15000. ‘Did you work that out in figures?
I came to the conclusion that practically whatever we did they would have six week’s start of us. I thought that the negotiations were tending rapidly towards war, and that we were not ready for war. I thought that wo ought at once to decide as to the line of policy which would be adopted if we were forced into war, and that we ought to begin a regular and effective preparation, with a view of carrying out that policy at the very moment we found it was impossible to avoid war, and I thought, that to do that we ought to protect our Colonies, and to have a force in our Colonies that would be sufficient to deter the enemy from invading them before we were ready.

15001. And, therefore, you advocated measures to be taken to delay any outbreak?
Yes, I advocated 'that the diplomatic proceedings should be conducted with a view to gaining time, and that the military preparations should be hurried.

15002. I suppose there is another way of putting that matter, that you would be of opinion that if there had been any means of forecasting the future earlier, and as soon as it became evident that there was a danger of war, the preparations ought then to have commenced?
Yes, to put it quite plainly, I thought the future was not being forecast—that we were drifting.

15003. In the memorandum, of which you have spoken, to the Commander’-in-Chief, you elaborated that?
I elaborated that theory in the memorandum which I addressed to the Commander-in-Chief on the 5th September, and in Which I said I knew he had represented those facts more fully, and, probably, better than I could, but I merely wanted to support the recommendations I knew he had put forward.

15004. Have you anything else to say about the position at the beginning of September?
Not beyond that my recommendations did not meet with the result that I had hoped they would; I still considered we were not in the beginning of September making sufficient preparation.

15005. Towards the end of September the Secretary of State asked you for your reasons with regard to the route, did he not?
Yes, he knew that from June up to that date I had always tried to impress upon him that, in my opinion, we could not leave the Orange Free State out of account, and that they would in the end be found to side with the Transvaal. I had always told him my experience in 1881, when they were a very harassing friend, at any rate, and lie asked me on that date to put my views on paper, and I did so.

15006. You put in the memorandum dated 24th September which you have, and naturally the only way to let us understand the question is that you should read it to us?
Yes. “ Now that money has been granted to make purchases in anticipation of the despatch of an expeditionary force to South Africa, it is essential that the base should be selected from which that force is to start. Durban, the base for an advance through Natal, is some 730 miles from Cape Town, the principal base of an advance through the Orange Free State. From Durban to Pretoria is, say, 500 miles. The average distance of Pretoria from the three ports in Cape Colony is, say, 1,000 miles. From the Natal frontier to Pretoria is 200 miles, and from the Cape frontier to Pretoria is 400 miles. It is probable that the railway authorities in Natal will do all they can to help an expedition. It is doubtful if in Cape Colony we should be at all certain of the same willing assistance, if, indeed, we can count on not being obstructed. So far, then, everything points to the Natal route being the best, and so it undoubtedly would be, were it not for two great drawbacks—the port of Durban and the position of the Orange Free State. I have not been able to obtain any reliable information aa to the facilities Durban now offers for the disembarkation of an expedition. I am told that the utmost speed would be three ships a day. An Army Corps will require close on 100 ships for its transport. If they can only discharge at the rate of three a day, disembarkation will occupy one whole month, and bad weather would make it still longer. This is a serious outlook. The Orange Free State flanks the line of advance by Natal for some 200 miles, viz., from Ladysmith to Standerton, or even farther. Now the Orange Free State may adopt three courses. 1. They may declare themselves neutral, and evince a benevolent neutrality to England. II. They may declare themselves neutral, with the determination of secretly helping the Transvaal as much as possible, and with the idea that the moment may come when it will be opportune to declare themselves on the .side of the Transvaal. III. They may openly aide with the Transvaal. A glance at the map will show that in the second case they will be dangerous, and in the third case it would be unwise to offer them the advantages an advance by Natal—which would mean a flank march of 200 miles across their front—-would offer them. In my opinion, an advance by Natal in either of the second or third cases would be a greater risk than ought to be incurred. It must be recollected that neither Natal nor the Transvaal will provide food for the force that advances on Pretoria. All it eats will have to be brought up from behind it. To advance on Pretoria and leave a hostile Free State to take its own time and opportunity for cutting the communications and stopping the flow of supplies, would, I think, be running an unnecessary and most dangerous risk. I would, in such a case, far rather face the double distance and the possible hostility of the Cape Rail way directorate, than risk a march of 200 miles round a concealed enemy. An advance through the Orange Free State mould give three seaports as bases instead of one, and at the commencement enormously simplify disembarkation, concentration on the frontier and supply when there. The Orange Free State is open, the advance would be through its centre, the country contains a good quantity of supplies. It would be almost impossible for an advance through the Free State to be opposed by all the Free State troops and all the Transvaal troops—while such a combination is quite possible against a force advancing by .Natal. On the other hand an advance through the Free State would have every chance of disposing of that State first, and settling with the Transvaal alone afterwards. Consequently I would most strongly urge that as soon as H.M.’s Government decides upon an expedition they should force the Free State to declare for one side or the other. If they declare for the other aide, our route to Pretoria should be vid Bloemfontein; if they declare for neutrality, they should be forced to give sureties that they preserve that neutrality —failing to do so they should be treated as hostile. A decision in the matter is urgently required, as it is essential the stores wo are now ordering should be collected at ports that servo the route which may be selected.” That, I believe, was read or oommunicated to the Cabinet, and Lord Lansdowne told me on the 30th, that the Cabinet had given orders for the expenditure—that was the expenditure for mobilisation—'and I then pressed him to at once call out the Reserves, and I pointed out to him in a letter that he would incur a very dangerous military risk if that were not done, but he did not do so. He put it off until the 7th October.

