Capitalists had already begun to feel nervous about the final security of
their investments; operations and credit became restricted, fresh projects
were abandoned and a persistent withdrawal of capital set in. Trade and
prosperity were progressively waning, accompanied with still more ominous
portents for the Uitlanders' future. It all meant a very extensive weeding
out of investments under enormous losses, except such as stood in relation
with dividend-paying mines. England, though apparently apathetic and
inactive, was not inattentive to the situation. Whoever had a stake, whether
in South Africa or abroad, looked to Great Britain as the Power upon whom
the duty devolved to provide a peaceable remedy. The suzerainty controversy
was then followed by other questions of diplomatic difference, among which
that of the franchise reform. Upon this matter English intervention took an
insistent form. It clearly turned all upon that—and once it were
satisfactorily arranged, the amicable solution of other questions might in
turn be expected to follow. As to suzerainty, that claim appeared relegated
to remain in abeyance. A conference was convened at Bloemfontein early in
June, 1899, for the discussion of those topics between the Colonial
Governor, Sir Alfred Milner, and the Presidents of the two Republics. The
outcome was a final demand for the right of representation of the Uitlander
interests in the legislative bodies of the Transvaal, amounting to one-fifth
of the total aggregate of members, the voting qualifications to consist in
the usual reasonable conditions and a residence in the State of five years,
operating retrospectively.
We
may here consider whether such a demand contained any real feature of
unfairness to warrant refusal.
Three-fifths of the entire white Transvaal population were Uitlanders, the
majority of them English. They own four-fifths of the total wealth invested
in the State. About half of them have been domiciled, with house and other
fixed property, for periods of from five to ten years and more.
The preponderance is not only in numbers and wealth, but also in
intelligence and in contributing at least four-fifths of the total State
revenues.
Is
it right or prudent to exclude such interests and such a majority from
legislative representation?
Could a minority of one-fifth, that is to say, twelve Uitlander members
against forty-eight Boer members, be said to constitute a menace to the
status or to the conservative interests of State?
Do
Uitlanders not deserve equal recognition with the burghers in respect to
intrinsic interest in the land, seeing that the former supplied all the
skill and the capital to explore and exploit the mine wealth, all at their
risk, and without which it would all have remained hidden and the country
continued fallow and poor?
Though one-fifth would be so small a minority, it would at least have
afforded the constitutional method of declaring the wishes of Uitlanders,
and have done away with the disquieting and less effective practices of
Press agitations, public demonstrations, and petitions. The measure could
also have been expected to open up the way towards reconciling relations
between the English and Boer races, beginning in the Transvaal, where it was
hoped that the burghers would be gained over as friends, and so to stand
aloof from the Afrikaner Bond. These were the supreme objects for peaceful
progress and not for annexation. Solemn assurances from highest quarters
were repeatedly given that no designs existed against the integrity of the
Republic, that nothing unfriendly lurked behind the franchise demand, but
that necessity dictated it for general good and the preservation of peace.
Nor were other diplomatic means left unemployed to ensure the acceptance of
the franchise reform. In addition to firmness of attitude and a display of
actual force, most of the other Powers, including the United States of
America, were induced to add their weight of persuasion in urging upon the
Transvaal the adoption of the measures demanded by England for correcting
the existing trouble. It may be urged that the display of force in sending
the first batches of troops would have afforded grounds for exasperation,
and be construed by the Transvaal as a menace and actual hostility, tending
to precipitate a conflict which it was so earnestly intended to avoid. To
this may be replied that the 20,000 men sent in August were readily viewed
as placing the hitherto undermanned Colonial garrisons upon an appropriate
peace effective only; but not so with respect to the army corps of 50,000
men despatched in September—this was felt as an intended restraint against
"Bond" projects, to enforce the observance of any agreement which the
Transvaal might for the nonce assent to, and above all it was tending,
unless at once opposed by the Bond, to weaken its ranks by producing
hesitation and ultimate defection from that body; the die was thus to be
cast, duplicity appeared to be played out—the ultimatum of 9th October was
the outcome; and England, though unprepared, could not possibly accept it
otherwise than as a wilful challenge to war.
