With the best will in the world it would have been quite impossible to
render any assistance to Dr. Jameson's forces, but apart from this there
never was the slightest doubt of his ability to get into Johannesburg
without assistance should he decide to attempt it. In conversation with the
leaders of the movement he had always scouted the idea of requiring
assistance from Johannesburg, nor would anyone have believed that with a
well-equipped and perfectly trained force of 800 men (as it was believed he
had) it was possible for the Boers to get together a force sufficiently
strong to stop him in his dash on Johannesburg.
In the absence of Mr. Charles Leonard, who had been recognized as the
leader of the movement, Mr. Lionel Phillips was elected Chairman of the
Reform Committee, and he and Messrs. J.G. Auret, A. Bailey, and M.
Langermann were chosen as the Committee's deputation to proceed to Pretoria
and meet the Commission appointed by the Government. They left at an early
hour on Wednesday morning, and were given practically a free hand to act on
behalf of the Reform Committee. The position having been so thoroughly
discussed there was no possibility of misunderstanding; there was no
division in the Committee as to the attitude to be taken up. The deputation
were to negotiate with the Government for a peaceful settlement on the basis
of the Manifesto, accepting what they might consider to be a reasonable
instalment of the reforms demanded. They were to deal with the Government in
a conciliatory spirit and to avoid all provocation to civil strife, but at
the same time to insist upon the recognition of rights
and the redress of the grievances, to avow the association with Dr.
Jameson's forces so far as it had existed, and to include him in any
settlement that might be made. It was impossible to lay down any definite
lines on which to negotiate on behalf of Dr. Jameson, as the Reform
Committee were still in complete ignorance of his reasons for starting; but
it was considered fairer and more reasonable to assume that he had started
in good faith and that the two messengers who had been sent to stop him had
not reached him, and to act accordingly. However awkward a predicament he
had placed the Johannesburg people in, they accepted a certain moral
responsibility for him and his actions and decided to make his safety the
first consideration.
Late on Tuesday night the Collector of Customs at Johannesburg informed
members of the Reform Committee that he had received a telegraphic despatch
from the Pretoria head office notifying the suspension of all duties on
various articles of food. It will be remembered that this relief was prayed
for by the representative bodies of mining and commerce on the Rand several
weeks before the outbreak and that the Government had replied that they were
unable during the recess to deal with the matter as the legislative power
and the power of levying and remitting duties had been taken from the
Executive by the Volksraad some time previously. It will also be remembered
that the Government acted on this hint as to the necessities of the
community in a wholly unexpected way by granting a monopoly for the free
importation of grain to a favoured individual of their party in Pretoria. It
is not wonderful therefore that the notification conveyed by the Collector
of Customs was received with considerable derision, and the opinion was
expressed that it would have redounded more to the credit of the
Government's honesty and intelligence had they remitted the duties when
first petitioned instead of doing so at the last moment hastily and
ungracefully—so to speak, at the point of the bayonet.
On Wednesday morning, whilst the deputation were engaged in negotiations
with the Government Commission, a telegram was received by the Reform
Committee in Johannesburg from Sir Jacobus de Wet, the
British agent, conveying the following proclamation of the High
Commissioner:
Whereas it has come to my knowledge that certain British
subjects, said to be under the leadership of Dr. Jameson, have violated
the territory of the South African Republic, and have cut
telegraph-wires, and done various other illegal acts; and whereas the
South African Republic is a friendly State, in amity with Her Majesty's
Government; and whereas it is my desire to respect the independence of
the said State;Now, therefore, I hereby command
the said Dr. Jameson and all persons accompanying him to immediately
retire from the territory of the South African Republic, on pain of the
penalties attached to their illegal proceedings; and I do further hereby
call upon all British subjects in the South African Republic to abstain
from giving the said Dr. Jameson any countenance or assistance in his
armed violation of the territory of a friendly State.
A reply was immediately sent to the British Agent stating that the Reform
Committee were not aware of the reasons which prompted Dr. Jameson to start,
but that as he was coming to their assistance, presumably in good faith,
they felt morally bound to provide for him, and they therefore urged the
British Agent most strongly to spare no effort in forwarding the
proclamation to Dr. Jameson so that he might be aware of the action taken by
the Imperial Government and might turn back before any conflict should take
place between his and the Boer forces. The Committee offered to forward the
despatch themselves if facilities of passport were given.
A full meeting of the Committee was immediately convened in order to
consider this new complication of the case, and the following telegram was
approved and sent at 11.15 a.m., addressed to the Deputation of the Reform
Committee, care of Her Majesty's Agent, Pretoria:
Meeting has been held since you started to consider
telegram from British Agent, and it was unanimously resolved to
authorize you to make following offer to Government. Begins: 'In order
to avert bloodshed on grounds of Dr. Jameson's action, if Government
will allow Dr. Jameson to come in unmolested, the Committee will
guarantee with their persons if necessary that he shall leave again
peacefully within as little delay as possible.'{22}
The Committee well realized the fatal results of Dr.
