We were busy all evening baking vet-koek
(a kind of scone fried in lard), as we had received the order to be ready to
leave the following morning at one o'clock, and to take provisions
sufficient for two days. Although our officers were beginning to see the
advisability of keeping their plans secret, we were able to guess that we
were going to attack General Clements' camp, an hour's ride further east at
Nooitgedacht--particularly as the chances of success, in case of an eventual
attack, were being discussed by some of the officers. The general opinion
was that Clements' force was 5,000 strong.
We left quite three-quarters of an
hour later than the fixed time in the early morning of December 13, 1900,
and recrossed the steep, narrow neck, took a way to our right in the
Kromriverskloof, making a sharp turn to Elandskrans, where a strong outpost
had been placed by the enemy on the Magalies Mountains.
That was the crust through which we
had to bite to get at the dainties of the booty. It cannot be denied that
victory and booty, in our impoverished circumstances, were very close
together in our thoughts. The enemy's camp lay at the foot of the long, high
cliff that forms a precipice on that side of the mountain, while the slope
of the mountain on our side was not steep, and there were a great many
footholds and boulders. The artillery had been left in the neck of the pass
to protect the lagers. Beyers, with some Zoutpansbergers, turned away from
us to the right to reach Elandskrans along the mountain ridge. It appeared,
therefore, that Beyers and Kemp were going to make the attack from the
north, with 1,000 men, and that Kemp had the centre and the left wing. We
were again too late. The sun had risen when we began the attack. Corporal
Botman was ordered by Kemp to surround the extreme right of the enemy's
right wing, with thirty men.
We had to storm the left to enclose
the enemy in the half-circle. We were exposed to a rain of bullets, and had
to storm through ravines and reefs, sometimes racing our horses, then
leading them, and making use of every cover. General Beyers, with his
splendid sharp-shooters, was already in hot action with the right wing, and
Commandant Kemp in the centre had forced his way close to the enemy. We tied
our horses together behind a reef, left them in charge of a few men, and
advanced, spreading ourselves in groups of three, four and five. A moment of
extreme anxiety followed.
Not to expose ourselves
unnecessarily, we had to peep from behind the rocks, shoot the course clear,
and run to the next cover. Malherbe and I stayed as close as possible to our
cool, collected, brave corporal, and we had to gasp for breath sometimes if
trying to keep up to him. The others forced their way upwards more to the
left, and so formed the furthest left point of the half-moon.
While the three of us were pushing
our way from position to position into the neighbourhood of the few khakies
who already dared not raise their heads from behind the rocks, I noticed,
some 500 paces to our front, a number of khakies moving in our direction. I
warned Malherbe to keep up his courage, as the enemy were getting
reinforcements. A moment later, while our corporal had again moved onwards,
I noticed several khakies on a stone ridge some 150 paces in front of us. It
appeared that they were driven on by part of the centre and right wing, for
just then two men made their appearance, whom I at once recognised as Boers
from the colour of their clothes and the quick way in which they aimed at
me. I stooped quick as a hare, and immediately rose again. The enemy now
surrendered, I believe to the number of two or three hundred of the
Northumberland Fusiliers, called the 'Fighting Fifth' on account of their
courage and bravery. We also took on the mountain a heliograph that the
enemy had broken.
The khakies acknowledged that we had
taken the position with the greatest possible speed. We were in the
majority. But it must not be forgotten that we were the attacking party and
had to expose ourselves, and also that, although the battle on the mountain
extended over a long line, our right wing had still to reckon with the
reinforcements that were sent up through a narrow kloof from the camp. It
was a repetition of Selikatsnek. The khakies had the good positions, and we
had good cover behind the rocks on the mountain slope. In such a case he is
no match for us.
We went on a few hundred paces over
pretty level ground, and then looked down upon the camp at the foot of the
mountain, which consisted of several hundreds of tents and many waggons.
Some of these waggons were inspanned, some were already retreating, but most
of them were not yet inspanned. The camp lay on the grounds and by the
fields of a deserted farm.
Afterwards I heard that Commandant
Badenhorst, of Pretoria (who had attacked the enemy before our arrival, at
the foot of the mountain, and so suffered the greatest loss), was already
retreating, but, hearing the fighting on the mountain, had renewed his
attack.
The enemy could not stand the fire
that we opened upon them, and had to retreat from the camp in the direction
of Commandonek. The inevitable consequence was that the troops on the west,
opposite De la Rey, had to retreat hurriedly so as not to be cut off by the
wedge that was forcing its way along the mountains into the camp. They were
far beyond reach of our bullets. Where De la Rey's cannon were, and why they
did not make themselves heard, I do not know. Neither do I know why General
Smuts did not cut off the retreat of the enemy to the south-east. They had
placed a few cannon to our left in the valley, and bombarded us fiercely on
the mountain without much result. The balls of a small Maxim flew past us
with a hissing sound and hindered us in our aim.
