the 3rd May, as the result of a night march through the mountains to the east of Utrecht. On the 6th May, a party of guides and local farmers, supported by a detachment of Imperial Yeomanry, made a successful night expedition from Mullens Pass to Wagenmaker's Vlei, across the '"Orange River Colony boundary, which led to"-the capture of Field-Cornet Meintjes, two Free State Artillery men, and two other burghers.”

So on 3 May GAM and the forces under his command were in action at Holkrantz (123) not far from Holkrantz (210) – see map previously posted. This from GAM’s sketchbook:



In the bottom right hand corner – “Holkrantz 121, 3 May 1902, GAM” (I presume GAM meant to write Holkrantz 123 but he does make the same mistake again, see below.)

I really am struggling with the faint writing:

Bottom middle “M. I. & Pom-pom” - definite
Towards top left “Schurumberg” – best guess
Towards top right “60 Boers from here” – best guess
Underneath at right angles “Holkrantz, ?0 Boers, J Degafor in command” – the ? could be 1 or 2 and Degafor is a best guess.
Far right at right angles “Holkrantz” with word underneath crossed out.

The next page is another simple sketch also dated 3rd May 1902 and titled “Pivaan Poort from Langbult” and at right angles across the top of the sketch “Pivaan Poort”, “Mooihoek I” and “Schurveberg” – the last showing one of my previous best guesses was a little out.

The next page is a sketch dated 15 May 1902 entitled “Blood River Poort” with Holkrantz 121 pointed out, followed by a view from Sheepers Nek dated 14 May 1902 and then one entitled “The fight at Lang’s Farm 2nd April 1901”. I presume for the last the date refers to when the fight occurred rather than when the sketch was completed.

The next sketch is a panoramic landscape, dated 15 July 1902 and entitled “Holkrantz 210” with “Place where fight took place 6th May 1902” highlighted. This is followed by the sketch I posted previously highlighting the positions of the Boers & Zulus on the 6 May 1902.

I wonder if these last two were GAM taking his task regarding the inquiry seriously and trying to work out in detail what happened on the day.

Having said that I do feel it was rather inappropriate, as commander of the local British forces, for GAM to in effect chair the inquiry, surely he should have been called as a witness to answer questions such as “Were you and your forces ever asked to intervene?” etc. etc.

If anybody knows where I could find a copy of the British Commission Enquiry Report and Maphalala’s thesis I would be very grateful.

Below is the link to Lt-Colonel George Arthur Mills’s sketchbook which also gives some information about his military career. I can add he was born in India on 25 March 1855. He was the son of a soldier employed by the East India Company who died when Geroge was only a few years old. His paternal grandfather was an alumni of Cambridge University who for a time was Headmaster of Exeter Grammar School before taking Holy Orders. George’s mother brought the family back to England and at the time of the 1871 Census they were living in the fashionable part of Bristol (Clifton). He passed away on 19 September 1927 whilst living near Reading in Berkshire.

collection.nam.ac.uk/detail.php?acc=1958-01-4-2

Here is his 1911 photo – as you can see his QSA medal bore 5 clasps – Orange Free State, Transvaal, Tugela Heights, Relief of Ladysmith, Laing’s Nek.

Long and short seems that the emotions surrounding this incident have obscured the truth. There are two SAMH journals that have conflicting views, one by Irwin and one by Smith. The looting of cattle is certain, the taunts are possible but remain conjecture. Allowing the attack to take place at this juncture was a failure in British command and as you mentioned a Commission chaired by a not entirely impartial individual, given the slaughter may be called into question. I guess there was culpability on all sides but the political ramifications down the line were very real.
If you ever manage to get a copy of the thesis and commission reports, I would be very interested in seeing them.

Previously I had only skimmed through the previous thread mentioned by Everhard and entitled "The Battle of Holkrans". This evening I read every word and it helped enormously with my understanding of the significance of the incident. I was also pleased to find the following document posted by QSAMike who possesses D Coetze's ABO. Sadly part of the document appears to be hidden from view. Mike made no comment regarding the document but it is the only time George Arthur Mills in effect receives a mention in the previous thread.



In future in my posts I shall only refer to the war as the South African War of 1899-1902.

I recommend others who have persevered this far do as I have done:

www.angloboerwar.com/forum/8-events/177-...-of-holkrans?start=0

The most interesting unanswered questions in relation to the Holkrans killings on May 6, 1902, pertain to the role played therein by British authorities and notably A.J. Shepstone, the British-appointed Magistrate of the Vryheid district.


A.J.Shepstone

Couple of facts:

-The tacit “only white men fighting” agreement between the British and Boers that had been in force from the beginning of the war in an effort to keep the natives from actively participating in the hostilities, was increasingly breached by both sides as the war progressed. By May 1902 this agreement had all but completely broken down in the Vryheid district, with the British authorities liberally supplying firearms and ammunition to pro-British Zulu factions. Among the latter figured the AbaQulusi’s under Chief Sikhobobo.


Sikhobobo

-Back and forth cattle rustling between Zulus and Boers had been going on for years in the Vryheid district. The herds with Potgieter at Holkrans on the day of the attack were taken from the Zulus but part, if not all, of these herds previously had been taken from Boers in the area who may, or may not, have taken these from the Zulus some time before.

