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| Inspection of the 5th Battalion |
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THE 1st Battalion was in Ladysmith when war was declared. They were
not present at either Glencoe (20th October 1899) or Elandslaagte (21st
October). On the 24th Sir George White, being anxious to engage the
attention of the Boers and so prevent them falling on General Yule's column,
then retreating from Dundee to Ladysmith, moved out of the latter town and
fought the action of Rietfontein. The force which he took out was—5th
Lancers, 19th Hussars, Imperial Light Horse, Natal Mounted Volunteers, 42nd
and 53rd Batteries RFA, No 10 Mountain Battery, 1st Liverpools, 1st Devons,
1st Gloucesters, and 2nd King's Royal Rifles.
Sir George threw out the Lancers and Hussars to seize some ridges and
protect his right. The Gloucesters advanced on the left and the
Liverpools on their right, the Devons being in support afterwards in the
firing line and the King's Royal Rifles at the baggage. The general's
intention was not to come to close fighting. The two field batteries
did admirable work, silencing the Boer guns and keeping down the enemy's
rifle-fire, and what was a tactical success might have been accomplished at
very slight loss, but the Gloucesters pushed rather too far forward and
suffered severely. Before 2 pm firing had ceased, the Boers had
withdrawn westwards, and the danger of that part of their army attacking
General Yule was over.
On 26th October General Yule's force entered Ladysmith, wearied and
mud-bedraggled, after a march entailing very great bodily hardship to all
and very great anxiety to those in command.
On the three following days the Boers concentrated to the north of
Ladysmith, and on the 29th General White resolved to again take the
offensive next day. The action is variously known as Lombard's Kop,
Farquhar's Farm, Nicholson's Nek, and Ladysmith. The last name seems
the most appropriate. To reconcile the different accounts of this
battle written by men who were on the field is an impossible task. For
example, the account of Mr Bennet Burleigh differs on many most important
points from that of 'The Times' historian. For the main features the
official despatch must be relied on. Briefly, General White's scheme
was to take the Boer positions, Long Hill and Pepworth Hill, north of
Ladysmith; to throw forward part of his cavalry between and beyond Lombard's
Kop and Bulwana on the north-east to protect his right flank, and to seize
Nicholson's Nek, or a position near it, on the north-west, from which the
rest of his cavalry could operate in the event of a Boer retreat.
At 11 pm on the 29th the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, 1st Gloucesters, and
10th Mountain Battery marched off towards Nicholson's Nek. At a hill
called Cainguba some stones were rolled down from above; there was a
momentary confusion, during which the mules carrying the mountain guns and
ammunition stampeded. Some of the infantry charged and took the hill
without difficulty. "The officer in command then ordered the remainder
of the force up the hill, and some stone works were set up in the darkness;
but when daylight appeared it was seen that the perimeter was such as to
make the task of holding the top one of difficulty. In the morning the
Boers massed round the hill, ascended its steep sides, and firing from the
rocks round the edge of the top, soon did much damage. At 12.30 a
white flag, unauthorised by any of the senior officers, was put up at an
outlying sangar and the Boers flocked in. The flag was indorsed by
those in chief command, and the whole force surrendered. This, of
course, was not known to Sir George till late on the 30th, although from men
and mule-drivers who had come back into Ladysmith in the morning he knew
that his operations on the left were foredoomed to failure, if not to
disaster. Strange it is that British troops have so often been
unfortunate in their experience of holding hill-tops in South Africa.
After dark on the 29th the Natal Mounted Volunteers seized Lombard's Kop and
Bulwana. At 3 am on the 30th Major General French moved out with the
5th Lancers, the 19th Hussars, and some Natal Volunteers; but at daybreak he
found that he could not get much farther than the exit of the pass between
the two last-mentioned hills; indeed by 8 am he could barely hold his
position, and was thus of little use in protecting the right of the main
attack.