Jameson's invasion under the circumstances, and much as their position had
been injured and complicated by his action, it was felt that it would still
be better to get rid of the foreign element which he represented and to
fight the battle out under such conditions as might arise without any
assistance than to let things go from bad to worse through further action on
Dr. Jameson's part.
No reply had been received from the High Commissioner to the telegrams
urging him to come up in person. Mr. Cecil Rhodes had telegraphed that he
was urgently pressing the High Commissioner to come, but that he had
received no assurances as yet from him. During Wednesday Messrs. Leonard and
Hamilton telegraphed that the former had seen the High Commissioner, who had
declined to move unless invited by the other side; they were using every
effort to induce him to move but no reliance could be placed upon him. They
further advised that in their strong opinion a reasonable compromise should
be effected, and that it was most vital to avoid offence. Mr. F.H. Hamilton,
who was one of the first associated with the movement, finding then that
nothing more could be done and feeling that his proper place was with his
comrades, refused to remain longer and returned to Johannesburg, arriving
there after Dr. Jameson's surrender.
Two and a half days had now elapsed since Dr. Jameson started, and the
Committee were still without word or sign from him as to his having started
or the reason which prompted him to do so. None knew better than Dr. Jameson
himself the difficulties and magnitude of the task which he had set the
Reform Committee when he struck his camp at Pitsani and marched into the
Transvaal. None knew better than he that with the best luck and all the will
and energy in the world it would hardly be possible to do as much as place
the town in a position of defence. Every hour some explanation or some
message was expected from him, something to throw a little light on his
action; but nothing ever came, and the Committee were left to act in the
dark as their judgment or good fortune might lead them.
The deputation which had been sent to Pretoria met the
Government Commission at noon on Wednesday. The Commission consisted of
Chief Justice Kotzé (Chairman), Judge Ameshof, and Executive Member Kock.
There was a Government shorthand clerk present. Before the business of the
meeting was gone into, at the request of the Chief Justice the deputation
consented to minutes of the interview being taken, remarking that as they
were dealing with the Government in good faith they had nothing to conceal.
It may be well to mention that at the meeting of Messrs. Malan and Marais
with the Reform Committee the question was raised as to the attitude of the
Government towards the deputation which it was suggested should be sent to
Pretoria. Someone remarked that the Government were quite capable of
inducing the deputation to go to Pretoria, having them arrested as soon as
they got there, and holding them as hostages. Messrs. Marais and Malan both
scouted the idea and stated positively that the Executive Council had
formally acknowledged to them that they were negotiating with the Reform
Committee in good faith, and that negotiations would of course be carried on
in a decent manner as between two civilized parties in arms. These little
incidents have a peculiar interest now in view of the treachery practised by
the Government by means of the negotiations with the deputation.
Mr. Lionel Phillips as spokesman detailed at length the position of
affairs in Johannesburg, citing the grievances and disabilities under which
the Uitlander population existed. He pointed out that year after year the
Uitlanders had been begging and petitioning for redress of these grievances,
for some amelioration of their condition, for fair and uniform treatment of
all the white subjects of the State, and for some representation in the
Legislature of the country, as they were entitled by their numbers and their
work and their property to have; yet not only had a deaf ear been turned to
all their petitions, but the conditions were actually aggravated year by
year and, instead of obtaining relief, there was a marked increase in the
burdens and disabilities imposed. He informed the Commission that the
Manifesto fairly represented the views of the Reform Committee and the
people of Johannesburg; that, whilst they were determined to have
their rights, they recognised that it might not be
possible to obtain complete redress at once, and they were prepared to
accept what they might consider a reasonable instalment of redress. He
stated that Dr. Jameson had remained on the borders of the Transvaal with an
armed force by a written arrangement with certain of the leaders, and that
he was there to render active assistance should the community be driven to
extremes and require his assistance; but as to his present action the
Committee could throw no further light upon it, as they were in ignorance of
his reason for starting; they could only assume that he had done so in good
faith, probably misled by rumours of trouble in Johannesburg which he
thought he had sufficient reason to believe. He added that so far from being
invited by the Committee, messengers had actually been sent to prevent him
from moving, but that it was not known to the Committee if these messengers
had reached him or if the telegrams which had been sent with a like purpose
had ever been delivered to him, and that consequently the Committee
preferred to believe that he had come in in good faith and thinking the
community to be in dire need, and for this reason the people of Johannesburg
were resolved to stand by him.
