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The 1st Battalion arrived in South Africa from India about the end of
December 1901, and in his despatch of 8th January 1902 Lord Kitchener
remarks, "On receipt of the news of this successful attack (that is, the
capture of about a battalion of Yeomanry at Tweefontein on 25th December
1901) I arranged to reinforce General Rundle by the 1st Black Watch and 4th
King's Royal Rifles". General Rundle issued an order to the colonel of
the 1st Black Watch stating that their expeditious march and timely arrival
had saved a critical situation.
The battalion was afterwards chiefly employed on the construction of the
blockhouse lines, and in guarding these lines during the big driving
operations which went on in the north of the Orange River Colony down to the
close of the campaign.
In Lord Kitchener's final despatch 7 officers and 9 non-commissioned
officers of the Royal Highlanders were mentioned, but these names embraced
both 1st and 2nd Battalions.
The 2nd Battalion arrived at the Cape about 13th November 1899.
Along with the 1st Highland Light Infantry, 2nd Seaforth Highlanders, and
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, they formed the 3rd or Highland
Brigade, under Major General Wauchope, and afterwards under Major General
Hector Macdonald.
While Lord Methuen was preparing for his advance towards Kimberley, and
until after the battle of Modder River, on 28th November (see
3rd Grenadier
Guards), the Black Watch was employed in the De Aar-Naauwpoort country.
The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders joined Lord Methuen in time to be of
great assistance at Modder River. The other three battalions and their
adored brigadier entered the camp some days after that battle.
The Black Watch will for many a year henceforth be associated with a
battle which was to them and the other distinguished regiments of the
brigade a day of disaster, yet scarcely of defeat. Excepting Spion
Kop, no engagement of the campaign has so engrossed public attention as, or
aroused more discussion than, Magersfontein. Regarding the scheme of
the battle and the events in the fighting line the most diverse opinions
have been uttered, so that to arrive at the truth some trouble and care are
needed.
Lord Methuen's despatch—that is, the one which is published—is dated 15th
February 1900, more than two months after the battle took place. It
was therefore not penned in haste. The general had most ample time to
collect particulars regarding incidents which did not take place under his
personal observation, but it is possible he did not make use of his
opportunities. This view is strengthened by the fact that in the
covering despatch of 17th February 1900 Lord Roberts said, "Lord Methuen has
been asked to expedite the
submission of the complete list of officers and men of the Black Watch whom
he considers worthy of special mention". In addition to the despatch,
many other accounts have been published which, in matters of some
importance, conflict with the despatch, and on other points supplement it
considerably. In the despatch Lord Methuen, after giving his reasons,
says, para 8: "I decided to continue my advance to Kimberley and attack the
Magersfontein kopje".
Para 9: "With this purpose I gave orders
for the kopje to be bombarded from 4.50 pm to 6.40 pm on the 10th December
with all my guns, including the naval 4'7-inch". Lord Methuen's
artillery consisted of the naval guns, the 18th, 62nd, and 75th Batteries RFA, and G Battery RHA.
Para 10: "At daybreak on 11th December the southern end of the kopje was
to be assaulted by the Highland Brigade, supported by all the guns, their
right and rear being protected by the Guards Brigade".
Para 11: "Judging from the moral effect
produced by the guns in my three previous actions, and the additional
anticipated effect of lyddite, I expected great destruction of life in the
trenches, and a considerable demoralising effect on the enemy's nerves,
thereby indirectly assisting the attack at daybreak".
Para 12:
"In accordance with the orders issued, of which I attach a copy, the
artillery on the 10th fired with accuracy and effect on the kopje and the
trenches at the foot from 4.30 pm to 6.45 pm".
It is difficult to say what effect their bombardment did have. The
doctor who was at the head of the OVS Ambulance Corps states that on the
10th their casualties from our artillery fire were three wounded.
Further, the bombardment may have been prejudicial to the attack next day,
because it almost certainly announced that an attack would follow, and that
the British had not properly located the trenches. Lord Methuen had a
balloon, but for some unknown reason it was not used on the 10th, and there
is cause to believe that the trenches in front of the foot of the kopje were
not known about until the fire came from them next day. The balloon
could easily have located those trenches.