[Determination to start in advance of the troops]

15007. That was a week?
Yes. the 7th October was the earliest date he said that it could be done, and I said: “The crisis will come before the troops get out to South Africa; may I go out at once? ” and it was definitely arranged that I should start on the 14th, and I did so.

15008. As we know, on the 9th the ultimatum came from the other side?

15009. That completes the period before the outbreak of the war; is there anything else with regard to the preparations for the war, which is the first head of our reference, that you would like to say at this point?
Well, we were late; the preparations were not so well advanced as they should have been, and we were ^short of hospital equipment, harness and wagons, and those sort of things, and of supplies.

15010. You were short at what point?
At the time I arrived at Cape Town; the troops came out faster than they could be properly equipped, or than we could collect food for them.

15011. The troops were surely not short of food at Cape Town?
No, but if you are sending troops up country by rail you must have magazines somewhere, and, of course, it was desirable to get your magazines as far forward as you could beforehand, and this had not been done.

15012. In Cape Colony or Natal?
In Cape Colony; in Natal it had been done. In Natal, Ladysmith was as fair forward as we were holding, and Ladysmith was full up with supplies to the end of the year; they had about 00 days’ supplies, that I had arranged for. I had asked for that to be done before I left England; in fact early in September I had suggested Ladysmith should be filled up with supplies.

15013. Do you represent that any of your movements in Cape Colony were delayed in consequence of the absence of supplies?
No, I do not, but I do represent that one of the anxieties I had ait first in Cape Colony, and one of the difficulties I had, was, that assuming that I had sent a larger portion of the force as it arrived to Natal, I should have been rather handicapped by want of supplies.

15014. More from the fact that they had not been sent away from Cape Town than from the fact that they were not in existence?
From the fact that they were not at that time in the Colony.

15015. In the Colony at all?
Yes. I was told before I left England that I should start with two months’ reserve of supplies, which would not have been a very large amount, but when the preparations were made that reserve of supply included the rations that are loaded with all troops :n each ship; it was not a real reserve in fact, it was a distributed reserve. We got it before there was any real reason to move many troops in Oa.pe Colony, but assuming that the original programme had held good, and that the troops on landing had been, moved up at once to form an Army Corps on the Orange River, and then it had been intended to commence an advance, the preparations were insufficient.

