Having failed in their constitutional attempts to secure a reasonable
voice in the government, or any redress of their grievances, there came the
time when men's thoughts naturally turned to the last expedient—force. Up to
and so late as the Volksraad Session of 1895 a constitutional agitation for
rights had been carried on by the Transvaal National Union, a body
representing the unenfranchised portion of the population. Of its members
but few belonged to the class of wealthy mine and land owners: they had so
far abstained from taking any part in a political organization which was
viewed with dislike and suspicion by the Government and the great majority
of the Boers. It has been asserted by a few Progressive members of the Raad
that many of the Boers were themselves opposed to the policy adopted towards
the newcomers; but, whilst this may be to some extent true, it is more than
questionable whether any of the burghers were willing to concede a share in
the power of government, although it is certain that great numbers would not
have taken active steps against the Uitlanders but for the invasion by a
foreign force. Any extending of the franchise means to the great majority of
the Boers a proportionate loss of independence.
When the matter of the Independence of the Republic is discussed it must
not be forgotten that independence conveys something to the Boers which is
radically different from what it means to anyone else. That the State should
continue for ever to be independent and prosperous—a true republic—would be
mockery heaped on injury if the absolute domination by
the Boer party should cease; and when the parrot-like cry of 'The
Independence of the State is threatened' is raised again and again à
propos of the most trivial measures and incidents, this idea is the one
that prompts it. Instances innumerable could be quoted seemingly
illustrating the Boer legislators' inability to distinguish between simple
measures of reform and justice, and measures aimed at undermining the
State's stability and independence. It is not stupidity! It is that the Boer
realizes at least one of the inevitable consequences of reform—that the
ignorant and incapable must go under. Reform is the death-knell of his
oligarchy, and therefore a danger to the independence of the State—as he
sees it. Until the European people who have lately become so deeply
concerned in Transvaal affairs realize how widely divergent are the two
interpretations of 'Independence,' they will not have begun to understand
the Transvaal Question.
The National Union did not represent any particular class in the
Uitlander community. It was formed of men drawn from all classes who felt
that the conditions of life were becoming intolerable, and that something
would have to be done by the community to bring about reforms which the
legislature showed no signs of voluntarily introducing.
When it is said that it consisted of men drawn from all classes, the
qualification should be made that the richer classes, that is to say, the
capitalists of the country, were very meagrely if at all represented. Many
efforts had been made to enlist the sympathies of the capitalists, and to
draw them into the movement, but the 'big firms,' as they were styled, for a
very long time refused to take any part whatever, preferring to abstain
entirely rather than associate themselves with a definite agitation. They
pleaded, and no doubt fairly, that in case of failure they with their vested
interests would be the ones to suffer, while in the event of success they
would not benefit in a greater degree than the individuals who had little or
no material stake. One by one however they were drawn into the political
movement to the extent of supplying funds for carrying on the reform
agitation, or of giving monetary support to those who were stimulating and
organizing the Progressive party among the Boers. There
can be no doubt that prior to 1895 the wealthier men without exception
refused to consider the possibility of violent measures. It was only when
they realized that the Boer party were determinedly hostile—organizing very
large encroachments upon the privileges of the Uitlanders and designing
fresh burdens to be borne by them—and when it became clear that the dangers
threatening as a result of their own supine attitude were worse than any
disfavour with which they might be viewed on account of political action,
that they began to take an active part with others in the agitation for
reform. It was not until the Volksraad in the Session of 1895 revealed their
real policy and their fixed determination to effect no reform that men began
to talk of the possibility of revolutionary measures becoming necessary. The
subject once mooted was frequently discussed, and once discussed became
familiar; and the thing which a few months before had been regarded as out
of the bounds of possibility came to be looked upon as a very probable
contingency. The extraordinary boom in shares, land, and all kinds of
property, which lasted throughout the year, no doubt operated against the
maturing of this feeling, but it nevertheless continued to grow. The most
dissatisfied section of the Rand was, naturally enough, that one which
included the South African Uitlander. These men, born in South Africa, or
having spent the best years of their lives there, felt extremely bitter
against the Boer Government, and were moved by feelings which were not in
any way connected with considerations of material gain. With them were
closely associated men of all nationalities who had determined to make their
homes in the Transvaal, and these formed the class which has been
disparagingly referred to as 'the political element,' but which the
experience of every country shows to be the backbone of a nation. They were
in fact the men who meant to have a hand in the future of South Africa.
After them came the much larger class whose interest in the reforms was
based mainly upon the fact that they suffered from the abuses and
over-taxation of the Government.
