TOPIC:

Charles William Eggar

Private, Medical Staff Corps
Driver, 66th Battery Royal Field Artillery – Anglo Boer War
Corporal, 1/4th Battalion, Hampshire Regiment
Private, Royal Engineers Inland Water Transport - WWI

- Queens South Africa Medal (C.C./T.H./RoL) to 16227 DVR. C. EGGAR, 66TH BTY: R.F.A.
- 1914/15 Star to 2255 PTE. C. EGGAR. HAMPS. R.
- British War Medal to 2255 CPL. C. EGGAR. HAMPS. R.
- Victory Medal to 2255 CPL. C. EGGAR. HAMPS. R.

Charles Eggar was born in Odiham in the County of Hampshire in the first half of 1881 the son of William Eggar, a Farm Labourer and his wife Fanny, born Brewer. The family lived on Rye Common in Odiham at the time of his baptism on 10 July 1881.

Ten years later, at the time of the 1891 England census, the family were living at Beechenwood Farm, near Rye Common, where Mr Eggar was employed as an Agricultural Labourer. In the cottage with a 9 year old Charles was Fanny (12), Albert John (7), Maurice (3) and Nellie Ann (1). As could be expected, Charles was a school boy.


Apart from when at war, Eggar lived his entire life in a 5 mile radius of Odiham

On 10 December 1897, Eggar walked into the recruiting office of the Medical Staff Corps and completed the attestation papers – Short Service 3 Years with the Colours and 9 Years with the Reserve. Claiming to be 18 years and 4 months old (we know him to have been no older than 16), he confirmed that he was born in Odiham near Alton and that he was a Labourer by occupation who was currently serving in the Militia section of the Medical Staff Corps.

Physically he was 5 feet 5 inches in height, weighed 127 lbs and had a fresh complexion, blue eyes and light brown hair. By way of distinctive marks about his person, he had not escaped the attentions of the tattoo artist and sported a Sword and Cross on his left forearm. The Doctor passed him fit at Aldershot with the comment – “ I find him suitable for the Medical Staff Corps.”

On 22 February 1898 he was transferred to the Royal Artillery with ‘Conditions of service altered to 7 years with the Colours and 5 years with the Reserve which will be converted into 8 and 4 years respectively if his period of Army Service expires while serving beyond the seas.’ The very next day saw his posting, as a Driver, to the 66th Battery, Royal Field Artillery – the unit he was to serve with for most of the Boer War.

After 1 year and 317 days he set sail for South Africa with his Battery to participate in the Anglo Boer War. This war had been long in the making. For several years the two Dutch-speaking Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal had been unhappy with perpetual threat of British Imperial interference in their domestic affairs. The abortive Jameson Raid of 1896 had strengthened Paul Kruger’s conviction that the British were guilty of nefarious dealings and couldn’t be trusted. It had also had the unfortunate effect of acting as a wake-up call to the Transvaal authorities who now set a massive rearmament programme in motion. Aside from 30 000 brand new, state-of-the-art Mauser rifles and ammunition, the Boers also procured a number of heavy artillery pieces from Creusot in France and Krupp in Germany.

As the last year of the 19th century dawned, they were preparing for conflict. This came when the ultimatum they sent to the British Government on 11 October went unanswered. The various Commandos streamed across the Cape and Natal borders from the Orange Free State and the Transvaal and invested the strategic (to the Boers) towns of Mafeking, Kimberley and Ladysmith. In anticipation of this move, the British authorities had despatched a number of regiments, along with cavalry and artillery, to South Africa. One of these was Eggar’s 66th Battery, R.F.A., which landed in South Africa on 23 October 1899 and, having made their way round to Durban, took to the field with Buller’s Natal Field Force, working its way ponderously upcountry to relieve Ladysmith where the siege commenced on 3 November 1899.

Buller was popular with the men who worshipped him. He was, however, by his own admission, perhaps not the man to command an army, having been “out of it” for so long. Some of his tactics and how they were executed were questionable but, hindsight being an exact science, it is easy for the armchair critic to cast aspersions from afar.


