When I was on the road to Heilbron, I heard that the commandos under General
Hattingh (those, namely, of Harrismith and Vrede) were near the Spitskopje,
seven miles to the south-east of Heilbron. I therefore went out of my course
and proceeded in the direction of these commandos. They were among those who
had stood the crucial test, and had not surrendered with Prinsloo.
It
was a real pleasure to me to meet the Harrismith burghers, and to talk with
them over bygone days. This was our first meeting since December, 1899. The
last time we had seen each other was when we were encamped round Ladysmith,
where we were, so to speak, neighbours—our positions being contiguous.
But what a shock went through my heart when I saw the cumbersome waggon-camps
which had come both from Vrede and Harrismith! For I remembered what trouble
and anxiety the waggons and carts had already caused me, and how my
commandos, in order to save them, had been forced to fly 280 miles—from
Slabbertsnek to Waterberg. As Commander-in-Chief, I was now determined to
carry out most strictly the Kroonstad regulation and have nothing more to do
with the waggons.
I
did not think that I should have any difficulty in convincing the commanders
of Harrismith and Vrede that the best thing would be to do away with these
unnecessary impediments, because, shortly before, the English themselves had
given me a text to preach from, by taking away a great number of waggons
from Commandant Hasebroek at Winburg and at Vet River. Nevertheless, my
words fell on unwilling ears.
It
was not long after I had arrived in the camp when I got the burghers
together and spoke to them. After thanking the officers and men for not
having surrendered with Prinsloo at Naauwpoort, I congratulated them on
their success at Ladybrand, where they had driven the English out of the
town and forced them to take refuge in the caverns of Leliehoek. I then went
on to tackle the tender subject—as a Boer regards it—of sacrificing the
waggons. No! I did not say so much as that—I only insisted on the waggons
being sent home. Now this was very much the same as saying: "Give up your
waggons and carts to the enemy"—an order which, expressed in that bald
manner, would have given offence.
However, I was resolved to have my way, and at the end of my speech, I said,
"I may not ask you, and I will not ask you what you will do with regard to
the waggons. I only tell you that they must disappear."
On
the following day I called the officers together, and gave them direct
orders to that effect. I was very polite, but also very determined that the
waggons should be sent off without a moment's delay. I also gave orders that
the Harrismith and Kroonstad burghers under General Philip Botha should
occupy themselves in cutting the English lines of communication between
Kroonstad and Zand River. The Bothaville burghers were to carry out similar
operations in their own district.
On
that same afternoon I rode with my staff to the Heilbron burghers, who now
had returned to their farms. (They had had permission to go home after they
had got back from Waterberg.) They had assembled in very strong force.
The enemy also had arrived in this part of the country, and we were
therefore obliged at once to get ourselves ready to fight in case it should
be necessary, or to retreat if the enemy should be too strong for us.
With the Heilbron, Harrismith and Vrede commandos, I had now a very
considerable force at my command.
When I met the burghers on the 25th of September I found that I must send a
force in the direction of Kroonstad, in order to oppose outposts which the
enemy had stationed some six miles from that town.
I
at once sent orders to General Hattingh that he was to come over to me with
his burghers. But what did I hear? The burghers had not been able to make up
their minds to part with their waggons; most of the men from Vrede and
Harrismith had gone home with these waggons, although there was a Kaffir
driver and a leader for almost every one, and although I had given express
orders that these Kaffirs were to be the ones to take back the waggons. How
angry I was! At such moments as these one would be well nigh driven mad were
there not a Higher Power to hold one back.
And, to make the situation still more serious, the English now came on from
all sides, and I had no troops! The Kroonstad burghers were in their own
district. I allowed those from Bethlehem to leave me in order to carry on
operations in their part of the country; the same likewise with the
Winburgers and the valiant Commandant Hasebroek, while the burghers of Vrede
and Harrismith had gone home.
I
had therefore with me only a small contingent from those districts, in
addition to the burghers from Heilbron.
