The attitude of the
European powers was generally observant of the requirements of neutrality in
so far as governmental action could be
proved. Th frequent charges which Great Britain made that the Transvaal
was recruiting forces in Europe were not proved against the States
from which the recruits came. The numbers in the parties which perhaps
actually joined the Boer forces were not large, and no formidable
fitting out of an expedition or
wholesale assistance was proved against any European government.
Germany, the power most
nearly in touch with the Transvaal in South Africa with the exception of
Portugal, early declared the governmental attitude toward the struggle. The
German consul-general at Cape Town on October 19, 1899, issued a
proclamation enjoining all German subjects to hold aloof from participation
in the hostilities which Great Britain at that time had not recognized as
belligerent in character. If insurgency be recognized as a distinct status
falling short of belligerency, this was perhaps such a recognition, but it
was in no sense an unfriendly act toward Great Britain. It was merely a
warning to German subjects as to the manner in which they should conduct
themselves under the circumstances. It did not recognize the Boers as
belligerents in the international sense, but it warned German subjects that
a condition of affairs existed which called for vigilance on their part in
their conduct toward, the contestants. Later, when the British Government
announced that the war would be recognized retroactively as entitled to full
belligerent status, Germany declared the governmental attitude to be that of
strict neutrality in the contest. An attempt of the Boers to recruit in
Damaraland was promptly stopped by the German officers in control, who were
ordered to allow neither men nor horses to cross the border for the purposes
of the war. All German steamship lines which
held subventions from the Government
were warned that if they were found carrying contraband they would
thereby forfeit their privileges. Stringent orders were also given by the
different German ship companies to their agents in no case to ship
contraband for the belligerents. The attitude assumed by the German
Government was not entirely in accord with the popular feeling in Germany.
On October 5 a mass-meeting at Goettingen, before proceeding to the business
for which the conference was called, proposed a resolution of sympathy for
the Boers: "Not because the Boers are entirely in the right, but because we
Germans must take sides against the English."[1] But despite popular
sentiment, the position which had been taken by the Government seems to have
been consistently maintained.
[Footnote 1: London
Times, Weekly Ed., Oct. 5, 1899, p. 626, col. 2.]
In June, prior to the
outbreak of war, President Kruger had been advised by the Dutch Minister for
Foreign Affairs that the Transvaal should maintain a moderate attitude in
the discussion of the questions at issue
with the British Government. The German
Government, too, had advised the Republics to invite mediation, but
at that time President Kruger declared that the moment had not yet come for
applying for the mediation of America. The United States, it was considered
by both Holland and Germany, could most successfully have undertaken the
role of mediator from the fact that England would have been more likely to
entertain proposals of the kind coming
from Washington than from a European capital.
In December, 1900,
Count Von Buelow, the German Imperial Chancellor, speaking of the neutral
attitude of Germany, declared that when President Kruger later attempted to
secure arbitration it was not until feeling had become so heated that he was
compelled to announce to the Dutch Government that it was not possible to
arrange for arbitration. The German Government, it was declared, regarded
any appeal to a Great Power at that time as hopeless and as very dangerous
to the Transvaal. The German and the
Dutch Governments each believed that President Kruger should not have
rejected the English proposal then before him for a joint commission of
inquiry.[2] The German Government had nothing for which to reproach itself
in regard to the outbreak of war or with reference to the fate of the
Republics. "Of course there are certain lengths to which we could not
possibly go. We could not, in order to prevent the door from being slammed,
let our own fingers be crushed between the door and the hinges; that would
not have helped the Boers and would only have harmed ourselves,--and when
the war had broken out it was impossible for us, in view of the general
situation of the world and from the standpoint of German interests as a
whole to adopt any attitude except that of strict neutrality."[3]
Continuing, Count Von Buelow pointed out the fact that the policy of a great
country should not at a critical moment be governed by the dictates of
feeling, but should be guided solely in accordance with the interests of the
country, calmly and deliberately calculated.
[Footnote 2: The German
Chancellor seems slightly in error in assuming that the Transvaal rejected
the English proposal for a joint inquiry. It will be remembered that
immediately following the Bloemfontein
Conference President Kruger had drafted a law considerably modifying the
Transvaal demands in the conference, and later submitted the
proposals of August 19, which he alleged had been" induced "by their implied
acceptance on the part of the British agent. When these proposals lapsed
from the fact of their non-acceptance by the British Government, he declared
that he was ready to return to the discussion of the proposed joint
commission of inquiry and was met by the English assertion that the
condition of affairs no longer warranted a discussion of the original
proposal for such a commission, and that Great Britain would have to
formulate new demands to meet the altered conditions. The outbreak of war
had forestalled these demands.]