For several years a very strong feeling against the capitalists had ruled
in Johannesburg. Men who thoroughly knew the Boer had
prophesied and continued throughout to prophesy that absolutely nothing
would be done to improve the conditions, and that the capitalists might as
well throw in their lot with the general public early in the day as be
forced to do so later, after spending their thousands in fruitless efforts
for reform, and after committing themselves to a policy which would be
regarded as selfish, pusillanimous, and foolish. The moneyed men no doubt
occupied a very prominent and powerful position. They were constantly
besought by the Reform leaders to side with them; they were looked to by the
Progressive Party in the Boer camp to aid reform by peaceful measures only,
to exercise all their influence towards preventing rash or violent measures
being taken by the more excited party, and to trust to time and patience to
achieve those results which they were all honestly desirous of bringing
about; and they were approached, as has been stated, by the President and
his party when moments of danger arrived, and when it was felt that their
influence could be used towards the preservation of peace,—as witness the
Loch incident.
'It is no crime to be a capitalist,' said one commentator on the late
events, and neither is it necessary to attribute to this section of the
community motives of patriotism to justify their association with the Reform
movement. It is not intended to suggest that the men who did associate
themselves eventually with it were not moved by any higher consideration
than that of protecting their interests—in many cases a far larger view than
this was taken; but it may be asked,—assuming that the capitalists were not
moved by higher considerations,—What is there in their position which should
debar them from endeavouring to introduce the reforms which would benefit
them only equally with every other honest man in the community?
Most of the wealthy houses in the Transvaal are either offshoots of or
have supporting connections with firms in England or on the Continent.
Between them and their principals much correspondence had taken place on the
political situation. As far as these houses were concerned, it was
impossible for them to enter upon any movement without the consent of their
European associates. For this reason the Reform movement,
as it eventually took place, has in some ways the appearance of and has very
frequently been stigmatized as an organization planned and promoted outside
the Transvaal. The fact is that Mr. Alfred Beit, of the firm of Wernher,
Beit and Co., London, and Mr. Cecil Rhodes, managing director of the
Consolidated Goldfields, may be regarded as the chiefs to whom the ultimate
decision as to whether it was necessary from the capitalistic point of view
to resort to extreme measures was necessarily left. Each of these gentlemen
controls in person and through his business associates many millions of
money invested in the Transvaal; each of them was, of course, a heavy
sufferer under the existing conditions affecting the mining industry, and
each, as a business man, must have been desirous of reform in the
administration. Mr. Beit acted in concert with Mr. Lionel Phillips, of H.
Eckstein and Co., the Johannesburg representatives of Wernher, Beit and Co.
Mr. Rhodes was represented by his brother, Colonel Francis Rhodes, and Mr.
J.H. Hammond, of the Consolidated Goldfields Company in Johannesburg. Mr.
George Farrar, another very large mine-owner, who joined a little later than
the others, with the gentlemen above named, may be considered to have
represented the capitalist element in the earlier stages of the Reform
movement. The other elements were represented by Mr. Charles Leonard, the
chairman of the National Union, and one or two other prominent members of
that body.
It is impossible to say with whom the idea of the movement, including the
arrangement with Dr. Jameson, originated. Perhaps it germinated when Dr.
Jameson read the life of Clive! Probably it was the result of discussion,
and no one man's idea. At any rate arms and ammunition were purchased, and
arrangements were made by which they should be smuggled into the country
concealed in machinery or gold-mining appliances. During the month of
November Messrs. Leonard and Phillips went to Capetown to see Mr. Rhodes, in
order to assure themselves finally as to the course which was to be pursued.
The position of Mr. Rhodes in the matter was recognised by them to be a
difficult one. Whilst as the managing director of the Consolidated
Goldfields he had as much right as any other man interested in the Transvaal
would have to concern himself in a movement of this
nature, his right to act in his capacity of managing director of the
Chartered Company would depend entirely on the nature of the part which he
professed to play; but his position as Prime Minister of the Colony made the
already difficult position much more complicated. Realizing this, Messrs.
Leonard and Phillips acting on behalf of the others determined to have a
perfectly clear understanding and to ascertain from Mr. Rhodes definitely
what were his objects in associating himself with the movement. The matter
was discussed at Mr. Rhodes' house, and the report given by the two deputies
to their colleagues on their return was that Mr. Rhodes frankly admitted
that he had two objects in view: one was to obtain an amelioration of the
conditions such as he was entitled to claim as representing an enormous
amount of capital invested in the Transvaal; the other object is best
described by Mr. Leonard. 'We read to him,' said that gentleman when
reporting to his comrades the result of his visit, 'the draft of our
declaration of rights. He was leaning against the mantelpiece smoking a
cigarette, and when it came to that part of the document in which we refer
to Free Trade in South African products he turned round suddenly, and said:
"That is what I want. That is all I ask of you. The rest will come in time.