West of French's cavalry was what was intended to be the main attacking
force under Colonel Grimwood, to consist of the 1st Liverpool, 1st
Leicester, 1st and 2nd King's Royal Rifles, and 2nd Dublin Fusiliers, with
the 21st, 42nd, and 53rd Batteries RFA and the Natal Field Battery. By
some unfortunate bungling or confusion of orders the artillery intended for
Colonel Grimwood did not accompany him, but branched off, taking along with
them the Liverpools, Dublin Fusiliers, and two companies of the Mounted
Infantry.
West of Grimwood was Colonel Ian Hamilton with the 1st Devon, 1st
Manchester, 2nd Gordons, and 2nd Rifle Brigade. The latter battalion
had arrived in Ladysmith at 3 am that morning, and only joined the rest of
the brigade on the field at 6.30. With Hamilton the 13th, 67th, and
69th Batteries RFA were intended to be.
The original scheme of the action involved that Colonel Grimwood's
brigade would turn half-left and work inwards to Pepworth Hill, but at an
early hour he was very heavily attacked from his right front and right
flank. Accordingly he had to turn in that direction, extend his front
greatly, throw his whole people into the firing line, and when that was done
he had the greatest difficulty in maintaining his position even after the
21st and 53rd Batteries came to his support. About 8 am General White
sent the 5th Dragoon Guards and 18th Hussars and the 69th and afterwards the
21st Batteries to assist French, the 13th and 53rd Batteries supporting
Grimwood. At 10 am the Manchesters were taken from Hamilton and were
also sent to support Grimwood. Even with this diversion of force to
the right he could gain nothing. "This condition of affairs continued
until 11.30 am, when, finding that there was little prospect of bringing the
engagement to a decisive issue, I determined to withdraw my troops".
The 2nd Rifle Brigade lined the crest of Limit Hill, facing east. The
2nd Gordons took up a similar position. Sir George's words are: "I
sent Major General Sir A Hunter, KCB, my chief of staff, to arrange a
retirement in echelon from the left, covered by the fire of our artillery.
This was most successfully carried out, the artillery advancing in the most
gallant manner and covering the infantry movement with the greatest skill
and coolness". That the artillery did magnificently is beyond doubt.
They had to work in the open exposed to very heavy shell-fire, and but for
the heroic services of the 13th, 21st, 53rd, and 69th Batteries, Grimwood's
infantry and French's cavalry would have had much greater difficulty in
withdrawing. Unfortunately unofficial accounts do not praise the
infantry of Colonel Grimwood's command, and it has been said that the
retirement was not orderly. 'The Times' historian is indeed
mercilessly severe on that officer and certain of the regiments in his
command. Whether that severity is warranted it is outside the scope of
this work to discuss; but it must be borne in mind that some of the troops
were still worn out with the march from Dundee—and further, at Talana Hill
they had lost very many officers. The 1st King's Royal Rifles, for
example, had lost their colonel and 4 officers killed and 6 wounded.
In his evidence before the War Commission Sir Archibald Hunter, who was
chief of Sir George White's staff, said: "We withdrew, and in a very orderly
way. The artillery covered our withdrawal, and the long lines of
infantry simply marched back; it was like a field-day".
No account of the battle of 30th October could possibly omit the value of
the services of the Naval Brigade, who arrived in Ladysmith by train that
morning, and with characteristic expedition got their guns into action
against the heavy artillery of the Boers.
During the siege of Ladysmith the Liverpools were located on the north
side of the town, and were not in the terrible fighting when the attack was
made upon the southern defences on 6th January. Of course a feint was
made on the north of the town, but the attack was not pressed as it was at
Caesar's Camp and Waggon Hill.
On the night of the 7th December Colonel Mellor and three companies of
the Liverpools seized Limit Hill, "and through the gap thus created" a
squadron of the 19th Hussars penetrated some four miles to the north,
destroying the enemy's telegraph line and burning various shelters, etc.
On 1st March 1900, the day of the relief, the 1st Liverpools and other
troops, now emaciated and worn to absolute weakness, crawled some five miles
north of Ladysmith to harass the enemy in their retreat, and did effect some
good work in that way.