[Footnote 3: Speech in Reichstag, London Times, Dec. 11, 1900, p. 5,
col. 1.]
The possibility of
mediation with Germany in the role of mediator was shown to have been made
conditional upon the acceptance of such a step by both the parties to the
contest, as otherwise it would not have been mediation but intervention,
with the ultimate possibility of the exercise of force for the purpose of
stopping the hostilities. Intervention of that kind, involving the idea of
coercion, was never considered by the
German Government because of the general situation of the world and
of special German interests. The idea of anything other than entirely
peaceful and friendly intervention was not entertained by any power in
considering the situation in South Africa. The German Chancellor declared
that "even those Powers which academically ventilated the idea of peaceful
mediation invariably and expressly laid stress upon the fact that they had
no thought or intention of forcing England to accept peace against her
will." He asserted that the possibility of mediation was thus excluded since
the preliminary condition of such a course was the consent of both parties
to the conflict.
Count Von Buelow also called attention to the fact that the gentlest form of
diplomatic inquiry made by the United States had been rejected by the
English Government
"officially and categorically in the most distinct manner possible." And
speaking officially, he continued, "We therefore did what we could as a
neutral Power and without imperilling direct German interests in order to
prevent the outbreak of war. In particular
we acted in the most straightforward
manner toward the governments of the South African Republics inasmuch as
from the first and in good time we left them in no doubt regarding
the situation in Europe and also regarding our own neutrality in the event
of war in South Africa. In both these regards we made matters clear to the
two South African Republics and did so in good time."[4] The Chancellor
seems to have fairly defined the position maintained by the German
Government throughout the war, although
popular feeling often clamored for official action in behalf of the
Boers.
[Footnote 4: Speech in
Reichstag, Dec. 10, 1900.]
A similar course was pursued by the French Government despite the fact
that in France
popular sympathy was more strongly in favor of the
Transvaal than was the case in Germany.
No official action, however, was taken which could involve France in
complications in view of the declared neutral attitude assumed at the
beginning of the war. The administration at Paris ordered the prefects
throughout the country to have removed from the official minutes the
resolutions of sympathy for the Boers
which had been adopted by the provincial councils. But opposed to the
correct attitude of the Government, popular feeling was manifested in
different ways. A committee of ladies in Paris made a direct appeal to the
French people. They declared: "We are not biased enemies of the British
Nation ... but we have a horror of grasping financiers, the men of prey who
have concocted in cold blood this rascally war. They have committed with
premeditation a crime of lese-humanite,
the greatest of crimes. May the blood which reddens the battle-fields
of South Africa forever be upon their heads.... Yes, we are heart and soul
with the Boers.... We admire them because old men and young women, even, are
all fighting like heroes.... Alas! to be sure, there is no more a France,
nor yet an America.... Ah! Ideal abode of the human conscience, founded by
Socrates, sanctified by Christ, illuminated in flashes of lightning by the
French Revolution, what has become of thee? There is no longer a common
temple for civilized states. Our house is divided against itself and is
falling asunder. Peace reigns everywhere save on the banks of the Vaal, but
it is an armed peace, an odious peace, a poisoned peace which is eating us
up and from which we are all dying."[5] Such hysterical outbursts in
France were not taken seriously by the
Government, and the feeling which inspired them was possibly more
largely due to historic hatred of England than to the inherent justice of
the Boer cause.
[Footnote 5: London
Times, April 2, 1900, p. 5, col. 5.]
The Ninth Peace
Conference, which was in session at Paris in the fall of 1900, without
expressly assuming the right of interfering in the affairs of a friendly
nation further than to "emphatically affirm the unchangeable principles of
international justice," adopted a resolution declaring that the
responsibility for the war devastating South Africa fell upon that one of
the two parties who repeatedly refused arbitration, that is, it was
explained, upon the British Government; that the British Government, in
ignoring the principles of right and justice, in refusing arbitration and in
using menaces only too likely to bring about war in a dispute which might
have been settled by judicial methods, had committed an outrage against the
rights of nations calculated to retard the pacific evolution of humanity;
that the Governments represented at the Hague had taken no public measures
to ensure respect for the resolutions which should have been regarded by
them as an engagement of honor; that an appeal to public opinion on the
subject of the Transvaal was advocated
and sympathy and admiration were expressed for the English members of
the conference.[6]
[Footnote 6: London
Times, Oct. 3, 1900, p. 3, col. 3.]