In the course of the discussion, Executive Member Kock remarked: 'If you
have erected fortifications and have taken up arms, you are nothing but
rebels.' Mr. Phillips replied: 'You can call us rebels if you like. All we
want is justice, decent treatment, and honest government; that is what we
have come to ask of you.' Mr. Kock thereupon remarked that the deputation
spoke as though they represented Johannesburg, whereas for all the
Government knew the Reform Committee might be but a few individuals of no
influence; and he asked if they could be informed as to who constituted that
body. The deputation gave certain names from memory and offered to telegraph
for a full list. The reply came in time to be handed to the Government and
it constituted the sole piece of evidence ever obtained as to who were
members of the Reform Committee. After hearing the statement of Mr. Phillips
the Chief Justice informed the deputation that the Commission were not
empowered to arrange terms, but were merely authorized to
hear what the deputation had to say, to ascertain their grievances and the
proposed remedies, and to report this discussion to the Government. Taking
up certain points referred to by Mr. Phillips, the Chief Justice asked
whether the Johannesburg people would consent to lay down their arms if the
Government granted practically all the reforms that were asked. Mr. Phillips
replied in the affirmative, adding that after enfranchisement the community
would naturally be privileged to take up arms again as burghers of the
State. The Chief Justice asked on what lines it was proposed that the
franchise should be granted. The deputation replied that the community would
be quite content if the Government would accept the principle, leaving the
settlement of details to a Commission of three persons—one to be appointed
by each party, and the third to be mutually agreed upon.
The meeting was adjourned at noon until 5 p.m., and in the meantime the
deputation telegraphed to the Reform Committee in Johannesburg the substance
of what had taken place, stating among other things that they had explained
the arrangements with Dr. Jameson. That such a message should be sent
through the Government telegraph-office at a time when every telegram was
read for the purpose of obtaining information as to what was on foot is
further proof (if proof be needed) that the 'revelations' as to the
connection between Dr. Jameson and the Reformers, which were brought out
with theatrical effect later on, were not by any means a startling surprise
to the Government, and were in fact well known to them in all essential
details before the first encounter between the Boers and Dr. Jameson had
taken place. The significance of this fact in its bearing upon Dr. Jameson's
surrender and the after-treatment of the Reform prisoners should not be lost
sight of.
The adjourned meeting between the Government Commission and the Reform
Committee deputation took place at 5 p.m., when the Chief Justice intimated
to the deputation that they had reported to a full meeting of the Executive
Council all that had taken place at the morning meeting, and that the
Executive had authorized them to hand to the deputation
in answer a resolution, the substance of which is given hereunder:
The High Commissioner has offered his services with a
view to a peaceful settlement. The Government of the South African
Republic have accepted his offer. Pending his arrival, no hostile step
will be taken against Johannesburg provided Johannesburg takes no
hostile step against the Government. In terms of a certain proclamation
recently issued by the State President the grievances will be earnestly
considered.
It is impossible to give the exact wording of the minute because the
original document was inadvertently destroyed and all applications to
Government for a copy were met at first by evasions and finally by
point-blank refusal. The document was required as evidence in the trial of
the Reform prisoners and every effort was made to secure an exact copy. As a
last resource the above version, as sworn to by a number of men who had seen
the original document, was put in. The Government were informed that if a
true copy of the original resolution as recorded in the Minute Book of the
Executive Council were not supplied for the purposes of evidence in the
trial the prisoners would hand in the version given above. No reply was
received to this, and the State Attorney acting on behalf of the Government
admitted the version here given in the statement put in by the prisoners. It
is clear therefore that if this version errs in any respect it cannot at all
events be to the disadvantage of the Government or they would assuredly have
objected to it and have produced the resolution itself.
On receipt of the above resolution the deputation inquired whether this
offer of the Government's was intended to include Dr. Jameson. The Chief
Justice replied that the Government declined to treat about him as he was a
foreign invader and would have to be turned out of the country. The
deputation thereupon handed in the telegram from the Reform Committee,
already quoted, offering their persons as security, and pointed out that
this was the most earnest and substantial guarantee that it was possible to
offer that the Committee had not invited Dr. Jameson and had no desire to
destroy the independence of the State. The Commission in reply stated that
the proclamation of the High Commissioner was being
forwarded to Dr. Jameson from various quarters, and that he would inevitably
be stopped. In reply to the statement by the deputation that they were not
empowered to accept terms which did not explicitly include Dr. Jameson but
would report to headquarters and reply later on, the Chief Justice stated
that the Government required no answer to the resolution handed to them.
