Towards the end of September Commandant F.E. Mentz had an engagement with
Colonel Byng's column near Heilbron. A portion of this officer's force had
held a ridge where there were some Kaffir kraals for cover; and Commandant
Mentz had with fifty burghers stormed this ridge, shooting down from thirty
to forty of the enemy, and taking twenty-five prisoners. We lost two killed
and three wounded. The Frankfort burghers under Commandant Ross had also not
been idle, for they had attacked a division of Colonel Rimington's troops
with the result that sixteen killed and wounded fell into their hands—among
these were seven of the National Scouts.
Thus fighting was taking place all over the country. I do not give any
report of the various engagements, as I was not present at them, and, as I
have already said, I only wish to record my own experiences. But it will be
easily seen, even from the scanty information I can give of these
skirmishes, that our small commandos had a splendid record of success.
It
is my intention to ask all my Vice-Commanders-in-Chief to narrate their
experiences. And when the whole story is told I am convinced that the world
will be astonished at what we were able to accomplish.
But however well these small commandos had fought, I myself believed that
the time had now come to make a great stroke. With this object in view I
gave orders that a number of the burghers should come to Blijdschap, in the
district of Bethlehem, under the command of the following officers:—General
Michal Prinsloo with Commandants Olivier, and Rautenbach of the Bethlehem
Commando; Commandant David Van Coller, who was in command of the Heilbron
burghers in the place of Commandant Steenekamp, who had resigned; Commandant
Hermanus Botha of Vrede; Commandant Roen of Ladybrand; and Commandant Jan
Cilliers of Kroonstad.
By
the beginning of November I had a force of seven hundred burghers under me
at Blijdschap.[101]
Although the spring was now far advanced, the veldt was in a very backward
condition. I therefore ordered the various subdivisions of my commando to go
and camp on the different farms in the neighbourhood. I spread the horses
over a large area, as they would thus find better pasture and so the sooner
recover their strength.
When November was drawing to a close I had an engagement with the English to
the south of Lindley. I had with me at that time General Hattingh, General
Wessel Wessels, and General Michal Prinsloo.
An
English force had encamped two days previously on the farm of Jagersrust,
which lies some ten miles to the south-east of Heilbron, and about the same
distance from Blijdschap. I had wished to make an attack on them the night
they arrived, but they were too near to Heilbron for me to venture on it.
The previous week three columns which came from Winburg and Kroonstad had
been operating near the Liebenbergsvlei, and driving a large laager of women
before them towards the north-east of the Liebenbergsvlei. But they had now
left the laager alone and returned to Kroonstad. The women had arrived at
Blijdschap at noon on November 28th on their way back to Lindley.
The morning following, two hours after sunrise, I received a report from
General Hattingh, who with Commandant Cilliers and a hundred men was
stationed close to Blijdschap. The General reported that the English from
Jagersrust were hotly pursuing the women's laager. And it soon appeared that
the women were being driven to the west of Blijdschap.
When General Hattingh heard that the English were hard by, he was some
twenty minutes' ride from Blijdschap, but he mounted his horse at once and
rode there as quickly as he could. On his arrival he immediately gave orders
to up-saddle, and, having sent me a second report, he started in pursuit of
the enemy.
As
soon as I had received General Hattingh's reports, I followed him with
General Wessels and a force of only a hundred men. I was at least five miles
from General Hattingh, and the English were twelve miles ahead. General
Michal Prinsloo was unfortunately a considerable distance away; and thus it
was that I could not at once get together my whole force of six hundred
burghers.
But General Michal Prinsloo had spent the time in attacking the English
force on their left front. Shortly after he had engaged the enemy I came up
behind them and delivered an attack on their right. But the veldt was very
uneven and high hills and intervening hollows made any co-operation between
us impossible, for one force could not tell where the other force was.
Meanwhile General Hattingh had attacked the enemy in the rear and thus
compelled them to withdraw their vanguard, which was then not far from the
women's laager and had nearly succeeded in capturing it. But now that the
whole force of the enemy was opposed to General Hattingh, he was forced to
give way and leave his positions. We lost two killed and three wounded.
Among the dead was the valiant F.C. Klopper of Kroonstad.
When I, with General Wessels and Commandant Hermanus Botha hurried up,
Commandant Hattingh was just on the point of retreating.
The English I saw numbered about a thousand mounted men and they had three
guns with them. I determined to make a flank attack, and accordingly marched
round to their right, at the same time sending orders to General Prinsloo to
get in the rear, or if he preferred in front of the enemy, so that we might
make a united attack upon them as they marched in the direction of Lindley.
It
now began to rain and a little later a very heavy thunderstorm burst on our
heads. This forced the English to halt on the farm of Victoriespruit.
The rain continued to fall in torrents and hindered General Prinsloo
carrying out my orders.
And now the sun went down.
As
our horses were quite exhausted by the hot pursuit after the English, and
the burghers wet through to the skin, I decided to postpone the attack to
the following day. I was also influenced in my decision by the consideration
that as the English were so far from any point from which reinforcements
could come, it was quite safe to let them alone until the morning. Nobody
could have foreseen that they would escape that night.
We
slept about five miles from them to the north-east, whilst General Prinsloo
and his men were not very far away to the south-east.
That night we placed the ordinary outposts, but no "brandwachten."
When on the next morning I sent my scouts out to discover the movements of
the enemy, what was my surprise when they reported that they had fled. They
had gone, my scouts informed me, towards Heilbron, which was about eighteen
miles off, and they had left behind them five laden waggons and one cart;
and where they had crossed Karoospruit they had, very naturally, lightened
their waggons, and flour, seed, oats, tarpaulins, and tents marked the point
where they had crossed the spruit. The enemy were already so far ahead when
I received this report that it was quite out of the question to catch them
before they reached Heilbron; so all idea of pursuing them had to be
abandoned.