We must have a beginning, and that will be the beginning. If you people get
your rights, the Customs Union, Railway Convention, and other things will
all come in time." He then added that we must take our own time about this
movement, and that he would keep Jameson on the frontier as long as it was
necessary as a moral support, and also to come to our assistance should we
get ourselves into a tight place. We asked him how he hoped to recoup
himself for his share of the expense in keeping Jameson's force on the
border, which should be borne by us jointly. He said that seeing the extent
of his interests in the country, he would be amply repaid by the improvement
in the conditions which it was intended to effect.'
It has since been suggested that the object of the movement was to 'steal
the country' and to annex it to Rhodesia, in order to rehabilitate the
Chartered Company. The suggestion is too ludicrous for serious discussion.
It must be obvious to anyone that the persons most
concerned in the movement, and whose interests lay in the Rand, would be the
very last to consent to any such scheme. There appears to be no conceivable
basis upon which such an arrangement could have been entered into, and it is
quite clear that no sensible business man having interests in a rich country
in a comparatively advanced state of development would consent to share that
certainty with a new country such as Rhodesia, the value of which, however
promising, has still to be proved. Notwithstanding the ludicrous nature of
the charge, it is quite certain that the Boers have a deep-rooted conviction
of its truth.
The arrangements with Dr. Jameson were made with him in person. During
the month of September he visited Johannesburg, and it was then agreed that
he should maintain a force of some 1,500 mounted men fully equipped, a
number of Maxims, and some field artillery; that he was, in addition to
this, to have with him 1,500 spare rifles and a quantity of spare
ammunition; and that about 5,000 rifles, three Maxim guns, and 1,000,000
rounds of ammunition were to be smuggled into Johannesburg. It was
calculated that in the town itself there would be, perhaps, 1,000 rifles
privately owned. Thus, in the event of a junction of forces being effected,
Johannesburg would be able to command about 9,000 armed men, with a fair
equipment of machine-guns and cannon. Nor was this all, for on the original
plan it was intended to seize the fort and magazines at Pretoria. And
circumstances favoured the plans of the Johannesburg men. The surrounding
wall of the fort, a mere barrack, had been removed on one side in order to
effect some additions; there were only about 100 men stationed there, and
all except half a dozen could be counted on as being asleep after 9 p.m.
There never was a simpler sensational task in the world than that of seizing
the Pretoria fort—fifty men could have done it. But there was more to be
done than the mere taking. In the fort there were known to be some 10,000
rifles, ten or twelve field-pieces, and 12,000,000 rounds of small-arm
ammunition; and it was designed to seize the fort and the railway on the
night of the outbreak and, by means of one or two trains, to carry off as
much of the material as possible and destroy the rest.
Association with Dr. Jameson as the leader of an
invading force is the one portion of their programme which the Reform
leaders find it extremely difficult to justify. As long as the movement was
confined to the Uitlanders resident in the Transvaal the sympathy of South
Africa and indeed of the world was with them. It was the alliance with the
foreign invader which forfeited that sympathy. That the eventual intention
of the Reformers was only to call upon Dr. Jameson in case they found
themselves attacked by and unable to cope with the Boers is a fact, but it
is only fair to Dr. Jameson to note that this was a modification of the
original arrangement by which both forces were to act simultaneously and in
concert,—when the signal should be given from Johannesburg.
On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's second visit to Johannesburg, towards
the end of November, the following letter of invitation was written and
handed to him:
To Dr. Jameson.
JOHANNESBURG.{19}
DEAR SIR,
The position of matters in this State has become so
critical that we are assured that at no distant period there will be a
conflict between the Government and the Uitlander population. It is
scarcely necessary for us to recapitulate what is now matter of history;
suffice it to say that the position of thousands of Englishmen and
others is rapidly becoming intolerable. Not satisfied with making the
Uitlander population pay virtually the whole of the revenue of the
country while denying them representation, the policy of the Government
has been steadily to encroach upon the liberty of the subject, and to
undermine the security for property to such an extent as to cause a very
deep-seated sense of discontent and danger. A foreign corporation of
Hollanders is to a considerable extent controlling our destinies, and in
conjunction with the Boer leaders endeavouring to cast them in a mould
which is wholly foreign to the genius of the people. Every public act
betrays the most positive hostility, not only to everything English, but
to the neighbouring States.