The Highland Brigade, supported on their right and rear by the Guards
Brigade, were to assault the southeasterly point of the kopje at daybreak on
the 11th, the kopje being the south-east part of the range held by the
Boers; but they had trenches on the flat country extending from this kopje
in a south-easterly direction for a distance of several miles to the Modder
River to protect their communication with Jacobsdal. The Highland
Brigade, commanded by Major General Wauchope and guided by Major Benson,
moved off in pitchy darkness at 12.30 am. Very soon a thunderstorm and deluge
of rain came on which lasted till daybreak. "The brigade was to march
in mass of quarter column, the four battalions keeping touch, ropes to be
used if necessary". It is uncertain whether the words last quoted were
part of the orders of Lord Methuen, but the formation, doubtless, was
approved by his lordship. It has been criticised on the ground that it
exposed the troops to tremendous danger if a counter-attack was suddenly
made; but, on the other hand, it is absolutely certain that on such a night
no other formation could have been kept at all. So wild and dark was
the night that, according to 'The Times' historian, Cronje himself lost his
way in his own lines and only by accident found himself at the kopje when
the attack commenced, having intended to be farther west. Military men
have to rely on experience. Under modern conditions there has been
only one successful night attack, that of Tel-el-Kebir. The Black
Watch were there also. On that occasion the formation in the advance
was that adopted by the Highland Brigade. A brigade cannot get out of
that formation by deployment, especially in pitchy darkness, in a few
minutes, while it takes a great deal longer for the companies to get into
extended order. It appears from the despatch, para 17, that it was
intended that "three battalions were to extend just before daybreak".
From this it may be gathered that it was intended that the actual attack
should commence after dawn, as men could not assault a position in this open
order in the dark. If an assault is to take place in the darkness,
anything but close order is held by very competent authorities to be
impracticable.
According to Major General Wauchope's explanations before moving off, he
intended the Black Watch to move to the east or rear of the kopje, the
Seaforths direct on its south-east face, and the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders to their left; but, according to the despatch, what actually
took place was somewhat different, and as the matter is of so much interest
it will be pardonable to quote that document, giving afterwards some remarks
made by responsible officers who were present. The letters in brackets
connect the passages with the remarks.
Para 18: "What happened was as follows: Not finding any signs of
the enemy on the right flank just before daybreak, which took place at 4 am,
as the brigade was approaching the foot of the kopje, Major General Wauchope
gave the order for the Black Watch to extend, but to direct its advance on
the spur in front, the Seaforth Highlanders to prolong to the left, the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to prolong to the right, the Highland
Light Infantry in reserve (a). Five minutes earlier (the kopje looming
in the distance), Major Benson had asked Major General Wauchope if he did
not consider it time to deploy (b). Lieutenant Colonel Hughes-Hallett states that the extension could have taken place 200 yards sooner,
but the leading battalion got thrown into confusion (c) in the dark by a
very thick bit of bush about 20 to 30 yards long. The Seaforth
Highlanders went round this bush to the right, and had just got into its
original position behind the Black Watch when the order to extend was given
by Major General Wauchope to the Black Watch. The Seaforth
Highlanders and two companies of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were
also moving out, and were in the act of extending when suddenly a heavy fire
was poured in by the enemy, most of the bullets going over the men.
Lieutenant Colonel Hughes-Hallett at once ordered the Seaforths to fix
bayonets and charge the position. The officers commanding the other
battalions acted in a similar manner. At this moment some one gave the
word 'Retire'. Part of the Black Watch then rushed back through the ranks
of the Seaforths. Lieutenant Colonel Hallett ordered his men to halt
and lie down, and not to retire. It was now becoming quite light, and
some of the Black Watch were a little in front, to the left of the Seaforths
"(d).
Para 19: "The artillery, advancing to the support of the attack, had
opened fire from the time it was light enough to see".
Para 20:"No orders having been received by the Seaforths, the
commanding officer advanced the leading units to try and reach the trenches,
which were about 400 yards off; but the officers and half the men fell
before a very heavy fire, which opened as soon as the men moved. About
ten minutes later the Seaforths tried another rush, with the same
result. Colonel Hughes-Hallett then considered it best to remain
where he was till orders came".
Para 21: "Meanwhile the 9th Lancers, the 12th Lancers, G Battery
Royal Horse Artillery, and Mounted Infantry were working on the right
flank".