The usual French
attitude toward Great Britain was expressed in these resolutions, but the
conference was not prepared to go so far as to
adopt a resolution proposed by a member
from Belgium expressing the hope that the mistake of depriving the
Republics of their independence would not be committed, and favoring an
energetic appeal to the powers for intervention. The resolution was rejected
by a large majority on the ground that it would be impolitic and naturally
irritating to England and without much probability of favorable results
being attained.
When the delegation of
the Boers which was sent to appeal to the European Powers for action in
behalf of the Republics reached Paris in July, 1900, the attitude of the
French Government was not altered, nor
were the envoys encouraged to hope for intervention. They were received
by the President but only in an informal and unofficial manner when
presented by Dr. Leyds. When they
reached Berlin in August neither the Emperor nor the Chancellor was
in the city and consequently the visit had no official significance, but in
St. Petersburg a more favorable
reception awaited them. The Official Messenger announced on August 26
that Dr. Leyds had been received in audience by the Czar. This statement,
coming as it did from the official organ of the Foreign Office, seemed to
signify a full recognition of the accredited character of the delegation,
and Dr. Leyds was referred to officially as "Minister of the South African
Republic."[7] With the exception of the British Minister, he was received by
all of the diplomatic corps, a courtesy which the members could not well
have denied him, but as to practical results the mission to Russia amounted
to nothing.
[Footnote 7: London
Times, July 26, 1900.]
On their return to
Germany the envoys received no official notice. The secret instructions
which they had opened only upon reaching Milan were supposed to have
contained certain communications which had been
exchanged between the Governments of
the Transvaal and Great Britain but which it was alleged had not been
published in the Blue Books. This assertion of sinister motives on the part
of Great Britain exerted little influence upon foreign governments in
Europe. The delegation realized the impossibility of securing the
interference of a concert of Powers or of any one State against the wishes
of England. The mission of the Boers had been doomed to failure from the
beginning.
The action of the Queen
of Holland in receiving the delegation was generally understood as not of an
unneutral character but as inspired by
sympathy for a kindred people and a willingness to mediate though not to
intervene. It was recognized that no nation whose interests were not
directly concerned could afford to persist in offers of mediation in view of
the fact that Great Britain had already intimated to the United States that
such an offer could not be accepted. Although Holland refused to intervene,
the attitude assumed by the Dutch Government in other respects caused severe
criticism in England. The chief
circumstance which confirmed the opinion that Holland as a neutral State had
not displayed a proper attitude at Lorenzo Marques was the fact that
after the visit of the envoys of the Transvaal the Hague Government had sent
a man-of-war to the island of St. Helena, which was being used as a prison
for the Boers who were transported from South Africa. This
proceeding was viewed by England as
officious from the fact that foreign men-of-war were not usually
received at that port. Popular feeling saw in the despatch of the man-of-war
an unfriendly act which might easily have led to difficulty. But the
incident, aside from the benevolent
character which Holland had given to the enforcement of her neutrality
laws throughout the war, had no significance in international law. It
was generally considered, however, that the feeling which England manifested
with regard to the visit of the cruiser gave some ground for
the suspicion that the British
Government might have had something to conceal at St. Helena.
The general attitude of Germany, France and Russia toward the Boer
mission was guided by a
policy of strict adherence to the neutral
obligations assumed at the beginning of
the war. These Powers in their official statements all followed such
a course, realizing that it was demanded by a sound foreign policy. They
considered the idea of intervention out of the question, although friendly
interest for the Boers and for the peaceful purpose of their mission was
evident.