Well in short the internal policy of the Government is
such as to have roused into antagonism to it, not only practically the
whole body of Uitlanders but a large number of the Boers; while its
external policy has exasperated the neighbouring States, causing the
possibility of great danger to the peace and independence of this
Republic. Public feeling is in a condition of smouldering discontent.
All the petitions of the people have been refused with a greater or less
degree of contempt; and in the debate on the Franchise petition, signed
by nearly 40,000 people, one
member challenged the Uitlanders to fight for the rights they asked for,
and not a single member spoke against him. Not to go into details, we
may say that the Government has called into existence all the elements
necessary for armed conflict. The one desire of the people here is for
fair play, the maintenance of their independence, and the preservation
of those public liberties without which life is not worth living. The
Government denies these things, and violates the national sense of
Englishmen at every turn.
What we have to consider is, What will be the
condition of things here in the event of a conflict? Thousands of
unarmed men, women and children of our race will be at the mercy of
well-armed Boers, while property of enormous value will be in the
greatest peril. We cannot contemplate the future without the gravest
apprehensions. All feel that we are justified in taking any steps to
prevent the shedding of blood, and to insure the protection of our
rights.
It is under these circumstances that we feel
constrained to call upon you to come to our aid,{20} should a
disturbance arise here. The circumstances are so extreme that we cannot
but believe that you and the men under you will not fail to come to the
rescue of people who will be so situated. We guarantee any expense that
may reasonably be incurred by you in helping us, and ask you to believe
that nothing but the sternest necessity has prompted this appeal.
CHARLES LEONARD.
LIONEL PHILLIPS.
FRANCIS RHODES.
JOHN HAYS HAMMOND.
GEORGE FARRAR.
The letter was drafted by Mr. Charles Leonard, and was signed then by
four out of the five signatories, the fifth signature being added some weeks
later in Cape Town. It was not dated, and was to be used only privately and
in case of necessity for the purpose of excusing Dr. Jameson to the
directors of the Chartered Company and the Imperial authorities in the
course which it was intended to take.
Various plans were discussed, and even dates were provisionally arranged.
The first arrangement agreed to was that Dr. Jameson should start two days
before the intended outbreak in Johannesburg. This was
agreed to for the time being, but subsequent discussion convinced the
leaders that there were the gravest objections to such a course, and it was
therefore decided that Dr. Jameson should be notified to start from his camp
on the same night as the outbreak in Johannesburg. The dates of December 28
and January 4 were in turn provisionally decided upon, but the primary
condition of these arrangements was that under no circumstances should Dr.
Jameson move without receiving the word from the Johannesburg party.
With reference to the question of going out to meet Dr. Jameson or giving
him assistance, the only thing that was discussed was that an officers'
patrol should be sent out to meet him, to escort him to his camp. There was
no doubt entertained as to the ability of Dr. Jameson and the force which it
was believed he would command to come in without assistance or the
arrangement would never have been made. The idea of the association with him
was, of course, that he should assist the Reformers—not they assist him; and
the proposal regarding the officers' patrol was one to which he only
consented after scouting the notion of any co-operation.
During the weeks which followed the conclusion of the arrangement
considerable dissatisfaction was felt at the very slow progress made in
obtaining arms. The number originally agreed to was deemed to be sufficient
but no more; and when it was first found that it would not be possible to
obtain this number but that a few hundreds less would have to be accepted,
doubts were freely expressed as to the wisdom of proceeding until a
sufficient supply had been obtained. When on two subsequent occasions it was
again notified that still a few hundred less would have to be accepted, some
members of the Reform Party were very emphatic in their objections to
proceeding any further until they should be satisfied that the undertakings
upon the strength of which they had entered upon the arrangement would be
faithfully adhered to. On the occasion of Dr. Jameson's last visit it had
been extracted from him that instead of 1,500 men he would probably start
with from 800 to 1,000. These discrepancies and alterations caused the
liveliest dissatisfaction in the minds of those who realized
that they were entering upon a very serious undertaking; but although
the equipment seemed poor, reliance was always placed on the taking of
Pretoria Fort. That at any rate was a certainty, and it would settle the
whole thing without a blow; for Johannesburg would have everything, and the
Boers would have rifles, but neither ammunition nor field-guns. Without
doubt the Pretoria arsenal was the key of the position, and it is admitted
by Boer and alien alike that it lay there unguarded, ready to be picked up,
and that nothing in the world could have saved it—except what did!