Map of the battle with 66th Battery position circled

Colenso

As part of the plan to relieve Ladysmith, Buller determined upon a frontal attack on the formidable Boer position, and he moved out of Chieveley Camp for that purpose at daybreak on Friday, December 15th. Of infantry he had four strong brigades: the 2nd (Hildyard’s) consisting of the 2nd Devons, the 2nd Queen’s or West Surrey, the 2nd West Yorkshire, and the 2nd East Surrey; the 4th Brigade (Lyttelton’s) comprising the 2nd Cameronians, the 3rd Rifles, the 1st Durhams, and the 1st Rifle Brigade; the 5th Brigade (Hart’s) with the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, the 1st Connaught Bangers, 1st Dublin Fusiliers, and the Border Regiment. There remained the 6th Brigade (Barton’s), which included the 2nd Royal Fusiliers, the 2nd Scots Fusiliers, the 1st Welsh Fusiliers, and the 2nd Irish Fusiliers — in all about 16,000 infantry.

The mounted men, who were commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the 13th Hussars, the 1st Royals, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of South African Horse, with a composite regiment formed from the mounted infantry of the Rifles and of the Dublin Fusiliers with squadrons of the Natal Carbineers and the Imperial Light Horse.

Cavalry was General Buller’s weakest arm, but his artillery was strong both in its quality and its number of guns. There were live batteries (30 guns) of the Field Artillery, the 7th, 14th, 63rd, 64th, and 66th. Besides these there were no less than sixteen naval guns from H.M.S. Terrible — fourteen of which were 12-pounders, and the other two of the 4-7 type which had done such good service both at Ladysmith and with Methuen. The whole force which moved out from Chieveley Camp numbered about 21,000 men.

The work which was allotted to the army was simple in conception, however terrible it might prove in execution. There were two points at which the river might be crossed, one three miles off on the left, named Bridle Drift, the other straight ahead at the Bridge of Colenso. The 5th or Irish Brigade was to endeavour to cross at Bridle Drift, and then to work down the river bank on the far side so as to support the 2nd or English Brigade, which was to cross at Colenso. The 4th Brigade was to advance between these, so as to help either which should be in difficulties. Meanwhile on the extreme right the mounted troops under Dundonald were to cover the flank and to attack Hlangwane Hill, a formidable position held strongly by the enemy upon the south bank of the Tugela. The remaining Fusilier brigade of infantry was to support this movement on the right. The guns were to cover the various attacks, and if possible gain a position from which the trenches might be enfiladed. This, simply stated, was the work which lay before the British army. In the bright clear morning sunshine, under a cloudless blue sky, they advanced with high hopes to the assault. Before them lay the long level plain, then the curve of the river, and beyond, silent and serene, stretched the lines and lines of gently curving hills. It was just five o'clock in the morning when the naval guns began to bay, and huge red dust clouds from the distant foothills showed where the lyddite was bursting. No answer came back, nor was there any movement upon the sunlit hills.

It is so difficult to make a modern battle intelligible when fought, as this was, over a front of seven or eight miles, that it is best perhaps to take the doings of each column in turn, beginning with the left flank, where Hart’s Irish Brigade had advanced to the assault of Bridle Drift.

Under an unanswered and therefore an unaimed fire from the heavy guns the Irish infantry moved forward upon the points which they had been ordered to attack. The Dublins led, then the Connaughts, the Inniskillings, and the Borderers. Incredibly the men in the two rear regiments appear to have been advanced in quarter column, and not to have deployed until after the enemy’s fire had opened. Had shrapnel struck this close formation, as it was within an ace of doing, the loss of life must have been as severe as it was unnecessary.

On approaching the Drift — the position or even the existence of which does not seem to have been very clearly defined — it was found that the troops had to advance into a loop formed by the river, so that they were exposed to a very heavy cross-fire upon their right flank, while they were rained on by shrapnel from in front. No sign of the enemy could be seen, though the men were dropping fast. All round, like the hissing of fat in the pan, is the monotonous crackle and rattle of the Mausers; no one can define exactly whence it comes.