The waggons that were inspanned fled
in the direction of Commandonek, and halted in the valley at a respectful
distance from us. Although the camp appeared to be almost deserted, a
continual firing was heard below us. I could not make out from where it came
until I suddenly discovered several small troops of horsemen who galloped at
intervals from behind a wall in the shade of some trees. They were in all
probability left there as cover for the waggons. The few shots we fired at
them missed their aim. We saw De la Rey's burghers capture a large herd of
cattle.
While Malherbe and I were peering
from behind our hurriedly erected entrenchment, and occasionally firing a
few shots, I discovered four or five brave khakies busy dragging along an
ammunition waggon, or a gun; from such a distance we could not distinguish
which. We fired at them with a sight of 800 paces, but did not hit them, as
the horizontal distance to the camp was not more than 400 paces, and we
should have used a sight of 600 paces, but the height of the mountain was
very misleading. Immediately afterwards a span of mules came in the
direction of the supposed gun, so Malherbe and I retreated as fast as we
could, to find a better cover more to the left. It is strange how in a
battle one always has an idea that all the threatened danger is aimed
specially at one's self.
We had to be on the look-out not to
fire at our own people, some of whom were already in the camp. My brother,
Malherbe, and I went to the narrow kloof that I have already mentioned,
after a fruitless search for our horses, which had meanwhile been taken to
the entrance of the kloof, and I heard from my brother that our brave
General had been wounded in the leg by a shell. During the search for our
horses we had noticed a long dust-cloud at the end of Kromriverskloof, near
Buffelspoort, moving from Rustenburg in the direction of Commandonek--in all
probability reinforcements for the enemy, arriving too late.
The Waterbergers and Zoutpansbergers,
who were most undisciplined, had descended through the kloof in quest of
booty. But the Krugersdorpers, formerly notorious for their rough behaviour,
were now the most orderly, and did not descend before all the men were
collected. The kloof was strewn with bodies of khakies, who were sent up as
reinforcement and pitilessly shot down by the burghers. The little stream of
water was red with blood, so that we could not even quench our thirst. Some
of the khakies had fallen from the high cliffs, where they had to lie
unburied--like the soldiers on Amajuba in 1881.
We led our horses to the opening of
the kloof, and then galloped into camp under the thundering noise of the
shells that the enemy were firing at us from the distance. There was no
control possible among the burghers. Each one loaded his horse with whatever
he could lay his hands on, and there was no thought of following up the
retreating enemy. They did not leave us undisturbed in our glory, but aimed
lyddite at us, which had the desired effect, that we in our disorder did not
storm the front positions, but retreated in the direction of our camp, a
quarter of a mile in among the trees. There Veld-Kornet Klaassen ordered his
men to off-saddle and give the horses a rest. Meanwhile the camp was burnt,
flames arose in all directions, and thousands of cartridges exploded.
After we had watered our horses in a
neighbouring spruit we lay down to rest. But ere long General De la Rey came
galloping into our midst with a lash in his hand, calling to us whether we
were not ashamed to lie there doing nothing, instead of following up our
advantage now that we had the chance, when otherwise the enemy would
ill-treat our women and children and burn down our homes. One of our
corporals rather impertinently informed De la Rey that he served under
another General, and would obey no orders but his. De la Rey thereupon rode
up to him and gave him a heavy cut with his lash. I went up to the General,
and told him that we were quite willing to fight, and had only off-saddled
for a rest by order of our Field-Cornet. In his rage he lifted his lash,
but, recognising me, lowered it again. If I had aimed at getting a cut from
him, I might have called out like the Dutch farmers, who got a box on the
ear from Peter the Great for pressing too closely upon him while he was
building ships at Zaandam: 'I have had one too! I have had one too!' We then
rode with the General to the burnt camp. The enemy had not found the game
worth the candle, and had saved their shell for a more favourable occasion.
One can imagine De la Rey's
indignation when he saw that waggons, provisions, and ammunition were nearly
all burnt. He pointed out to us how ammunition and guns were required on
every side. General Beyers, whom we met there, excused himself by explaining
that he had ordered only those things to be burnt that we did not require.
We then rode to the other positions on the opposite side of the camp, but
the enemy were in full flight, followed by an occasional burgher.
I do not consider myself able to
criticise the manner in which our officers organized this battle. But it was
easy to see that a great mistake had been made. We had much to be thankful
for, but the result might have been more advantageous to us. The whole camp
with all its cannon should have been taken with a smaller loss than eighty
men killed and wounded.
I do not know the number of the
enemy's killed and wounded. If our first attack had been made unanimously
and unexpectedly, we could easily have crushed the enemy. The prisoners, as
usual, pretended that they knew all about our plans, but why, then, were
their reinforcements too late, or, rather, why did they never arrive? When
General De la Rey organizes an attack, and his instructions are well carried
out, the burghers have so much confidence in him, and like him so well, in
spite of, or perhaps because of his violent temper, that they never have any
doubt as to his ultimate success.
The prisoners were released. In my
presence they were always well treated, and I have seen many khaki prisoners
who have never on any occasion been ill-treated.