The reader will understand that, under these circumstances, the forces which
now began to concentrate on us were too great for us to withstand; and that
no other course lay open to me than to go through Schoemansdrift; and, in
case I should be pursued, to Bothaville, in order to enter the zandveld
(desert) through which it would be difficult for the enemy to advance.
We
continued in the direction of Wolvehoek Station, and on the following night
crossed the line between Vredefortweg and Wolvehoek, where I wrecked the
railway at various points, and also took prisoner a small force of thirteen
who had been lying asleep in their tents. This last incident happened early
in the morning of September 30th.
We
had crossed the line, and were about three miles on the further side of it,
when a train came up and bombarded us with an Armstrong and a
Maxim-Nordenfeldt, without however doing any damage. Our guns were too far
behind the vanguard, and the poor horses too tired to go back for them, or
we should have answered their fire. However, we got an opportunity of using
our big guns against 200 mounted men, who had pursued us, but who, when they
saw we were ready to receive them, turned round and—took the shortest road
to safety!
That evening we marched to a place a little to the south of Parijs, and the
following day to the kopjes west of Vredefort. There we stayed a few days
until the enemy again began to concentrate at Heilbron.
I
then divided my commando into two parts. One part I took with me, while I
sent the Harrismith burghers (those at least who had not gone home with the
waggons) under General Philip Botha, in the direction of Kroonstad, where he
would meet the commando of that district, which had received orders to
operate to the west of the railway line. General Philip Botha nominated
Veldtcornet P. De Vos as Commandant of the Kroonstad contingent instead of
Commandant Frans Van Aard. He made a good choice, for Commandant De Vos was
not only a valiant officer, but also a strictly honourable man.
For some days the enemy remained encamped on the farm called Klipstapel,
which lies to the south-east of Vredefort. Then they attacked us. We held
our own for a day and a half, but at last had to retreat to the Vaal River,
whither the English, doubtless thinking that we were again going to
Waterberg, did not pursue us. This was on the 7th of October, 1900.
I
now received a report from General Liebenberg that General Barton and his
column were in the neighbourhood of Frederiksstad Station. He asked me (as
he was too weak to venture anything alone) whether I would join him in an
attack upon the English General. I decided to do so, and sent him a
confidential letter saying that I would join him in a week's time.
In
order to mislead the English, I retreated ostentatiously through
Schoemansdrift to the farm of Baltespoort, which stands on the banks of the
Rhenoster River, fifteen miles from the drift. The following night I
returned by the way I had come, and crossed the river a little to the west
of Schoemansdrift.
When on the following night we were again in the saddle I heard from many a
mouth, "Whither now?"
Our destination was Frederiksstad Station, where we were to engage General
Barton. Previous to an attack, thorough scouting should always take place.
Accordingly I sent out my scouts, and discovered that General Liebenberg had
entirely cut off the English from their communications, so that, except for
heliographic messages, they were entirely out of touch with the rest of
their forces. Now I do not know if they had "smelt a rat," but they were
certainly well entrenched near the station on ridges to the south-east and
to the north.
We
had therefore to besiege General Barton in his entrenchments. For the first
five days we held positions to the east, to the south, and to the
north-west. On the fifth day I agreed with General Liebenberg that we should
take up a new position on the embankment north-west of the strongest part of
the English encampment. This position was to be held by two hundred men, of
whom I gave eighty to General Froneman and one hundred and twenty to General
Liebenberg. It was a position that we could not leave during the day without
great danger, and it needed a large force to hold it, for its garrison had
to be strong enough to defend itself if it should be attacked.
If
only my arrangements had been carried out all would have gone well.
But what happened?
I
thought that two hundred men had gone in accordance with my orders to that
position. Instead of this there were only eighty there when, on the
following morning, a very strong reinforcement of English, ordered up by
General Barton, appeared from the direction of Krugersdorp. I did not hear
of this reinforcement till it was so close that there was no chance for me
to keep it back. In fact, when I got the report the enemy were already
storming the unfortunate handful of burghers and firing fiercely upon them.