This was in fact their answer, and if the people of Johannesburg
observed the conditions mentioned therein there would be no further trouble,
but if they disregarded them they would be held responsible for whatever
followed. The deputation returned to Johannesburg fully convinced that the
grievances would be redressed and a peaceful settlement arrived at through
the mediation of the High Commissioner, and that Dr. Jameson would
inevitably obey the latter's proclamation and leave the country peacefully
on ascertaining that there was no necessity for his intervention on behalf
of the Uitlanders.
Not only did the Government supply the deputation with the minute in
writing already quoted, but they also instructed the local officers of
Johannesburg to make public their decision to avail themselves of Sir
Hercules Robinson's services. It will be observed that the notification
published in Johannesburg is not so full as the Executive minute handed to
the deputation in Pretoria, but the spirit in which it was given and
accepted is shown by the following notice issued by the Reform Committee
embodying the official statement:
REFORM COMMITTEE.
NOTICE.
The Government have handed us a written reply this
afternoon (January 1), stating they have agreed to accept the offer of
the High Commissioner to go to Pretoria to assist the Government in
preventing bloodshed, and then the representations of the Committee will
be taken into serious consideration. The communication referred to is as
follows:
'The Government of the South African Republic have
accepted the offer of the High Commissioner to come to Pretoria.
(Signed) J. L. VAN DER MERWE, Mining Commissioner.
J. F. DE BEER, Judicial Commissioner. CARL JEPPE, Member
of the First Volksraad, Johannesburg. A. H. BLECKSLEY,
Commandant Volunteers.
Desirous as the Committee has
always been to obtain its objects without the shedding of blood and
incurring the horrors of civil war, the opportunity of achieving its
aims by peaceful means is welcome.
The Reform Committee desires that the public will aid
them with the loyalty and enthusiasm which they have shown so far in the
maintenance of its organization, and will stand firm in the cause of law
and order and the establishment of their rights.
By order of the Committee.
This notice was published in the local press, and also distributed as a
leaflet in Johannesburg.
More than this! At one o'clock on Wednesday President Kruger had sent for
Sir Jacobus de Wet and requested him to transmit to the Reform Committee the
following message: 'I desire again to invite your serious attention to the
fact that negotiations are going on between Mr. Chamberlain and His Honour
the President. I am convinced the Government is prepared to meet any
committee or deputation at any time to discuss matters. In view of this and
of negotiations with Mr. Chamberlain I advise you to follow a constitutional
course.' That telegram was framed at President Kruger's request and approved
by him before being transmitted.
A great deal has been said about the impolicy, and even the bad faith, of
the Johannesburg people in concluding an armistice which did not include Dr.
Jameson. From the above account it is clear in the first place that every
effort was made to provide for his safety, and in the next place that no
armistice was concluded. Certain terms were offered by the Government which
it was open to the Committee to either accept or reject or ignore, as they
might decide later on. In plain English, the Committee were as free after
the negotiations as they had been before. They gave no undertaking to
abstain from hostile action; they simply received the offer of the
Government. Whether they complied with those conditions as a matter of
cold-blooded selfish policy, whether they simply selected an easy way out of
a difficult position, or whether they complied with the conditions solely
because they were not in a position to do anything else, it is open to every
man to decide for himself; but it does not seem fair, in face of the fact
that they were not able to do anything else, to impute the worst
motives of all for the course which they eventually took.
On the return of the deputation to Johannesburg a
report of what had taken place was given to a full meeting of the Reform
Committee. Divers opinions were expressed as to what was the right course to
take, but eventually all were agreed that, as the first duty of the
Committee was undoubtedly to protect the town and the unarmed section of the
community, as they could not afford to send a single man out of the place,
as there was no reason to suppose that Dr. Jameson required or would welcome
any assistance, and as it seemed certain that he would be stopped by the
High Commissioner's proclamation and turned back, it would be nothing short
of criminal madness to adopt any aggressive measures at that stage.
It does not appear to have occurred to many of the hostile critics of the
Reform Committee to consider what might have happened when they are judging
what actually took place. Dr. Jameson had invaded the country with less than
500 men. It must be clear from this that it was not his intention to conquer
the Transvaal. It must have been and indeed it was his idea that it would be
impossible for the Imperial Government to stand passively by and witness the
struggle between its own subjects preferring legitimate and moderate claims
and a corrupt and incompetent Boer Government. Intervention of one sort or
another he certainly expected—either material help in the shape of British
troops, or the intervention of the High Commissioner to effect a peaceful
settlement. By the false step which evoked the High Commissioner's
proclamation he had forfeited all claim to the support on which he reckoned.