From the beginning of
the war the active duties of neutrality had fallen upon Portugal, since
neither the Transvaal nor the Orange Free State possessed a seaport. Fifty
miles of railway separated the Portuguese
harbor of Lorenzo Marques in Delagoa
Bay from the Transvaal border, and from this point the road continued
to Pretoria. Lorenzo Marques being neutral could not be blockaded, but,
being neutral, it was the duty of the Portuguese Government to observe the
laws of neutrality. Great Britain alleged that a constant stream of supplies
and recruits passed over the Portuguese border to aid the Boer armies. The
difficulty on the part of the English Government, however, was to prove that
the goods were in fact on their way to a belligerent destination or that
small parties of men were in reality organized bands of recruits for the
fighting forces of the enemy. It was asserted that the manner in which
Portugal performed her neutral obligations, demanding an absolutely
impartial treatment of both belligerents, made Delagoa Bay and the port of
Lorenzo Marques more valuable to the Republics than would have been the case
had they actually been in their possession.
The efficiency of
Portugal's performance of neutral duties varied during the war. As early as
August 25, before negotiations had been broken off between the Transvaal and
Great Britain, the Portuguese Governor at
Lorenzo Marques refused to permit two
cargoes of Mauser ammunition to land because it was consigned to the
Transvaal. The ammunition was transferred to a Portuguese troop ship, and
the Governor assigned as sufficient reason for his action the fact that
Great Britain had urged the measure upon the Portuguese authorities. He
stated that orders had been received from Lisbon that guns and ammunition
for the Transvaal should not be landed until further notice from the
Portuguese Government. The Transvaal strongly protested against this act as
a breach of a treaty between the two Governments in which by Article VI the
Portuguese Government was prohibited from stopping ammunition intended for
the Transvaal, but upon representations by England might stop ammunition on
its way to any English colony. The opinion in the Transvaal was that the act
on the part of Portugal and Great Britain constituted an act of war, in that
peaceable negotiations were still pending, a view which seems fully
warranted since Portugal possessed no right to treat any traffic as
contraband before war had begun. A petition was circulated at Pretoria
advising the Government to discontinue negotiations pending with England
looking to a peaceful settlement of the issues between the two Governments.
Although this step was not taken, the protestations made by the Transvaal
seem to have had their effect upon the Portuguese authorities, for upon the
outbreak of war the banks at Lorenzo
Marques continued to accept Transvaal coin, and after the first
flurry caused by the transition from peace to war the Transvaal notes were
accepted at their face value.
By the middle of
December the English Government had begun to view the condition of affairs
at the port of Delagoa Bay and the town of Lorenzo Marques with grave
dissatisfaction. It was publicly alleged that Lorenzo Marques was nothing
more nor less than a base from which the Transvaal obtained everything that
it needed. Further than this, it was declared that the town was the
headquarters of Transvaal agents of every description who were in daily
communication with their Government and with Europe. The English authorities
felt themselves helpless to prevent the importation of machinery and other
material required for the mines which were worked by the Transvaal
Government. Even explosives for the
government factory and actual ammunition reached the Transvaal by way of
Lorenzo Marques because of the inability of the English cruisers to
make a thorough search of foreign vessels bound for a neutral port and
professedly carrying foodstuffs. British shippers alleged that while they
were prohibited from trading with the enemy foreign shippers were reaping
the profits and materially aiding in the prolongation of the war.
It later developed that
the apparent neglect on the part of Portugal to observe a strict watch over
the character of goods allowed to pass through to the Transvaal was not
entirely due to the governmental attitude at Lisbon. It seems that the Dutch
consul at Lorenzo Marques had taken over in the way of friendly offices the
interests of the Orange Free State as well as those of the Transvaal. It was
also ascertained that the consul of Holland was the manager of the local
agencies for a number of steamboat companies, among them the Castle Packet
Company, the African Boating Company, the British India, and the
British and Colonial Steam Navigation
Company. Only one English company had put patriotism before profit
and transferred its agency from the Dutch consul upon the outbreak of war.
The British Government
was also handicapped by the fact that local British banks accepted the
drafts issued by the Transvaal and Orange Free State. The Transvaal dies of
1899 and 1900 had been seized by the English, but despite this fact the
coins issued with the date of the dies of 1897 and 1898 were freely used by
the local English banks.[8] This unpatriotic action on the part of British
subjects controlling the banks made
easy the work of the Boer forwarding agents; it was alleged, and the
fact seemed pretty well authenticated, that the Dutch consul, Mr. Pott,
facilitated this work by allowing contraband to be landed at night. Such
articles thrown into half-laden trucks upon the railway
often reached the Transvaal without
detection. Cases labelled "candles" were hoisted in without pretense
of examination. It was alleged also
that guns and fifty tons of shells had been landed in December under the
very noses of two British warships, and that wholesale smuggling was
going on with the connivance of a nominally neutral consular agent.