15016. As it turned out it was not so?
As it turned out it did not matter.

15017. Does that remark also apply to transport?
Yes, all the wagons had not arrived, and the harness was short. At the moment we were also able to get on. at the Cape when I got there as much with the preparation of transport as I should have liked, because a good deal of the material, instead of having been provided beforehand and being ready, came out with the troops, and when you have to equip an entirely new transport, of which your men know nothing, you want a certain amount of time to do it. In the minutes that I wrote urging better preparation, I always pointed out that the transport would be a strange transport.

15018. And I suppose there again you mean that if you had had to make your advance in the way you contemplated, this deficiency of transport would have been serious?
Yes, there would have been a great deal of trouble, and there was some trouble as it was.

15019. (Viscount Esher.) One of the points you mention in your statement -is that no council of war was held; do you wish to suggest that one should have been held?
Well, I do suggest to the Commission that I was placed in an uncomfortable position/—I made no complaint myself—but one which I do not think in future a General Officer ought to be placed in. I think there should have been a consideration of the intended expedition at which the Commander-in-Chief designate should have expressed his views before the Army Hoard or the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, or before some Board who would have heard what he had to say, and 'he would have had an opportunity of raising a large number of questions that I should have liked many times during the three months to raise, but I never had any opportunity.

15020. You were never called before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet at all?
No, I was never called before anything.

15021. And you were not present at any meeting of the Army Board at the War Office?
Not one—practically a.t not one. I was President of a Committee which sat at that time in the War Office which had nothing to do with the war, and occasionally Lord Wolseley, if he heard I was in the Office, and there was any question going to be considered in the Secretary of State’s room, sent down for me and asked me to come in; but that was a casual matter, and I was never consulted on anything nor was I ever given any question to consider and answer by anybody.

15022. You had some interviews with Lord Lansdowne, of course?
Yes; Lord Lansdowne’s 'instructions to me were: “ Come in to see me if you come to town.” 

15023. But you did not see the Prime Minister or the Colonial Secretary, or any other member of the Government?
No, nor did I see any of the correspondence that was passing at the time between the Cape and the Colonial Office.

15024. In the summary of your evidence there is a heading which begins: “ General considerations affecting the plan of the campaign.” Did you lay those considerations before Cord Lansdowne or any other member of the Government?
No, I was never asked for my opinion on anything of the sort. I did indirectly discuss them with Lord Wolseley on several occasions, and we differed on an important point—namely, that fie attached strategical importance to Bloemfontein which I did not.

[General considerations affecting the plan of the campaign]

15025. But that was a discussion between you and the Commander-in-Chief?
A private discussion.

15026. And these general considerations were not laid before the Government, because you were never asked to state your opinion to any Minister of the Crown?
Never; I was asked for nothing.

15027. I see you say that when you arrived at Madeira you received telegrams from Sir George White and General Forestier- Walker, and you say that you approve of General Forestier- Walker’s dispositions with certain exceptions; did you send any reply to Sir George White’s telegram?
I think I acknowledged it. I do not know that I did more, as I had nothing to say to him.

15028. He informed you that the forces of the two Republics were converging towards Dundee and Ladysmith, but you did not upon that send any reply to him, did you?
No, I did not certainly send any reply, because whatever he mentioned in the telegram he had done probably before I got it. I found it waiting for me at Madeira.

15029. You say, “While approving General Forestier-Walker’s dispositions.” I suppose you telegraphed to him saying that you approved his dispositions generally?
I did. Sir George White’s telegram was received at Madeira, and he had sent it on the 15th October, so that it had been waiting two days when I got there: “ Transvaal and Orange Free State forces are converging towards Dundee and Ladysmith, and are in strength inside Natal border. Hunter’s loss here would be heavily felt. I propose keeping him for the present.” That was my chief of the staff that he kept; that was all he said, and there was nothing to answer. My answer to General Forestier-Walker was: “I fully concur in your dispositions. Orange River Bridge most important at this moment. Do not risk much at Naauwpoort or Molteno until you feel strong enough. If sailors go to Molteno, send on good Engineer officer with them, as they are inclined to select points exposed to long range fire. Good luck to you.”

