The English, now that they had taken Bethlehem, were in need of rest; and
this was especially the case with General Macdonald, who had come up by
forced marches from the far-off Transvaal. A short breathing space was also
a great benefit to us, for we had many preparations to make in view of
probable events in the near future. I did not deceive myself as to the
meaning of the present situation; now that all of us, except two small
parties at Commandonek and Witnek, had retreated behind the lofty
Roodebergen, I could see that, in all probability, we must before long be
annihilated by the immense forces of the enemy.
The Roodebergen, which now separated us from the English, is a vast chain of
mountains, extending from the Caledon River on the Basuto frontier to
Slabbertsnek, then stretching away to Witzeshoek, where it again touches
Basutoland. The passes over this wild mountain range are Commandonek, Witnek,
Slabbertsnek, Retiefsnek, Naauwpoort and Witzeshoek. These are almost the
only places where the mountains can be crossed by vehicles or horses; and,
moreover, there are long stretches where they are impassable even to
pedestrians.
It
is plain enough, therefore, that nothing would have pleased the English more
than for us to have remained behind the Roodebergen. If those Free-Staters—they
must have been thinking—try to make a stand there, it will be the last stand
they will ever make.
And the English would have been quite right in their anticipations. To have
stayed where we then were would, without doubt, have been the end of us.
Therefore, when the proposal was made that we should take positions in the
mountains, I opposed it as emphatically as I could, alleging
incontrovertible arguments against it. It was then decided that all our
forces, with the exception of a small watch, should issue forth from behind
the mountains.
We
also arranged to divide the whole of the commandos[61] we had with us into
three parts:—
I
was in supreme command of the first division, which was to march under the
orders of General Botha. It consisted of burghers from Heilbron, under
Commandant Steenekamp, and of Kroonstad men, under Commandant Van Aard.
Besides these, there were also five hundred men from Bethlehem, under
Commandant Michal Prinsloo; the burghers from Boshof, under Veldtcornet
Badenhorst; a small number of Colonials from Griqualand, under
Vice-Commandant Van Zyl; and some Potchefstroom burghers, who happened to be
with us. Further, I took with me, for scouting purposes, Danie Theron and
his corps of eighty men, recruited from almost every nation on the face of
the earth; Captain Scheepers and his men also served me in the same
capacity.
The Government and its officials were placed under my protection; and I was
to set out, on July the 15th, in the direction of Kroonstad-Heilbron.
The second division was entrusted to Assistant Commander-in-Chief Paul Roux,
with P.J. Fourie and C.C. Froneman as Vechtgeneraals. It was composed of
burghers from Fauresmith, under Commandant Visser; from Bloemfontein, under
Commandant Du Plooij; from Wepener, under Commandant Roux; from Smithfield,
under Commandant Potgieter; from Thaba'Nchu, under Commandant J.H. Olivier;
from Jacobsdal, under Commandant H. Pretorius; and of the Deetje
Bloemfontein commando, under Commandant Kolbe.
This force was to wait until the day after my departure, that is, until the
16th, and then proceed in the evening in the direction of Bloemfontein. From
the capital it was to go south, and during its advance it was to bring back
to the commandos all those burghers in the southern districts who had
remained behind.
General Crowther was given the command over the third division, which
consisted of the burghers from Ficksburg, under Commandant P. De Villiers;
from Ladybrand, under Commandant Ferreira; from Winburg, under Commandant
Sarel Harebroek; and from Senekal, under Commandant Van der Merve.
This division was to start on the 16th, and marching to the north of
Bethlehem, was to continue advancing in that direction until it fell in with
the commandos from Harrismith and Vrede under Commander-in-Chief Hattingh.
It would then operate, under his directions, in the north-eastern districts.
The remainder of Commandant Michal Prinsloo's Bethlehem men—that is to say,
the burghers of Wittebergen—were to stay behind as a watch, and to take
orders from Mr. Marthinus Prinsloo. This watch was divided into three
sections: the first to occupy a position at Slabbertsnek, the second at
Retiefsnek, and the third at Naauwpoort. They were forbidden to use waggons;
thus if the enemy should appear in overwhelming numbers, it would always be
possible for them to escape across the mountains.
My
reason for selecting these men in preference to others, was that they
belonged to the district, and thus were well acquainted with every foot of
this rough and difficult country. Their duties were simply to protect the
large numbers of cattle which we had driven on to the mountains, and I
anticipated that there would be no difficulty about this, for now that all
our commandos had left those parts, the English would not think it worth
while to send a large force against a mere handful of watchers.