On or about December 19, Messrs. Woolls-Sampson and A. Bailey, two
Johannesburg men concerned in the movement, who had been in communication
with Mr. Rhodes and others in Cape Town, arrived in Johannesburg, and
indicated clearly that the question as to which flag was to be raised was
either deemed to be a relatively unimportant one or one concerning which
some of the parties had not clearly and honestly expressed their intentions.
In simple truth, it appeared to be the case that Dr. Jameson either thought
that the Johannesburg reformers were quite indifferent on the subject of the
flag, or assumed that the provisions for the maintenance of the Transvaal
flag were merely talk, and that the Union Jack would be hoisted at once.
Nothing was further from the truth. The Reform Party in Johannesburg
included men to whom the Union Jack is as dear as their own heart's blood,
but it also included many others to whom that flag does not appeal—men of
other nationalities and other associations and other sympathies. It
included—perhaps the strongest element of all—those men whose sympathies
were naturally and most strongly all for British rule, which they believed
to be the best in the world, but whose judgment showed them that to proclaim
that rule would be to defeat the very objects they honestly had in view, and
who would have regarded the change of flag at the last moment as an
unprincipled deception of those comrades who had been induced to co-operate
for reform and not for annexation. It had been repeatedly and emphatically
stated that the object was not to deprive the Boer of his independence or
the State of its autonomy, but to alter the system of government in such a
way as, first to obtain betterment of the economic conditions
which affect everyone, and afterwards to induce a policy more in
accordance with the general South African sentiment—in fact to get the
Transvaal into line with the other South African States, in the same way for
instance as the Free State had shown itself disposed to go. It is but poor
work explaining failure, yet it must surely be permissible that something
should be said for those who alone have had no hearing yet. And it is in the
minds of the Reformers that the professions of their 'real intentions'
regarding the flag made by Dr. Jameson and Mr. Rhodes might appropriately
have been made before the raid, instead of afterwards when all was over. The
regard for definite pledges, which in the Reformers was described as merely
an excuse for backing out, would, if it had been observed by all, have made
a sickening fiasco impossible.
No sooner had a doubt been raised on the subject of the flag than a
trusted emissary was despatched to inquire from Mr. Rhodes the meaning of
this tampering with one of the fundamental conditions of the agreement. The
messenger returned on Christmas morning, and at a largely-attended meeting
of the ringleaders stated that he had seen Mr. Rhodes, and had received from
him the assurance that it was all right about the flag: no question or doubt
had been raised on the subject. In returning to Capetown however in company
with Dr. Rutherfoord Harris, he learned from that gentleman that it was by
no means all right, and gathered that it was assumed that the provision
about maintaining the Transvaal flag was so much talk necessary to secure
the adhesion of some doubtful people. The announcement was received with the
gravest dissatisfaction. Several of the leading men stated emphatically that
nothing would induce them to take part in the movement unless the original
arrangement was loyally adhered to. In consequence of this it was resolved
to despatch Messrs. Charles Leonard and F.H. Hamilton to see Mr. Rhodes and
to obtain from him a definite guarantee that in the event of their availing
themselves of Dr. Jameson's help under any conditions the latter would abide
by the arrangements agreed upon.
It was then thought that a week would be sufficient time in which to
clear up the flag question and complete preparations. It
was decided to call a big public meeting for the night of Monday, January 6,
not with the intention of holding the meeting, but as a blind to cover the
simultaneous rising in Johannesburg and seizing of the arsenal in Pretoria
on the night of Saturday, January 4. With this in mind it was arranged to
publish, in the form of a manifesto,{21} the address which Mr. Charles
Leonard had prepared for the meeting.
Among the Reformers there had always been a considerable section who
regarded the alliance or arrangement with Dr. Jameson as a very doubtful
advantage. It was this section which strongly and successfully opposed the
suggestion that he should start before an actual outbreak. The difference of
opinion was not such as to cause division in the ranks, but yet sufficient
to keep alive discussion as to how the common aim could be achieved without
risk of the complications which external aid in the initial stages would be
sure to cause. To this feeling of doubt was added a sense of distrust when
Dr. Jameson's importunity and impatience became known; and when the question
of the flag was raised there were few, if any, among those concerned in the
movement who did not feel that the tail was trying to wag the dog. The
feeling was so strong that many were prepared to abandon the whole scheme
and start de novo rather than continue an undertaking in which it
looked as though they were being fooled. Hence the despatch of Messrs.
Leonard and Hamilton on Christmas Day.