The gallant Irishmen pushed on, the four regiments clubbed into one, with all military organisation rapidly disappearing, and nothing left but their gallant spirit and their furious desire to come to grips with the enemy. Rolling on in a broad wave of shouting angry men, they never winced from the fire until they had swept up to the bank of the river.

The bank of the river had been gained, but where was the ford? The troops could find no ford, and they lay down, as had been done in so many previous actions, unwilling to retreat and unable to advance, with 'the same merciless pelting from front and flank. The naval guns had silenced the Boer artillery, but who could silence the unseen riflemen? In every fold and behind every anthill the Irishmen lay thick and waited for better times. For five hours, under the tropical sun, the grimy parched men held on to the ground they had occupied. British shells pitched short and fell among them. A regiment in support fired at them, not knowing that any of the line were so far advanced. Shot at from the front, the flank, and the rear, the 5th Brigade held grimly on.

But fortunately their orders to retire were at hand, and it is certain that had they not reached them the regiments would have been uselessly destroyed where they lay. It seems to have been Buller himself that ordered them to fall back. As they retreated there was an entire absence of haste and panic, but officers and men were hopelessly jumbled up, and General Hart — whose judgment may occasionally be questioned, but whose cool courage was beyond praise — had hard work to reform the splendid brigade which six hours ago had tramped out of Chieveley Camp. Between five and six hundred of them had fallen.

Next we move to 4th, or Lyttelton’s Brigade, which was instructed not to attack itself but to support the attack on either side of it. With the help of the naval guns it did what it could to extricate and cover the retreat of the Irishmen, but it could play no very important part in the action, and its losses were insignificant. On its right in turn Hildyard’s English Brigade had developed its attack upon Colenso and the bridge.

The regiments under Hildyard’s lead were the 2nd West Surrey, the 2nd Devons, the East Surreys, and the West Yorkshires. The enemy had evidently anticipated the main attack on this position, and not only were the trenches upon the other side exceptionally strong, but their artillery converged upon the bridge, at least a dozen heavy pieces, besides a number of quick-firers, bearing upon it. The Devons and the Queens, in open order led the attack, being supported by the East Surrey and the West Yorkshires. Advancing under a very heavy fire the brigade experienced much the same ordeal as their comrades of Hart’s brigade, which was mitigated by the fact that from the first they preserved their open order in columns of half-companies extended to six paces, and that the river in front of them did not permit that right flank fire which was so fatal to the Irishmen.

With a loss of some two hundred men the leading regiments succeeded in reaching Colenso, and the West Surrey, advancing by rushes of fifty yards at a time, had established itself in the station when a catastrophe occurred to the artillery which was supporting it which rendered all further advance impossible. How far the bridge was mined and what the chances were of the brigade winning its way across it are questions still undecided. For the reason of this we must follow the fortunes of the next unit upon their right.

This consisted of the important body of artillery who had been told off to support the main attack. It comprised two field batteries, the 14th and the 66th, under the command of Colonel Long, and six naval guns (two of 4-7, and four 12-pounders) under Lieutenant Ogilvy of the Terrible. At an early stage of the action Long’s guns whirled forwards, outstripped the infantry brigades upon their flanks, left the slow-moving naval guns with their ox-teams behind them, and unlimbered within seven hundred — some say five hundred — yards of the enemy’s trenches. From this position he opened fire upon Fort Wylie, which was the centre of that portion of the Boer position which faced him.

“Seven times the English made heroic efforts to save the guns; but the teams were shot down and the men trying to serve them were each time driven back with heavy loss. Eleven guns with all their ammunition fell into the hands of the Boers.”

But his two unhappy batteries were destined not to turn the tide of battle, as he had hoped, but rather to furnish the classic example of the helplessness of artillery against modern rifle fire. A blizzard of lead broke over the two doomed batteries. The teams fell in heaps, some dead, some mutilated, and mutilating others in their frantic struggles. One driver, crazed with horror, sprang on a leader, cut the traces and tore madly off the field. But a perfect discipline reigned among the vast majority of the gunners, and the words of command and the laying and working of the guns were all as methodical as at Okehampton. Not only was there a most deadly rifle fire, partly from the lines in front and partly from the village of Colenso upon their left flank, but the Boer automatic quick-firers found the range to a nicety, and the little shells were crackling and banging continually over the batteries.

