The 2nd Battalion sailed on the Dilwara on 2nd December 1899 and arrived
on 25th December. Along with the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the 1st
South Lancashire Regiment, and the 1st York and Lancaster Regiment, they
formed the 11th Brigade under Major General Woodgate, and part of the Vth
Division under Sir Charles Warren.
Two battalions of the 10th Brigade, the 2nd Royal Warwicks and the 1st
Yorkshire Regiment, were left in Cape Colony, and the remainder of the
division disembarked at Durban in order to take part in the relief of
Ladysmith. At the time of their arrival the operations were at a
standstill, Colenso having been fought on 15th December, and General Buller
being unable to do anything until the reinforcements arrived.
Sir Charles Warren's division was taken to Frere as the battalions arrived,
and on 10th January 1900 he set out from Frere to Springfield. The
operations undertaken between 18th and 22nd January are briefly set forth
under the 2nd Queen's (Royal West Surrey), —the 2nd Brigade, of which that
regiment formed a part, having also been put under Sir Charles Warren.
In the actions about Venter's Spruit on the 19th, 20th, and 21st January the
11th Brigade was on the British right. On those dates the King's Own
had no very heavy fighting, although other battalions of the brigade had
serious casualties. On the 20th, when the fighting was very severe on
the right centre, the brigade headquarters, with the 2nd King's Own and the
1st South Lancashire Regiment, were with the artillery, six batteries, which
were massed on or about Three-Tree Hill, south-west of Spion Kop.
Roughly the Boer position was two sides of a square: one side Brakfontein
and Vaal Krantz, facing southeast towards Potgeiter's Drift and Spearman's
Hill, still held by General Lyttelton; the other side facing south-west
towards Warren's lines. Spion Kop, a high hill, lay at the angle of
the two sides.
On the 22nd it was decided that Spion Kop must be taken. Next day it
was reconnoitred, but chiefly on the south-east side, that being the portion
of the hill which could not be seen from the other Boer positions. At
7 pm General Woodgate decided to assault from the south - west face, and
Colonel Thorneycroft, of Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, had barely time to
ride out and note some landmarks in the dusk.
About 10.30 pm General Woodgate marched from the rendezvous, near Warren's
chief camp. His force was the 2nd Royal Lancaster, six companies of
the Lancashire Fusiliers, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, 180 men and 18
officers, and a half-company Royal Engineers, supported by two companies
Connaught Rangers and the newly arrived Imperial Light Infantry, a Natal
raised corps. Unofficial accounts, including that of Mr Oppenheim,
state that two companies of the South Lancashire Regiment formed part of the
attacking force, and this is evidently correct, judging by the casualties.
When the troops, now extended in line, were near the crest they were
challenged. As arranged before hand, they at once lay down and the
Boers fired. When Colonel Thorneycroft thought that the magazines of
the Boer rifles had been emptied he gave the command to charge. This
was done, and about 4 am the crest was carried. The Boers fled.
About ten of our men were wounded up to this time.
General Woodgate ordered a trench and breastworks to be made. The
darkness and a heavy mist made it impossible "to get the exact crest for a
good field of fire". The rocky ground and a want of proper tools added
to the difficulties; however, a shallow trench about 200 yards long was dug
and occupied by the Royal Lancaster, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, and
the Lancashire Fusiliers. There was some intermittent rifle - firing
through the mist, and before it lifted, men who had been pushed forward
found that the trench did not command the ascent, there being much dead
ground not 200 yards away. About 8 am the mist cleared, and the enemy
then commenced to pour in that awful shell and rifle fire which was to last
throughout the whole day. It was now seen that Spion Kop was not the
commanding feature it was thought to be, but that it was itself commanded by
several mountains which had been intrenched and fortified by the enemy.
The trench which had been made by General Woodgate's men was found to be of
little use, and troops had to be taken forward by rushes, and lying down
near the edge of the plateau, they had there to use what cover they could
find. Many most gallant attempts were made to hold patches of rocks.
Often all the officers and men in these advanced positions were killed or
wounded. This happened over and over again throughout the day.
Between 8.30 and 9 am General Woodgate was mortally wounded.