Confidence in their power to control Dr. Jameson and direct the movement,
as they considered they had the right and ability to do, had been so shaken
in the reformers that as soon as Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton had been sent
they began to discuss a complete change of plans, and awaited only the reply
from Capetown before taking the first steps in the prosecution of the new
programme. The plan most favoured was that the importation and distribution
of arms should be continued as speedily and as secretly as possible, that,
instead of an invading force, as many armed and trained men as could be
obtained should be brought in, nominally as mechanics or men seeking
employment on the mines, that the public meeting called
for January 6 should be held and made as large and demonstrative as
possible, and a demand made to the Volksraad to grant the redress of the
grievances complained of, and, failing reasonable concessions, that they
should rise in arms and at the same time appeal to England, as the paramount
Power, or to the other South African Governments, to mediate and so avert
civil war. It was believed, and with much reason, that the Boers, knowing,
as they then inevitably would, that a considerable quantity of arms and
ammunition had been smuggled in, and knowing also that the sentiment of
South Africa, including the Free State, was all in favour of considerable
concessions to the Uitlanders, would have hesitated to take the initiative
against Johannesburg, and would either have yielded to the pressure of the
general South African opinion and have accepted the mediation of the High
Commissioner, or would have offered considerable reforms. The Kruger party,
it was well known, would proceed to any extreme rather than concede anything
to the Uitlanders; but at that time the majority of the Boers were opposed
to the Kruger policy of favouring the Hollanders and Germans to the
exclusion of all other Uitlanders, and this majority would not have
consented to measures calculated to embroil them with the people who had
made their country prosperous, and even to imperil the very existence of the
State, whilst an alternative course so easy as the one presented lay open to
them.
On the day following the despatch of Messrs. Leonard and Hamilton to
Capetown it was decided to send messengers to Dr. Jameson to emphatically
prohibit any movement on his part, also to explain to him the position of
affairs in Johannesburg with reference to the flag, and above all to impress
upon him the condition of unpreparedness. Major Heany was sent by train viâ
Kimberley, and in order to facilitate his travelling a telegram was sent to
Mr. Rhodes in Capetown asking him to arrange for a special train, and
acquainting him with the purpose of the trip. Captain Holden was sent on
horseback across country to Pitsani. Both gentlemen carried the most
definite instructions to Dr. Jameson on no account to move. Both gentlemen
have since stated that they delivered the messages in
word and in spirit absolutely as they were given to them in Johannesburg,
and that they carried no private messages whatever from any individual
member of the Committee in any way conflicting with the purport of the
official message with which they were charged.
On the Thursday, Friday, and Saturday telegrams and messages were
received from Dr. Jameson, all revealing impatience and a desire if not an
intention to disregard the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Replies were
sent to him and to the Capetown agents protesting against the tone adopted,
urging him to desist from the endeavour to rush the Johannesburg people as
they were pushing matters on to the best of their ability and hoped for a
successful issue without recourse to violent measures, and stating
emphatically that the decision must be left entirely in the hands of
Johannesburg as agreed, otherwise there would be certain disaster. Besides
what would be regarded as the official expressions and messages of the
Johannesburg people, several individual members of the party telegraphed to
Dr. Jameson informing him of the position and adding their personal advice
and testimony. The probability of achieving success without firing a shot
was referred to in the sense of a most satisfactory prospect. It did not
occur to any one among the Johannesburg party that it was this prospect that
moved Dr. Jameson to start. That idea is of later birth.
On Sunday morning, at about ten o'clock, two telegrams of importance were
received. The first was from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard, to the following
effect: 'We have received perfectly satisfactory assurance from Cecil
Rhodes, but a misunderstanding undoubtedly exists elsewhere. In our opinion,
continue preparations, but carefully, and without any sort of hurry, as
entirely fresh departure will be necessary. In view of changed condition
Jameson has been advised accordingly.' Portions of this message were in
code. It left Capetown at 2.20 p.m. on Saturday, the 28th, and was received
on Sunday at about ten o'clock. The second telegram was one from Dr. Jameson
to his brother, Mr. S.W. Jameson, and had been despatched at about the same
time. It was in the Bedford-McNeil Code, and was much mutilated—so
much so that it was thought to have been purposely done
in the telegraph office in order to obscure the meaning. One expression was
clear, however, and that was: 'I shall start without fail to-morrow night.'
It concluded with the words: 'Inform Dr. Wolff—distant cutting. He will
understand.'
The words 'distant cutting' did not occur in any code-book. Dr. Jameson
states that they were words privately agreed upon between him and Dr. Wolff.