[Footnote 8: London
Times, Weekly Ed., Jan. 12, 1899, p. 20, col. 4.]
Under the protests of
the British Government, however, orders arrived from Lisbon which revived an
old law requiring all persons leaving
Portuguese territory to obtain passports signed by the Governor-general. The
applicants were required to give guarantees through their respective
consuls that they were not going to the Transvaal for the purpose of
enlisting. The Portuguese authorities took the matter in hand, and
persons attempting to go without
passports were promptly sent back. The customs authorities began a
stricter watch over the Transvaal imports, and on January 19 seized as
contraband three cases of signalling apparatus consigned to Pretoria.[9]
[Footnote 9: London
Times, Weekly Ed., Jan. 19, 1900, p. 36, col. 3.]
It was claimed,
however, that of the imports of £30,500 to Delagoa Bay
during December there had been
forwarded to the Transvaal goods valued at not less than £31,000. And
it seemed evident to England, despite the more stringent port regulations,
that the number of foreigners daily entering the Transvaal by way of Lorenzo
Marques was far in excess of the number which would be desirous of going to
Pretoria for peaceful purposes. Mr. Pott, it was still alleged, was acting
as the head of a Boer organization for facilitating the entrance of men
desiring to enlist with the Boer forces. He was consequently cautioned in
January by the Portuguese Governor that if he recruited for the Boer forces
or was detected doing anything inconsistent with the neutral obligations of
Portugal, a request would be made to
the Netherlands Government to have him transferred to another field.
The Portuguese authorities at the same time began a closer supervision of
the persons who were allowed to enter the Transvaal from Portuguese
territory. The previous restriction that passports be signed by the
respective consuls of persons leaving for Transvaal territory was considered
insufficient, and the consuls of the
different countries represented at Lorenzo Marques were informed that they
must personally guarantee that the applicants whom they endorsed were not
military men, and were not proceeding to assist the Boer forces in
the field.
These restrictions,
while giving evidence of Portugal's efforts to see that the neutrality of
the port was respected, did not satisfy the English authorities. The latter
still alleged that no doubt existed as to the fact that Lorenzo Marques was
being used by Boer agents as a recruiting station for the Transvaal forces.
It was asserted that large numbers of
"men of military stamp" landed daily at Lorenzo Marques from all
parts of Europe, and were allowed to proceed to the Transvaal for the
purpose of either actually enlisting with the Boers or working the
government mines. It was alleged, too, that a number of these newcomers were
"smart looking men," evidently officers. The majority, however, were of a
low class, mostly penniless adventurers. On February 2 the report was made
to the English authorities that twenty of the better sort, many wearing
riding boots and carrying field glasses, had left Lorenzo Marques for the
Transvaal, and as tending to throw suspicion upon the purpose of their
journey, a Transvaal detective was "most assiduous" in his attentions to
them.[10] The influence of the consul of Holland largely defeated all
efforts to stop entirely the imperfect fulfillment of the duties of
neutrality incumbent upon the port.
[Footnote 10: London
Times, Weekly Ed., Feb. 5, 1900, p. 84, col. 2.]
At other places any
attempts to convey prohibited goods into the
Transvaal were summarily stopped. Arms
and ammunition which the Boers attempted to land at Inhambane were
seized by the Portuguese customs authorities on the ground that they were
consigned under a false description. The consignment was not a large one and
the attempt was evidently made as an experiment. This incident, too,
indicates the extremity to which the Transvaal authorities had been reduced
by the increased watchfulness at Lorenzo Marques, for the distance from the
port of Inhambane to the Transvaal could be covered only by native carriers
and required fourteen days for the trip. The difficulties in evading the
customs surveillance at Lorenzo Marques had also been increased by the fact
that most of the steamship companies which had at first employed the Dutch
consul as their agent had later relieved him of this duty. But,
notwithstanding the continued protests by England, the Hague Government
seemed reluctant to take any official notice of the evident partiality of
its consular agent. With reference to the English protests the
Administration took the view that while acting as the representative of the
Transvaal and Orange Free State during the war Mr.