Lieutenant Blake Knox states that after receiving his wound the general
ordered a signal message to be sent to Sir Charles Warren to the effect, "We
are between a terrible cross - fire and can barely hold our own. Water
is badly needed. Help us". This message is mentioned by Mr
Oppenheim also, but is not mentioned in the White Book, and may never have
been received. Mr Blake Knox's statement is valuable, however, as
showing that the general was convinced at that early hour of the great
difficulty we should have in holding the hill. Colonel Thorneycroft,
in his report of 26th January 1900, mentions that when General Woodgate was
wounded Colonel Blomfield of the Lancashire Fusiliers assumed command, but
he too was shortly after wounded. About 10.30 Colonel Crofton, who is
said by Mr Oppenheim and Mr Blake Knox to have assumed command, sent off a
message to General Warren, via the headquarters' signallers at Swartz Kop.
Much controversy has raged over the exact words. Colonel Crofton and
Captain Martin said the words were, "General Woodgate killed, reinforcements
urgently required". General Warren says that as received the words
were, "Reinforce at once or all lost, general dead". It matters little
which is correct, as the latter statement was absolutely justified, and it
is unlikely that had the wording been as claimed by Colonel Crofton there
would have been any difference in General Buller's decision to put Colonel
Thorneycroft in command. To blame Colonel Crofton or Captain Martin
for not writing the message is too ridiculous. Thorneycroft about
12.30 received a message from General Warren that he was to take command,
the messenger being shot dead while delivering the order. Throughout
the whole day the men on the left held their advanced line, but on the right
and in the centre not only was the remnant of the advanced line driven in,
but that part of the trench was for a time vacated. Colonel
Thorneycroft says: "The Boers closed in on the right and centre. Some
men of mixed regiments at right end of trench got up and put up their hands;
three or four Boers came out and signalled their comrades to advance.
I was the only officer in the trench on the left, and I got up and shouted
to the leader of the Boers that I was the commandant and that there was no
surrender. In order not to get mixed up in any discussion I called on
all men to follow me, and retired to some rocks farther back. The
Boers opened a heavy fire on us. On reaching the rocks I saw a company
of the Middlesex Regiment advancing. I collected them up to the rocks,
and ordered all to advance again. This the men did, and we reoccupied
the trench and crest line in front". The other accounts do fuller
justice to Thorneycroft's own splendid bravery and determination.
During the afternoon reinforcements arrived, first the Infantry, and the
2nd Scottish Rifles, — the latter coming from Potgeiter's and ascending the
southern slope. Again a wretched discussion arose as to who should
command. However, Colonel Thorneycroft remained at least practically
in command.
Before 10 am General Warren had wired to General Lyttelton, "Give every
assistance you can on your side". General Lyttelton at once sent off
Bethune's Mounted Infantry, two squadrons; the 2nd Scottish Rifles and the
3rd King's Royal Rifles,—the first two to report themselves at the top of
Spion Kop, but on the extreme right, and the King's Royal Rifles to scale a
lofty peak, or rather two peaks, north-east of Spion Kop. These orders
were splendidly carried out, the King's Royal Rifles doing magnificent work,
getting to the top of the hill and capturing the peaks. General
Lyttelton seems to have become unnecessarily nervous about his people,
because at 3 pm he signalled to the King's Royal Rifles, "Retire steadily
till further orders". At 3.30 and 4.50 these messages were repeated,
the latter by messenger; but, fortunately for all parties, the messages were
not received, for at 6 pm the officer commanding the King's Royal Rifles
signalled, "We are on top of hill. Unless I get orders to retire I
shall stay here"; but "Retire when dark" came back. This message was
sent off at 6 pm. Half an hour later General Lyttelton received from
General Warren a wire saying, "The assistance you are giving most valuable.
We shall try to remain in statu quo during to-morrow". Colonel
Thorneycroft does not say whether he knew that the King's Royal Rifles were
to withdraw; the point seems to be of very great importance if he is to be
blamed for retiring. The evacuation by our people of a hill, the
possession of which was important, if not vital, to the defence of Spion
Kop, was not an encouragement to men who had borne such a burden as had
fallen to the devoted band on the bullet-and-shell-swept plateau that day.
During the afternoon the Boers had not again attempted to rush the plateau,
and their rifle-fire had slackened a little, but their shell-fire was
heavier than ever. Mr Oppenheim states that seven shells per minute
fell for a time.
At 2.30 Colonel Thorneycroft sent a message to Sir Charles Warren to the
effect that the enemy's guns were sweeping the whole top, asking what
further reinforcements could be sent "to hold the hill to-night", that water
was badly needed. In a postscript he added, "If you wish to really
make a certainty of hill for night you must send more infantry and attack
enemy's guns". At 6.30 Colonel Thorneycroft again wrote Sir Charles
Warren, "The troops which marched up here last night are quite done up ...