The telegram was shown to Dr. Wolff as soon as he could be found, but he
declared himself unable to throw any light whatever upon it. It was however
clear from the message that on Saturday afternoon it had been Dr. Jameson's
intention to disregard the wishes of the Committee, and to start on Sunday
night, and the telegram impressed the recipients more than ever with the
wisdom of their action in sending the messengers to Capetown and to Pitsani
to insist upon no further steps being taken. It is of little consequence
what the words 'distant cutting' really meant, or whether they were, or
should have been, understood by any of the parties. Major Heany and Captain
Holden, it was known, could not have reached Dr. Jameson at the time the
message was despatched, and therefore no more importance was attached to
this than to the other impatient telegrams.
It was assumed that, on receiving the emphatic messages sent through
Major Heany and Captain Holden, Dr. Jameson would realize the seriousness of
the position, and would, in fact, abide by the arrangements made with him.
Nor was this all. It was also clear that the telegram of Mr. Rhodes to which
it was inferred reference was made in the concluding words of Messrs.
Hamilton's and Leonard's wire—'Jameson has been advised accordingly'—could
not have reached Dr. Jameson at the time his telegram to his brother was
despatched. It was part of the instructions to Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard
that any communications which they might desire to make to Dr. Jameson
should pass through Mr. Cecil Rhodes in order to ensure due regard being
paid to them. There was therefore no doubt in the minds of the Johannesburg
men that during Saturday afternoon—that is to say, more than twenty-four
hours before he proposed moving—he must have received a wire forbidding him
to move.
The facts here given were sufficient to warrant the
belief that all that was necessary had been done to prevent any movement.
But more reassuring than all precautions was the conviction that Dr.
Jameson, no matter how much he might 'bluff' in order to force immediate
action, would never be guilty of so gross a breach of faith as to start in
defiance of the wishes of the Johannesburg people. Extreme dissatisfaction
of course prevailed in the minds of a good many when they learned of the
efforts made by him to force their hands, and this feeling was intensified
by the report brought in by Dr. Wolff, who had just returned from seeing Dr.
Jameson at Pitsani. Dr. Wolff had arrived at Pitsani on the previous
Tuesday, and was then greeted by Dr. Jameson with the remark that he had 'as
nearly as possible started for Pretoria last night.' It was felt that this
might appear to be a very fine and dashing thing for a party of men well
armed and trained and able to take care of themselves, but that it betrayed
great indifference to his pledges, as well as to the fate of his associates,
who as he knew perfectly well had not even the arms to defend themselves
from the consequences of any precipitate action on his part, and who had
moreover the responsibility for the control and protection of unarmed
Johannesburg.
The feeling among the Reformers on Sunday, the 29th, was one of
considerable relief at having found out in time the intention of their
reckless colleague, and at having taken the necessary steps to control him.
Secure in the belief that the messages from Capetown had duly reached Dr.
Jameson, and that either Major Heany or Captain Holden had by that time also
reached him, and that in the future the management of their affairs would be
left in their own hands, they continued during Sunday and Monday, the 29th
and 30th, to arrange plans on the basis before indicated, awaiting in the
meantime further communications from Messrs. Hamilton and Leonard.
In the meanwhile it became generally known in Johannesburg that some
movement was afoot, and suppressed excitement and expectancy became
everywhere manifest. On Saturday, December 28, the President returned from
his annual tour through certain of the outlying districts. On his journey he
was met by a number of burghers at Bronkhorst Spruit, the
scene of the battle in the War of Independence, about twenty miles from
Pretoria. One of the burghers, an old Boer named Hans Botha, who was the
opponent of Mr. Woolls-Sampson in the 'duel' at the battle of Zwartkoppies,
in addressing the President, said that he had heard that there was some talk
of a rising in Johannesburg, and added that although he had many bullets in
him (It is stated that he still has five!), he could find room for more if
it was a question of tackling the Britishers. The President replied that he
had heard of the threatened rising, and did not believe it: he could not say
what was likely to happen, but they must remember this—if they wanted to
kill a tortoise they must wait until he put his head out of the shell.
In an interview with a representative of the press immediately after this
the President said that the position was full of gravity and might lead to
disagreeable consequences, especially to the mining industry and commercial
enterprise generally; but he was still confident that common-sense would
prevail in Johannesburg, and expressed the conviction that the law-abiding
portion of the community, which included the greater part of the English and
other nationalities, would support all measures for the preservation of law
and order. He said that his endeavours hitherto to secure concessions for
the Uitlander population had been frustrated by the public utterances and
actions of irresponsible and unscrupulous agitators whose methods had often
a detrimental effect on the Volksraad and on the burghers throughout the
Republic. The first commotion created was by the flag incident some years
before (1890), which caused a great shock to confidence; another sinister
incident was the refusal of a portion of the British community to serve
their adopted country in the Malaboch War, when the union of Boer and Briton
against the common enemy was nearly brought about. 'If wiser counsels
unfortunately should not prevail,' the President continued, 'then let the
storm arise, and the wind thereof will separate the chaff from the grain.