Already every gun had its litter of dead around it, but each was still fringed by its own group of furious officers and sweating desperate gunners. Poor Long was down, with a bullet through his arm and another through his liver. ‘Abandon be damned! We don't abandon guns!’ was his last cry as they dragged him into the shelter of a little donga hard by. Colonel Hunt fell, shot in two places. Officers and men were falling fast. The guns could not be worked, and yet they could not be removed, for every effort to bring up teams from the shelter where the limbers lay ended in the death of the horses. The survivors took refuge from the murderous fire in that small hollow to which Long had been carried, a hundred yards or so from the line of bullet-splashed cannon. One gun on the right was still served by four men who refused to leave it. They seemed to bear charmed lives, these four, as they strained and wrestled with their 15-pounder, amid the spurting sand and the blue wreaths of the bursting shells.

For two hours the little knot of heart-sick humiliated officers and men lay in the precarious shelter of the donga and looked out at the bullet-swept plain and the line of silent guns. Many of them were wounded. Their chief lay among them, still calling out in his delirium for his guns. They had been joined by the gallant Baptie, a brave surgeon, who rode across to the donga amid a murderous fire, and did what he could for the injured men. Now and then a rush was made into the open, sometimes in the hope of firing another round, sometimes to bring a wounded comrade in from the pitiless pelt of the bullets. How fearful was that lead-storm may be gathered from the fact that one gunner was found with sixty-four wounds in his body. Several men dropped in these sorties, and the disheartened survivors settled down once more in the donga.


A rather romanticised painting of the Loss of the Guns

The hope to which they clung was that their guns were not really lost, but that the arrival of infantry would enable them to work them once more. Infantry did at last arrive, but in such small numbers that it made the situation more difficult instead of easing it. Colonel Bullock had brought up two companies of the Devons, and a few Scots Fusiliers were joined with them, but such a handful could not turn the tide. They also took refuge in the donga, and waited for better times.

In the meanwhile the attention of Generals Buller and Clery had been called to the desperate position of the guns, and they had made their way to that further nullah in the rear where the remaining limber horses and drivers were. This was some distance behind that other donga in which Long, Bullock, and their Devons and gunners were crouching. ‘Will any of you volunteer to save the guns?’ cried Buller. Corporal Nurse, Gunner Young, and a few others responded. The desperate venture was led by three aides-de-camp of the Generals, Congreve, Schofield, and Roberts, the only son of the famous soldier. Two gun teams were taken down, the horses galloping frantically through an infernal fire, and each team succeeded in getting back with a gun. But the loss was fearful. Roberts was mortally wounded.

In the meanwhile Captain Keed, of the 7th Battery, had arrived with two spare teams of horses, and another determined effort was made under his leadership to save some of the guns. But the fire was too murderous. Two-thirds of his horses and half his men, including himself, were struck down, and General Buller commanded that all further attempts to reach the abandoned batteries should be given up. It is evident that if our gunners could not live under the fire of the enemy it would be equally impossible for the enemy to remove the guns under a fire from a couple of battalions of our infantry. There was plenty of time also, for the guns were abandoned about eleven and the Boers did not venture to seize them until four. Not only could the guns have been saved, but they might, one would think, have been transformed into an excellent bait for a trap to tempt the Boers out of their trenches. All in all, ten cannon, with a handful of Devons, with their Colonel, and the surviving gunners were taken prisoners in the donga which had sheltered them all day. This was huge embarrassment for not only Buller but the entire army.

As Conan Doyle put it in his Great Boer War, “And so the first attempt at the relief of Ladysmith came to an end. At twelve o'clock all the troops upon the ground were retreating for the camp. There was nothing in the shape of rout or panic, and the withdrawal was as orderly as the advance; but the fact remained that we had lost 1,200 men in killed, wounded, and missing, and had gained absolutely nothing. We had not even the satisfaction of knowing that we had inflicted as well as endured punishment, for the enemy remained throughout the day so cleverly concealed that it is doubtful whether more than a hundred casualties occurred in their ranks. Once more it was shown how weak an arm is artillery against an enemy who lies in shelter.”

