During the period of, say, twenty-five years after the inception of the
Afrikaner Bond, and while its organization and development were secretly
kept at full pace with occurring events, the British Government consistently
and openly pursued the policy of bringing about the unification of South
Africa. Mr. Froude, a speaker of rare gifts, was sent to lecture upon the
topic: this was in about 1873. The Colonial Governor, Sir Bartle Frere,
strenuously advocated that union. The lines suggested were a general
federation under one protective flag, self-government in the Colonies, and
the continuance of uncurtailed autonomic independence in the two Republics.
The benefits which such a coalition promised to all concerned in South
Africa are obvious. It would guarantee harmony between the two white races
without involving the least sacrifice of liberty with any party—it simply
meant coincident peace, prosperity and security, and would relieve England
of a considerable burden of anxiety. The scheme promised to find all-round
acceptance, but, unaccountably, except to Bond men, its greatest opponents
were the Cape Colonial Boers. It was, however, confidently hoped that, with
patience, opposition and indifference would be overcome, and in view of this
no opportunity was lost to prove England's loyal sincerity by genial
treatment, by conciliating the various interests, and gratifying the wishes
of the Boer communities, and so to ensure the desideratum of complete
rapprochement between the white races.
Conferences were convened with the objects of coming to agreements for the
establishment of a general South African Customs Union, and for adjusting
railway tariffs upon fair bases and a more reliable permanency of rates
suggesting reciprocal terms advantageous to the Republics. These efforts
also proved fruitless through similar opposition.
The Afrikaner Bond party, as the reader will understand, had ranged itself
against all such attempts, whilst successfully masking its own object all
the time.
Other differences, which, with a friendly and united spirit, were capable of
easy adjustment, were welcomed by that party as grist to its mill in order
to widen the gulf and to increase the tension.
Besides the chagrin over the failure of its peace policy, the British
Cabinet had finally to admit itself confronted with a very real and ominous
national peril, face to face with the South African Medusa, Afrikanerdom,
defying Great Britain in preconcerted aggression and revolt. That apparition
was all the more startlingly disquieting because of the suddenness with
which the magnitude of the menace and its wide perspectives had begun to
expand into clearer view. It was interesting to note how the English
ministry responded to the call upon its fortitude; the terrifying apparition
did not seem to petrify that body of men, despite the galling handicapping
consequences through the opposition of part of the nation, which was indeed
tantamount to encouraging South African rebels and usurpers.
