MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE SPECIAL NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES AT
VEREENIGING, SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, THURSDAY, THE 29TH OF MAY, 1902, AND
THE FOLLOWING DAYS
MAY 29TH, 1902.
The Rev. J.D. Kestell having offered prayer, the Chairman requested
Vice-President Burger to address the meeting.
Vice-President Burger said that the documents laid before the Governments by
the Commission would now be read to the meeting. Thereupon Mr. D. Van Velden
read the following letter:
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION.
PRETORIA, 28th May, 1902.
To
the Governments of the Orange Free State and the South African Republic:
HONBLE. GENTLEMEN,—
In
accordance with instructions received from you, we went to Pretoria in order
to negotiate with the British authorities on the question of peace. We have
the honour to make the following report:
The meetings lasted from Monday, May 19th, to Wednesday, May 28th, its
prolongation having been principally caused by the length of time taken up
by the cable correspondence with the British Government.
We
first handed in a proposal (annexed under A)[113] in which we attempted to
negotiate on the basis of a limited independence with surrender of part of
our territory. Lords Kitchener and Milner refused emphatically to negotiate
on this basis, and expressed the opinion that to cable this proposal to the
British Government would be detrimental to the objects of these
negotiations. They told us they had already informed the two Governments
that the British Government would only negotiate on the basis of an amended
form of the Middelburg proposal. In order finally to formulate this
proposal, Lord Milner asked the assistance of some members of the
Commission; and this was granted, on the understanding that the assistance
of these members of the Commission should be given without prejudice to
themselves.
As
the result of the deliberations of this sub-committee, Lord Milner produced
a draft proposal, in which we insisted that a fresh clause (No. 11) should
be inserted; and this was done. This draft proposal (annexed under B)[114]
was then cabled to the British Government, revised by them, and then
communicated to us in its final shape (annexed under B).[115] We were
informed by the British Government that no further revision of this proposal
would be allowed, but that it must now be either accepted or rejected in its
entirety by the delegates of the two Republics; and that this acceptance or
rejection must take place within a stipulated time. We then told Lord
Kitchener that he should know our final decision by the evening of the next
Saturday at latest.
During our formal negotiations certain informal conversations took place in
reference to the British subjects (in Cape Colony and Natal) who have been
fighting on our side. As a result of these informal conversations a
communication from the British Government was imparted to us (annexed under
B).[116]
We
have the honour to remain, etc.,
LOUIS BOTHA.
J.H. DE LA REY.
C.R. DE WET.
J.B.M. HERTZOG.
J.D. SMUTS.
Vice-President Burger said that the delegates must proceed to discuss this
document, and that they would then be asked to decide—firstly, whether the
struggle should be continued; secondly, whether the proposal of the British
Government should be accepted; and, thirdly, whether they were prepared to
surrender unconditionally.
It
was decided that minutes of the meeting should be kept, and the delegates
then proceeded to discuss the different articles of the British Government's
proposal. The whole of the morning and a part of the afternoon sitting were
devoted to questions dealing with the meaning of the several clauses, the
members of the Commission answering to the best of their ability.
After these questions had been disposed of, Mr. De Clercq rose to speak. He
said that he had already given his own opinion, but that now it was for the
whole meeting to decide whether they would give up the war, and, if they
resolved to do so, whether they would accept the proposal unconditionally.
As to the proposal, it could not be denied that it did not give all that
they themselves desired, but that could not have been expected. Should they
now return to their commandos and be asked by their burghers what they had
effected, they would have to reply, "Nothing." How would they be able to
meet their burghers with such an answer as that? It would therefore be
better to get terms from the British Government; and by doing so they would
also gratify the British nation. As for himself, he was for accepting the
proposal, unless it could be proved to him that unconditional surrender
would be a still better course to take.
General Nieuwouwdt then proposed that the meeting should, without further
delay, proceed to vote whether the war should be terminated, and whether the
terms offered to them should be accepted.
General Froneman seconded this proposal.
Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) felt that this was too important a matter to be
treated with such haste. A decision about such a document as the one now
lying before the meeting could not be come to in a moment. The delegates
would hardly agree with the last speaker in his opinion that they should at
once proceed to vote whether the war should or should not be continued. Time
was required before coming to such a decision. Moreover it had to be proved
whether it were possible to continue the war. There were some districts
where it certainly could no longer be carried on. Was it possible for one
part of the nation to continue fighting without the other? Then there was
the question whether their resources and the troops which they still had
were sufficient to justify them in prolonging the struggle. If they were
insufficient the war must be discontinued and terms must be accepted. It
would not be an easy thing to do; one could not, with a light heart, give up
the independence of their country; but half a loaf was better than no
bread,[117] and even such a sacrifice as this might be necessary if the
nation was to be saved.
Commandant Jacobsz (Harrismith) was at one with the last speaker in holding
that they must not be in too great a hurry to vote on the proposal.
Mr. P.R. Viljoen (Heidelberg) felt that the proposal of the British
Government would so tightly bind them that they would never again be free.
They were knee-haltered[118] now, but under certain circumstances they might
even be hobbled.[119]
He
considered that the meeting should ask the Governments to stop the war.
General Du Toit (Wolmaransstad) said that the times through which they were
passing were very critical; every one ought to say exactly what he thought,
and no one ought to be condemned for doing so. A delegate who should say
that the war could not be continued must not be considered disloyal to his
country because he did so. As regarded the three questions before the
meeting, according to the opinion of his burghers the war ought to be
continued. The views of his burghers when he left the commandos had been
clearly expressed. "Let us retain our independence, or go on fighting," they
had said. But why were they of this mind? Because they were unaware how
matters stood in other districts. The eyes of the delegates, however, while
directed towards God, were also able to observe the condition of the eastern
parts of their country. If the burghers in those parts could not hold out,
it would be impossible for the other commandos to do so. It could not be
denied that some of the commandos were no longer able to continue fighting.
That being the case, even if there were a majority in favour of prolonging
the struggle, that majority would have to yield to the wishes of the
minority, and for this reason: if the war were to be continued in conformity
with the wishes of the majority, and if the minority were to be compelled to
surrender (and nobody would be surprised at this), then the majority would
find themselves too weak to go on fighting. Thus there were clear reasons
why the war must be ended. Moreover, its continuation would involve not only
the national but also the moral death of the Republics. But it was still to
be proved that a continuation of the war was even possible; for himself he
feared that it was not so, and if fight he must he could only fight without
hope and without heart. If he were now to go back to his burghers, and they
were to ask him why he persisted in the war, and he was compelled to reply
that he was doing so on the strength of opinions expressed in newspapers,
and on the encouragement given to the cause of the Republics in their pages,
he would be told that he was building on sand. Again, he feared that if the
war were to be continued, detached parties would be formed which would try
to obtain terms from the English for themselves. And should the commandos in
time become so weak as to be forced to surrender unconditionally, what then
would be the fate of the officers? Would they not lose everything, and be
banished into the bargain? Let no one think, however, that he was trying
merely to do what was best for himself. No. There was now a chance for
negotiating; should the meeting let slip that chance, unconditional
surrender would most certainly result, and that would be disastrous to all.
He hoped that he would not be misunderstood; if the meeting decided to go on
with the war, he, for one, would not lay down his arms. No, he would
actively prosecute the war, and operate in conjunction with the other
generals. But what would be the use of it: he sided with those who held that
the struggle could no longer be carried on.
Commandant Rheeder (Rouxville) wished to reply to those who demanded reasons
for the continuation of the war. One reason, he said, was to be found in the
fact that England would not allow them to have any communication with the
deputation in Europe; that meant that something advantageous to us was being
held back. Another was the consideration of what their descendants in time
to come would say. "How is it," they would ask, "that we are not now free
men? There were a large number of burghers in the veldt to continue the
war—what has become of our independence?" And what answer shall we be able
to make?—we whose courage failed us before such tremendous odds, and who
laid down our arms when victory was still possible? The speaker would only
be satisfied if the meeting were unanimous for stopping the war, not
otherwise. He thought of the families. How would the delegates face their
families on their return, after the sacrifice of independence? He considered
that the commandos should leave those districts where resistance was no
longer possible and go to others. If to discontinue the war meant to
surrender independence, then the war must not be discontinued.