Our wounded fortunately bore a high proportion to our killed, as they always will do when it is rifle fire rather than shell fire which is effective. Roughly we had 150 killed and about 720 wounded. A more humiliating item is the 250 or so who were missing. These men were the gunners, the Devons, and the Scots Fusiliers, who were taken in the donga together with small bodies from the Connaughts, the Dublins, and other regiments who, having found some shelter, were unable to leave it, and clung on until the retirement of their regiments left them in a hopeless position. Some of these small knots of men were allowed to retire in the evening by the Boers, who seemed by no means anxious to increase the number of their prisoners.

Eggar, fortunately, was nether wounded nor taken prisoner, managing to make his way back to the main force – possibly one of those allowed to retire. One can only imagine how traumatised, thirsty and sick to the stomach he must have been on reaching safety.

The remnants of the battery were left at Chieveley during the Spion Kop-Vaal Krantz operations. Eggar was transferred to 143 Battery on 22 June 1900 and returned to England on 12 July 1900. He took no further part in the war and was awarded the Queens Medal with clasps, Cape Colony, Tugela Heights and the Relief of Ladysmith.

On 8 March 1901 he was promoted to Lance Bombardier but this was short-lived as he was demoted to Driver on 3 October 1901 – at the same time he was remustered as a Gunner. On 1 April 1904 he extended his service to 8 years with the Colours and on 9 December 1905 was placed on the Army Reserve. He was discharged as a Gunner on 9 December 1913 after the Termination of his Engagement.

Whilst on the Reserve, Eggar continued on in his civilian occupation of Labourer. There was time too for romance – at the Registrar’s Office in Woolwich on 4 January 1908, he wed Jane Duller who had already born him a daughter, Dorothy Ellen, at Hawley on 19 February 1907. Eggar was described as a Labourer living in Blackwater when Dot was baptised on 17 March 1907.

Life for the next few years was tranquil – at the time of the 1911 England census the family were living at the Hawley Green Lodge, an estate ain the Blackwater area. Eggar, now 29, was still a Labourer by occupation and the little family had grown – Dorothy had new playmates in the form of Charles William (2) and baby John Alfred who was only 2 months old.



At Yately on 16 December 1913 Eggar took the decision to don a uniform once more – confirming that he was 34 years and 4 months old and that he was a Labourer in the employ of Mr Lawrence Currie of Minley Manor, Hawley Green Lodge, Blackwater, he completed the required attestation papers. Adding that he had prior service with the Royal Field Artillery, he specified a preference for the 4th Hants. Regiment. Physically he was now 5 feet 6 inches, had normal vision and good physical development. Having been found fit for the army, he was assigned the rank of Private and no. 2255.

Perhaps he had had a premonition that the world was about to go to war – whatever the case may be, on 4 August 1914 the Great War erupted onto the world stage, pitting the might of Great Britain and her Empire against the Kaiser Wilhelm II’s Germany and his allies.

The 4th Hampshires were on Salisbury Plain for their annual summer camp when Britain declared war on 4 August 1914. Men immediately flocked to enlist and the battalion was soon ‘oversubscribed’. The Army’s solution was to authorise the formation of 2nd Line units which were distinguished by a ‘2/’ prefix from the original unit (prefixed ‘1/’.) Thus the 4th Hampshires were split into the 1/4th Battalion and 2/4th Battalion.

The backbone of the 1/4th Battalion were the pre-war Territorial soldiers. The War Office quickly decided that units such as these were sufficiently experienced for them to replace Regular Army units overseas, particularly in India. On 9 October the 1/4th Hampshires sailed for Bombay, arriving a month later. From there they travelled to the British Army base at Poona, where they were assigned to the 2nd Indian Division of the Indian Army. In January 1915 the battalion moved again, to Rawalpindi. The Allied Army – initially 6th (Poona) Division under Major-General Charles Townshend – had arrived in Mesopotamia soon after war broke out. By the end of November, the port of Basra had been secured and the town of Qurna was captured the following month.