If these burghers had only had enough ammunition they would have been able
to defend themselves, but as they were obliged to keep up a continuous fire
on the storming party their cartridges were speedily exhausted. When this
happened there was nothing for them to do but to fly. This they did under a
fierce fire from three guns, which had been bombarding them continuously
since the morning—doing but little damage however, as our burghers were
behind the railway embankment. But now they had to fly over open ground, and
on foot, as they had gone down without their horses because there was no
safe place for the animals.
If
two hundred burghers—the number I had arranged for—had been in the position,
there would have been no chance of the enemy's reinforcement being able to
drive them out: and in all probability General Barton would have been
obliged to surrender. Instead of this we had a loss of thirty killed and
wounded, and about the same number were taken prisoners. Among the dead was
the renowned Sarel Cilliers, grandson of the worthy "voortrekker"[73] of the
same name. Veldtcornet Jurie Wessels was the most distinguished of the
prisoners.
It
was a miserable affair altogether: General Froneman ought to have called his
men back when he saw that General Liebenberg had not sent his contingent. I
have heard however that Captain Cilliers refused to leave the position until
it became no longer tenable. It was hard indeed for him to lose a battle
thus, when it was nearly won, and to be compelled to retreat when victory
was all but within his grasp.
We
retired towards Vanvurenskloof, and on arriving there the following evening
heard that a great English force had come from Schoemansdrift and captured
Potchefstroom, that another force was at Tijgerfontein, and a third at
Schoemansdrift.
Early next morning we crossed the Vaal River at Witbanksfontein. There we
off-saddled.
Now I had sent out scouts—not, however, Commandant Jan Theron's men, but
ordinary burghers whom the Commandants had sent out—and just as we had
partaken about noon of a late breakfast, these burghers came hurriedly into
the camp, shouting: "The enemy is close at hand!"
It
was not long before every one had up-saddled, and we were off. The English
had taken up positions on the kopjes due north of the Vaal River, whilst we
had for our defence only kraals and boundary walls. As these offered no
shelter for our horses, we were forced to retreat. And a most unpleasant
time of it we had until we got out of range of their guns and small arms.
During this retreat we lost one of our guns. This happened while I was with
the left wing. One of the wheels of the carriage fell off, and the gun had
to be left behind. Another incident of our flight was more remarkable. A
shell from one of the enemy's guns hit an ox waggon on which there were four
cases of dynamite, and everything was blown up.
The oxen had just been unyoked and had left the waggon, or else a terrible
catastrophe would have occurred.
We
lost also two burghers, who, thinking that it would be safe to go into a
dwelling house, and hide themselves there, gave an opportunity to some
English troops who were on the march from Schoemansdrift, to take them
prisoner.
We
retired for some distance in an easterly direction, and when it became dark,
swerved suddenly to the west, as if aiming for a point somewhat to the
south-west of Bothaville. The following evening we stayed at
Bronkhaistfontein, near the Witkopjes. From there we went on next morning to
the west of Rheboksfontein, remaining that night at Winkeldrift, on the
Rhenoster River.
There I received a report that President Steyn with his staff was coming
from Machadodorp, where he had met the Transvaal Government. The President
requested me to come and see him, and also to meet General De la Rey, who
would be there.
I
told the commandos to go on in the direction of Bothaville and went with my
staff to the President. We met on the 31st of October near Ventersdorp. From
him I heard that when he came to Machadodorp President Kruger was just ready
to sail from Lourenço Marques, in the man-of-war Gelderland, which had been
specially sent by Queen Wilhelmina to bring him over to the Netherlands.
This was shortly before Portugal ceased to be neutral—the old President got
away only just in time.
General De la Rey had been prevented from coming: and on the 2nd of November
I went with the President towards Bothaville.
I
had received reports from General Fourie, Judge Hertzog, and Captain
Scheepers, that the burghers in their districts had rejoined; this made me
think that the time had now come to make another dash into Cape Colony.
