The subjoined document is printed in the form in which it was supplied to
the author by a journalist, to whom it had been given as a fair statement of
the case. The marginal remarks are the notes made by a member of the Reform
Committee to whom it was shown.
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE EXPEDITION THAT LEFT THE PROTECTORATE AT THE
URGENT REQUEST OF THE LEADING CITIZENS OF JOHANNESBURG WITH THE OBJECT OF
STANDING BY THEM AND MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER WHILST THEY WERE DEMANDING
JUSTICE FROM THE TRANSVAAL AUTHORITIES. By SIR JOHN C. WILLOUGHBY, BART.,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Dr. Jameson's Forces.
On Saturday, December 28, 1895, Dr. Jameson received a Reuter's telegram
showing that the situation at Johannesburg had become acute. At the same
time reliable information was received that the Boers in the Zeerust and
Lichtenburg districts were assembling, and had been summoned to march on
Johannesburg.
Preparations were at once made to act on the terms of the letter dated
December 20, and already published, and also in accordance with verbal
arrangements with the signatories of that letter—viz., that should Dr.
Jameson hear that the Boers were collecting, and that the intentions of the
Johannesburg people had become generally known, he was at once to come to
the aid of the latter with whatever force he had available, and without
further reference to them, the object being that such force should reach
Johannesburg without any conflict.
At 3 p.m. on Sunday afternoon, December 29, everything
was in readiness at Pitsani Camp.
The troops were paraded, and Dr. Jameson read the letter of invitation
from Johannesburg.
He then explained to the force (a) that no hostilities were
intended; (b) that we should only fight if forced to do so in
self-defence; (c) that neither the persons nor property of
inhabitants of the Transvaal were to be molested; (d) that our sole
object was to help our fellow-men in their extremity, and to ensure their
obtaining attention to their just demands.
Dr. Jameson's speech was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the
men, who cheered most heartily.
The above programme was strictly adhered to until the column was fired
upon on the night of the 31st.
Many Boers, singly and in small parties, were encountered on the line of
march; to one and all of these the pacific nature of the expedition was
carefully explained.
Start from Pitsani.
The force left Pitsani Camp at 6.30 p.m., December 29, and marched
through the night.
At 5.15 a.m. on the morning of the 30th the column reached the village of
Malmani (39 miles distant from Pitsani).
Junction effected at Malmani with B.B.P.
Precisely at the same moment the advanced guard of the Mafeking Column
(under Colonel Grey) reached the village, and the junction was effected
between the two bodies.
For details of the composition of the combined force, as also for general
particulars of the march to Krugersdorp, see sketch of the route and
schedule attached (marked A. and B. respectively).
Defile at lead-mines passed.
From Malmani I pushed on as rapidly as possible in order to cross in
daylight the very dangerous defile at Lead Mines. This place, distant 71
miles from Pitsani, was passed at 5.30 p.m., December 30.
I was subsequently informed that a force of several hundred Boers, sent
from Lichtenburg to intercept the force at this point, missed doing so by
three hours only.
Letter from Commandant-General.
At our next 'off-saddle' Dr. Jameson received a letter from the
Commandant-General of the Transvaal demanding to know the reason of our
advance, and ordering us to return immediately. A reply was sent to this,
explaining Dr. Jameson's reasons in the same terms as those used to the
force at Pitsani.
Letter from High Commissioner.
At Doornport (91 miles from Pitsani), during an 'off-saddle' early on
Tuesday morning, December 31, a mounted messenger overtook us, and presented
a letter from the High Commissioner, which contained an order to Dr. Jameson
and myself to return at once to Mafeking and Pitsani.
Reasons for not retreating.
A retreat by now was out of the question, and to comply with these
instructions an impossibility. In the first place, there was absolutely no
food for men or horses along the road which we had recently followed;
secondly, three days at least would be necessary for our horses, jaded with
forced marching, to return; on the road ahead we were sure of finding, at
all events, some food for man and beast. Furthermore, we had by now
traversed almost two-thirds of the total distance; a large force of Boers
was known to be intercepting our retreat, and we were convinced that any
retrograde movement would bring on an attack of Boers from all sides.
It was felt, therefore, that to ensure the safety of our little force, no
alternative remained but to push on to Krugersdorp to our friends, who we
were confident would be awaiting our arrival there.