They have had no water, and ammunition is running short". After
stating that he 'thought' it impossible to permanently hold the hill as long
as "the enemy's guns can play on it", he requested instructions, and wound
up, "The situation is critical".
Up till dark Colonel Thorneycroft seems to have had no answer to any of
these messages. After dark—the hour is uncertain, and is variously
given, but probably about eight—he states that he consulted officers
commanding the Royal Lancaster and Scottish Rifles. These agreed that
the hill was untenable, and some time after the troops were drawn in and
marched off. Mr Oppenheim says Colonel Thorneycroft came round the
trenches on the crest as late as 11 pm and then said the men were to go
down.
When one considers the heroic conduct of the officers and men on the
hill, including always the King's Royal Rifles on the twin peaks, one is
struck by the apparent lack of interest displayed by General Warren.
He has been severely criticised by his chiefs, and one is forced to think
criticism was justified. Apart from purely military or tactical
questions—such as, "Was everything possible done by Hart's and Hildyard's
men to relieve the awful pressure on the Kop?" "Was every possible step
taken at the earliest possible moment to ensure that the hill would be made
safe as soon as darkness set in and the defenders relieved?"—ordinary
common-sense demanded that Sir Charles should have at least come to the
bottom of or partly up the hill, so that he could communicate by messenger
more quickly with those on the top. Ordinary feeling demanded that he
should have given Colonel Thorneycroft every encouragement to hold on by
reciting what was being done to ensure the safety of the hill at night, if
anything practical was being done, and it should not have been left to a
chance messenger (Mr Churchill) to volunteer to go to the top. Mr
Churchill was twice up,—once at dusk, once after dark. When he arrived
the second time Colonel Thorneycroft had already decided to retire.
For the withdrawal of the King's Royal Rifles Sir Charles Warren cannot
be blamed, and as that order was given from near Potgeiter's, one would
imagine that General Buller approved of its being sent. The point is
not brought out in the despatches, but it is important. Lieutenant
Blake Knox says l that when taken a prisoner by the Boers on the 25th he
learned that they were greatly disheartened by our capture of the twin
peaks, that they considered these the key to the position, as, if the Boers
regained the Kop, they in turn would be enfiladed by our men on the peaks.
Various writers on the Boer side who were present have expressed the same
view; while our own people at Ladysmith say they saw preparations for
retiral being made by the Boers, so far confirming these views. In his
statement to the War Commission Sir Charles Warren suggested that the
withdrawal of the King's Royal Rifles from the twin peaks was done by order
of Sir Redvers Buller, and that that withdrawal may have caused Major
Thorneycroft to decide upon the evacuation of Spion Kop. When the
history of Spion Kop is written the question of the peaks cannot be left out
of account. The British losses on the 24th are set down at 28 officers
and 175 men killed, 34 officers and 520 men wounded, 6 officers and 280 men
missing. Some of the missing were undoubtedly killed. The Royal
Lancasters lost 3 officers and at least 34 men killed, 4 officers and over
100 men wounded, 1 officer and about 50 men missing. In his despatch
of 30th January 1900 (White Book, p 24) Sir Redvers Buller "bears testimony
to the gallant and admirable behaviour of the troops", and says, "the Royal
Lancasters fought gallantly".
After retiring across the Tugela to Spearman's Camp General Buller gave
his men a few days' rest before making his next attempt at Vaal Krantz.
On the 5th February that attempt was begun. It will be remembered that
the Lancashire Brigade, now under General Wynne, demonstrated against the
Boer left at Brakfontein, while the real attack was developed opposite Vaal
Krantz by General Lyttelton. The Lancashire Brigade did their part
very well. Their losses were not heavy.
The 2nd Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire Regiment took part in the
fighting between 13th and 27th February, the other two battalions being left
to guard the bridge at Springfield and other points. On the 22nd
General Wynne, whose brigade for the time being was the 2nd Royal Lancaster,
1st South Lancashire, and the Rifle Reserve Battalion, endeavoured to
capture hills east of Grobelar's and north of Onderbrook Spruit. In
this the brigade had very severe fighting, the South Lancashire Regiment
being the first line. That day General Wynne was wounded and the
brigade lost its second brigadier.
The York and Lancasters arrived at Colenso on the 27th, and the three
regiments, along with the West Yorks, were put under Colonel Kitchener, and
took part in the final and successful assault on the works between Railway
Hill and Terrace Hill, and on the latter hill itself (see 2nd Queen's).