Para 22: "At 12 midnight on the 10th the 12th Lancers and Guards
marched from camp, the former to join the Cavalry Brigade, the latter to
protect the right and rear of the Highland Brigade. Considering the
night, it does Major General Sir Henry Colvile immense credit that he
carried out his orders to the letter, as did Major General Babington".
Para 23: "A heavy fire was maintained the whole morning. The
Guards Brigade held a front of about If miles. The Yorkshire Light
Infantry protected my right flank with five companies, three companies being
left at a drift".
Para 24: "Captain Jones, Royal Engineers, and Lieutenant Grubb were
with the balloon section, and gave me valuable information during the day.
I learned from this source, at about 12 noon, that the enemy were receiving
large reinforcements from Abutsdam and from Spytfontein".
Para 25: "The enemy held their own on this part of the field, for the
under feature was strongly intrenched, concealed by small bushes, and on
slight undulations".
Para 26: "At 12 noon I ordered the battalion of 'Gordons’, which was
with the supply column, to support the Highland Brigade. The trenches,
even after the bombardment by lyddite and shrapnel since daybreak, were too
strongly held to be cleared".
Para 27: "The 'Gordons' advanced in separate half-battalions, and
though the attack could not be carried home, the battalion did splendid work
throughout the day "(e).
Para 28: "At 1 pm the Seaforths found themselves exposed to a heavy
cross-fire, the enemy trying to get round to the right. The commanding
officer brought his left forward. An order to 'Retire' was given, and
it was at this time that the greater part of the casualties occurred (f).
The retirement continued for 500 yards, and the ' Highlanders' remained
there till dusk. Lieutenant Colonel Downman, commanding Gordons, gave
the order to retire, because he found his position untenable, so soon as the
Seaforth Highlanders made the turning movement to the right".
Para 29: "This was an unfortunate retirement, for Lieutenant Colonel
Hughes-Hallett had received instructions (g) from me to remain in position
until dusk, and the enemy were at this time quitting the trenches by tens
and twenties".
Para 30: "I have made use of Lieutenant Colonel Hughes-Hallett's
report (the acting brigadier) for the description of the part the Highland
Brigade took in the action".
Para 31: "Major General Wauchope told me, when I asked him the
question, on the evening of the 10th, that he quite understood his orders,
and made no further remark. He died at the head of the brigade, in
which his name will always remain honoured and respected. His high
military reputation and attainments disarm all criticism. Every
soldier in my division deplores the loss of a fine soldier and a true
comrade".
Para 32: "The attack failed. The inclement weather was against
success; the men in the Highland Brigade were ready enough to rally, but the
paucity of officers and non-commissioned officers rendered this no easy
matter. I attach no blame to this splendid brigade. From noon
until dark I held my own opposite to the enemy's intrenchments".
Para 33: "G Battery Royal Horse Artillery fired hard till dark,
expending nearly 200 rounds per gun".
Para 34: "Nothing could exceed the conduct of the troops from the
time of the failure of the attack at daybreak. There was not the
slightest confusion, though the fight was carried on under as hard
conditions as one can imagine, for the men had been on the move from
midnight and were suffering terribly from thirst. At 7.15 pm fighting
ceased, the Highland Brigade formed up under cover, the Guards Brigade held
my front, the Yorkshire Light Infantry secured my right flank, the cavalry
and guns were drawn in to behind the infantry".
The following remarks are made on the authority and with the permission of
responsible officers of the Black Watch who were present:—
(a) The order sent at the last minute was for both the Seaforths and Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders to deploy to the right, probably due to the Black
Watch not being so much to the east as had been intended.
(b) There is every reason for hesitation in accepting this statement.
General Wauchope was seen to place his hand on Major Benson's shoulder and
interrogate him as to his whereabouts. Major General Wauchope would
not keep his force in quarter column a single moment longer than the
situation required. No one knew better the proper tactical formation
suited for the occasion.
(c) This is absolutely denied by the surviving officers of the Black Watch
who can speak to the facts. One of these says: "In the three leading
companies of the Black Watch of whom I can speak there was no confusion
whatever". Another says: "There was no confusion in the Black Watch
when moving through the bushes. The battalion moved through in file
and formed up in perfect order on the far side of the bushes —that is, the
side next the Boer trenches. After these bushes were past the
Seaforths did form up behind the Black Watch".