Pott was only fulfilling the duties
incumbent upon him in this triple capacity.
As the war progressed,
although the administration of the customs at
Lorenzo Marques was made more
efficient, this improvement was inversely proportional to the
successes of the Boer forces in the field. Under the circumstances it was
almost impossible for England to prove that actual governmental support had
been given to any scheme for augmenting the military forces of the
Transvaal, but the whole manipulation of the customs seemed to be controlled
by a weak administration not too scrupulous in seeing that an impartial view
was taken of the situation. The failure of the Boers to attain their ends in
the field did more to improve the efficiency of the administration of the
customs than the protests of England. It seems unquestionable that the
resources of the Transvaal had induced the Portuguese authorities at Lorenzo
Marques to display toward the Boers an attitude which, according to obsolete
ideas, was termed benevolent neutrality. But as the Boer hopes declined the
Portuguese authorities increased their vigilance, and in the end went as far
in favor of England as they had previously gone in their benevolent attitude
to the Republics. Passengers arriving by German and other steamers were
refused passports upon the instance of the British consul where there was a
strong suspicion that they were entering the Transvaal for purposes hostile
to Great Britain.
Portugal, too, refused
to accept the offer of the Transvaal to advance
the amount required of the Lisbon
Government by the Beirne Arbitration Award.[11] The Portuguese
Government, in courteously declining the offer, stated that the amount had
already been provided. Great Britain, who already held a preemptive title to
Delagoa Bay, was also ready to advance the money, but was denied this
privilege by Portugal.
[Footnote 11: London
Times, Weekly Ed., April 20, 1900, p. 244, col. 2.]
By August, 1900, it had
become evident that the Boer hopes of bringing the war to any sort of
favorable conclusion were doomed to failure. On August 4 all the customs
officials at Lorenzo Marques were dismissed and their places filled by
military officers, and a force of twelve hundred men was sent out from
Lisbon two days later. The Portuguese frontier was
put under a strong guard and all Boer
refugees who arrived were summoned before the Governor and warned
against carrying on any communications with the Transvaal Government or with
the Boer forces still in the field. Notice was given them that if they were
detected in such transactions they would be sent out of Portuguese territory
and the right of asylum denied them. And in the further performance of her
neutral duties at such a time Portugal assumed an entirely correct attitude.
In September three
thousand Boers evacuated their position along the
frontier and surrendered to the
Portuguese Governor. They were lodged in the barracks at Lorenzo Marques and
later, to prevent any disturbance in the town that might be caused by
their presence, were removed to the Portuguese transports lying in the
harbor. The Governor gave notice to the English commander who had occupied
the position evacuated by the Boers that all the Transvaal troops which had
surrendered were being guarded and would not be allowed to rejoin the Boer
forces still in the field. A number of the refugees agreed to surrender to
the British commander as prisoners of war upon the stipulation that they
would not be sent out of the country, and thus better terms were obtained
than by those captured in the field. Others who surrendered to Portugal were
transported by Portuguese ships to Lisbon, land being assigned them in the
country where they were given permission to settle.
In other respects,
also, during the later phases of actual warfare, Portugal maintained a
correct attitude. Especially was this attitude noticeable with reference to
the investigation of the conduct of the Dutch consul at Lorenzo Marques. In
spite of the protests of Great Britain and of Portugal as to his unneutral
attitude he had been continued in his position. But on December 7, 1900, the
strain to which the relations between the two Governments had been put
reached the breaking point. The Dutch
Minister, Dr. Van Weede, withdrew from Lisbon and at the same time
the Portuguese Minister at the Hague, Count de Selin, returned to Lisbon.
The reason for this
technical breaking off of friendly relations was
explained on December 11. A member of
the Second Chamber at the Hague, M. Van Bylandt, questioned the
Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the cause of the difficulties between the
two Governments. M. Beaufort, in his explanation of the situation, stated
that as early as November 17, 1899, the Dutch Government had been informed
that it would be necessary for the Lisbon authorities to cancel the
exequatur of Mr. Pott as consul at Lorenzo Marques. This cancellation of the
agent's credentials, it was alleged, was deemed necessary on account of
irregularities with reference to the
transshipment of contraband of war from Lorenzo Marques to the
Transvaal. It was further represented to the Dutch Government that the
consul under suspension had made an improper use of his position as the
acting consular agent for the Free State and the Transvaal; he had taken
advantage of the consular privileges accorded him at Lorenzo Marques as the
representative of a neutral Power at a neutral port; the courteous
communications made by the Portuguese Government prior to the final
withdrawal of his exequatur had not received from the Hague Government the
attention they deserved; every opportunity had been given the Dutch
Government to take the initiative in the matter by merely recalling their
agent, but this step had not been taken.