15030. (Sir Henry Norman.) Do I understand, Sir Redvers, that before your departure for South Africa, you received no letter of general instructions as to what the Government wished to be done?

15031. Nor on your arrival there?

15032. Or after your arrival? 
None—'the usual letter of service.

16033. But that is a mere letter of appointment?

15034. (Sir Frederick Darley.) Speaking broadly, your opinion is that the Commander of a force such as you had under you at that time should be taken into the confidence of the Government?
I think so. I think I suffered myself a tremendous disadvantage by not having the smallest idea when I arrived at Cape Town of the course which negotiations had been baking, and the attitude of mind in which I should find Lord Milner.

15035. And you further think that such a Commander ought to have an opportunity of expressing his views upon the state of military affairs to the Government?
I certainly think so. I think any man is better for having been forced to explain his views, and the very fact of explaining a man’s views very often calls attention to variousI things he might otherwise overlook, and I think that to send a man out on that sort of expedition without having caused him first of all to give some notion of bis policy is really placing him at a disadvantage. There were matters I should very much have liked myself to have brought forward and discussed. I was told to treat my appointment as confidential, and I was not able to discuss them very much, and it would have been an advantage for me to go before a body of gentlemen and say “I think so and so.”

15036. (Sir John Edge.) When did you first know that it might be assumed that the Orange Free State would join the Transvaal?
I knew it in 1881, and I never altered my opinion.

15037. I know that was your opinion all through, but when were you first informed by anyone in connection with the Government?
By nobody. I believe, if you recollect, in November, 1899, Mr. Balfour made a speech at Dewsbury, and he there said that on the 28th September (the figures worked out to that) if he had been asked whether the Orange Free State were likely to be at war with us he would have replied we were more likely to be at war with Switzerland, and that was the attitude certainly up to the day of my minute of September, with which I was met by Lord Lansdowne on every occasion when I mentioned the Orange Free State.

15038. That in any consideration of the war and how you would conduct it in South Africa you were to leave the Orange Free State out of account altogether?
Out of account; that was Lord Lansdowne’s expression, to leave the Orange Free State out of account; and that was really my difficulty, because in my own mind every plan I had and every theory I had about the war was based on the certainty that I should have to fight the Orange Free State, and practically when I was talking beforehand I was always having rather to argue on the supposition that I should not have to fight the Orange Free State.

15039. (Chairman.) Do you not say here that on the 30th September you were told the Government had decided to adopt the route by the Orange Free State?
Yes, on the 30th September; my minute was on the 24th September.

15040. Your remarks apply not up to the time you left the country, but only up to the time of that minute?
That is so. I read in the paper that they had made a treaty; I knew that from the newspapers. I forget the date of the treaty, but it was some considerable time before that—a treaty as to an offensive and defensive alliance.

15041. (Sir John Edge.) If you had been allowed to take the Orange Free State into account from the first as a certain opponent, what line would you have taken? Would you have suggested an advance through Natal, or any advance through Bloemfontein?
In all cases on Pretoria I should have advanced through the Free State, and I should have endeavoured not to advance through Natal. I may say that as long ago as 1895 the question was submitted to me, and I gave the opinion then very strongly against any advance through Natal. The difficulties in Natal are enormous, and nobody who has not seen the country can appreciate them.

15042. I think you said you formed the opinion in 188I that in a war with the Transvaal we should have the Free State against us?
Yes, President Brand told me so then.

15043. And you had never seen anything to make you alter that opinion?

15044. (Sir John Jackson.) Is it within your knowledge whether in the past on recent occasions Generals' in chief command have been sent out without some plan of campaign having been discussed by the authorities at the War Office?
Well, I should say not; I should say that usually the plan of campaign has been rather fully thought out, and I imagine known to the War Office, at any rate, known to the General.