Vice-President Burger said that he had not heard from the last speaker any
reasons whatsoever for continuing the war.
Commandant Rheeder then remarked that if they wanted to surrender their
country they should have done so earlier, when the burghers were not
entirely destitute. But now nothing was left to them. As to the narrowness
of the field of operations, there was still room enough to fight.
Commandant P.L. Uijs (Pretoria) referred to the frequent allusion which had
been made to their European deputation. That deputation was now in Holland,
and must know if anything was going on there to the advantage of the
Republics. If there were any hopeful signs there, their comrades would
certainly have informed them. They had not done so, and therefore the
meeting should dismiss this subject from its thoughts.
The meeting then adjourned until 7.15 p.m.
Upon reassembling, Commandant Cronje (Winburg) said that he would not detain
the meeting for long; he only wished to say a very few words. It had been
rightly said that they were passing through a momentous period of their
history. To his mind the present was the critical epoch in the existence of
the African nation, whose destinies they had now to decide. Delegates were
asking what hopes they could now entertain. But what grounds for hope were
there when the war began? In his opinion there were none. It was only that
men believed then that Right was Might, and put their trust in God. And God
had helped them. When the enemy had entered their country everything was
dark. There had been a day on which more than four thousand men had
surrendered. Then, even as now, they had been without hope. Then, even as
now, those who wanted to continue the war had been told that they were mad.
That had been some two years ago, and yet the war was still going on. Then,
even as now, there had been no food, and yet they had managed to live. The
delegates represented a free people; let them not take a step of which they
would afterwards repent. As regarded intervention, he had often said that
one could not rely on it. But they could rely on God. When he returned to
his burghers, and was questioned as to his reason for the course of action
which he had advocated, he hoped to be able to answer, "Belief in God."
There had always been times when there was no food, and yet they had always
managed to live. A deputation had been officially sent to Europe, and was
now there to represent their interests. Had the meeting lost its confidence
in that deputation? Did it not realize that if the case of the Republic was
hopeless in Europe the deputation would send word to that effect? It had
been said that by continuing the war they would be exterminating the nation.
He did not believe this. The way to exterminate the nation was to accept the
British proposal. To go on with the war was their only policy, and it was a
very good policy. The deputation had claimed that their advice should be
taken before any negotiations were attempted. What right, then, had the
delegates to give up the war on the basis of the proposal now before them?
To do so was to give the death blow to their national existence; later on
they would have cause to rue it. Moreover, the proposal did not safeguard
the interests of their brethren in Cape Colony. Again, landed property
belonging to burghers had already been sold, and in all probability these
burghers would never see any of the proceeds. The sum (£3,000,000) which the
proposal offered to compensate for all damages, was not sufficient to cover
damage already done. For these and other reasons the proposal could not be
accepted. No other course was open to them except to reject the proposal and
to continue hostilities.
General Froneman (Ladybrand) agreed with the last speaker. He loved his
country, and could not think of surrendering it. The reasons which had
induced them to begin the war were still in force. He had been through the
whole campaign, and saw stronger reasons now than ever before for the
continuing of the war. His districts, like those of others, were exhausted,
and yet his burghers remained in the veldt. He had been present at the
surrender of the four thousand; he had seen General Cronje give up his
sword. Those had been dark days, but the struggle still went on; they could
still keep on their legs. It had been God's will that this war should take
place. Prayers had been offered that it might be averted, but God had ruled
it otherwise. Therefore they must carry the war through, and never think of
surrender. They were Republicans. What would it be to have to give up that
name for ever? He had consulted his burghers and their women-folk; he had
asked them, "What conditions of peace will you accept?" They had answered,
"No peace at all, if it means any loss of independence." And so, before he
could vote for peace, he would have again to take the opinion of his
burghers.
Veldtcornet B.H. Breijtenbach (Utrecht) urged that a definite yes or no must
be given to the question, Is the war to continue? The general condition of
the country had been laid before the meeting, and it had been clearly shown
that its condition made the carrying on of the war impossible. One could not
escape from that fact. Why then should they argue any longer? What reason
had they for wishing to prolong this struggle? They surely would not do so
blindfold. Unless good reasons could be alleged for continuing it, the war
would have to be stopped. As those good reasons were not forthcoming, he
would vote with those who were for peace. To continue the war would be a
crime. Some of the last few speakers had stated that there had been no
sufficient reasons for commencing the war. That might be true. They might
have been over-confident then. Be that as it might, they certainly had lost
so much ground since then that they must now give up the struggle. This was
his irrevocable opinion. It had been clearly shown that fourteen commandos
were unable to continue in the veldt. This made peace a necessity, for what
was to be gained by continuing a struggle without a proper army. The war
might last a few months longer, but it must end then—and end in disaster.
Commandant W.J. Viljoen (Witwatersrand) said that some speakers were for and
others against the continuation of hostilities. The first were guided by
faith alone; the second had brought forward definite grounds for their
opinion. A year ago both parties had been inspired by faith, but what had
been the result? He would be glad enough to be convinced, but those who
wished to continue the war must show grounds for such a line of action.
General De la Rey would only say a few words. He had received definite
instructions before he went to his burghers neither to encourage nor
discourage them, whatever they might say at their meetings. He had strictly
observed these instructions, and had never attempted to influence them.
There were present among the delegates nine men (one being from Cape Colony)
who represented his burghers, and who would testify as to their state of
mind and temper; he need not therefore say anything. The delegates could
bear witness how full of courage the men were. Nevertheless, the war could
not be continued. Say or do what they would at that meeting, the war must
cease. Some had talked about faith. But what was faith? True faith consisted
in saying, "Lord, Thy will, not mine, be done." They must bow before the
will of God. The delegates, he continued, must choose one of the three
courses which were open to them. It would be a great calamity if they were
to decide to surrender unconditionally. Had it been necessary to do so it
should have been done while they still possessed something. Should they then
continue the war? But the question as to what would become of the people
under those circumstances must be faced—to continue fighting would be the
ruin of the nation. The delegates might go away determined to fight, but the
burghers would lay down their arms, and the state of affairs which would
thus ensue would not redound to their honour. But the British Government
offered guarantees; it would help the nation so that the nation might help
itself. If any one were to say now, "Continue fighting," he and his generals
might have the heart to do so if they kept their minds fixed on their recent
exploits. For himself, however, he would refuse absolutely to accede to that
request. And what real advantage had accrued from his successes in the
veldt? What had followed on them? All his cattle had been taken away, some
three hundred of his men had been killed, wounded, or taken prisoner. Some
of the delegates set their hopes on the European deputation, but what did
that deputation say a year ago? It said that all depended on their
continuing to fight. They had continued to fight. What more, then, was there
left for them to do? Some gentlemen present had definite mandates from their
burghers, who very likely had no knowledge of the actual state of affairs
when they gave those mandates. He himself had not known at that time in what
a plight the country was. He challenged each and all of the delegates to
show their burghers the proposal of the British Government, and then to see
if those burghers were not in favour of unconditional surrender. But if the
meeting insisted on the continuation of hostilities, the nation would be
driven into hands-upping; thus the war would end in dishonour and disgrace.
Landdrost Bosman (Wakkerstroom) was glad that General De la Rey had spoken
out so boldly; it was every one's duty to do so. He himself also was against
the continuance of the war.