(d) The orders for the battalions to deploy, referred to in (a), had been
given, and the colonel of the Black Watch was proceeding to get the
battalion into attack formation when the fire from the Boer trenches burst
out. Both Black Watch and Seaforths lay down for a few moments, then
proceeded to deploy as ordered; the Seaforths to get out from behind the
Black Watch, and the latter battalion to open the leading two and a half
companies roughly to six paces across the head of the column. Another
portion of the Black Watch was taken by Majors Berkeley and Cuthbertson to
the right of the two and a half companies, and having passed through or over
two wire fences, got close up to the trench at the foot of the kopje.
The advances or rushes of the Seaforths barely reached the front lines of
the Black Watch, but Lieutenant Wilson of the Seaforths did reach the kopje
with a mixed party of men of both battalions. The alleged order to
retire was not given by any officer or man of the Black Watch, and was not
acted on in that battalion. There was no rushing back. The
officer who commanded the rear company said: "The men fell back slowly five
or six paces; they then moved off half-right, following the other companies
who deployed to the right. Those of them who did not reach the front
line I found to the right of the place where the battalion was when fire
opened on the force in quarter column, and in nowise behind it. If
there had been any rushing back I would have seen it. I am certain
nine-tenths of the battalion were in the front line hours after fire
opened". The same officer says: "Very few of the Seaforths were able
to reach the front lines of the Black Watch. About 10 am the leading
lines of the Black Watch were obliged to fall back, and did so on a
supporting line of Seaforths".
(e) The Gordons reached a point about 400 yards from the Boer trenches.
All their endeavours to get farther in failed.
(f) The casualties in the Black Watch took place chiefly before 8
am,—perhaps 50 per cent of them within the first hour's firing.
(g) No such instructions ever reached the Black Watch; perhaps because it
was absolutely impossible to transmit them in any way. Apart, however,
from all instructions, one officer of the Black Watch and his surviving men
remained till 7 pm at the point he reached shortly after fire broke out in
the morning— that point being 270 yards from the trenches.
According to ' The Times' History, vol ii p 402 et seq, the Seaforths pushed
up among the Black Watch and to their right, and so well did some sections
of both battalions work forward that Captain Macfarlan of the Black Watch,
who was killed, "and some 20 or 30 men, rushed straight up the south-eastern
point of the hill". The fire of our men behind and of the British guns
drove them down again. Lieutenant Cox of the Seaforths and three or
four men climbed the hill, but the whole party were killed. Lieutenant
Wilson of the same regiment and Sergeant Fraser of the Black Watch took a
party of about 100 men round to the reverse side of the hill, and were
climbing it there when they were driven back partly by British shrapnel.
This party was also all shot down or captured.
The fact that very many of the Black Watch were found by the enemy, dead,
close to his trenches, and were buried by him, is the best evidence that the
battalion got forward a considerable distance from the point they were when
fire opened,—approximately 300 yards from the trenches. For over
twelve hours the battalion lay without food or water, with scarcely any
cover, under a murderous fire at close range and from an enemy well
concealed in intrenchments. That they were able to do so proves their
splendid courage and discipline. Their losses were about 44 per cent.
Notwithstanding this some ungenerous things have been said, perhaps by
people who could never have stood the same trial. These people,
military and other, have founded their criticism on two points—the alleged
postponement by General Wauchope of the time for deploying and the alleged
rushing back. Neither point has been made good, and both allegations
seem to be groundless. On the other hand, is there in history any
record of a body of men coming through a similar trial, and coming out of it
better as a whole? It is very improbable that any commanding officer would
seriously say that his men could have done more than was done by the
Highland Brigade, and by the Black Watch in particular.
The dangers of a night attack are proverbial, and must occur to the least
initiated. The general who orders one must lay his account for all
contingencies. Lord Methuen knew the risks and took them. He
should have been prepared for failure in the first rush, and that
preparation, one would imagine, should have been readiness to throw at least
one other brigade to the support of the attack; but instead of that he sent
one battalion, a mere ineffectual driblet, utterly useless for turning the
scale. He might have pushed the Boers hard on their right, but he did
not, Pole-Carew's movement being most apparently a 'diversion'. The
fact is, that Lord Methuen seems to have expected that by letting matters
drift, and allowing his men to lie within decisive range till sunset, the
Boers would bolt as at Modder River. The despatch certainly gives that
impression. That method of winning battles does not seem commendable.