President Steyn had expressed a wish to go with us.
We
marched on with the intention of crossing the railway line somewhere near
Winburg. On the morning of the 5th we arrived at Bothaville, where we found
General Froneman, who had been marching with the commandos from Rhenoster
River. Little did we know that a terrible misfortune was awaiting us.
That very afternoon a strong English force, which indeed had been in pursuit
of us all the time, came up, and a skirmish took place, after which the
English withdrew out of reach of our guns, while we took up a position under
cover of the nearest hill. Without suspecting any harm we went into camp
about seven miles from the English, keeping the Valsch River between us and
them.
I
placed an outpost that night close to the river and told them to stay there
till the following day. The burghers of this watch returned in the morning
and reported that they had seen nothing but wreaths of smoke ascending from
the north bank of the river. They believed that these came from the English
camp.
We
were still safe then—so at least we all believed.
But the corporal who had brought this report had but just left me, and was
scarcely one hundred paces off when I heard the report of rifles. I thought
at first that it was only some cattle being shot for food, but all at once
there were more shots, and what did we see? The English were within three
hundred paces of us, on a little hill near Bothaville, and close to the spot
from whence my outpost had just returned.
It
was early morning. The sun had not risen more than twenty minutes and many
of the burghers still lay asleep rolled up in their blankets.
The scene which ensued was unlike anything I had ever witnessed before. I
heard a good deal about panics—I was now to see one with my own eyes. Whilst
I was looking for my horse to get him up-saddled a few of the burghers were
making some sort of a stand against the enemy. But all those who had already
up-saddled were riding away at break-neck speed. Many even were leaving
their saddles behind and galloping off bare-back. As I up-saddled my horse I
called out to them:—
"Don't run away! Come back and storm the enemy's position!" But it was no
use. A panic had seized them, and the victims of that panic were those brave
men who had never thought of flight, but only of resisting the enemy!
The only thing I could do was to leap into the saddle and try to persuade
the fugitives to return. But I did not succeed, for as I stopped them at one
point others galloped past me, and I was thus kept dodging from point to
point, until the whole commando was out of range of the firing.
The leader of the enemy's storming party was Colonel Le Gallais, without
doubt one of the bravest English officers I have ever met. On this occasion
he did not encounter much resistance, for only a very few of the burghers
attacked him, and that only at one point of his position. Among these
burghers were Staats-Procureur Jacob De Villiers, and Veldtcornet Jan
Viljoen. As for the rest of our men, it was useless to try to get them to
come back to the fight. The gunners however did everything they could to
save their guns, but had not enough time to get the oxen inspanned.
Our loss was, as far as I could make out, nine killed, between twenty and
thirty wounded, and about one hundred prisoners. Among the dead were
Veldtcornets Jan Viljoen, of Heilbron, and Van Zijl, of Cape Colony; and
among the wounded, Staats-Procureur Jacob De Villiers and Jan Rechter, the
latter of whom subsequently died. The wounded who managed to escape included
General Froneman, who was slightly wounded in the chest; Mr. Thomas Brain,
who had been hit in the thigh; and one of my staff who was severely wounded,
his shoulder being pierced by a bullet.
According to English reports, Dr. De Landsheer, a Belgian, was killed in
this engagement. The English newspapers asserted that the doctor was found
dead with a bandolier round his body. I can vouch for the fact that the
doctor possessed neither rifle nor bandolier, and I am unable to believe
that he armed himself on the battlefield.
Six of our Krupp guns were captured in this battle, but as our ammunition
for these pieces was nearly exhausted, the loss of them made little
difference to us.
I
feel compelled to add that, if the burghers had stood shoulder to shoulder
we should certainly have driven back the enemy, and the mishap would never
have occurred. We were eight hundred men strong, and the enemy numbered not
more than one thousand to one thousand two hundred. But a surprise attack
such as theirs had been usually produces disastrous consequences.
[73] Pioneer.