Although it had been said that the war had been begun in faith, it ought not
to be forgotten that it had also been begun with hope of intervention, as
was shown by the sending of the deputation to Europe—that deputation which,
as they had often heard, had done so much good work. Another proof that
there had then been hope of intervention was that the burghers had ordered
the delegates to keep them in communication with the deputation. And that
they had not relied exclusively on faith at the beginning of the war was
shown by the fact that they had founded great hopes on what their brethren
in Cape Colony might accomplish. These hopes had now been dissipated by
General Smuts, who had just said that there was no chance of a general
insurrection.
Again, could the war be continued when their commandos were so much
weakened, and when food was so scarce? It was nonsense to say that food had
been scarce a year ago; there had been a sufficiency then, and at the
present time there was not. One could ride from Vereeniging to Piet Retief
without seeing more than two or three herds of cattle. Moreover, the women
and children were in a most pitiable condition. One delegate had spoken
against any scheme which would be as it were a trampling on the blood which
had already been spilt—he shared that delegate's sentiments; but he
considered that to shed yet more blood in a cause which was to all
appearance hopeless would be still more reprehensible. He should prefer not
to enter into the religious aspect of the question. It was difficult to
fathom the purposes of God; perhaps it might be the Divine will that they
should lose their independence. All that they could do was to follow the
course which seemed to be good and right. Were they, then, to surrender
unconditionally? He would say no. It would be giving the enemy opportunities
for doing things from which they might otherwise desist. Moreover, by voting
for such a policy the leaders would incur the displeasure of the nation. In
choosing what course they would pursue the delegates should let nothing else
sway them save the good of the nation. They must not be carried away by
their feelings; they must listen only to the voice of reason.
Commandant H.S. Grobler (Bethal) felt that, under the circumstances, the war
could not be continued. It had already reduced them to such straits that
they would soon have to fly to the utmost borders of their territories,
leaving the enemy unopposed in the very heart of the country. At the
beginning of the war they had not relied on faith alone; there had also been
guns, war material and provisions. But now none of these things were left to
them. It was terrible to him to think that they must sacrifice the
independence of their country. He was a true son of his country, and could
not consent to the surrender of her independence unless that were the only
way of saving the women and children from starvation. But it was not only
the women and children who were on the verge of starvation; the burghers
still left in the laagers were in the same predicament. What, moreover, was
to happen to the prisoners of war, if the struggle were to be continued? And
to the families in the camps? The delegates must not forget those families.
If the people generally were dying a national, the families were dying a
moral, death. It was a sad thought that there were among their women in the
camps, many who were thus losing their moral vitality. It was a thought
which should make them determined to conclude the war.
Commandant Van Niekerk (Ficksburg) said that his commandos had commissioned
him to hold out for independence. The proposal of the British Government
could not be accepted. They must take no hasty step. If they persevered in
the war, the enemy would grant them better terms. All they had to do was to
act like brave men.
General J.G. Celliers (Lichtenburg) had already told the meeting what
mandate he had received from his burghers. But he was there to do the best
he could for the nation as a whole. The condition of the country was very
critical. The fact that his own commandos were faring well was not a
sufficient reason for continuing the war. He must take all circumstances
into consideration. He had said that he was in favour of an arrangement by
which peace should be made without the sacrifice of independence. Such an
arrangement they had attempted to bring about. They had elected a
Commission, which had done all in its power to give effect to their wishes
in this matter. And the result was the proposal of the British Government
now lying before them. That was what the Commission had obtained for them.
Which of them could say that he could have obtained better terms for the
people than those contained in that proposal? Or that, if the war were to be
continued, the people would gain any advantage which that proposal did not
give them? It had been said that the deputation in Europe had encouraged the
burghers in their prolonged struggle. The last message they had received
from the deputation had been: "Go on till every remedy has been tried."
Could that be called encouragement? It had also been said that the nation
must have faith. He admitted the necessity—but it must not be the sort of
faith which chose what it would believe, and what it would disbelieve. They
must be prepared to believe that it might be the will of God that they
should yield to the enemy. As he had more insight into the state of affairs
than his burghers, and therefore was better qualified to form a judgment, he
did not feel himself bound by their mandate. Had the burghers known what he
now knew, they would have given him a very different commission. He felt
that it was a serious thing to continue sacrificing the lives of his
fellow-countrymen. Moreover, however dear independence might be, it was
useless to attempt impossibilities. Their one aim should be to safeguard the
interests of the nation. His vote would be with those who were for accepting
the proposal of the British Government.
Commander-in-Chief de Wet was the next to address the meeting. His speech
was as follows:—
"As I feel it to be my duty to speak out all my mind before this meeting, I
shall go back to the very beginning of the war. And recalling my feelings at
that period, I can say that I had less hope then for intervention than I
have now. I do not mean to say that I am sanguine about it even now; but I
know to-day, what I did not know then, that great sympathy is felt for us by
other nations. Even in England this sympathy is to be found, as is shown by
the largely-attended 'Pro-Boer' meetings which have been held in that
country. And that the feeling in our favour is widespread is evident from
the reports which we received by word of mouth from the messenger to whom
the deputation entrusted its recent letter, for we cannot believe that the
deputation would have employed an unreliable person. And what did that
messenger say? Among other things, he said that our cause was winning new
adherents every day. It may be asked, however, why the deputation did not
send a report of its own? I reply that it had its hand upon the pulse of the
Governments, and that the information it was thus gaining was of such a
character that it could not be entrusted to any messenger whatsoever.
Perhaps the deputation was unable in any way to communicate what it knew to
us—it would never do to noise abroad the secrets of European policy. The
silence of the delegates ought not, then, to discourage us; on the contrary,
we should regard it as a hopeful sign.
"If there is any one man who feels deeply for the critical condition of our
country, I am that man. And critical our condition certainly is; so that I
am not surprised that some of us are asking, 'What hope have we now in
continuing the struggle?' But I would ask another question: 'What hope had
we at the beginning of the war?' Our faith in God—we had nothing else to
rely on! At the very outset of the war I knew that we, with our forty-five
thousand troops, were engaged in a contest against a nation that had no less
than seven hundred and fifty thousand men under arms, and who could easily
send against us a third of that number. And to counterbalance the terrible
odds against us, we had nothing, as I knew, but our faith. At that time
there were some who expected that effectual help would come from Cape
Colony. I was never deluded by this hope. I knew of course that there were
men there who would fight with us against England; I knew how much those men
sympathized with our cause; but I also knew that the circumstances of that
country would make it impossible for the colonists to help us more than they
have, as a matter of fact, done. No! God was our one Hope when the war
began. And if, when the war is over, victory lies with us, it will not be
the first time that faith in God has enabled the weaker nation to overthrow
the stronger.
"Those of you who urge that the war should be discontinued, ask us, who are
for carrying it on, what tangible reason we have for our hope. But what
tangible reason for hope was there at the beginning of the war? Are our
affairs darker now? Quite the contrary—miracles have been worked in our
favour during the last twenty-two months. General Botha wrote to me some
time ago, saying that the scarcity of ammunition was causing him much
anxiety. And he had good cause for that anxiety—ammunition was exhausted.
When a burgher came to me at that time with an empty bandolier, it
absolutely terrified me. But now, to use an expression of General Joubert's,
my pleasure is tempered with shame when I think of the plentiful store of
ammunition which we possess. I am not angry with those of my compatriots who
ask for reasons—I give my reasons—nor have I given a thousandth part of
them.
"The enemy has already made us some concessions. There was a time when Lord
Salisbury said that the English Government would be satisfied with nothing
short of unconditional surrender. He does not say so to-day. England is
negotiating with us—that is to say, she shows signs of yielding to our
demands. If we continue the war, England will negotiate again; she will
offer still more favourable terms; she will not even stick at independence.
"Do you want more of my reasons? Look back once more upon our past history,
and you shall find them. Recall the time when the Transvaal was at war with
England. At that time we did not know the English so well as we now know
them; we had only thirteen cartridges for each man; and there were the
so-called 'Loyalists'—a chicken-hearted crew—to hamper us. Faith was our
only support then—and you all know how that war resulted.