Apart from the above considerations, even had it been
possible to effect a retreat from Doornport, we knew that Johannesburg had
risen, and felt that by turning back we should be shamefully deserting those
coming to meet us.
Finally, it appeared to us impossible to turn back, in view of the fact
that we had been urgently called in to avert a massacre, which we had been
assured would be imminent in the event of a crisis such as had now occurred.
Boer scouts.
Near Boon's store, on the evening of the 31st, an advanced patrol fell in
with Lieutenant Eloff, of the Krugersdorp Volunteers. This officer, in
charge of a party of 15 scouts, had come out to gain intelligence of our
movements. He was detained whilst our intentions were fully explained to
him, and then released at Dr. Jameson's request.
First skirmish New Year's Eve.
At midnight (New Year's Eve), while the advanced scouts were crossing a
rocky wooded ridge at right angles to and barring the line of advance, they
were fired on by a party of 40 Boers, who had posted themselves in this
position. The scouts, reinforced by the advanced guard, under Inspector
Straker, drove off their assailants after a short skirmish, during which one
trooper of the M.M.P. was wounded.
At Van Oudtshoorn's, early on the following morning (January 1), Dr.
Jameson received a second letter from the High Commissioner, to which he
replied in writing.
At 9.30 a.m. the march was resumed in the usual day formation. After
marching two miles, the column got clear of the hills and emerged into open
country.
10.15 a.m.
About this time Inspector Drury, in command of the rearguard, sent word
that a force of about 100 Boers was following him about one mile in rear. I
thereupon reinforced the rearguard, hitherto consisting of a troop and one
Maxim, by an additional half-troop and another Maxim.
11 a.m.
About 5 miles beyond Van Oudtshoorn's store the column was met by two
cyclists bearing letters from several leaders of the Johannesburg Reform
Committee. These letters expressed the liveliest approval and delight at our
speedy approach, and finally contained a renewal of their promise to meet
the column with a force at Krugersdorp.{55} The messengers also reported
that only 300 armed Boers were in the town.
This news was communicated to the troops, who received it with loud
cheers.
When within two miles of Hind's store, the column was delayed by
extensive wire-fencing, which ran for one and a half miles on either side of
the road, and practically constituted a defile.
While the column was halted and the wire being cut, the country for some
distance on both sides was carefully scouted.
By this means it was ascertained that there was a considerable force of
Boers (1) on the left front, (2) in the immediate front (retreating hastily
on Krugersdorp), (3) a third party on the right flank.
The force which had been following the column from Van Oudtshoorn's
continued to hover in the rear.
Lieutenant-Colonel White, in command of the advanced guard, sent back a
request for guns to be pushed forward as a precaution in case of
an attack from the Boers in front. By the time these guns
reached the advanced guard, the Boers were still retreating some two miles
off. A few rounds were then fired in their direction. Had Colonel White, in
the first instance, opened fire with his Maxims on the Boers, whom he
surprised watering their horses close to Hind's store, considerable loss
would have been inflicted; but this was not our object, for with the
exception of the small skirmish on the previous night, the Boers had not as
yet molested the column, whose sole aim was to reach Johannesburg if
possible without fighting.
1.30 p.m.
At this hour Hind's store was reached.
Here the troops rested for one and a half hours.
Unfortunately, hardly any provisions for men and horses were available.
3 p.m.
An officers' patrol, consisting of Major Villiers (Royal Horse Guards)
and Lieutenant Grenfell (1st Life Guards) and six men, moved off for the
purpose of reconnoitring the left flank of the Boer position, while Captain
Lindsell, with his permanent force of advanced scouts, pushed on as usual to
reconnoitre the approach by the main road. At the same time I forwarded a
note to the Commandant of the forces in Krugersdorp to the effect that, in
the event of my friendly force meeting with opposition on its approach, I
should be forced to shell the town, and that therefore I gave him this
warning in order that the women and children might be moved out of danger.
To this note, which was despatched by a Boer who had been detained at Van
Oudtshoorn, I received no reply.
At Hind's store we were informed that the force in our front had
increased during the forenoon to about 800 men, of whom a large number were
entrenched on the hillside.
4.30 p.m.
Four miles beyond Hind's store, the column following the scouts, which
met with no opposition, ascended a steep rise of some 400 feet, and came
full in view of the Boer position on the opposite side of a deep valley,
traversed by a broad "sluit" or muddy water course.