Officers, NCO's and men of the 1/4 Hants Regiment

Eggar and the 1/4 Hampshires embarked at Karachi on 13 March aboard the H.M.T. Elephanta, disembarking at Basra on 18 March 1915 where they served with the 33 Indian Infantry Brigade as part of the build-up of British and Indian forces in Mesopotamia. However, other elements necessary for a deeper advance up the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, particularly medical and logistical support, were not increased. Several Hampshire Regiment units fought in Mesopotamia during the Great War, but it is the 4th Battalion who are most closely associated with the campaign – primarily because of the losses they sustained there.

The Hampshires were initially employed north of Basra on steamers on the River Euphrates, operating against Turkish lines of communications. They took no part in a hard-fought engagement at Shaiba (12-15 April 1915) in which the British successfully defeated a Turkish attempt to retake Basra. With the port city secure once more, the battalion was ordered to Ahwaz in Arabistan to confront Turkish forces threatening the APOC pipeline there. The Hampshires spent a month operating in difficult terrain – often swampy – and increasing heat, but the Turks refused to give battle and the battalion returned to Basra.

The Allies, by this time strengthened by the arrival of the 12th Division under Major General George Gorringe and the 6th Cavalry Brigade commanded by Major-General Sir Charles Melliss VC, returned to the offensive and on 4 June captured the town of Amara. Conditions were far from ideal – the flooding of the Tigris resulted in waterlogged ground while the extremes of heat and swarms of flies must have seemed utterly alien to the British soldiers.

The advance northwards continued, the next attack, on the town of Nasiriyah, 28 miles up the Euphrates from Amara, followed a month later.
The first assault on 14 July using boats failed. A second attempt was made on 24 July, with the 1/4th Hampshires in the thick of the fighting in temperatures that reached 110 Fahrenheit. In one 24-hour period alone, 15 men collapsed with heatstroke, one dying. The Turks eventually withdrew and Nasiriyah was occupied on 25 July. The Hampshires, having suffered 30 per cent casualties, were then taken out of the line and returned to Amara. Just eight officers and 167 men remained fit for duty.

General Sir John Nixon, senior commander of the British Indian Army, ordered a further advance, despite misgivings from Townshend. Kut-al-Amara was taken on 27 September 1915, but crucially the Turkish forces there escaped and regrouped. More troops were sent to reinforce 6th Division which advanced again to Ctesiphon, just 18 miles from Baghdad. Here the Allies and Turks fought an inconclusive battle on 22 November. After the battle, with his supply lines stretched beyond their limits, Townshend decided to withdraw to Kut pursued by the Turks.

The exhausted troops of 6th Division reached Kut on 3 December 1915, having marched 44 miles in just 36 hours. The garrison had stockpiles of supplies and, with reinforcements expected to arrive within a month, Townshend took the fateful decision to stand at Kut and defend the town.

On 29 April 1916, with food supplies exhausted and all hope of relief gone, Major-General Townshend surrendered the Kut garrison and its 13,309 personnel to the Turks. Of these, 2,689 were British, including 277 officers, and 10,440 (204 officers) were Indian, including 3,248 camp followers.

During the five-month siege 1,025 men had died from enemy action, 721 from disease and 72 were missing. A further 2,500 men had been wounded and 1,450 were in hospital.

Eggar could count himself extremely lucky he was not in HQ or A Company 1/4th Hants. It was they who were locked up in Kut and taken prisoner afterwards, resulting in the death of over 60% of them. Among the attacking Composite Battalion put together were 345 men of the 1/4th Hampshires who were particularly eager for success given that many of their comrades were trapped inside Kut.

The attack was a disaster. After shelling the Turkish positions, the British and Indian troops advanced in heavy rain over flat ground which afforded neither cover nor surprise. The 9th Brigade, which four 1/4th Hampshires had managed to infiltrate, attempted to reinforce a group of around 60 men who had got within 50 yards of the Turkish trenches. However, they were quickly driven back.

On a day of heavy casualties, the Hampshires suffered particularly badly. They went into battle with 16 officers and 339 other ranks and came out with three and 64 respectively.