"I
am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That is a very
difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I think also that we might
meet the emergency in this way—a part of the men should be told off to lay
down their arms for the sake of the women, and then they could take the
women with them to the English in the towns. This would be a hard expedient,
but it may be the only one possible.
"America has been referred to by some of the speakers, who have compared our
circumstances with those of the United States, when they made war upon
England. The comparison is, in one respect at least, an apt one, for we also
have large territories to which we can always retreat.
"As to Europe—we know little of the condition of things there. Our
information about Europe comes only from newspapers, and 'Jingo' newspapers
at that. If there is not a great deal going on in Europe which England wants
to hide from us, why is she so careful not to let us see European journals?
If there were anything in them unfavourable to our cause, England would
flood our country with them in her own interests. We must also note that
England will not permit our deputation to return to us.
"Taking all these facts into consideration, and remembering that the
sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself, may be regarded as
being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I
maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued. We must fight on, no
matter how long, until our independence is absolutely secure."
General Beijers (Waterberg) said that he had to give an answer to the
question whether he ought to follow his reason or his conscience; he could
only reply that conscience had the first claim upon him. If he were to
perish whilst following the guidance of reason, he would feel that he had
been unfaithful; whereas, were he to die whilst obeying the dictates of
conscience, he would not fear death. Martyrs of old had died for their
faith; but he feared that the martyr spirit was now only to be met with in
books! Those martyrs had died, and with their death it had seemed that all
was lost; but the truth, for which they had given up their lives, had lived!
But how is it now with us? We think our cause a righteous one, but are we
willing to die for it? Some spoke of our existence as a nation—but whether
that were to be preserved or lost, did not lie with us—it was in the hands
of God—He would take care of it. Right must conquer in the end. They must
take care to be on the side of right, should it even cost them their lives.
He agreed with those who said that, even if the present deliberations were
to come to nothing, they would have another chance, later on, of
negotiating. This had been proved by what had already happened. General de
Wet had shown them how Lord Salisbury had gone back upon his first demands;
he (General Beijers) could tell them that on one occasion Lord Roberts had
declined even to speak to General Botha—and yet the English were negotiating
with them now. He was quite open to conviction, but at present he could not
see that the war ought to be stopped. Nevertheless he was not blind to the
critical state of their affairs. But their case was not yet hopeless; their
anxiety about food, their lack of horses—these were not insurmountable
difficulties. They might even find some means by which to save their
womenfolk.
No. These difficulties were not insuperable; but there was one difficulty
which was insuperable—the present spirit of the nation. When a spirit, be it
what it might, inspired or ruled a man, then that man would submit to no
other sway. The spirit that now ruled the burghers was a spirit that was
driving them over to the enemy. Against that spirit it was impossible to
contend. General De la Rey had said that, if the proposal now before the
meeting were to be shown to the burghers, they would at once accept it—that
was the sort of spirit that was in them, and one must take it into
consideration, for he was convinced that it presented an insurmountable
obstacle to the continuation of the war.
The meeting was then closed with prayer.
FRIDAY, MAY 30TH, 1902.
After the preliminary prayer had been offered, Vice-President Burger said
that before beginning the business of the day, it was his sad duty to inform
the meeting that the President of the Orange Free State had been obliged to
resign, on account of serious illness. President Steyn had been compelled,
in order to obtain medical assistance, to put himself in the hands of the
enemy. He had further to communicate that Commander-in-Chief de Wet had been
appointed Vice-President of the Orange Free State. He wished to express his
deep sympathy with the representatives in the severe loss which they had
sustained. President Steyn, he said, had been a rock and pillar to their
great cause.
Vice-President de Wet having thanked the Vice-President of the South African
Republic for his kind and sympathetic words, Mr. J. Naude (the
representative of Pretoria, and of General Kemp's flying columns) put some
questions with regard to the colonists who had been fighting on the Boer
side. These questions were answered by General Smuts. Mr. Naude then asked
if the delegates were expected to come to any decision about independence.
General Botha replied that the Governments had informed Lords Kitchener and
Milner that they were not in a condition to decide that question—that it was
a matter for the nation to settle. The delegates had then gone to their
burghers, and now had returned, and were present.
Mr. Naude said that it must therefore have been known at Klerksdorp that the
delegates had to decide upon the question of independence. If that were so,
he found himself in a difficulty. Either the delegates had been misled, or
they were the victims of a mistake, for they had never been told that they
had been elected as plenipotentiaries. Notwithstanding all that the lawyers
might say, he considered himself as having a certain definite mission. He
had obtained the votes of his burghers on the understanding that he would
take up a certain position. He had asked them whether independence was to be
given up, and they had answered in the negative. He could not therefore vote
for the acceptance of the proposal now before the meeting, for that proposal
demanded the surrender of independence. His burghers had also insisted on
being allowed to keep their arms, and on the use of their language in
schools and Courts of Justice, both of which conditions were refused by the
British proposal. Since, therefore, he could not agree to the proposal, he
was for continuing the war. Some asked what were the chances of success? He
remembered the state of feeling among the burghers at Warmebad—that was a
dark time indeed. The Commandant-General had paid those burghers a visit,
and had told them that they had nothing to lose, but everything to win, by
continuing the struggle. That had been enough for them. They had not had
much prospect then; they could not see whither their road was leading. But
they had found out afterwards. It had been a dark time too when Pretoria was
taken, but most of the burghers had remained steadfast. And after the
darkness the light had come back. Again a dark cloud was over them—it would
pass away, and the light would reappear.
General De la Rey explained that he had not intended to mislead anybody at
the gatherings of the burghers. Every document which the Government had
handed over to him had been laid before those gatherings. Mr. Naude had
asked whether the delegates at that meeting had to decide about
independence. Most certainly they had. And to do so was a duty devolving
upon Mr. Naude as much as on any other delegate present. They would have to
decide, not for their own districts alone, but for the whole country.
Mr. Naude said that he had no wish to free himself from his responsibility,
but he could not forget that he had come there with a definite mission.
Judge Hertzog wished again to explain the rights of the question from a
legal point of view. One must ask: If the nation were here, what would it
wish to be done? And one must act in conformity with what one thinks its
answer would be. The Judge then proceeded to speak on the matter in general.
What, he asked, were the arguments in favour of continuing the war? In the
first place, England was growing weaker just as their own nation was. Any
one could see that with their own eyes. It was true as regarded the
financial side of the question. No doubt England could still collect
millions of pounds, if she wished, but the time would come when she would
have trouble with her tax-payers. Already the British Government found it
difficult to pay the interest on the sum borrowed for war expenses, as was
proved by the fact that a corn tax had been levied in England. That tax
would not have been levied unless things had been in a serious condition. In
the second place, he would ask how it was they had not been allowed to meet
their deputation? It would only have taken the deputation fourteen days to
perform the journey; by now it would have been among them. But permission
had been refused them. And why? It was said that to grant a permission would
have been a military irregularity. But the present meeting was also a
military irregularity. There must be something more behind that refusal. But
what were the arguments against going on with the war? He would enumerate
them—the situation in which they found themselves was critical; the country
as a whole was exhausted. Nearly all the horses had died or had been
captured. The strongest argument of all, however, was that some of their own
people had turned against them, and were fighting in the ranks of the enemy.
Then the condition of the women caused great anxiety; a fear had been
expressed that a moral decay might set in among the families in the camps.