15045. It would in the past have been discussed between the General going out and the Commander-in-Chief?
Yes. I went out in 1878 with the General who was then sent to the Cape, but it was more the case of a rebellion, and therefore he was dependent almost entirely when he arrived at the Cape on what the Governor said, so that there was no plan of campaign at the moment, but the whole conditions of the case had been explained to him.

15046. But in this case I understand you had not really any formal discussions with the Commander-in-Chief?
I had no formal discussion with anybody.

15047. (Sir John Hopkins.) Were you put in touch or were you in touch with the Intelligence Department before you went out? Could you feel yourself in a position to go to them for any information that they might be able to give to you?
Yes, they did give me everything that they had, but I considered I was not in a position to direct them to get anything without going to Lord Wolseley and asking him to do it. It was outside the Office.

15048. Did you take out an Intelligence Officer with you on your staff?
No. There wore such officers out there.

15049. Of course you could have had any papers from them that they had or any information that they had before you started?
I had all their information before, and they had been preparing information for a considerable time I believe, but the information they obtained, and the action they took, was not directed in any way by me.

15050. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie-) Do you say that you had all the information the Intelligence Department had furnished to the Government?
I do not know about the Government; they gave me all the books.

15051. And the documents, I suppose?
Yes, I should say everything they furnished the Government with.

15052. Early in August you were aware of the practical certainty in their minds that the Free State would officially join hands with the Transvaal?
Yes, I was aware of it in the minds of the Intelligence Department, but it was not accepted by the Government. So late as the 16th August certainly, at any rate, one member of the Government would not have anything to do with the Free State.

15053. Did you discuss this document of the Intelligence Division with Lord Lansdowne?
No, I do not think I had any Intelligence Department documents given to me until I was appointed Commander-in-Chief.

15054. That is the point I wish to get at?
I do not think I had, and I was appointed Commander-in-Chief on the 9th of October.

15055. When you told Sir John Hopkins that you had the Intelligence Division information, that was only when you were appointed Commander-in-Chief?
Yes. If I had gone to the Intelligence Department I have no doubt Sir John Ardagh, who was a very old friend of mine, would have given me anything I had asked him for, and I got from the Intelligence Department the information I used in the minute about the port of Durban.

15056. But the Secretary of State for War did not suggest to you at your early interview that you ought to see the Director of Military Intelligence and discuss the matter with him?
No, he told me to keep my appointment strictly confidential.

15057. And consequently he did not discuss with you any documents he had received from the Intelligence Division, giving reasons at great length?
He discussed with me the numbers, which he quoted from an Intelligence Department paper, that he said the Transvaal could put into the field.

15058. But in addition to that, reasons showing fairly clearly the certainty that the Orange Free State would join with the South African Republic?
No; as I say, whenever I urged that I was confident of it myself —and I urged it to him several times, as often as I conveniently could—in each case the answer always was that the Orange Free State was to be left out of account.

15059. There was a document on the 8th of August, 1899, giving at great, length the reasons for believing certainly that the Orange Free State would join with the South African Republic in war. Were you given a copy of that document at the time in August?
I really could not say; I doubt it. I have seen the document, but my impression is that I got it considerably after that date.

15060. And you say that in any case you would not have paid much attention to it, as your mind was already made up that the Orange Free State would join the South African Republic?
Yes, I was confident.

15061. (Viscount Esher.) Did Lord Lansdowne never draw your attention to the treaty of July, 1897, between the Orange Free State and the Transvaal—there are only three clauses to it?
Novel’. I was aware of that treaty.

15062. But Lord Lansdowne never discussed that treaty with you or mentioned it or referred to it?
Never; I can state that most confidently, because it was a point on which I was always grumbling to Lord Wolseley when wo were talking of this war, that they would eventually have to go through the Free State, and I thought it should be settled, and that until we could make a plan of campaign we could not get on. It was absurd my making proposals for what I hoped not to have to do.