Thus everything was settled, and on the 15th of July I set out through
Slabbertsnek, expecting that the other generals would follow me, conformably
to my orders and the known wishes of the Government.
But what really happened?
Immediately after my departure, some of the officers, displeased that
Assistant Commander-in-Chief Roux should have been entrusted with the
command, expressed the wish that another meeting should be held and a new
Assistant Commander-in-Chief elected. This would have been absolutely
illegal, for the Volksraad had decreed that the President should be
empowered to alter all the commando-laws. But even then, all would have gone
well if Roux had only stood firm. Unfortunately, however, he yielded, and on
July the 17th a meeting was called together at which Mr. Marthinus Prinsloo
was chosen Assistant Commander-in-Chief. He had a bare majority even at the
actual meeting, and several officers, who had been unable to be present, had
still to record their votes.
Not only, therefore, had Prinsloo been elected irregularly, but his
election, such as it was, could only be considered as provisional.
Nevertheless, for the moment, power was in his hands. How did he use it?
He
surrendered unconditionally to the English.
On
the 17th and 18th of July the enemy had broken through at Slabbertsnek and
Retiefsnek, causing the greatest confusion among our forces.
Many of the officers and burghers were for an immediate surrender, as
appears from the fact that the same assembly which, in defiance of the law,
elected Mr. Prinsloo as Commander-in-Chief, also decided, by seventeen votes
to thirteen, to give up their forces to the enemy. But this decision was at
once rescinded—an act of policy on the part of the officers—and it was
agreed to ask for an armistice of six days, to enable them to take counsel
with the Government.
A
more senseless course of action could hardly be imagined. The Boer Army, as
anybody could see, was in a very tight place. Did its officers think that
the English would be so foolish as to grant an armistice at such a time as
this—when all that the burghers wanted was a few days in which to effect
their escape? Either the officers were remarkably short-sighted, or ...
something worse.
It
was still possible for the commandos to retire in the direction of Oldenburg
or of Witzeshoek. But instead of getting this done with all speed, Mr.
Prinsloo began a correspondence with General Hunter about this ridiculous
armistice, which the English general of course refused to grant.
It
was on July the 29th, 1900, that Prinsloo, with all the burghers on the
mountains, surrendered unconditionally to the enemy.
The circumstances of this surrender were so suspicious, that it is hard to
acquit the man who was responsible for it of a definite act of treachery;
and the case against him is all the more grave from the fact that Vilonel,
who was at that time serving a term of imprisonment for high treason, had a
share in the transaction.
Prinsloo's surrender included General Crowther, Commandants Paul De Villiers,
Ferreira, Joubert, Du Plooij, Potgieter, Crowther, Van der Merve, and Roux;
and about three thousand men.
The most melancholy circumstance about the whole affair was that, when the
surrender was made, some of the burghers had reached the farm of Salamon
Raath, and were thus as good as free, and yet had to ride back, and to go
with the others to lay down their arms.
As
to Roux, the deposed Commander-in-Chief, there is a word to be added. I had
always heard that he was a very cautious man, and yet on this occasion he
acted like a child, going in person to General Hunter's camp to protest
against the surrender, on the ground that it was he (Roux), and not Prinsloo,
that was Commander-in-Chief. One can hardly believe that he really thought
it possible thus to nullify Prinsloo's act. But he certainly behaved as if
he did, and his ingenuous conduct must have afforded much amusement to the
English general.
If
any one is in doubt as to what was the result of General Roux's absurd
escapade, I have only to say that the English had one prisoner the more!
Those who escaped were but few. Of all our large forces, there were only
Generals Froneman, Fourie and De Villiers (of Harrismith); Commandants
Hasebroek, Olivier, Visser, Kolbe, and a few others; a small number of
burghers, and six or seven guns, that did not fall into the hands of the
English.
What, then, is to be our judgment on this act of Prinsloo and of the other
chief officers in command of our forces behind the Roodebergen?
That it was nothing short of an act of murder, committed on the Government,
the country, and the nation, to surrender three thousand men in such a way.
Even the burghers themselves cannot be held to have been altogether without
guilt, though they can justly plead that they were only obeying orders.
The sequel to Prinsloo's surrender was on a par with it. A large number of
burghers from Harrismith and a small part of the Vrede commando, although
they had already made good their escape, rode quietly from their farms into
Harrismith, and there surrendered to General Sir Hector Macdonald.—One could
gnash one's teeth to think that a nation should so readily rush to its own
ruin!
[61] The Harrismith and Vrede commandos had also received orders to join us.