Two officers were mentioned in General White's despatch of 23rd March
1900.
When Sir Redvers Buller moved north from Natal the Ladysmith troops,
called the IVth Division, were put under General Lyttelton, the brigadiers
being General F W Kitchener, 7th Brigade, and General Howard, 8th Brigade,
the latter composed of 1st Liverpool, 1st Leicestershire, 1st Royal
Inniskilling Fusiliers, and 1st King's Eoyal Rifles; the Fusiliers taking
the place of the 2nd King's Royal Rifles, which went to Ceylon in July with
prisoners.
The IVth Division had fighting in various places after moving north from
the Natal Railway, particularly at Rooikopjes on 24th July, where the
Gordons of the 7th Brigade had stiffish work, and at Amersfoort on the 7th
August. Daily there was skirmishing. In the fighting on the 21st
August, Sergeant Hampton of the 2nd Liverpool Mounted Infantry and
Corporal Knight of the 1st Battalion gained
the Victoria Cross for acts of the most conspicuous gallantry.
It became evident that the Boers were to make a stand between Geluk and
Dalmanutha. "Buller met with some opposition on the 23rd August near
Van Wyk's Vlei, and towards evening two companies of the 1st Battalion
Liverpool Regiment entered by mistake a hollow out of sight of the main
body, where they came under a heavy fire, losing 10 men killed, and 1
officer and 45 men wounded". On the 23rd
Private Heaton also gained the Cross for volunteering to take back a
message explaining the unfortunate position of the companies; this he
successfully did, saving them from capture. The very unsatisfactory
incident mentioned in the quotation took place close to the main Boer
position, which on the 27th Sir Redvers Buller, after consultation with Lord
Roberts, decided to assault. The 7th Brigade, General Walter
Kitchener's, was chosen for the main attack, the 8th supporting. The
regiment selected to lead the assault on the key of the position at
Bergendal was the 2nd Rifle Brigade, and as to them fell the worst of the
fighting, the details of the action are dealt with under that battalion.
After the battle of Bergendal General Buller's force crossed to the north
of the railway and marched towards Lydenburg. On 2nd September he
found himself in front of a very strong position at Badfontein, and Lord
Roberts ordered Ian Hamilton with a strong column to move up on Buller's
left. This had the desired effect, and on the 6th the enemy withdrew
beyond Lydenburg. On the 8th General Buller successfully attacked
another position at Paardeplatz, and thereafter he crossed the Mauchsberg
and other mountains after the fleeing Boers. He returned to Lydenburg,
and leaving part of his force there, he came back to the railway, and
shortly afterwards he himself left for home.
Five officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men of the battalion
were mentioned in General Buller's final despatch of 9th November 1900, and
8 officers and 12 non-commissioned officers and men in Lord Roberts' final
despatch.
Part of Buller's force long continued to garrison Lydenburg and the posts
between that town and the railway. One of the posts, Helvetia, close
to the line, was garrisoned by about 250 men of the Liverpools with a 4-7
naval gun when the place was attacked and captured by a strong force of
Boers on 29th December 1900. In his telegraphic despatch Lord
Kitchener described Helvetia as a "very strong post", and he seemed to be
surprised at its capture. Our losses were 11 men killed, 4 officers
and 20 men wounded, and the remainder taken prisoners. No official
explanation of the loss of the post has ever been made public, and from some
points of view this is a matter of regret, as the incident, left as it is,
tarnishes the reputation of a regiment which had done very good work.
Very probably a few individuals were responsible for the Boers getting in;
and it has been said that in any event there is very good ground for
believing that it would be better for the regiment involved, and for the
service generally, if the result of the official inquiry in such a case were
published.
During the remainder of the war the 1st Liverpool Regiment was in the
Eastern Transvaal.
Three officers and 6 non-commissioned officers and men gained mention in
Lord Kitchener's despatches during the war, 1 officer, Captain Wilkinson,
being appointed major "for holding out at Helvetia"; and in the final
despatch 3 officers and 3 men were mentioned.