As
the pursuit of our study will show, the success of Mr. Chamberlain's
diplomacy to avert war depended upon the very slender prospects that the
Transvaal Government might have been induced to waver, and finally to break
with the Afrikaner Bond—a forlorn hope indeed, considering the perfection
which that formidable organization had reached. Its cherished objects were
not meant to be abandoned. The advice of "Bond" leaders prevailed. War was
declared and the Rubicon crossed in enthusiastic expectations of soon
realizing the long-deferred Bond motto: "The expulsion of the hateful
English."
It
is true the Transvaal had made a show of acquiescence to British and foreign
pressure. This first took the shape of an offer of a seven years' franchise,
and then one of five years, exceeding even Mr. Milner's demands as to the
number of Uitlander representation. That of seven years was so fenced in
with nugatory trammels and conditions that it had for those reasons to be
rejected; whilst that at five years was coupled with the equally
unacceptable conditions that the claim of suzerainty should be renounced,
and that in all other respects the Transvaal should be recognised as
absolutely independent in terms of the Sand River Convention of 1852.
Those offers could hardly have been made in sincerity, but rather as a
temporary device and to meet the susceptibilities of the advising Powers,
for all the time preparations for war were never relaxed for a moment, but
were pushed on with extreme vigour. On the other hand, the British programme
seeking to ensure peace by the franchise expedient had been strictly
followed without deviation. When the Transvaal Government professed
irritation over the disposition of some British troops too near the
Transvaal border, they were promptly removed to more remote and less
strategic positions, rather than incur the risk of rupture. During the month
preceding the outbreak of the war, some large continental consignments of
war munitions were, as usual, permitted to reach the Republics unhindered
through several Colonial ports, portions being actually smuggled over the
Colonial railways as merchandise addressed to a well-known Pretoria firm,
but on arrival were secretly delivered, under cover of night, at the various
forts and arsenals. These proceedings were carried out with the connivance
of the Colonial Bond authorities, and though known to the British Governor,
it was all winked at rather than hazard the momentous objects of peace by
the introduction of another knotty subject. To sum up the situation, it was
a diplomatic contest on the part of Great Britain aiming at peace and to
safeguard her possessions and prestige, while the Afrikaner Bond, on the
other part, continued active in the work of sedition and preparing for a war
of usurpation. Every one must admit that the demand of the British Ministry
for an immediate and adequate representation proceeded from the necessity
and the desire to overcome the South African crisis in a just and pacific
way. The measure was counted upon to effect conciliation between the
Uitlander and burgher elements, and as a further result was earnestly hoped
to bring about the secession of the Transvaal from the Afrikaner Bond, and
so reduce that dangerous confederacy to a somewhat negligible impotence. To
discover other objects of a sinister sort lurking behind needs a more than
inventive genius. A united Afrikaner Bond, persistent to carry out its fell
project, definitely meant war sooner or later. Its first step in launching
out to it was that notorious ultimatum, which was tantamount to snatching
back the feigned offers of the seven and five years' franchise. According to
original programme, the very next step to accomplish the coup d'étatwas the
immediate seizure of all Colonial ports, and to complete a general and
irrevocable Boer rising all over the Colonies.
All the while the old device had been put into practice of hiding Bond guilt
by accusing England of designs against the integrity of the Boer Republics.
But directly after, in the exultation of victorious invasions, the mask was
shamelessly dropped, and Boerdom stands out defiantly and nakedly
self-confessed, aiming at conquest and supremacy over all South Africa. Will
the ensuing century have in store an instance to match that record plot of
artifice and dissimulation, and see half the world duped into partisanship
with it—by journalistic craft?
It
may well be imagined that Mr. Chamberlain and his noble colleagues had
anything but beds of roses whilst pursuing the diplomacy adopted to
checkmate the Bond. They had to gain national support without divulging
their own proceeding, and were at the same time reduced to a situation which
imposed a spartan fortitude in concealing and repressing involuntary
perturbation in the presence of an impending national crisis, and also the
stoical endurance of bitter recriminations on the part of an opposition
comprising a large and honourable but poorly informed section of the English
nation.
