It
was at this time that I decided to make my way to Lindley, which had been
retaken by the English a few days after General Piet de Wet had captured the
Yeomanry in that town. The object of my journey was to discover if it were
not possible to again seize the place. On the 21st of June I covered half
the distance to Lindley, and the following day I arrived within ten miles of
the town.
I
rode round the town with Piet de Wet the next day, in order to find out our
best method of attacking it.
Commandant Olivier had been sent by me that morning in the direction of
Kroonstad to oppose a strong English column, which I had been informed was
approaching. But my plan must have leaked out in some way or other, for the
enemy carefully chose so well protected a route that they gave Commandant
Olivier no chance of attacking them. Thus the following morning the English
arrived safely at Lindley, and now there was no possibility of capturing the
town.
In
the meantime President Steyn's laager had moved from the east of Heilbron
and joined us. He himself, with the members of the Government, had gone to
Bethlehem. General Marthinus Prinsloo was there too; he had resigned his
post of Commander-in-Chief of the commandos which guarded the Drakensberg.
Commandant Hattingh of Vrede had been chosen in his place, and he also was
at Bethlehem.
A
difficulty now arose as to Prinsloo's position. The President declared that
Prinsloo was nothing more than a private burgher; but Commandant Olivier was
not satisfied with this, and asked that there might be an election of a
Commander-in-Chief. This request, however, the President refused to grant.
I
did not wish the office of Commander-in-Chief to devolve upon myself, for I
knew that I did not possess the confidence of the officers. And as some
eight miles to the east of Lindley there was telegraphic communication with
Bethlehem, I was able to hold a conversation with the President over the
wires. I accordingly again asked him to permit an election. But it was all
in vain; the President declined to allow an election to take place.
I
now took matters into my own hands. I collected the officers together with
the object of holding a secret election. Thus I should discover what their
opinion of me might be as chief of the Free State forces. I was firmly
resolved that should the majority of the officers be against me, and the
President should still refuse his consent to an election, that I would send
in my resignation, and no longer continue to hold the post of
Commander-in-Chief.
Commander-in-Chief Hattingh, Vechtgeneraal Roux, and all the oldest
commandants of the Free State, were present at this meeting. The voting was
by ballot; and the result was that there were two votes for General
Marthinus Prinsloo, one for General Piet de Wet, and twenty-seven for
myself.
I
at once wired to the President, and told him what had occurred. He was ready
to abide by the decision, and I was satisfied now that I knew exactly where
I stood. Mr. Marthinus Prinsloo was also contented with the turn events had
taken. And I must say this of him, that it was not he who had insisted on an
election.
It
soon became apparent that the enemy's object was the capture of Bethlehem.
The English forces round Senekal advanced towards Lindley, and having been
joined by the troops stationed there, had proceeded in the direction of
Bethlehem; consequently a very large British force was marching on that
town.
We
on our part now numbered over five thousand men, for General Roux had joined
us with some[57] of his burghers.
The English were unopposed until they reached Elandsfontein, but there a
battle took place in which big guns played the main rôle, although there was
also some heavy fighting with small arms.
In
this engagement Commandant Michal Prinsloo did a brave deed. I arrived at
his position just after the burghers had succeeded in shooting down the men
who served three of the enemy's guns. With a hundred men he now stormed the
guns, hoping to be able to bring them back with him to our lines. Whilst he
charged, I cannonaded the enemy, with a Krupp and fifteen pound Armstrong,
to such good effect that they were forced to retreat behind a ridge. In this
way Commandant Prinsloo reached the guns safely, but he had no horses with
him to drag them back to us. He could do nothing but make the attempt to get
them away by the help of his burghers, and this he tried to accomplish under
a fierce fire from the English. But he would still have succeeded in the
endeavour, had not unfortunately a large force of the enemy appeared on the
scene, and attacked him and his hundred burghers. I was unable to keep the
English back, for both my guns had been disabled. The nipple of the
Armstrong had been blown away, and—for the first time—the lock of the Krupp
had become jammed. Had it not been for this mishap, Commandant Prinsloo
would certainly have been able to remove the guns to the other side of a
ridge, whither teams of our horses were already approaching. But, as it was,
he had to hurry away as fast as possible, and leave the guns behind.
When the enemy arrived they had outflanked us so far to the north, that we
had nothing open to us but again to abandon our positions. We therefore
retired to Blauwkop, and on the following day to Bethlehem.