The Government will give every opportunity for free speech and free
ventilation of grievances, but it is fully prepared to put a stop to any
movement made for the upsetting of law and order.'
On the same day the President was interviewed by a
deputation of Americans from Johannesburg. They were men of the highest
position and influence in the community and were earnestly desirous of
securing reforms, but they were impressed with the idea that peaceful means
had not yet been exhausted and that the President and his Executive would
listen to reason if they were convinced that serious consequences would
follow the neglect to reform. The President received them civilly, as he
often does when he has a strong hand to play: it is generally when his cards
are poor that he gives way to the paroxysms of rage and indulges in the
personal abuse and violent behaviour which have earned for him so unenviable
a reputation. He listened to all that had been advanced by the deputation,
and then said that 'it was no time to talk when danger was at hand. That was
the time for action.' The deputation represented to him that there was no
danger at hand unless the President by his own act precipitated matters and
caused the trouble himself, that matters were completely in his hands, and
that if he would deal with the people in a liberal and statesmanlike way and
grant the reforms which were universally acknowledged to be necessary there
would not be anywhere in the world a more law-abiding and loyal community
than that of Johannesburg. The President answered merely by the question:
'If a crisis should occur, on which side shall I find the Americans?' The
answer was, 'On the side of liberty and good government.' The President
replied, 'You are all alike, tarred with the same brush; you are British in
your hearts.'
In reply to another deputation, representing a section of the community
which was not by any means at one with the reformers, but the leading
members of which still urged the necessity for reforms, the President said,
'Either you are with me in the last extremity or you are with the enemy;
choose which course you will adopt. Call a meeting to repudiate the
Manifesto in its entirety, or there is final rupture between us.' The
gentlemen addressed declared emphatically that on the Manifesto there could
be no retreat. On that Johannesburg was absolutely at one. The President
replied, 'Then, I shall know how to deal with Johannesburg,' and left the
room.
The various business associations of Johannesburg and
Pretoria approached the President at different hours in these threatening
times, and did all that was possible to induce him to make reasonable
concessions. Although numbers of his followers and counsellors were strongly
in favour of doing something to avert the coming storm, the President
himself seemed inclined to fight until the last ditch was reached rather
than concede anything. In reply to the Mercantile Association he said that
he was quite willing to give the franchise, but that it would be to those
who were really worthy of it—those for instance who rallied round the
Government in this crisis and took no part in the mischievous agitation and
clamouring for so-called reforms: all malcontents should be excluded. In
fact he made it perfectly plain that the franchise would be treated as a
huge bribery fund; and he himself was introducing the thin end of the wedge
in the suggestion made to the Association with a view to splitting up the
Reform Party in Johannesburg. He however added that the special duties on
food-stuffs would be immediately removed pending confirmation by the
Volksraad, that equal subsidies would be granted to Dutch and English
schools alike, and that the Netherlands Railway Company would be approached
with a view to having the tariffs reduced. The effect of this was however
slightly marred by the concluding sentence in which he stated that 'as he
had kept his former promises, so he would do his best to keep this.'
In reply to a second deputation of Americans, the President in a moment
of irritation said that it was impossible to grant the franchise to the
Uitlander—American, British, or other; he would lose his power if he did;
the Government would no longer be his. A member of the deputation said,
'Surely, if we take the oath of allegiance, you will trust us?' The
President hesitated for a moment, and then said, 'This is no time to talk
about these things; I can promise you nothing.'
Footnotes for Chapter III
{19} The date of 20th December, 1895, was filled
in by Dr. Jameson when he decided to start and to publish the letter.
{20} When this letter was published by Dr.
Jameson and cabled to the London Times the sense of it was very
gravely—but doubtless unintentionally—altered by terminating this sentence
with the word 'aid' and carrying the remaining words into the next sentence.
(July, 1899.) At the Westminster inquiry it transpired that on December
20 Mr. Rhodes instructed Dr. Harris to wire for a copy of the letter. Dr.
Jameson forwarded it after filling in that day's date. On December 30, Dr.
Harris, again acting on Mr. Rhodes' instructions, telegraphed the letter to
the Times, having altered the date to 28th, and prefaced it with the
statement that the letter had been 'sent on Saturday (28) to Dr. Jameson,
Mafeking.'
{21} See Appendix I. for
the full text of Manifesto.