It was reasonable to suppose therefore that, on the receipt of the
proclamation ordering him to return and calling on all British subjects to
abstain from assisting him, he would realize the consequences of his
mistake. He would also learn from the Reform Committee's messengers (that
is, assuming that he did not know it already) that the Johannesburg people
neither required nor wished for his intervention, and he would elect to
leave the country in accordance with the High Commissioner's mandate rather
than continue a course which, with the opposition of the British Government
added to that of the Boer Government, must inevitably end in disgrace and
disaster. This was the conclusion arrived at in the
Reform Committee room; and it was then considered what would be the position
of the Johannesburg people if, in defiance of the High Commissioner's
proclamation and in violation of the terms offered by the Transvaal
Government, they should adopt aggressive and wholly futile measures in aid
of Dr. Jameson, only to find that he himself had obeyed the proclamation and
had turned back.
No man in his senses would have anticipated Dr. Jameson's continuing his
march after receipt of the proclamation and full information as to the
wishes and position of the Johannesburg people. But, apart from this, it was
the opinion of military men, such as Colonel Heyman, who had been sent in by
Dr. Jameson, and who were present at the meetings of the Reform Committee,
that it would not be possible for the Boers to stop him, and that it would
require a very large force indeed to cope with a body of men so well
trained, well equipped, and well led as his were thought to be. It would
moreover need extraordinary luck and management on the Boers' side to get
together any considerable force in time to intercept him before he should
reach Johannesburg. It may be added that the opinion expressed by these
gentlemen is still adhered to. They say that, properly led, Jameson's force
should have got in without firing a shot, and that, properly handled, they
should not have been stopped by a much greater number of Boers. However this
is as it may be.
It has been stated, and the statement has gained considerable credence,
that the very train which brought the deputation back to Johannesburg after
their negotiations with the Government also brought a detachment of the
State artillery with field-pieces and a plentiful supply of ammunition to
reinforce the Boers, who were then in position to intercept Dr. Jameson, and
it has further been suggested that the obvious course for the Reform
Committee to have taken was to break up the line and to stop trains passing
out towards Krugersdorp, also to seize the telegraph and railway offices.
Such action would have been perfectly futile. As a matter of fact the
artillery and ammunition were sent direct from Pretoria by waggon, and not
through Johannesburg at all.{23} Any such action as the
seizing of the telegraph and railway offices would have been useless in
itself, if intended to aid Jameson's force, and would of course have been a
declaration of war on the part of the Committee against the Transvaal
Government, a declaration which they were not able to back up by any
effective measures. A partially successful attempt was made to blow up the
line between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp by individuals who thought that
they would be rendering a service to the cause, and who did not stop to
calculate the full effects of their action.
During the afternoon of Wednesday, while the deputation were still
engaged in negotiation with the Government Commission, the messenger
despatched by Sir Jacobus de Wet, British Agent in Pretoria, to deliver the
High Commissioner's proclamation to Dr. Jameson, arrived in Johannesburg,
and applied at the Reform Committee rooms for an escort through the lines of
defence, showing at the same time the passport given him by the
Commandant-General to pass him through the Boer lines. It was immediately
decided to take advantage of the opportunity in order to bring further
pressure to bear upon Dr. Jameson to induce him to leave the country
peacefully, and to make finally and absolutely sure that he should realize
the true position of affairs. Mr. J. J. Lace, a member of the Reform
Committee, volunteered to accompany the messenger to explain to Dr. Jameson
the state of affairs in Johannesburg and to induce him to return while there
was yet a chance of retrieving the position. On the return of the deputation
this action of the rest of the Committee was cordially approved and was
found to be in entire accord with the attitude taken up by them in their
dealings with the Government.
If any evidence were needed as to the sincerity and singleness of purpose
of the Committee, the action taken by the deputation in Pretoria and the
rest of the Committee in Johannesburg, whilst acting
independently of each other and without any opportunity of discussing
matters and deciding upon a common line, should be sufficient. If the
Committee as a whole had not been following an honest and clearly-defined
policy they would have inevitably come to grief under such trying
circumstances. As a matter of fact, the steps taken during Wednesday by the
two sections acting independently were wholly in accord.
In the course of the day it became known that Dr. Jameson had caused to
be published the letter of invitation quoted in another chapter, and from
this it was clear to those who knew the circumstances under which the letter
was given that he had deliberately started in violation of the agreement
entered into, that he had thrown discretion to the winds, and decided to
force the hands of the Johannesburg people. The result of this was that
among the leaders it was realized that Dr. Jameson was playing his own hand
with complete indifference to the consequences for others; but the vast
majority of the Rand community could not possibly realize this, and were
firmly convinced that the invading force had come in in good faith,
believing the community to be in extreme peril.