Major General Macdonald arrived at Modder River in time to take the command
of the brigade in the next active operation. In accordance with the
orders of Lord Roberts, the brigade marched on 3rd February to Koodosberg
Drift, some distance west of the camp. After some stiff fighting the
hills commanding the drift were seized, and the brigade was then ordered to
rejoin the main body. In this affair the Black Watch lost Captain
Eykyn, Lieutenant F G Tait, and 2 men killed and 7 wounded.
On 10th February 1900 Lord Roberts placed General Colvile in command of
the newly formed IXth Division, the 1st Brigade of which was the Highland
(minus for a time the Highland Light Infantry). For a sketch of the
work of the division as a whole see the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.
Having followed hard on the Vlth Division, Colvile arrived at Paardeberg
on 17th February. Colvile's bivouac that night was on the south side
of the river and west of the Boer position. In obedience to Lord
Kitchener's orders the Highland Brigade was, early in the morning, sent to
the south-east to reinforce Kelly-Kenny, and during the remainder of the
attack does not seem to have been under Colvile's orders. He gives,
however, in his 'Work of the IXth Division’, a most excellent account of
their doings.
Macdonald extended his men as he moved off to the south; he then turned
to his left, or north-east, and advanced his three battalions across the
plain towards the Boer-lined river-bank. When the advance had reached
its farthest point the Seaforths were on the left of the line, the Black
Watch in the centre, and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on the right,
next to the men of the Vlth Division.
Speaking of this advance, General Colvile says: "Whoever ordered it, it
was a very fine feat on the part of the Highlanders, and one of which they
will always have reason to be proud. One can hardly say the ground was
worse for advancing over under fire than that which the Guards had to deal
with at the Modder River fight, for that would be impossible to find; but it
was certainly as bad, and I never hope to see or read of anything grander
than the advance of that thin line across the coverless plain, under a hail
of lead from their invisible enemy in the river-banks".
Some of the Black Watch and Seaforths, being assisted by Smith-Dorrien's men
on the north side, not only got close to the river, but two companies of the
former with a part of the latter regiment actually crossed and advanced up
the north bank, a company of the Black Watch being first across. The
losses of the brigade were extremely severe, but these casualties were not
wasted; the circle round Cronje was by their grand work much contracted and
therefore strengthened. The Black Watch lost 1 officer and 13 men
killed, and 4 officers and 90 men wounded, out of a total strength of 12
officers and 640 rank and file. In Lord Roberts' despatch of 31st
March 1900 4 officers and 5 non-commissioned officers and men were mentioned
for good work at Paardeberg. Between 18th February and the end of
April, when the IXth Division was broken up, the Highland Brigade had no
very serious fighting. What they did do during that period is briefly
recounted under the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, the senior regiment
of the division.
About the end of April the 19th Brigade was placed under Lieutenant General
Ian Hamilton in the force which was to form the army of the right in the
northern advance. On 30th April General Colvile, with the Highland
Brigade, two 4'7 guns under Grant, and some 90 men of the Eastern Province
Horse, marched to Waterval Drift, near Sannah's Post. Next day the
Highland Light Infantry again joined the brigade. Colvile's force was
ordered to follow and co-operate with Ian Hamilton in his march to Winburg.
On 4th May the brigade had a chance of being of very great service. It
fell to their lot to take the Babiansberg, on which the enemy were strongly
posted. The Black Watch were on the left, the Highland Light Infantry
in the centre, the Seaforths on the right, and the Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders in reserve. Colonel Carthew-Yorstoun handled the Black
Watch "in a very clever way", moving part of his men up a steep kloof, while
the naval guns and the remainder of the infantry kept down the Boer fire.
The attack was successful beyond the most sanguine expectations, and the
Boers fled. In his telegram of 5th May Lord Roberts said, "The Black
Watch distinguished themselves, and were very skilfully led".
On 6th May the brigade marched into Winburg. On the 17th Macdonald
with the Black Watch and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders marched on to
Ventersburg. On the 22nd Colvile with the remainder of the force also
set off. On the 24th the brigade moved to Blauwbosh, the enemy
hovering around in force. On the 26th the Boers were found to be
holding the Blauwberg strongly, and had to be cleared out. This was
done after some stiff fighting, the Black Watch again having the lion's
share. They were in the centre, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
on their left, and the Seaforths on the right. On the same evening the
force entered Lindley. General Colvile left Lindley on the 27th, and
his column had not gone far before it was seen that the Boers were round him
in considerable strength. At one time the Black Watch, acting as
rear-guard, were heavily pressed. The same evening General Colvile
sent a message to headquarters to the effect that De Wet with a large force
and 13 guns was reported to be in the neighbourhood, and that with his big
transport column and lack of cavalry he might have some difficulty in
getting through to Heilbron, and he suggested that a demonstration be made
from that town so as to assist him. The message did not get through.