So
far as I was able to find out, this column was under the command of Colonel
Rimington.
As
I was unable now to get in touch with the enemy, I set off with my commando
to what was once the town of Lindley. Alas! it could not any more be called
a town. Every house was burnt down; not even the church and parsonage were
spared.
We
found the veldt in very good condition; the early spring rains and the
downpours of the previous day had quite revived the grass. And so I decided
to remain at Lindley as long as possible, to give our horses a chance of
recovering their condition. It was impossible to provide them with forage,
for the amount the English had left behind was entirely insufficient as a
supply for the large number of horses we had with us.
For ten or twelve days we remained at Lindley, and so the horses had a short
breathing time, but not long enough to give the poor animals time fully to
regain their strength. In addition to being overworked, some of our horses
were suffering from a skin disease which we were quite unable to cure. This
disease had never before been known in the Republics.
When I was at Lindley I sent Commandant Johannes Meijer, one of my staff,
with forty men, to Cape Colony. With him went that brave soldier, Captain
Willem Pretorius, of whom I have made mention previously. If Commandant
Meijer had had sufficient time to collect a commando in the Colony, I am
sure that he would have proved that the younger generation of Free-Staters,
to whom he and Willem Pretorius belonged, possess qualities which were
entirely unsuspected before the war began.
On
the 8th of December three columns of the enemy appeared from Kroonstad.
It
had been my plan to remain at Lindley and wait my chance of dealing with
Colonel Baker, for he had under him a certain National Scout, who constantly
made raids from Winburg with a band of four or five hundred Kaffirs. A few
months previously a division of Commandant Hasebroek's commando had been
attacked at Doornberg by this man's Kaffirs, and four burghers had been
murdered in a horrible manner. More cases of this nature had taken place,
and I only mention this one in passing. I am not in a position to give all
the instances, but many of them were sworn to in affidavits, of which copies
were sent to Lord Kitchener. The original affidavits fell into the hands of
the English; but fresh ones shall be drawn up on my return to South Africa,
so that I may be able to prove the statements I have made. The narration of
these brutalities I prefer to leave to persons more conversant With the
facts than myself. I have only alluded to the subject so as to make it clear
why I like to keep my eye on Colonel Baker's column.
I
must now continue my story where I left it.
I
took up my position to the north-west of Lindley, in front of the columns
which approached from Kroonstad. But after a few skirmishes with them, I
returned to the east till darkness came on. When night had fallen I went
round to the south, behind Kaffirskop, expecting to receive the news that
Colonel Baker was coming up from Winburg, for he generally carried on his
operations in conjunction with the forces at Kroonstad.
On
the following day the enemy marched to Liebenbergsvlei, between Bethlehem
and Reitz. Thence they took the road between Lindley and Reitz to Kroonstad.
Piet de Wet, of the National Scouts, was with these columns.
After we had remained two days at Kaffirskop, we crossed the Valsch River.
The news then came that a column with a convoy was on the march from
Harrismith to Bethlehem.
I
felt that it was my duty to attack this column, but, although I advanced
with all haste, I was not in time to catch the enemy before they reached
Bethlehem. When I saw this, I decided to wait, at a distance of some fifteen
miles to the north-east of Bethlehem, for I expected that the column would
return to Harrismith.
The troops remained in Bethlehem till the morning of the 18th of December;
they then marched out towards Harrismith.
I
at once divided my commando into two parts, each consisting of two hundred
and fifty men. One of these divisions I posted behind the eastern end of the
Langberg, about forty miles from Bethlehem; the other on the banks of the
Tijgerkloofspruit, at the point where the road to Harrismith crosses the
stream.
I
gave strict orders to both divisions that as soon as I opened fire on the
English with the Maxim-Nordenfeldt, they were to charge down on them from
both sides at the same time.
The enemy, I may mention, were about six or seven hundred men strong, and
had two guns.
I
myself, with the Maxim-Nordenfeldt, was now on a high round hill, on the
eastern side of Tijgerkloof. I was very careful to be out of sight of the
English, so that they might get quite close to the burghers before the gun
disclosed my presence.
I
succeeded in hiding my burghers so successfully that the English did not
observe them until they were within about twelve hundred paces of my men in
Tijgerkloof.
Some of the enemy's scouts rode on ahead, and when I judged that they must
almost immediately see the burghers, I ordered Captain Muller, who was
standing behind a rise, to come out of cover and open fire; then I jumped on
my horse, and down the hill I went, at full gallop, to my burghers.
I
had scarcely covered half the distance, when Captain Muller opened fire on
the enemy.
As
the sound fell on my ears, it seemed to me that nothing now could save them!
What was now my bitter disappointment when I saw that only one-third of my
burghers were charging. The others were keeping under cover, and do what I
would I could not drive them out.
Everything went wrong.
When the burghers who were charging the English discovered that the greater
part of their comrades had remained, they turned round and retreated. But
before this had happened they had attacked the English at four different
points.
It
had been a short but a very hot engagement.
There was no possibility of inducing my men to charge, and so I thought it
wisest to retreat, swallowing my disappointment as best I could.
The burghers re-assembled to the south of the Langberg; and we found that
our loss was two killed and nine wounded, of whom two subsequently died.
We
could not ascertain the English losses, but we saw their ambulances very
busy. We heard afterwards that they had suffered much more severely than we
had done.
[101] A court-martial was held at this place, and several persons appeared
before it. A certain De Lange was condemned to death for high treason.