In sensational matters of this kind it is very often the case that a
single phrase will illustrate the position more aptly than chapters of
description. It is unfortunately also the case that phrases are used and
catch the ear and survive the circumstances of the time, carrying with them
meanings which they were never intended to convey. In the course of the
events which took place in the early part of the year many such expressions
were seized on and continually quoted. Among them, and belonging to the
second description above referred to, is the phrase 'Stand by Jameson.' It
was never used in the sense of sending out an armed force to the assistance
of Dr. Jameson, because it was recognized from the beginning that such a
course was not within the range of possibility. The phrase was first used in
the Executive Council Chamber when the deputation from the Reform Committee
met the Government Commission and Mr. Lionel Phillips explained the nature
of the connection between the Johannesburg people and the invading force.
After showing that the Rand community were not responsible for
his immediate action, and after acknowledging that he was
on the border with the intention of rendering assistance if it should be
necessary, he said that the Uitlanders nevertheless believed that, owing to
circumstances of which they were ignorant, Dr. Jameson had started in
absolute good faith to come to their assistance, and for that reason they
were determined to stand by him. For that reason they offered their persons
as security for his peaceful evacuation of the country—a course which was
then, and is still, deemed to be 'standing by him' in as effective and
practical a manner as it was possible for men in their position to do.
The reproach levelled at the Reform Committee by members of the Transvaal
Government ever since the surrender of Dr. Jameson is that, whilst
professing not to support hostile action against the State, and whilst
avowing loyalty to the Republic, the people of Johannesburg did not give the
logical and practical proof of such loyalty that the Government were
entitled to expect; that is, they did not take up arms to fight against the
invaders. It is scarcely necessary to say that such a preposterous idea
never entered the minds of any of the Uitlanders. When all is said and done,
blood is thicker than water, alike with the Uitlanders as with the Boers.
The Boers have shown on many occasions that they elect to side with their
kin on the promptings of their heart rather than support those whom their
judgment shows them to be worthy of their assistance. Had the Uitlanders
been sufficiently armed there can be no question that rightly or wrongly
they would have sided with Jameson, and would have given him effective
support had they known that he needed it. Had he ever reached Johannesburg
the enthusiasm would have been wild and unbounded, and, however much the
cooler heads among the community might realize that such a partial success
might have proved a more serious misfortune than the total failure has been,
no such considerations would have weighed with the community in general; and
the men who were aiming at practical and lasting good results, rather than
cultivating popular enthusiasm, would have been swept aside, and others,
more in accord with the humour of the moment, would have taken their places.
It is useless to speculate as to what would have happened
had Dr. Jameson reached Johannesburg. The prestige of success might have
enabled him, as it has enabled many others, to achieve the apparently
impossible and compel the acceptance of terms which would have insured a
lasting peace; but as Johannesburg had neither arms nor ammunition,
especially the latter, commensurate with the requirements of anything like
severe fighting, even for a single day, and as the invading force had not
more than enough for its own requirements, it is difficult to conceive that
anything but disaster could have followed.
Throughout the troubles which followed the invasion it was not the
personal suffering or loss which fell to the lot of the Johannesburg people
that touched them so nearly as the taunts which were unjustly levelled at
them for not rendering assistance to Dr. Jameson. The terms, 'cowards,'
'poltroons,' and 'traitors,' and the name of 'Judasburg,' absolutely
undeserved as they were known to be, rankled in the hearts of all, and it
was only by the exercise of much self-denial and restraint that it was
possible for men to remain silent during the period preceding Dr. Jameson's
trial. Extremely bitter feeling was roused by the tacit approval given to
these censures by the officers of the invading force, for their continued
silence was naturally construed to be tacit approval. 'Not once,' said one
of the Reformers, 'has a single member of Dr. Jameson's party come forward
and stated that the imputations on the Reformers were undeserved; yet we
gave them the benefit of every doubt, and tried throughout to screen them,
whilst all the time the Doctor and at least three of his companions knew
that they had started to "make their own flotation." That is not cricket.'
It has been urged on behalf of Dr. Jameson that he could not have been
asked to state prior to his trial that he never expected or arranged for
help from Johannesburg—that his case was already a sufficiently difficult
one without embarrassing it with other people's affairs. Yet it was noted in
Johannesburg that, when a report was circulated to the effect that he had
started the invasion on the instructions of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, he and another
officer of his force wrote jointly to the English papers to say that there
was no truth whatever in the statement. The consequences of taking upon
himself the responsibility for initiative in this way,
while he had yet to undergo his trial, were far more serious than would have
followed a simple statement to the effect that injustice was being done to
the Rand community in the charges of cowardice laid against it. It was felt
then, and the feeling has not in any way abated, that Dr. Jameson regarded
the fate and interests of the people of Johannesburg with indifference,
looking upon them merely as pawns in a game that he was playing. It was only
Mr. Rhodes who took an opportunity to say that 'the Johannesburg people are
not cowards; they were rushed.'