In
the meantime I had once more become encumbered with a large waggon camp,
which proved a source of great danger. During the last few weeks waggons had
been accumulating round me without attracting my attention. The reason that
the burghers were so anxious to bring their waggons with them, was to be
found in the fact that the English, whenever they arrived at one of our
farms, always took the waggons and oxen. The Boers felt it very hard to be
robbed in this way of their property; and they hoped to be able to save
their waggons and carts by taking them to the commando.
It
was natural for them to wish to save all they could; but I was convinced
that the waggons could only be saved at the expense of our great cause. But
nobody could see it in that light. And as I could only appeal to the free
will of my burghers, I dare not attempt to get rid of the waggons by force.
If I had made any such attempt, serious consequences would certainly have
followed, even if a revolt had not ensued. The great fault of the burghers
was disobedience, and this came especially to the fore when their
possessions were in jeopardy.
I
now made up my mind to defend the town of Bethlehem. The following morning I
went with the Generals and Commandants to reconnoitre the country, so that I
might be able to point out to each of them the position that I wished him to
occupy.
Our line of defence began at the south of Wolhuterskop (a kop to the
south-west of Bethlehem), and extended from there to the north-west of the
town.
When I had given my instructions to the officers, they returned to their
commandos, which were stationed behind the first ridges to the south of
Bethlehem, and brought them to the positions I had assigned to them.
So
many of the horses were exhausted, that a large number of the burghers had
to go on foot. Such of these Voetgangers[58] as were not required to attend
to the waggons, I placed at Wolhuterskop.
When I had done this I gave notice to the inhabitants of Bethlehem, that as
the dorp would be defended, I must insist on the women and children leaving
it at once. It was not long before a number of women and children, and even
a few men, started out on their way to Fouriesburg. The prisoner Vilonel,
also, was conducted to this town.
At
four o'clock that afternoon the advance guards of the enemy approached; and
fifteen of their scouts made their appearance on the ridge to the north of
the town. The burghers reserved their fire until these men were almost upon
them. Then they let their Mausers speak, and in a moment there were nine
riderless horses. The other six English made their escape, although they
must have had wounds to show for their rashness.[59]
Only a few moments had passed before the roar of guns was mingled with the
crack of rifles, and the whole air was filled with the thunder of battle.
Everywhere the burghers fought with the utmost valour; the Voetgangers on
Wolhuterskop were perhaps the bravest of them all. Whenever the enemy
approached our positions, they were met by a torrent of bullets. And thus
the day came to a close.
But the next day a large force of English appeared from the direction of
Reitz. This had come from the Transvaal, and, if I remember rightly, was
commanded by General Sir Hector Macdonald. He had come up and joined
Generals Clements, Hunter, Broadwood and Paget, with the object of once and
for all making an end of the Free-Staters.
Our positions were now exposed to a most terrific bombardment, but
fortunately without any serious consequences. I must describe here the
fearful havoc that one lyddite shell wrought. It fell into the position held
by Commandant Steenekamp, to the north-west of Bethlehem, and struck a rock
behind which twenty-five of our horses were standing. Without a single
exception every horse was killed!
The attack was pressed with the greatest vigour on the positions held by
Commandants Van Aard and Piet Fourie. It became impossible for these
officers to maintain their ground; and, at about twelve o'clock, before I
was able to send them any reinforcements, they were compelled to give way.
Thus retreat became inevitable, and the enemy entered Bethlehem.
One of our guns we were unable to remove; but before we withdrew it was
thrown down the krans[60] of the mountain, and broken to pieces.
I
knew at the time the number the English had lost, but now it had slipped my
memory. I obtained the information from a man named Bland, who acted as our
telegraphist. He had tapped the telegraph wire at Zwingkrans, and before
General Clements had detected that he was not communicating with Senekal, he
had received from that General a full list of the English killed and
wounded.
We
withdrew our commandos in a southerly direction to Retiefsnek, whither
President Steyn and the Government had already preceded us.
[57] He had left the remainder of his burghers at Witnek and at Houtnek,
near Ficksburg.
[58] Infantry.
[59] As I have already stated, I intend to write on another occasion a book
dealing with the art of scouting; and the above incident will there form a
striking proof of how foolishly the English scouts did their work.
[60] Precipice.