Standing on the plateau or spur, on which our force was forming up for
action, the view to our front was as follows:
Passing through our position to the west ran the Hind's store—Krugersdorp
Road traversing the valley and the Boer position almost at right angles to
both lines.
Immediately to the north of this road, at the point where it disappeared
over the sky-line on the opposite slope, lay the Queen's Battery House and
earthworks, completely commanding the valley on all sides and distant 1,900
yards from our standpoint.
Some 1,000 yards down the valley to the north stood a farmhouse,
surrounded by a dense plantation, which flanked the valley.
Half-way up the opposite slope, and adjacent to the road, stood an iron
house which commanded the drift where the road crossed the above-mentioned
watercourse.
On the south side of the road, and immediately opposite the last-named
iron house, an extensive rectangular stone wall enclosure with high trees
formed an excellent advanced central defensive position. Further up the
slope, some 500 yards to the south of this enclosure, stretched a line of
rifle-pits, which were again flanked to the south by 'prospecting' trenches.
On the sky-line numbers of Boers were apparent to our front and right front.
Before reaching the plateau we had observed small parties of Boers
hurrying towards Krugersdorp, and immediately on reaching the high
ground the rearguard was attacked by the Boer force which
had followed the column during the whole morning.
I therefore had no further hesitation in opening fire on the Krugersdorp
position.
4.30 p.m.
The two seven-pounders and the 12-1/2 pounder opened on the Boer line,
making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and Captain Gosling at
1,900 yards.
5 p.m.
This fire was kept up until 5 p.m. The Boers made practically no reply,
but lay quiet in the trenches and battery.
Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated, the
first line consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100 men), under
Colonel White advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this force; a strong troop
with a Maxim formed the right and left supports on either flank.
Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B.B.P. and one Maxim, had been
previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left.
The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve and
rearguard.
The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of the
watercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy cross-fire from all
points of the defence.
Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond the
watercourse.
The left support under Inspector Dykes then advanced to prolong the first
line to the left, but, diverging too much to his left this officer
experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse and plantation, and
was driven back with some loss.
Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and come
into action.
5.30 p.m.
About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that the
country to our right was open, and that we could easily move round in that
direction.
It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intended
holding their position.
Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of the Boers—an
event which I had been momentarily expecting—I did not feel justified in
pushing a general attack, which would have certainly entailed heavy losses
on my small force.
6.15 p.m.
I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim to keep
in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateau to our left,
and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B.B.P., one 12-1/2 pounder, and one
Maxim to cover our left flank and continue firing on the battery and
trenches south of the road.
I then made a general flank movement to the right with the remaining
troops.
Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advanced
position during the next half-hour, and blew up the battery house.
Flank movement.
Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first houses of the
Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt to intercept the
movement.
Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of the
promised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to push
on with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting
in the darkness to slip through any intervening opposition.
Two guides were obtained, the column formed in the prescribed night order
of march, and we started off along a road leading direct to Johannesburg.
At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from the
direction of Krugersdorp, which lay 1-1/2 miles to the left rear.
We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of the
long-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg had Maxims, and
that the Staats'-Artillerie were not expected to arrive until the following
morning. To leave our supposed friends in the lurch was out of the question.
I determined at once to move to their support.
Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road I advanced rapidly
across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction of the firing, in
the formation shown in the accompanying sketch.
After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and we
perceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. The flankers
on the right reported another force threatening that flank.
Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from the ammunition
carts, I ordered a retreat on them.
It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the cause
thereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force from Johannesburg.
Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our friends at
all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could not fail to carry
out their repeated promises,{56} renewed to us by letter so lately as 11
a.m. this same day. It was now very nearly dark. In the dusk the Boers could
be seen closing in on three sides—viz., north, east, and south. The road to
Johannesburg appeared completely barred, and the last opportunity of
slipping through, which had presented itself an hour ago when the renewed
firing was heard, was gone not to return.
Bivouac, January 1.
Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available.
But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which we afterwards
heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at the arrival of large
reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column would have been by this time
(7 p.m.) at least four or five miles further on the road to Johannesburg,
with an excellent chance of reaching that town without further opposition.
I moved the column to the edge of a wide vley to the right of the road,
and formed the horses in quarter-column under cover of the slope. The carts
were formed up in rear and on both flanks, and five Maxims were placed along
the front so as to sweep the plateau.
The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear and
flank faces.