That consideration had great weight with him. No one with any heart could
remain indifferent to it. If there was one thing which more than anything
else made him respect Commandant-General Botha, it was that the
Commandant-General had the heart to feel, and the courage to express, the
importance of that consideration. The present war was one of the saddest
that had ever been waged. He doubted if there had ever been a war in which a
nation had suffered as they had. But all those sufferings, horrible though
they were, did not influence his decision. Did he but see the chance of
finally securing freedom for the nation, he would put all such
considerations on one side, and go on fighting till death. No; it was not
the horror of the situation which influenced him; there was something that
weighed upon his heart yet more heavily—it was the holding of that meeting
at Vereeniging. He reproached no one. Every one had acted with the best
intentions. Nevertheless that meeting was a fatal error; it would give them
their death blow. For what had it produced—a statement from the lips of the
Commandant-General himself that the condition of the country was hopeless.
If there were yet any burghers whose courage was not gone, would they not be
utterly disheartened when they heard what their leaders had said at that
meeting? That was the saddest thought of all. He could understand that those
burghers who had already lost heart should be leaving the commandos, but now
those who had never yet been disheartened would become so. But
notwithstanding all this, it was difficult to feel certain which was the
right course to pursue—to give up the war or to continue it. He could only
suggest that those who were now in doubt on the matter should support the
line of action which, before their doubt began, had appeared to them to be
best.
Mr. L.J. Meijer (a member of the Government of the South African Republic)
then gave some account of the devastation of that part of the country which
lay to the north of the Eastern Railway, and on the further side of the Sabi
River. (This report coincided with those already given by the delegates.) He
went on to say that as they were all in the dark, and could not see the road
they were travelling along, they must take reason and conscience for their
guide. They had already lost much: let them not lose everything. And what
could they hope to gain by continuing the struggle? To do so might be to
throw away their last chance of peace. What would their progeny say of them
if they were to persist in the struggle and thus lose everything they had
possessed? They would say, "Our forefathers were brave, but they had no
brains." Whereas, if they were to stop the war, their progeny would say,
"Our forefathers did not fight for their own glory." He pointed out that
however little the British proposal contained of what they desired, it
nevertheless promised them representative government. In the past he had
been against the war; he had wished that the five years' franchise should be
granted. Although the people had opposed this measure he had always
supported it. And why? Because he had feared that were that measure not
conceded African blood would stain the ground. Must they still continue to
shed blood? After the capture of Bloemfontein there had been a secret
meeting of the council of war at Pretoria. His Government had then been
willing to surrender, but the Free State had refused. The two Governments
had therefore decided to go on with the war. A year later, in the month of
June, there had been another meeting. A letter had been sent to the Free
State. The two Governments had met at Waterval, and had once more decided to
continue the struggle. Later on, again, the Government of the South African
Republic wrote another letter to the Free State; but there had been no
opportunity of meeting until the present occasion, which saw them assembled
together at Vereeniging. Were they again going to decide to continue their
resistance? It was a matter for serious consideration. There was but little
seed-corn left. This must, if they had to go on fighting, be preserved from
the enemy at all costs; were it to be destroyed, the African nation must
cease to exist. But they could not continue the war. It was the Boers now
who were teaching the English how to fight against us; Boers now were with
the enemy's forces, showing them how to march by night, and pointing out to
them all the foot passes.
Commandant Van Niekerk (Kroonstad) pointed out that the Colonists had
already rendered them valuable aid, and could still do so. Were they now to
abandon these Colonists, and—thinking only about saving themselves—leave
them to fight on alone? It would be sad indeed if the burghers were
compelled to lay down their arms.
Commandant-General L. Botha said that in regard to the holding of a national
meeting, he had already chosen delegates with power to act. He spoke of the
state of affairs at the beginning of the war—the two Republics had then at
least sixty thousand men under arms. In reference to the Cape Colony, he
said that it had never been expected that that country would allow its
railways to be used for the transport of troops. The Commandant-General then
proceeded as follows:—
"I
used to entertain hopes that the European Powers would interfere on our
behalf. All that they have done, however, has been to look on while England
was introducing all sorts of new methods of warfare, methods, too, which are
contrary to all international law.
"When the war began we had plenty of provisions, and a commando could remain
for weeks in one spot without the local food supply running out. Our
families, too, were then well provided for. But all this is now changed. One
is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English
protection. This question of our womenfolk is one of our greatest
difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man answers that some of the
burghers should surrender themselves to the English, and take the women with
them. But most of the women now amongst us are the wives of men already
prisoners. And how can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be
willing to give up liberty for their sakes?
"As to the deputation, we must remember that it was accredited to all the
Powers of Europe. And yet it has only been able to hand in its credentials
to the Netherlands Government. Does not this prove that no other Government
is willing to receive it? If you need further proof, I refer you to the
letter in which the deputation—they were still allowed to write to us
then—said: 'There is no chance for us in Europe.' The deputation wanted to
be allowed to return home, but our Government advised them to remain in
Europe, because their arrival in South Africa would be a death blow to the
hopes of many. That is why the deputation is still in Europe. Later on they
said that, although they knew that there was no chance of intervention, yet
they felt that they ought to persist in their efforts, because of the
sacrifices which we had already made. It is possible that a war may arise in
Europe from which we shall gain something, but what right have we to expect
such a contingency? Moreover, great nations take but little interest in the
fate of small ones—indeed, it is to the advantage of the former that the
small nations should be wiped out of existence.
"I
cannot refrain from alluding to the faithlessness of some of our burghers,
who are to be found in the ranks of the enemy. But this is not the only sign
of the way in which affairs are trending—I look back on the past. I remember
that we have been fighting a full year since we last heard of our
deputation. What have we gained since June, 1901? Nothing. On the contrary,
we have been going backwards so fast that, if this weakening process goes on
much longer, we shall soon find ourselves unable any more to call ourselves
a fighting nation. What have we not undergone in the course of this year
which is just over! In the concentration camps alone, twenty thousand women
and children have died. When I was in Pretoria I received reports from our
information office, and otherwise, of our losses. I found that there were
thirty-one thousand six hundred prisoners of war, of whom six hundred had
died, and that three thousand eight hundred of our burghers had been killed
in the war. Is not a loss such as this, in so short a time as two and a half
years, a serious matter? Think, too, of the sufferings which those twenty
thousand women who died in the camps must have endured!
"I
am not deaf to the claims of the colonists who have been fighting for us. I
have said that if we surrender our independence, we must provide for them.
Should we serve their interests by continuing the war? No, indeed! The best
thing for them would be that we should bring it to a close. But if we are
absolutely determined to go on fighting, let us at least say to them, 'We
advise you to desist.'
"What I am saying now is in substance what I said at Warmbad at a time when
there were two thousand men of that district in the Veldt. How many are
there now? Four hundred and eighty! On that occasion I also said that we
must continue the war until we were driven by sheer starvation to make
peace. Well, in some divisions starvation has already come. The delegates
themselves have had to confess that our strength up till now has lain in the
fact that we have been able to continue the struggle in every district. In
this way we have divided the enemy's forces. But if we are compelled to
abandon some of our districts, and to concentrate on certain points, then
the English also will concentrate, and attack us with an irresistible force.
"It has been suggested that we ought to march into Cape Colony. I know,
however, what that would mean—Commander-in-Chief de Wet marched into the
colonies. He had a large force, and the season of the year was auspicious
for his attempt, and yet he failed. How, then, shall we succeed in winter,
and with horses so weak that they can only go op-een-stap.[120]
"What, then, are we to do? Some will reply, 'Go on with the war,' Yes, but
for how long? For ten or twelve years? But would that be possible? If in two
years we have been reduced from sixty thousand fighting men to half that
number, where will our army be after another ten years of war? It is clear
enough to me that if we go on any longer, we shall be compelled to
surrender. Would it not be better to come to some agreement with the enemy,
while we have the opportunity? We have all received the gift of reason; let
us use it on the present occasion.
"As far as I and my own burghers are concerned, to continue the struggle is
still possible. But we must not only think of ourselves. We must almost
think of others. There are, for instance, the widows and orphans. If we
accept the terms now offered to us, they will remain under our care. But if
we go on with the war until we are forced to surrender, who will then take
care of them? Or if we were all killed, what could we do for them? We should
not even be able to send a deputation to Europe, to ask for money to help us
to rebuild our farms, and to feed our burghers.