"General Kitchener's Brigade . . . gained the railway
cutting. He then directed the West Yorkshire and the Royal Lancaster
Regiments to attack Railway Hill; but the men of the latter, seeing the main
position, Terrace Hill on their left front, went straight at it, and were
stopped by a heavy fire from the sangars in the valley. General
Kitchener at once remedied the mistake and directed the South Lancashire on
the right of the Royal Lancaster, between them and the West Yorkshire, who
were then gaining the crest of Railway Hill. The South Lancashire
pressed forward and, aided by the artillery-fire, captured the sangars in
the valley, taking a few prisoners and killing many of the enemy ...
The sangars in the valley were soon taken, though, I regret to say, at the
cost of the life of Colonel M'Carthy O'Leary, who fell while gallantly
leading his regiment; and the Royal Lancaster and South Lancashire, pressing
on, well supported by the York and Lancaster on the right and the 4th
Brigade on the left, soon gained the summit of the hill and the day was
won".
Between 13th and 27th February the Royal Lancaster lost 2 officers and 28
men killed, and 8 officers and 145 men wounded.
Three officers and 18 men were mentioned in despatches by General Buller
for exceptional gallantry in the relief operations. Two men were
recommended for the distinguished conduct medal for conspicuous gallantry on
Spion Kop.
When General Buller attacked the Boer position north of Ladysmith the Vth
Division, now under Hildyard, marched up the railway or by the direct road,
not taking part in the turning movement by Helpmakaar. In the capture
of Botha's Pass the 10th Brigade took and occupied Van Wyk's Hill (see 2nd
Queen's and 2nd Middlesex), and the 2nd Brigade and the 11th or Lancashire
Brigade carried the pass itself, both brigades doing admirable work. A
few days afterwards, on 11th June, there was a stiff battle at Alleman's Nek,
in which the 2nd and 10th Brigades did the active work, the 11th being with
the baggage and in support.
After the Laing's Nek position was turned and the Natal-Pretoria line
occupied, the 11th Brigade were largely employed in taking and afterwards in
garrisoning the Wakkerstroom-Vryheid-Utrecht district, a very troublesome
and difficult piece of country.
In his final despatch of 9th November 1900 General Buller mentioned 5
officers and 3 men of the battalion; and in Lord Roberts' final despatch 8
officers and 16 non-commissioned officers and men gained mention.
On 11th December 1900 the enemy fiercely attacked Vryheid, but were driven
off with heavy loss. The garrison was composed of the 2nd Royal
Lancaster and 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers Mounted Infantry. Colonel Gawne
and another officer and 3 men were killed and 14 wounded. An outpost
of about 35 men with an officer were surprised at the beginning of the
attack and the party were taken prisoners.
On the 19th of the same month the York and Lancaster was engaged at
Wooldrift, and often during the ensuing nine months some part of the brigade
had fighting.
On 26th September 1901 the Mounted Infantry of the Vth Division gained
great glory at Fort Itala and Fort Prospect. It will be remembered
that General Louis Botha had massed his forces in the south-east of the
Transvaal for another great effort to invade Natal. On 17th September
he ambushed and destroyed Major Gough's force of 200 Mounted Infantry,
chiefly of the 4th Brigade with a few South Lancashire. Botha then
moved against the two forts. At Itala the garrison was two guns 69th
EFA, three companies Mounted Infantry, and one maxim. The Boers under
Botha, Opperman, and others numbered between 1800 and 2000 men.
Immediately after twelve midnight, 25th and 26th, the attack commenced, and
continued with little cessation until 7.30 PM, when the Boers drew off
defeated and discouraged. Our losses were 1 officer and 21 men killed,
5 officers and 54 men wounded; those of the Royal Lancaster being 3 men
killed and 8 wounded.
At Fort Prospect the garrison was composed of 35 men of the Dorset
Mounted Infantry and 51 of the Durham Militia Artillery. The Boers
numbered about 500. The attack commenced at 4.30 am on the 26th, and
lasted thirteen hours. Here again the Boers were driven off with heavy
loss.
In his despatch of 8th October 1901 Lord Kitchener said, "The successful
defence of these two places reflects the greatest credit on Major Chapman
and Captain Rowley, and on all ranks of the small garrisons under their
respective commands". Several commendations in despatches came to the
battalion for very gallant work on this occasion; and in Lord Kitchener's
final despatch 4 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men were
mentioned.