The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on the side;
sentries and cossack posts were posted on each face.
Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches and
cuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards.
9 p.m.
At 9 p.m. a heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm of bullets
swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sides except the
south-west.
The troops were protected by their position on the slope below the level
of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, which lasted about
twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable.
The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery as possible,
although very tired and hungry and without water.
We were then left unmolested for two or three hours.
Midnight.
About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp, but
the firing was not kept up for long.
Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to get our
range.
Thursday, January 2.
At 3.30 a.m. patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force as
silently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off.
At 4 a.m. a heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and the
patrols driven in from the north and east sides.
Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by Lieutenant
Jesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope.
Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the south
returned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in that
direction.
The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in force were
occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankment for a distance
of one and a half miles right across the direct road to Johannesburg.
I covered the movements of the main body with the B.B.P. and two Maxims
under Colonel Grey along the original left front of the bivouac, and two
troops M.M.P., under Major K. White on the right front.
During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however the main
body was partially sheltered by the slope.
Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley without
casualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic Mine, was
subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White hereupon very
judiciously threw out one troop to the left to cover the further advance of
the main body.
This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by the disappearance
of our volunteer guide of the previous night.
Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained.
In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and the
covering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M.M.P. covering
troops, and rejoined the main body.
5 a.m.
At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but most gallantly
insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of the action.
Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in action
until he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop.
While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavy fire,
and several men and horses were lost here.
I detailed a rearguard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R. White,
to cover our rear and left flank, and move the remainder of the troops in
the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward as possible.
In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept up for
ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a stand was made by
various small detachments of the rear and flank guard. In
this manner the Boers were successfully kept a distance of 500 yards, and
repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank of the main body.
In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfontein we
met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the mining population, who
professed a desire to help if only they had arms.
8 a.m.
Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey, at
the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the Speitfontein mine,
was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line of advance.
I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with the
rear-guard.
On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a ridge
which our guide stated was Doornkop.
The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were then
carried out.
The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who I regret to say was severely
wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridge in most
gallant style and pushed on beyond it.
About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which we have learnt
with grief has subsequently proved fatal.
Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P., charged,
and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening our left flank.
The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill was
impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left.
This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that without
storming the Boer position there was no road open to Johannesburg except by
a wide detour of many miles to the right.
8.30 a.m.
At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High Commissioner
again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson informed me at the
same time of the most disheartening news, viz., that he had received a
message stating that Johannesburg would not or could not come to our
assistance, and that we must fight our way through unaided.
Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again
pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another steep and
stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds of Boers
completely covered from our fire.
This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must
advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no way of
getting round this hill.
Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out,
outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to keep their
promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by one-fourth, I no
longer considered that I was justified in sacrificing any more of the lives
of the men under me.
As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render
assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of
Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless attempt
to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover which must
without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless slaughter.
9.15 a.m.
With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the Commandant
that we would surrender provided that he would give a
guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the force.
To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all,
provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.
In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan
subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he would not
answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until our arms had
been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.
I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to loss
of time from the following causes:
(1) The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp,
which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg
force.
(2) The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp or of the guides to the
Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by
Johannesburg.
(3) The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed
Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.
I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp,
marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under 70 hours, the
horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles between Pitsani and
Doornkop occupied 86 hours, during 17 of which the men were engaged with the
Boers, and were practically without food or water, having had their last
meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, 17
miles from Krugersdorp.
The average weight carried by each horse was 16 stone.
(2) List of officers engaged in the expedition and composition of the
force marked B. From this it will be seen that there was a total of 494 men
and officers (exclusive of staff).
(3) Plans of engagements at Krugersdorp and Doornkop, and of the bivouac
on the night of January 1st.
I cannot close this narrative without testifying to the very great
gallantry and endurance of all officers, non-commissioned officers, and
troopers under my command in the field and on the march under most trying
circumstances.
COMPOSITION OF FORCE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John Willoughby, Royal
Horse Guards Commanding.
Major Hon. Robert White, Royal Welsh
Fusiliers Senior Staff Officer.
Major C. Hyde Villiers, Royal Horse Guards Staff Officer.
Captain Kincaid-Smith, Royal Artillery Artillery Staff Officer.
Captain Kennedy, B.S.A.C.'s Service Quartermaster.
Captain E. Holden, Derbyshire Yeomanry Assistant Quarter-Master.