Before starting on the 28th he received the message from Colonel Spragge,
commanding the 13th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, telling that they were at
Lindley, and needed help and food. It will be remembered that to that
Colvile replied that he was eighteen miles from Lindley, that he could not
send Spragge supplies, and he advised him to retire to the railway.
It would be out of place to discuss here with any fulness the wisdom of
Colvile's action in the matter, but as the affair is so mixed up with the
history of the Highland Brigade some slight reference to it cannot but be
made. General Colvile's decision not to send or go to Spragge has been
defended by himself and commended by some writers, his and their grounds
being that (first) he had been ordered to be at Heilbron on the 29th, and he
believed that his not being there might affect Lord Roberts' forward
movement. Sending back part of his force was really impossible in view
of the strength of the enemy, and to go back with the whole would mean that
Heilbron could not be reached on the 29th. (Second) It has been also
said that Colvile's force was itself not strong enough for the task of
relieving Spragge. On the other hand, it has been said that General
Colvile should at once have gone back, and the information at present
available would point to this having been his proper course. Admitting
that Colvile had been told to be at Heilbron on the 29th, he should surely
have put the question to himself, "What further order would the
Commander-in-Chief give me if he knew that this battalion of Yeomanry, which
is really part of my own force, was in difficulties eighteen miles to my
rear?" What the answer would have been cannot surely be in doubt for a
second. The possession or non-possession of Heilbron by the Highland
Brigade on the 29th could have had no appreciable effect on the progress of
Lord Roberts with his immense force of 40,000 men, which had as yet swept
away all opposition. If conceivably it could have had any effect, what
mattered a couple of days' delay? While the possibility of this battalion of
fresh troops, unaccustomed to Boer warfare, being surrounded by the enemy,
should have led any general to think their capture was a probability.
That the Yeomanry were really his own men is an important factor, for surely
a general of division is in duty bound not to lose a battalion even at the
risk of a technical divergence from orders given before it was possible to
foresee the difficulties that battalion might find itself in. That Colvile's return to Lindley would have resulted in joining forces with
Spragge is almost beyond doubt. His brigade, helped by the naval guns,
had beaten the Boers on the way into Lindley, and they were to beat them
again on the 28th. The Yeomanry made a splendid defence, fighting with
great gallantry till the 31st, when they were forced to surrender. For
a very excellent account of their engagement see ' Arts under Arms’, by
Maurice Fitzgibbon. Longmans, Green & Co, 1901.
To return to the narrative, on the morning of the 28th the Highland
Brigade continued its march on Heilbron, but very soon learned that progress
was to be fiercely opposed. The Highland Light Infantry were placed in
the front, the Black Watch on the left, the Seaforths on the right, while
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, acting as rear-guard, held a hill,
Spitz Kop. The Highland Light Infantry were able to occupy Roodepoort
Ridge without much loss, and the pressure on the left was never serious; but
the right flank and rear-guard had very stiff fighting till far on in the
afternoon: the enemy was, however, repulsed in all his attacks. The
disposition of the brigade that evening is the best proof that General
Macdonald had learned the value of extension, and further, that he had
implicit confidence in the units of the brigade. At night the Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders still held Spitz Kop, the Highland Light Infantry
were occupying a position beyond a little river seven miles ahead, while the
two flanks of the oblong figure were three miles apart. On this day,
as in all previous actions, Grant's two naval guns did splendid work, and
the 5th Battery RFA, which had joined Colvile at Winburg, was also
invaluable. In his account of the action General Colvile gave the
Highland Brigade the highest praise. On the evening of the 29th the
force, after some further fighting, entered Heilbron.
It may be thought undue space has been devoted to the fighting on this
march, but having in view the great strength of the enemy then massed in the
north-east of the Orange River Colony, the work of Colvile's force has by
very competent critics been considered of the highest order. To clear
the same bit of country Sir A Hunter had afterwards two and a half divisions
under his command.