"There are three questions now before us—three alternatives between which we
have to choose—the continuing of the war, unconditional surrender, and the
acceptance of the British proposal. With regard to the first, I fail to see
what satisfactory result can come to us from persisting in this unequal
contest, which must result in the end in our extermination. As to the choice
between the other two, in many ways unconditional surrender would be the
better. But, for the sake of the nation, we may not choose it. Although to
reject it may involve us in many hardships, yet we must think of nothing
else but the interests of the nation. Our only course, then, is to accept
the proposal of the English Government. Its terms may not be very
advantageous to us, but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost
impossible position."
After a short adjournment the delegates again assembled at about 2 p.m.
General C.H. Muller (Boksburg) said that his burghers had sent him to defend
their menaced independence. One part of them had authorized him to act as
his judgment should dictate; another part had ordered him to hold out for
independence and to try to get into communication with the European
deputation. He had long ago told his burghers that they must trust in God if
they wished to continue the war, for they could not do so by relying only on
their guns and rifles. He did not like to think of what they would say if he
were to go back to them and tell them that he had not been in communication
with the deputation, and that the proposal of the English Government had
been accepted. He could not bring himself to surrender. Nevertheless, having
in view what the Commandant-General and others had said, he felt that he
must do so, for it was impossible for him to prosecute the war
single-handed. But could not the delegates continue to stand by one another,
and make a covenant with the Lord? The district which he represented was one
of the poorest in the whole country, and the £3,000,000 offered by the enemy
did not include any provision for those who, like his burghers, could do
nothing to help themselves. He would again suggest that the delegates should
make a vow unto the Lord. For himself, he could not vote for the acceptance
of the British proposal.
General J.H. Smuts then spoke as follows:—
"Up till now I have taken no part in this discussion, but my opinions are
not unknown to my Government; we have arrived at a dark period both in the
history of our war, and in the course of our national development. To me it
is all the darker because I am one of those who, as members of the
Government of the South African Republic, provoked the war with England. A
man, however, may not draw back from the consequences of his deeds. We must
therefore keep back all private feeling, and decide solely with a view to
the lasting interests of our nation. This is an important occasion for us—it
is perhaps the last time that we shall meet as a free people with a free
government. Let us then rise to the height of this occasion; let us arrive
at a decision for which our posterity shall bless, and not curse us.
"The great danger for this meeting is that of deciding the questions before
it on purely military grounds. Nearly all the delegates here are officers
who in the past have never quailed before the overwhelming forces of the
enemy, and who therefore are never likely to do so in the future. They do
not know what fear is, and they are ready to shed the last drop of their
blood in the defence of their country.
"Now if we look at the matter from their point of view, that is to say, if
we look at it merely as a military question, I am bound to admit that we
shall come to the conclusion that the war can be continued. We are still an
unconquered power; we have still about eighteen thousand men in the
field—veterans, with whom one can accomplish almost anything. From a purely
military standpoint, our cause is not yet lost. But it is as a nation, and
not as an army, that we are met here, and it is therefore for the nation
principally that we must consult. No one sits here to represent this or that
commando. One and all, we represent the African nation, and not only those
members of it which are now in the field, but also those who rest beneath
the soil, and those yet unborn, who shall succeed us.
"No! We do not only represent our burghers on commando, the troops over
which we are placed in command; we represent also the thousands who have
passed away, after making the last sacrifice for their country; the
prisoners scattered all the world over; the women and children dying by the
thousand in the prison camps of the enemy; we represent the blood and the
tears of the whole African nation. From the prisons, the camps, the graves,
the veldt, and from the womb of the future, that nation cries out to us to
make a wise decision now, to take no step which might lead to the downfall
or even to the extermination of their race, and thus make all their
sacrifices of no avail. Our struggle, up to the present, has not been an
aimless one. We have not been fighting in mere desperation. We began this
strife, and we have continued it, because we wanted to maintain our
independence and were prepared to sacrifice everything for it. But we must
not sacrifice the African nation itself upon the altar of independence. So
soon as we are convinced that our chance of maintaining our autonomous
position as Republics is, humanly speaking, at an end, it becomes our clear
duty to desist from our efforts. We must not run the risk of sacrificing our
nation and its future to a mere idea which can no longer be realized.
"And ought we not to be convinced that independence is now irretrievably
lost? We have been fighting without cessation for nearly three years. It is
no exaggeration to say that during that period we have been employing all
the strength and all the means which we possess, in the furtherance of our
cause. We have sacrificed thousands of lives; we have lost all our earthly
goods; our dear country is become one continuous desert; more than twenty
thousand of our women and children have perished in the camps of the enemy.
And has this brought us independence? Just the reverse; it is receding
further and further from us every day. The longer we fight, the greater will
be the distance between us and the aim for which we are fighting.
"The manner in which the enemy has been conducting, and still continues to
conduct, this war, has reduced our country to such a state of exhaustion,
that it will soon be a physical impossibility for us to fight any longer.
Our only hope lies in the chance of help from outside. A year ago I, in the
name of my Government, communicated the condition of our nation to His
Honour States-President Kruger, in Europe. He wrote in reply that we must
rely on the state of affairs in Cape Colony—and the sympathy of European
nations—and that we must continue the war until all other means were
exhausted."
The speaker here enlarged upon the political developments which had taken
place in the United States and in the principal European countries during
the preceding two years, and then continued:—
"So far as we are concerned, the sum total of the foreign situation is that
we obtain a great deal of sympathy, for which we are naturally most
grateful. More than this we do not obtain, nor shall obtain for many a long
year. Europe will go on expressing sympathy with us until the last Boer hero
has died on the field and the last Boer woman has gone down to her
grave—until, in fact, the whole Boer nation has been sacrificed on the altar
of history and of humanity.
"I
have already, on a former occasion, told you what I think about the
situation in Cape Colony. We have made great mistakes there; perhaps even
now Cape Colony is not ripe for the sort of policy which we have been
pursuing with regard to it. At all events, we cannot entertain any hopes of
a general rising of the Colonists. We cannot, however, give too much honour
to those three thousand heroes in the Colony who have sacrificed all in our
behalf, even though they have not succeeded in securing our independence for
us.
"Thus we have given President Kruger's advice a fair trial. For twelve
months we have been testing the value of the methods which he urged upon us.
And, as a result of it all, we have become convinced that those methods are
of no avail—that if we wish to remain independent we must depend upon
ourselves alone. But the facts which the various delegates have brought
before our notice show that we cannot thus depend upon ourselves; that,
unless we obtain outside help, the struggle must come to an end. We have,
then, no hope of success. Our country is already devastated and in ruins;
let us stop before our people are ruined also.
"And now the enemy approaches with a proposal, which, however unacceptable
it may be to us in other respects, includes the promise of amnesty for our
Colonial brethren who have been fighting side by side with us. I fear that
the day will come when we shall no longer be able to save these so-called
rebels, and then it will be a just ground for reproach that we sacrificed
their interests in a cause that was already hopeless. Moreover, if we
refused the proposal which the British Government now makes to us, I am
afraid that we shall considerably weaken our position in the eyes of the
world, and thus lose much of the sympathy which to-day it evinces in our
favour.
"Brethren, we have vowed to stand fast to the bitter end; but let us be men,
and acknowledge that that end has now come, and that it is more bitter than
ever we thought it could be. For death itself would be sweet compared with
the step which we must now take. But let us bow before the will of God.
"The future is dark indeed, but we will not give up courage, and hope, and
trust in God. No one shall ever convince me that this unparalleled sacrifice
which the African nation has laid upon the altar of freedom will be in vain.