-Cattle rustling operations by the Zulus in the later stages of the war were regularly carried out by a combined British-Zulu force. (The AbaQulusi Zulus under Sikhobobo are referred to by S.J. Maphalala as Mr. Shepstone’s Commando, Wassermann goes as far as stating that Sikobobo and his men were “part of Shepstone’s force”)

-Although cattle rustling habitually resulted in casualties on both sides, as far as I could determine, none had resulted in large scale human slaughter.

-A de-facto armistice was in place from before the Klerksdorp Conference in April 1902, and was maintained thereafter pending the follow-up negotiations in Vereeniging. Boer as well as British civil and military authorities in the Vryheid district were aware of that.

- Sikhobobo and his AbaQulusi were in May 1902 accommodated in the railway station buildings in Vryheid under the protection of Major General Bruce Hamilton and District Magistrate A.J. Shepstone.

-On the eve of the attack on Potgieter’s commando at Holkrans, Sikhobobo met with Shepstone before heading north with an impi of about 300 AbaQulusi.

-On arrival at Holkrans, a council of war was held by Sikhobobo before the attack on the bivouac of the commando of Potgieter was launched at 04:00.

-The AbaQulusi attack was executed according to the “Horns of the Buffalo” tactic which has as sole design to encircle and annihilate enemy forces.

Evaluation:
A crucial aspect in establishing the degree of A.J. Shepstone’s culpability, if any, in the Holkrans killings is the meeting between him and Sikhobobo on the eve of the attack. Who called it? what was agreed?
The hierarchy between the British and the abaQulusi at the time can be gleaned from the fact that chief Sikhobobo and his abaQulusis were at the time dependent on Shepstone in terms of arms and ammunition supply, shelter and protection. With the war clearly nearing its conclusion with an inevitable British victory, and perhaps with post-war British/Zulu relationship already in mind, it seems unlikely that a man with the cunning and intelligence of Sikhobobo would not have heeded Shepstone’s advise or instructions regarding an intended raid on Boer positions. The fact that a meeting between him and Shepstone took place on the eve of the attack only underlines that Sikhobobo was at the time not in a position to raise his Impi and head north to fetch cattle under Boer guard at Holkrans without, at a minimum, consent of the British authorities in the District.

So, it can safely be deduced that the District Magistrate A.J. Shepstone was aware that a raid on the Boer commando at Holkrans was to take place by Zulus using firearms that had been supplied by the British. It is also clear that Shepstone had all the leverage over Sikhobobo he needed to prevent such raid from being carried out, but knowingly and willingly ignored the reasons (the-facto armistice and potential harm such raid could do to the peace negotiation process) to do so. This, at a minimum, makes him co-responsible for what happened at Holkrans.

Now what if the meeting on the eve of the attack was called by Shepstone rather than by Sikhobobo? To take this one step further; what if Shepstone was behind the apparent change of the objective of the operation from recuperating a herd of cattle to the annihilation of a commando? Certainly, Shepstone’s title was that of Magistrate, but he was also a spymaster who, with the support of his local military intelligence officer, J. Roberts, had organized an extensive spy network among the Zulu inhabitants of the Vryheid district. With spies directly reporting to him, Shepstone possibly knew of the exact location of Potgieter’s commando even before Sikhobobo did and from that perspective it is possible to imagine that he saw an opportunity to strike at the Boers without direct British involvement and to that purpose called the meeting with Sikhobobo.


It is possible that Shepstone only informed Sikhobobo of the location of Potgieter’s commando and/or consented to the abaQulusis to undertake a raid to get “his” herd of cattle back. This could have been achieved with much fewer casualties on both sides, as evidenced by earlier raids. A surprise attack by an overwhelming force on an unsuspecting commando in near total darkness usually resulted in mass flight perhaps with pockets of resistance from small groups of trapped men. The Horns of the Buffalo attack tactic actually used by Sikhobobo, however, rendered any escape sheer impossible. That the members of Potgieter’s commando actually did try to escape is evidenced by the many Boer casualties that occurred at relatively large distances from their bivouac. No evidence has surfaced that suggests Shepstone or other British official instigated the battle tactic that resulted in the near annihilation of Potgieter’s commando. In this context it should also be pointed out that it is equally well possible that Sikhobobo and his chiefs unilaterally changed the objective of the raid without Shepstone’s instigation or knowledge. Sikhobobo’s had ample reasons for hating the Boers as a few weeks before his kraal had been raised to the ground and there were (unsubstantiated) rumours that Potgieter had insulted and taunted him.

Perhaps one day we will know who called the meeting between Shepstone and Sikhobobo and what was discussed and agreed. In any case, the report on the Hokrans 210 killings that was produced shortly after the war based on self-exonerating declarations by Shepstone and others to an entirely partial Commission of Enquiry, can without any ceremony be stored in the shredder; the same place where any documentation potentially incriminating Shepstone and other British authorities would have ended up as soon as the killings became a politically-charged hot potato.

Sources: The ABW in the Borderlands of the Transvaal and Zululand 1899–1902 by Prof Johan Wassermann, “Zululand And The Anglo- Boer War (1899-1902)” by A.de V. Minnaar, “Revisiting a controversial last engagement of the ABW” by Pat Irwin as well as various other internet based sources such as this site, Wikipedia and Geni.