15063. Did you see that treaty?
I read it certainly.

15064. Had you seen it?
Yes, I had; I think I had seen it in 1897.

15065. Did it not satisfy you that practically the Orange Free State were bound to assist the Transvaal?
I never doubted it; my point always was that I remembered so well in 1881, as I said, the shameful behaviour of the Orange Free State, and when Mr. Brand was expostulated with he said he could not help himself—that blood was thicker than water, and I said, “ Do not let the Government deceive' themselves; this same thing will happen, and the Orange Free State men will fight on the side of the Transvaal whatever happens.” That was my conviction throughout.

15066. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) And you were aware that besides the treaty of July, 1897, there was a Military Convention of July, 1897?
Yes. an offensive and defensive alliance.

15067. There was a Military Convention as well, agreeing as to the command of the two forces, when the two States wore acting together, providing for their discipline, supplies, and so forth?
Yes, I knew of that.

15068. But Lord Lansdowne never discussed that matter with you ; he never brought that forward?
Never at all; he declined to discuss the question of the Orange Free State with me practically until the 23rd September, when he suddenly told me I might put my views forward as to the route.

15069. (Chairman.) There was a doubt, though, in spite of all these treaties and conventions, as to the attitude of the Orange Free State, was there not?
I believe that is so, but I had no doubt in my mind as to what the attitude of the Free State young men would, be: that was the point.

15070. But there might be political reasons for not bringing forward the fact of the convention and treaty?
Yes, that was one of the reasons which influenced me when I said in my minute that I did not wish to do anything which would prevent negotiations or impede negotiations.

15071. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) But that would still mako it necessary to take steps, in view of the eventuality of the States joining hands?
I thought so.

15072. The only other point I would like to raise on the preparations for the war—a quite different subject—is that you mentioned that the Cabinet decided to send to India for a force of 5,500 men, which was the only organised body of troops they could put in the field at the moment without dislocating the whole of our mobilisation arrangements. During the five years previous to the war, was that the normal position of things, that we could not send 5,000 or 10,000 men out of the country without dislocating the arrangements?

The arrangements there referred to were our arrangements for mobilisation of the Army Corps, and they were complete; the regiments were told off, and I think at that time actually they were warned, at any rate if they were not warned, the warnings were all ready, and everything was settled. The arrangements connected with the Army Corps were so far perfected that practically we had a good deal of work done which would have been upset by withdrawing men for a detached force.

15073. They must have been withdrawn from the same body?
They would have been portions of the same body.

15074. Under the system which then existed we could not have laid our hands on 5,000 men in this country outside the First Army Corps?
Under the system which then existed the very most we hoped ever to put in the field, and the very most the Government had ever allowed the Military to consider that they should put in the field, was two Army Corps, and the First Army Corps was at that time, so to speak, under orders, and the Second Army Corps was nominally waiting in reserve. The Second Army Corps would have been largely formed of Militia, and, therefore, practically taking these men out would have taken the cream off the milk.

15075. I only ask you, with your experience of military organisation, whether that is quite a sound state of things for an Empire with an enormous number of dependencies scattered all over the world?
Well, you must have some limit and you must have some organisation, and I think as we had that force available and as the Government had gone so far as to have these troops in India told off, and as they were a complete force, and as they could come more rapidly, that it was the proper thing to do, and I think it is sound for the Empire to make such arrangements.

15076. Taking the other 5,000 away from our Colonies. Do you approve of that?

15077. In the Mediterranean?
The Mediterranean has always been considered under our system as holding the first troops available for war, and then you fill up the Mediterranean garrisons again; they are not left empty, but they are filled up with rather younger men.

15078. You do not feel that there is any danger of doing it in the case of a European war?
I do not think there was any danger whatever of doing it under the conditions existing when we went to war at the Cape, but there might be if we were having a war in the Mediterranean.