Surgeon Captain Farmer, B.S.A. Co. }
Surgeon Captain Seaton Hamilton, late 1st Life } Medical Officers.
Guards }
Lieutenant Grenfell, 1st Life Guards Remount Officer.
Lieutenant Jesser-Coope, B.S.A. Co. Transport Officer.
Captain Lindsell, late Royal Scots Fusiliers In charge Scouts.
Major J.B. Stracey, Scots Guards }
Major Heany, B.S.A. Co. } Officers temporarily
Captain Foley } attached to Staff.
Lieutenant Harry R. Holden, late Grenadier }
Guards }
OFFICERS OF MASHONALAND MOUNTED POLICE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Hon. H.F. White, Grenadier
Guards Commanding.
Inspector Bodle (late 6th Dragoons) 2nd in command.
Inspector Straker, commanding A Troop.
Inspector Dykes, commanding B Troop.
Inspector Barry, commanding C Troop.
Inspector Drury, commanding D Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Scott and Cashel, A Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Tomlinson and Chawner, B Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Cazalet and Williams, C Troop.
Sub-Inspectors Murray and Constable, D Troop.
Artillery Troop—Inspector Bowden and Sub-Inspector Spain.
Regimental Sergeant—Major Abbott.
BECHUANALAND BORDER POLICE.
Lieutenant-Colonel Raleigh Grey, 6th Dragoons Commanding.
Major Hon. Charles Coventry 2nd in command.
Captain Gosling, commanding G Troop.
Sub-Lieutenants Hoare and Wood, commanding G Troop.
Captain Munroe, commanding K Troop.
Sub-Lieutenant McQueen, commanding K Troop.
Medical Officer Surgeon Garraway.
Veterinary Surgeon Lakie.
M.M. Police officers and men 372 Pitsani
Staff 13 camp.
Colony boys (leading horses, etc.) 65
Horses 480
Mules 128
One 12-1/2-pounder, 6 Maxims, 6 Scotch carts, 1 Cape cart,
2 grain waggons.
B.B. Police officers and men 122 Mafeking
Staff 1 column.
Drivers and leaders 10
Horses 160
Mules 30
Two 7-pounders, 2 Maxims, 2 Scotch carts, 2 Cape carts.
Officers and men 494 Totals.
Staff 14
Drivers, leaders, etc. 75
Horses 640
Mules 158
M.H. Maxims 8
12-1/2-pounder 1
7-pounder 2
Scotch carts 8
Cape carts 3
AMMUNITION.
Rounds.
Carried by men and natives 50,000 Lee-Met.
Carried in Scotch carts and Cape carts 54,000 rifle.
-------
Total 104,000
=======
On the guns 17,000 Maxim.
In carts 28,000
-------
Total 45,000
=======
On limber 44 12-1/2
On one Scotch cart 80 pounders.
-------
Total 124
=======
On limbers 70 7-pounders.
In Scotch carts 172
-------
Total 242
=======
The rifle ammunition used was that supplied by the Maxim firm for their
guns and also pellet powder.
The powder used with the 12-1/2-pounder was that known as 'ballistite.'
Rocket signals and limelights were carried, but not used.
EQUIPMENT CARRIED.
- On the Person.
- (a) Rifle (10 rounds).
- (b) Bandolier (60 rounds).
- (c) Haversack (1/2 day's ration).
- (d) Water-bottle filled.
- On the Saddle.
- (a) Nosebag (5 lb. grain).
- (b) Cloak on wallet.
- (c) Rifle bucket.
- (d) Patrol tin (with grocery ration).
- (e) Leather axe-holder (every fourth man).
Near-side wallet, 30 rounds and 1/2 day's rations.
Off-side wallet, 20 rounds, tin dubbin, hold-all, and towel.
Average weight carried by horse = 16 stone.
Average weight carried by Scotch carts = 1,600 lb.
Footnotes for Appendix H
{55} The letters are published in their proper
place, and readers can satisfy themselves as to whether they justify the
above inference.
{56} Note. July, 1899. In the Report of the
Select Committee of the House of Commons (No. 311 of 1897), page 298, are
the following:—
Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman: "Did you understand that you were to meet a
considerable force at Krugersdorp coming from Johannesburg?"
Sir John Willoughby: Not when we started from Pitsani, but
certainly after the letters received from the cyclists.