One account describes how a group of Hampshires were cut down:

‘A small batch of the Hants were seen to advance at walking pace some 1,800 yards without taking cover. At 400 yards from the enemy one officer and two men were left. They walked coolly on and were within 300 yards of the Turkish trenches when the officer, the last of that forlornest of forlorn hopes, fell.’

The attack was abandoned and the British soldiers, cold and wet, withdrew. Those unfortunate enough to be wounded on the battlefield had to crawl back as best they could through the mud and slime. Many were never seen again. For several months, the shattered remnants of the 1/4th Hampshires were fit for nothing more than camp and guard duties.

But Eggar was destined for other things – at Basra on 1 April 1917 he was transferred to the Inland Water Transport section of the Royal Engineers, assigned no. 271163 and the rank of Sapper. A day later he was granted Engineers pay and on 6 November 1917 was promoted to Corporal. On 17 October 1917 he was sent to England for one month’s leave and struck off the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force strength on embarkation for the trip home.

Whilst Eggar was serving in the Middle East a tragedy was playing out at home and one wonders what effect this must have had on his state of mind. A Memorandum was addressed to the Secretary, T.F. Association, Southampton on 14 December 1916, it read as follows:

“A letter has just been received from Mrs Lewcock, Frogmore Park Farm, Blackwater informing me of the death of the above man’s wife (C. Eggar, 1/4 Hants. Regt.), on Sunday last, and asking for the man to come home to make arrangements for his little children.” What a contretemps! Eggar must have been very despondent as he was not able to get home. The upshot of all this was that a separation allowance was now paid to his mother – Fanny Eggar of 13 Minley Cottages, Farnborough, in respect of the children.

Back home and the war over, Eggar began to put the pieces of his life back together – in the Minley Parish Church on 8 May 1920, at the age of 38, he wed 44 year old spinster Ida Jane Kate Curtis. He was a Forester by occupation.

Perhaps his mind, in the last year of his life, was starting to wander – whatever the cause – a sad incident took place in his twilight years. In an article headed “Temptation – Theft in Bar”, the Aldershot News and Military Gazette of 13 December 1946 reported that:

“Admitting that he picked up a pair of gauntlet gloves in a Cove inn, Charles William Eggar (66) on bail, of Sankey-lane, Cove-road, Fleet, pleased guilty at Aldershot’s Magistrate’s Court, on Thursday to stealing the gloves. The Magistrates found the case proved but dismissed it on payment of £1 costs.

Police Constable Miller said that at 1 p.m. on December 1st Mr Maurice Hughes of 17 Pharo’s Row, Upper Hale , went into the public bar of the “Crown and Cushion, “ Frimley Road, Cove and placed his gloves on the window sill. Later he went outside and on returning to the bar found that the gloves had gone. Defendant had left the bar. Witness saw him at his home and said, “I believe you stole the gloves.”

Defendant replied, “Yes I took them. I felt sorry afterwards on the way home, it was on the spur of the moment,” and returned the gloves. When charged he said, “I am sorry, I cannot say anymore.” Inspector S. Bright said there was nothing against the defendant previously.”

Charles William Eggar passed away at Aldershot in September 1949 at the age of 69.

As always, a masterclass of research Rory.
A poignant story. Thank you for sharing.
Happy New Year to you.

Dave......

I agree. This is excellent and was very interesting reading. Thank you

Ian

Dave F wrote: As always, a masterclass of research Rory.
A poignant story. Thank you for sharing.
Happy New Year to you.

Dave......

Thank you and the same to you and your Dave - compliments of the season.

Best regards

Rory

A marvellous military/life history well told. Charles William Eggar certainly led an interesting life!
Cheers Steve

Although Colenso is an ugly place now, the sites of all 12 guns of the 66th and 14th Btty are clearly marked by white stones. These can even be seen on Google Earth, and run roughly E-W centered on Lat -28.738703° Long 29.830297°
I attach the Google streetview of the gun positions. I understand the late Darrel Hall found these positions by finding the T friction tubes, a method I have used to mark the gun positions on Three Tree Hill.