The general public did not know the circumstances under which Dr. Jameson
had agreed to remain on the frontier. They did not know that telegrams and
messengers had been despatched to stop him, nor was it felt advisable to
inform them of these steps at a time when matters had seemingly gone too far
to be stopped. It was considered that any statement of that kind put forth
at that particular juncture would simply tend to create a panic from which
no good results could accrue, and that, as Dr Jameson had cast the die and
crossed his Rubicon, as little as possible should be done needlessly to
embarrass him. Suggestions were continually being made, and have been and
are still being frequently quoted, to the effect that a force should be sent
out to create a diversion among the Boer commandoes in Jameson's favour.
Suggestions were made by men who had not the remotest idea of the resources
at the command of the Committee, or who did not stop to think of what might
have happened had Johannesburg been depleted of its armed force, and so left
at the mercy of a few hundred Boers. There were always, as there will always
be, men prepared for any reckless gamble, but this course was most earnestly
considered time after time by the Committee when some fresh suggestion or
development seemed to warrant a reconsideration of the decision already
arrived at not to attempt any aggressive measures. Finally the matter was by
common consent left in the hands of Colonel Heyman, an officer who has
rendered distinguished service in South Africa, and whose reputation and
judgment were acknowledged by all. This course was the more readily agreed
to since Colonel Heyman was by none more highly thought
of than by Dr. Jameson himself. The decision given by him was that the
invading force, properly led, drilled and equipped as it was, was a far
stronger body than the entire force enrolled under the Reform Committee, and
that it would require a very large force indeed of burghers to stop it. If
Dr. Jameson had thought that he would need help there had been ample time
for him to send a fast mounted messenger to Johannesburg. He had not done
so; and it was therefore to be presumed that as he had taken upon himself
the responsibility of invasion he was prepared for all contingencies; but,
apart from this, the force available in Johannesburg, which would be in a
few days a very good one behind earthworks, was at that moment utterly unfit
to march out in the open. It would in its then condition, and with no
equipment of field-pieces, be liable to be annihilated by a relatively small
number of Boers before it should reach Dr. Jameson. It was decided, however,
that, should fighting take place within such distance from the town that men
could be taken from the defences without endangering the safety of the town,
a force should be taken out at once.
Fault has repeatedly been found with the military organization in
Johannesburg for not having been well served by an Intelligence Department,
and for not knowing from day to day what the whereabouts and position of Dr.
Jameson's forces were.
The reply to this is that the Johannesburg people had only two days in
which to look after themselves and protect themselves in the crisis in which
Dr. Jameson's action had plunged them; that as a matter of fact strenuous
efforts were made to establish communication with the invading force; that
the Intelligence Department—which, considering how short a time was
available for its organization, was by no means unsatisfactory—was employed
in many directions besides that in which Dr. Jameson was moving; that some
success was achieved in communicating with him, but that the risks to be
taken, owing to the imperative necessity of saving time at almost any cost,
were greater than usual and resulted in the capture of eight or ten of the
men employed in the endeavour to communicate with Dr. Jameson alone;
and finally, that since he had seen fit to violate all
the arrangements entered into and dash into the country in defiance of the
expressed wishes of the people, whom he was bent on rescuing whether they
wished to be rescued or not, the least that could be expected of him and of
his force was that they should acquaint themselves with the road which they
proposed to travel and take the necessary steps to keep the Johannesburg
people posted as to their movements.
It has been urged by a prominent member of the invading force—not Dr.
Jameson—that since the force had been kept on the border for some weeks with
the sole object of assisting Johannesburg people when they should require
assistance, the very least that they were entitled to expect was that
someone should be sent out to show them the road and not leave them to go
astray for want of a guide. To this it was replied that a force which had
been, as they stated, on the border for several weeks with the sole object
of invading the country by a certain road, had ample time, and might
certainly have been expected to know the road; and as for relieving
Johannesburg in its necessity, the argument might have applied had this
'necessity' ever arisen; but since the idea was to force the hands of the
Reformers, the latter might fairly regard themselves as absolved from every
undertaking, specific or implied, which might ever have been made in
connection with the business. But at that time the excuse had not been
devised that there had ever been an undertaking to assist Jameson, on the
contrary it was readily admitted that such an idea was never entertained for
a moment; nor can one understand how anyone cognizant of the telegram from
Dr. Jameson to Dr. Rutherfoord Harris—'We will make our own flotation by the
aid of the letter which I shall publish'—can set up any defence at the
expense of others.