15079. Not if a war at the Cape had involved the intervention of a European Power?
I do not think so. The Cabinet which must decide that particular question must have some idea as to whether, if they sent a force to the Cape, it would immediately mean an attack upon Malta, for example, and if it would mean an attack upon Malta I do not think it would be right to take the troops out of the garrison. I think you must consider the circumstances of the case, and in that particular case I think it was a very good way; they were on the road, and all ready; they had all their equipment with them, and were ready to go. The geographical conditions of our immense Empire offer advantages as well as disadvantages.

(Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) It has been a moot question, and I wished to elicit your opinion upon it.

15080. (Sir John Hopkins.) Lord Wolseley gave us to understand that if you wanted a force of, say, 10,000 men to proceed on any oversea expedition, for that force a portion of an Army Corps might be mobilised and utilised; do you agree with that?
Certainly it might. In this particular case we wanted an Army Corps also.

15081. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) Without calling out the Reserves?
Yes, you could mobilise 10,000 men certainly without calling out the Reserves.

15082. (Chairman.) But only by drawing on the other battalions
Yes, by drawing on the other battalions.

15083. (Sir George Taubman-Goldie.) That is by dislocating your system of drafts and so forth?
Well, our system is fairly elastic; I do not think there is much to complain of in our system, considering the requirements of the Empire.

15084. We have so many small wars that I wished to see whether we could not supply the small wars without disturbing the general system?
Then you would probably leave your best troops at home, and that in a small war where you would most want them ; if you were to leave your Army Corps at home and have your 10,000 men free, either those 10,000 men are your best men or your worst men.

15085. The best men?
Then you do not have your best men in your Army Corps when you have a big war.

15086. I quite understand you might have to throw them in in addition in a big war, but my suggestion only is that there should be 5,000 or 10,000 men or a few more ready to throw into all these small wars we have in different parts of the world, and I want to know whether things could not be so organised as to have a force of that kind always ready without having to go to Parliament?

Practically we have 10,000 men; we have always been able to do that.

15087. Without calling out the reserves?
Certainly we could do that.

15088. (Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal.) When you took part in the former war with the Transvaal did you form the opinion that while the Government of the Free State professed neutrality, the sympathies of the people were with the Transvaal?
They were.

15089. And that they covertly rendered them all the assistance they could?
That is so ; it was so to my knowledge.

15090. From that and from what has taken place since you reasoned that the sympathies of the Free State would still he with the Transvaal, and you thought it desirable that that position should he known, and that the route should he through the Free State rather than through Natal?
Yes, I considered that we were hound if we went to war to make war with the whole of the Free State and the whole of the Transvaal, and practically, whatever the Free State said, our difficulty would he equal to the sum of the two States. I did hope at the time that by dealing with the Free State first, the Boers being a very selfish people, it was a thousand chances to one almost against the whole forces of the Transvaal being sent to aid the Free State; and, therefore, they could have been got into order and made quiet before there was any necessity for invading the Transvaal. That was my idea.

15091. And when you were appointed to take command in South Africa, as the responsibility of the campaign would rest on you, you thought that you should have been taken more into the confidence of the Government here than you were?
I thought that it would have helped me a great deal if I had been asked to formulate my views, if I had been given an opportunity of formulating my views, and discussing with the Government the difficulties of the undertaking that I was required to commence.

15092. And you think that sufficient consideration was not given to your representations?
I do.

15093. During the former war were the Boers mounted generally? They were a body of mounted men then?
Yes, mounted men.

15094. As on the recent occasion?
Yes, they certainly would be mounted.

15095. Might it not be supposed then that it would be a very great advantage to have a very considerable number of mounted men to meet them, so that the force might to a certain extent be a mobile one also?
I think it was to be considered so.

15096. But that was not really the case in the first part of the war; such preparations were not made?
They were not.

15097. It was principally infantry which were sent out?
Yes, almost wholly infantry.

15098. It would have been preferable, would it not, had a larger number of mounted men been sent?
I think so.

15099. {Chairman.) We have come to your arrival at the Cape and in the section of your statement headed “ Arrival at Cape Town—the situation ” you describe the situation very fully. Lord Esher asked you with regard to the question of general considerations ; is there anything you wish to add to that?
I think not.