It has been a war for freedom—not only for the freedom of the Boers, but for
the freedom of all the nations of South Africa. Its results we leave in
God's hands. Perhaps it is His will to lead our nation through defeat,
through abasement, yes, and even through the valley of the shadow of death,
to the glory of a nobler future, to the light of a brighter day."
Commandant A.J. Bester (Bloemfontein) said that at the meeting at which he
had been elected his burghers had told him that they were resolved not to
become the subjects of England. The arguments now urged against the
continuation of the war were not new—they had been used in former times of
depression. History gave many instances in which their nation had been
delivered out of the most critical positions. One could not help believing
that Right would conquer. How was it to be explained that two hundred and
forty thousand troops had failed to exterminate two small Republics? Then
there had been miraculous escapes; surely the thoughts of these ought to
encourage them. They must all be of one mind. His own decision was to stand
or to fall for his freedom.
Mr. Birkenstock (Vrijheid) asked whether the proposal could not be accepted
under protest.
General J.C. Smuts answered that the meeting could empower the Governments
to accept the proposal, and to add that they did so with such and such
provisos.
Commandant A.J. Bester (Bloemfontein) thought that there had been enough
said, and recommended that the discussion be closed.
Commandant F.E. Mentz (Heilbron) also thought that it was not necessary to
argue any more. He believed that the war could not be continued. In
Heilbron, Bloemfontein, and part of Bethlehem there were not five head of
cattle left. The helpless condition of the women and children also demanded
consideration. The state of the country was becoming so desperate that they
were now obliged to break away from the kraals. He himself had been
compelled to this not long ago, and had lost forty men in one day. He would
have to leave his district, but could not bring it to his heart to leave the
women behind. It was quite clear to him that the war must be stopped, for
some parts of the Transvaal were absolutely unable to go on fighting.
Moreover, were the war to continue, commando after commando would go over to
the enemy.
General Kemp (Krugersdorp) took a more encouraging view of affairs. He would
stand or fall with the independence. His mandate was to that effect. His
conscience also would not justify him in taking any other course. He thought
that the proposal of the English Government was vague, that there was not
sufficient provision for the Boer losses in it, and that it treated the
Dutch language as a foreign tongue. Circumstances had often been dark, and
the darkness would pass away this time as it had done before. Remembering
the commission which had been given to him by the burghers, he could not do
otherwise than vote for a continuation of the war.
Vice-President Burger: "I have already given my opinion. I am sorry that the
meeting seems to be divided. It is necessary for the welfare of our nation
that we should be of one mind. Are we to continue the war? From what I have
seen and heard, it is clear to me that we cannot do so. I repeat that there
is no possibility of it, neither does any real hope exist that by doing so
we should benefit the nation. It is idle to compare our condition in the
struggle in 1877-1881 with that in which we now find ourselves; I speak from
experience.
"It is true that the victory was then ours; that it was so is due to the
help which we received from outside. The Orange Free State remained neutral,
but assistance came from President Brand in South Africa and from Gladstone
in England: thus it was not by our own sword that we were enabled to win.
"It will be asked why, if we have kept up the struggle for two years and a
half, can we not still continue to do so?
"Because, in the meantime, we have become weaker and weaker, and if we
persist the end must be fatal. What grounds have we for expecting that we
may yet be victorious? Each man we lose renders us weaker; every hundred men
we lose means a similar gain to the enemy. England's numerical strength does
not diminish; on the contrary, there are even more troops in the country at
this moment than when Lord Roberts had the command. England also has used
our own men against us, and has not been ashamed of arming the Kaffirs; the
enemy are learning from our own men in what way they should fight—he must be
blind indeed who cannot see these facts.
"I
do not think we can appropriately call this altogether a 'war of faith.'
Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God, but there were
also two or three other things to rely upon. We had considerable confidence
in our own weapons; we under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had
seized upon our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the
possibility of defeat.
"The question still remains, What are we to do? I have no great opinion of
the document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to stop
the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace it is not on account of any
advantages that this proposal offers me: it is the weight of my own
responsibility which drives me to it.
"If I think that by holding out I should dig the nation's grave, nothing
must induce me to continue the struggle.
"Therefore I consider it my duty, as leader of our nation, to do my utmost
that not one man more shall be killed, that not one woman more shall die.
"The sacrifice must be made; is not this also a trial of our faith? What
shall we gain by going on? Nothing! It is obvious that further surrenders
will take place—here of a few, there of many—and our weakness will increase.
"We shall also be obliged to abandon large areas of the country. Will this
make us stronger? Rather, will it not enable the enemy to concentrate still
more? And the abandoned tracts—to whom will they belong? To the enemy!
"In all probability this is our last meeting. I do not believe that we shall
be given another chance to negotiate: we shall be deemed too insignificant.
If we reject this proposal, what prospects have we in the future? If we
accept it, we can, like a child, increase in size and strength, but with its
rejection goes our last opportunity.
"Fell a tree and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it.
What has the nation done to deserve extinction?
"Those who wish to continue the war are influenced chiefly by hope; but on
what is this hope founded? On our arms? No. On intervention? By no means. On
what then? No one can say.
"I
am sorry that the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are at variance on
this point, and I regret that it is the Transvaal which has to declare
itself unable to proceed further; but the enemy have concentrated all their
forces in this State, and we can hold out no longer."
Mr. L. Jacobsz: "I have hitherto not spoken, because I am a non-combatant. I
have also suffered much, although less than others. I have listened to what
has been said, but my opinion is not changed by the views I have heard
expressed.
"I
repeat now what I said at Klerksdorp, namely that the struggle cannot
continue. I have noted the condition of the country, which is such that the
commandos can no longer be supported. I would point out the condition of the
women and children, of whom many are dying, and all are exposed to great
dangers. If there was a chance of succeeding in the end, then we might hold
out, but there is no such chance; there is no possibility of intervention,
and the silence of the deputation is ominous.
"I
sympathize with the heroes present at this meeting; we must have a
foundation for our faith, and we cannot altogether compare our people with
the people of Israel. Israel had promises made to them; we have none. I
would further point out that, in the interests of the nation, it will not do
to surrender unconditionally: the terms before us may be deceptive, but they
are the best obtainable.
"With regard to the difficulty of those delegates who consider that they are
bound to act as they have been commissioned, I am of the same opinion as
Judge Hertzog and General Smuts."
Commandant J.J. Alberts (Standerton) spoke more or less in the same strain.
He was of opinion that the war should be finished by ceding territory, but,
failing this, that it should be ended on any terms obtainable.
Vice-President de Wet expressed his opinion that, considering the short time
at their disposal, they should proceed, if possible, to make some proposal.
General D.A. Brand said that he would have spoken if he had not thought that
enough had been said; he considered it desirable to close the discussion,
and was willing to make a proposal.
Veldtcornet D.J.E. Opperman (Pretoria South) considered that the
difficulties of continuing the war, and of accepting the proposal, were
equal. Some of his burghers would fight no longer. What troubled him most
was the condition of the women; it went to his heart to see these families
perish. He was of opinion that, for the sake of the women and children who
were suffering so intensely, the proposal should be accepted under protest.
Veldtcornet J. Van Steedden, seconded by Veldtcornet B.J. Roos, moved that
the discussion be now closed.
The meeting was adjourned after prayer.
SATURDAY, MAY 31ST, 1902.
The meeting was opened with prayer.
General Nieuwouwdt, seconded by General Brand, made the following proposal:—
"This meeting of special deputies from the two Republics, after considering
the proposal of His Majesty's Government for the re-establishment of peace,
and taking into consideration (a) the demands of the burghers in the veldt
and the commissions which they had given to their representatives; (b) that
they do not consider themselves justified in concluding peace on the basis
laid down by His Majesty's Government before having been placed in
communication with the delegates of the Republic now in Europe, decides that
it cannot accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and orders the
Governments of the two Republics to communicate this decision to His
Majesty's Government through its representatives."