By Wednesday night it was known that Major Heany had passed through
Mafeking in time to join Dr. Jameson's force, and that, bar some
extraordinary accident, Captain Holden must have met Dr. Jameson on his way,
since he had been despatched along the road which Dr. Jameson would take in
marching on Johannesburg; and if all other reasons did not suffice to assure
the Committee that Dr. Jameson would not be relying on
any assistance from Johannesburg the presence of one or other of the two
officers above mentioned would enable him to know that he should not count
upon Johannesburg to give him active support. Both were thoroughly well
acquainted with the position and were able to inform him, and have since
admitted that they did inform him, that he should not count upon a single
man going out to meet him. Captain Holden—who prior to the trial of Dr.
Jameson and his comrades, prompted by loyalty to his chief, abstained from
making any statement which could possibly embarrass him—immediately after
the trial expressed his regret at the unjust censure upon the Johannesburg
people and the charges of cowardice and bad faith which had been levelled
against them, and stated that he reached Pitsani the night before Dr.
Jameson started, and that he faithfully and fully delivered the messages
which he was charged to deliver and earnestly impressed upon Dr. Jameson the
position in which the Johannesburg people were placed, and their desire that
he should not embarrass them by any precipitate action.
Before daybreak on Thursday, January 2, Bugler Vallé, of Dr. Jameson's
force, arrived in the Reform Committee room and reported himself as having
been sent by the Doctor at about midnight after the battle at Krugersdorp on
Wednesday. He stated that the Doctor had supplied him with the best horse in
the troop and sent him on to inform Colonel Rhodes where he was. He
described the battle at the Queen's Mine, Krugersdorp, and stated that the
force had been obliged to retreat from the position in which they had fought
in order to take up a better one on higher ground, but that the position in
which they had camped for the night was not a very good one. When questioned
as to the exact message that he had been told to deliver he replied, 'The
Doctor says, "Tell them that I am getting along all right, but they must
send out to meet me."' He was asked what was meant by 'sending out to meet
him.' Did it mean to send a force out? Did he want help? His reply was, 'No;
the Doctor says he is getting along all right, but you must send out to meet
him.' The messenger was keenly questioned upon this point, but adhered to
the statement that the force was getting along all right and would be in
early in the morning. Colonel Rhodes, who was the first
to see the messenger, was however dissatisfied with the grudging admissions
and the ambiguous message, and expressed the belief that 'the Doctor wants
help, but is ashamed to say so.' Acting promptly on this conviction, he
despatched all the mounted men available (about 100) under command of
Colonel Bettington, with instructions to ascertain the whereabouts of Dr.
Jameson's force, and if possible to join them.
This was done without the authority of the Committee and in direct
opposition to the line already decided upon. It was moreover considered to
be taking a wholly unnecessary risk, in view of the fact that an attack upon
the town was threatened by burgher forces on the north-west side, and it was
immediately decided by a number of members who heard of Colonel Rhodes'
action to despatch a messenger ordering the troop not to proceed more than
ten miles from the town, but to reconnoitre and ascertain what Dr. Jameson's
position was, with the reservation that, should it be found that he actually
needed help, such assistance as was possible should of course be given him.
As a matter of hard fact it would not have been possible for the troop to
reach Dr. Jameson before his surrender, so that the action taken upon the
only message received from the invading force had no practical bearing upon
the results.
At daybreak on Thursday morning Mr. Lace and the despatch rider sent by
the British Agent to deliver the High Commissioner's proclamation and the
covering despatch were passed through the Dutch lines under the authority of
the Commandant-General, and they delivered the documents to Dr. Jameson in
person. In reply to Sir Jacobus de Wet's appeal Dr. Jameson said, 'Tell Sir
Jacobus de Wet that I have received his despatch; and that I shall see him
in Pretoria to-morrow.' Mr. Lace briefly informed him of the position, as he
had undertaken to do. The presence of a Boer escort and the shortness of the
time allowed for the delivery of the messages prevented any lengthy
conversation. Dr. Jameson made no comment further than to say, 'It is too
late now,' and then asked the question, 'Where are the troops?' to which Mr.
Lace replied, 'What troops do you mean? We know nothing about troops.' It
did not occur to Mr. Lace or to anyone else that he could
have meant 'troops' from Johannesburg. With the receipt of Dr. Jameson's
verbal reply to the British Agent's despatch-carrier the business was
concluded, and the escort from the Boer lines insisted on leaving, taking
with them Mr. Lace and the despatch-rider. He offered no further remark.
Footnotes for Chapter V
{22} The telegram originally read 'within
twenty-four hours,' but it was considered impossible to guarantee the time
exactly, and the alteration as above given was made, the word 'within' being
inadvertently left standing instead of 'with.'
{23} Captain Ferreira, at one time in command of
the guard over the Reformers, informed the writer that he had formed one of
the cavalry escort. 'It is a good story,' he said, 'but what fools we would
have been to send our guns shut up in trucks through a hostile camp of
20,000 armed men—as we thought—round two sides of a triangle instead of
going by the shorter and safe road.'