For a month the Highland Brigade remained about Heilbron enjoying what was
comparatively a rest, but on desperately low rations, a convoy despatched to
them on 5th June having been captured.
On 27th June General Colvile left for Pretoria. He had done work of
a very high quality; he may have made one mistake, for which he paid
heavily.
In the beginning of July General Macdonald and his brigade, now minus the
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, who had been taken to the Transvaal,
marched to Frankfort, arriving there on the 3rd, to take part in the
operations of Sir A Hunter, which had been designed to enclose a large Boer
force in the Brandwater basin. During these operations, which were
lengthy and arduous, the brigade did good work. On the 22nd General
Hunter moved from Bethlehem with the Highland Brigade, some artillery,
Lovat's Scouts, Rimington's Guides, etc, towards Retief Nek. On the
23rd the Highland Light Infantry had taken some low hills, while the Black
Watch carried by assault in face of severe opposition a further crest, which
practically turned the enemy's position on the nek. In this action the
Black Watch lost 2 officers and 17 men wounded, of whom 1 officer and 1 man
died. On the night of the 23rd and morning of the 24th the Highland
Light Infantry seized the higher hills. Next day, the Seaforths moving
to the right, the Black Watch gained other positions, which made it
necessary for the Boers to retreat.
On the 24th General Macdonald with the Highland Brigade and other troops
set out to seize two other neks into the basin. On the 26th the Black
Watch and Highland Light Infantry were employed under General Bruce Hamilton
near Nauwpoort Nek, meeting opposition. This day the Black Watch had
six casualties when carrying a spur. After further fighting the neks
were seized by the 30th; but notwithstanding this, General Olivier and some
1200 Boers escaped northwards to Harrismith. Macdonald followed and
occupied Harrismith, but was soon recalled to trek back and forward in the
Bethlehem district. On the 15th August there was a stiff fight south
of Heilbron, in which the Highland Light Infantry had about 50 casualties.
It was soon apparent that the north-east of the Orange River Colony was to
remain the fighting-ground of the Free Staters. Constant skirmishing
continued to occur. On 13th September Macdonald defeated a strong
force, driving them before him in confusion for a long distance. The
Highland Brigade and Lovat's Scouts captured 7 prisoners, 31 waggons, some
dynamite, ammunition, etc. About this time the Boers began to move to
the south of Bloemfontein and Macdonald was sent in that direction.
The Black Watch went to Ladybrand and the Seaforths to Jagersfontein,
Fauresmith, and other places.
In Lord Roberts' final despatch 13 officers and 19 non-commissioned
officers and men of the Black Watch were mentioned.
At the end of November 1900 Macdonald was put in command at Aliwal North.
Henceforth the Highlanders scarcely acted as a brigade, the battalions being
much separated. The Black Watch remained about Ladybrand in
comparative quiet, but they had one misfortune. Lord Kitchener in his
despatch of 8th September 1901 says: "On 22nd August a party of the Black
Watch Mounted Infantry, detached from Ladybrand to Modder Poort to endeavour
to drive any Boers found in that direction towards General Elliot's right
front, was caught in unfavourable ground and captured by a commando said to
be under De Wet. Our casualties were 1 man killed and 1 officer and 4
men wounded, whilst the Boers who rushed the position had 5 men killed,
including Field-Cornet Crowther". About 60 men were taken prisoners.
In September 1901, when Botha was threatening Natal, the battalion was
hurried through the Drakensbergs to guard the drifts about the Natal
border. Afterwards a part of it was on the Standerton-Ermelo
blockhouse line, while some companies were employed under Rimington and
other column commanders in the great drives in the Heilbron-Harrismith
district between 5th and 28th February 1902.
The battalion had the honour of providing a company as escort to Captain
Bearcroft's 4'7 guns in Lord Roberts' advance to Pretoria, also in that to
Belfast, and in the subsequent movement of General French on Barberton.
In his report dated 9th June 1900, referring to the advance on Pretoria on
4th June, Captain Bearcroft says, "The detachments of the Black Watch and
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under Captain Richardson of the latter
regiment, detailed as escort for the guns, materially assisted in dispersing
the snipers with long-range rifle-fire".
In the later phases of the war 1 officer and 2 non-commissioned officers
were mentioned in despatches by Lord Kitchener, and in his final despatch 7
officers and 9 non-commissioned officers were mentioned, but these embraced
both battalions.