Mr. P.R. Viljoen, seconded by General H.A. Alberts, made a proposal, amended
afterwards by General Smuts and Judge Hertzog, which appears later on under
the proposal of H.P.J. Pretorius and C. Botha.
A
third proposal by General E. Botha and General J.G. Celliers was laid upon
the table, but subsequently withdrawn.
Mr. F.W. Reitz considered it to be his duty not only to the nation but also
to himself as a citizen, to say that, in case the proposal of the British
Government should be accepted, it would be necessary for the meeting to make
provisions as to whose signatures should be attached to the necessary
documents. He himself would not sign any document by which the independence
would be given up.
Remarks were made by several members on the first proposal, and Mr. P.R.
Viljoen asked that no division should arise.
Vice-President de Wet then said that, as the time was limited, and all could
not speak, he would propose that a Commission should be nominated in order
to draw up a third proposal in which various opinions of the members should
be set down; and that, whilst the Commission was occupied in this way, the
Orange Free State delegates on their part and those of the South African
Republic on their part, should meet in order that an understanding might be
come to between them. They must endeavour to come to a decision, for it
would be of the greatest possible advantage to them.
Commandant-General Botha thought that this hint should be taken. They had
suffered and fought together: let them not part in anger.
The above-mentioned Commission was then decided upon, and Judge Hertzog and
General Smuts were elected.
Then the Orange Free State delegates went to the tent of Vice-President de
Wet, whilst those of the South African Republic remained in the tent in
which the meeting was held.
After a time of heated dispute—for every man was preparing himself for the
bitter end—they came to an agreement, and Judge Hertzog read the following
proposal:—
"We, the national representatives of both the South African Republic and the
Orange Free State, at the meeting held at Vereeniging, from the 15th of May
till the 31st of May, 1902, have with grief considered the proposal made by
His Majesty's Government in connexion with the conclusion of the existing
hostilities, and their communication that this proposal had to be accepted,
or rejected, unaltered. We are sorry that His Majesty's Government has
absolutely declined to negotiate with the Governments of the Republics on
the basis of their independence, or to allow our Governments to enter into
communication with our deputations. Our people, however, have always been
under the impression that not only on the grounds of justice, but also
taking into consideration the great material and personal sacrifices made
for their independence, that it had a well-founded claim for that
independence.
"We have seriously considered the future of our country, and have specially
observed the following facts:—
"Firstly, that the military policy pursued by the British military
authorities has led to the general devastation of the territory of both
Republics by the burning down of farms and towns, by the destruction of all
means of subsistence, and by the exhausting of all resources required for
the maintenance of our families, the subsistence of our armies, and the
continuation of the war.
"Secondly, that the placing of our families in the concentration camps has
brought on an unheard-of condition of suffering and sickness, so that in a
comparatively short time about twenty thousand of our beloved ones have died
there, and that the horrid probability has arisen that, by continuing the
war, our whole nation may die out in this way.
"Thirdly, that the Kaffir tribe, within and without the frontiers of the
territory of the two Republics, are mostly armed and are taking part in the
war against us, and through the committing of murders and all sorts of
cruelties have caused an unbearable condition of affairs in many districts
of both Republics. An instance of this happened not long ago in the district
of Vrijheid, where fifty-six burghers on one occasion were murdered and
mutilated in a fearful manner.
"Fourthly, that by the proclamations of the enemy the burghers still
fighting are threatened with the loss of all their movable and landed
property—and thus with utter ruin—which proclamations have already been
enforced.
"Fifthly, that it has already, through the circumstances of the war, become
quite impossible for us to keep the many thousand prisoners of war taken by
our forces, and that we have thus been unable to inflict much damage on the
British forces (whereas the burghers who are taken prisoners by the British
armies are sent out of the country), and that, after war has raged for
nearly three years, there only remains an insignificant part of the fighting
forces with which we began.
"Sixthly, that this fighting remainder, which is only a small minority of
our whole nation, has to fight against an overpowering force of the enemy,
and besides is reduced to a condition of starvation, and is destitute of all
necessaries, and that notwithstanding our utmost efforts, and the sacrifice
of everything that is dear and precious to us, we cannot foresee an eventual
victory.
"We are therefore of opinion that there is no justifiable ground for
expecting that by continuing the war the nation will retain its
independence, and that, under these circumstances, the nation is not
justified in continuing the war, because this can only lead to social and
material ruin, not for us alone, but also for our posterity. Compelled by
the above-named circumstances and motives, we commission both Governments to
accept the proposal of His Majesty's Government, and to sign it in the name
of the people of both Republics.
"We, the representative delegates, express our confidence that the present
circumstances will, by accepting the proposal of His Majesty's Government,
be speedily ameliorated in such a way that our nation will be placed in a
position to enjoy the privileges to which they think they have a just claim,
on the ground not only of their past sacrifices, but also of those made in
this war.
"We have with great satisfaction taken note of the decision of His Majesty's
Government to grant a large measure of amnesty to the British subjects who
have taken up arms on our behalf, and to whom we are united by bonds of love
and honour; and express our wish that it may please His Majesty to still
further extend this amnesty."
Mr. P.R. Viljoen then withdrew his proposal.
Commandant H.P.J. Pretorius, seconded by General C. Botha, presented the
proposal, as read by the Commission.
General Nieuwouwdt also withdrew his proposal, but it was at once taken over
by General C.C.J. Badenhorst, seconded by Commandant A.J. Bester, of
Bloemfontein.
The meeting then adjourned till the afternoon.
________________________________________
In
the afternoon at 2.05 it again met.
Proceeding to the voting, the proposal of H.P.J. Pretorius, seconded by
General C. Botha, was accepted, by fifty-four votes against six. Then
Vice-President Burger spoke a few words suitable to the occasion as
follows:—"We are standing here at the grave of the two Republics. Much yet
remains to be done, although we shall not be able to do it in the official
capacities which we have formerly occupied. Let us not draw our hands back
from the work which it is our duty to accomplish. Let us ask God to guide
us, and to show us how we shall be enabled to keep our nation together. We
must be ready to forgive and forget, whenever we meet our brethren. That
part of our nation which has proved unfaithful we must not reject."
Later, Vice-President Burger spoke a few words of farewell to the
Commandant-General, to the Members of the Executive Councils, and to the
delegates.
In
the afternoon, as it turned out for the last time, Commandant Jacobsz,
seconded by General Muller, made the following proposal, which was
unanimously accepted by the meeting:—
"This meeting of Delegates, having in view the necessity of collecting means
to provide for the wants of the suffering women and children, widows and
orphans, and other destitute persons, who have through this war come to a
condition of want, and also having in view the desirability of nominating a
Committee, whose duty it shall be to arrange the necessary steps in this
matter, and to finally decide on the management and distribution of the
donations received, decides:—
"To nominate the Hon. Messrs. M.J. Steyn, S.W. Burger, L. Botha, C.R. de
Wet, J.H. De la Rey, A.P. Kriel, and J.D. Kestell, as the Committee, to
carry out all arrangements for the above-mentioned purposes, that may seem
desirable and expedient to them, and also to appoint new Members,
Sub-Committees and working Committees; and the said Committee is empowered
to draw up regulations, and to amend them from time to time as shall seem to
them expedient.
"This meeting further decides to send abroad from the above-mentioned
Committee, Messrs. C.R. de Wet, L. Botha, and J.H. De la Rey, in order that
they may help in collecting the above-mentioned donations."
Then this—the last meeting of the two Republics—was closed with prayer.
[113] See page 363 et seq.
[114] See page 379 et seq.
[115] See page 391 et seq.
[116] See page 395 et seq.
[117] The Boer form of this proverb is: Half an egg is better than an empty
shell.
[118] The head fastened to the knee.
[119] Having two legs fastened together.
[120] The step of a tired horse.