M. Beaufort admitted
that this had been the attitude of the Portuguese Government, but asserted
that he had not cared to suspend Mr. Pott
without an inquiry, and for this
purpose had merely granted him leave of absence for three months.
This action, he said, had not been favorably received in Lisbon, and he had
therefore thought it necessary to warn
the Portuguese Government that the withdrawal of the consul's exequatur
would be considered an unfriendly act. But notwithstanding the warning, the
consul's credentials had been cancelled by the Lisbon Government. As
a consequence of this act M. Beaufort had requested the Dutch Minister at
Lisbon to come to the Hague that he might take part in a personal interview
with the consul under suspension. Later, M. Beaufort stated that the
specific incidents upon which Mr. Pott's conduct had been arraigned were the
illegal importation of heliographic apparatus for the Transvaal artillery
and a wrongful grant of passports in his dual capacity as consular agent for
Holland and the Republics.[12]
[Footnote 12: London
Times, March 1, 1900, p. 5, col. 3.]
In the end diplomatic
relations were resumed between the two
Governments. Holland, after an investigation of the charges against her
consul, acquiesced in the action of the Lisbon Government. But the
incident served to demonstrate the fact
that the Government at Lisbon was aware of the inefficient manner in
which the duties of neutrality had been enforced at Lorenzo Marques by the
port administration.
From this time on to
the close of the war the Portuguese Government displayed greater care in
asserting the neutral character of the port. By placing the town under
military supervision this purpose was more surely attained, and the only
other charge made against Portugal for the
failure to perform a neutral duty came
from the Transvaal Government, an allegation of a more serious
character than any that had been advanced by the English Government. The
grounds upon which Portugal granted a privilege of war to one of the
belligerents under protest from the other have not been made so clear as the
reasons which led to her apparent dereliction of duty at Lorenzo Marques.
This incident placed the Portuguese Government in an unfavorable light with
regard to its duty in the full and impartial performance of the obligation
of neutrality. British troops were allowed to pass across Portuguese
territory in order to reach belligerent British territory commanding the
Transvaal position on the north. From Rhodesia, the nominal objective point
in this movement of troops, the
Transvaal might be conveniently invaded from the north, as it was
already attacked on the south.
Early in the war the British South Africa Company, a chartered company
which was
responsible for the administration of the Rhodesian Government, became
apprehensive as to the fate of this section of the
country should the Boers decide to
invade it. Troops had been raised in Rhodesia for the war but were
employed outside the colony. It was asserted that this fact had left the
province in such an unprotected state that, aside from the fear of a Boer
invasion, a Kaffir uprising was imminent.
Mr. Chamberlain had
refused to send forces into Rhodesia in December upon the ground that troops
could not be spared. But it was finally
arranged to send five thousand mounted men, some of them to be enlisted
in Rhodesia and all of them to be furnished outside of England.
Before the end of January, 1899, a commander had been appointed from the
English army, and it was expected that the forces would be upon the borders
of Bechuanaland by the end of May.
Difficulty at once
arose with reference to the right of passage of these troops, military
stores, and in fact a full equipment for warlike purposes. There was not
much choice of routes. Those through the
Transvaal and through Bechuanaland were
closed. The only route left was through the port of Beira. This
course necessitated the passage of belligerent troops across two hundred
miles of neutral territory controlled by Portugal as territorial sovereign.
Beira, situated about four hundred and fifty miles north of Lorenzo Marques,
bears nearly the same relation topographically to British Mashonaland and to
British Rhodesia that Delagoa Bay does to the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State. A railway nearing completion formed an almost continuous route from
Beira to Salisbury in Rhodesia, and once in the latter province troops would
be in a position to invade the Transvaal.
Under ordinary
circumstances it would have been a distinct breach of neutrality on the part
of Portugal to allow the passage across her territory of the troops of one
of the belligerents, since the obvious destination could only be the country
of the other belligerent, with whom she
was on friendly terms. Portugal had granted to England in 1896 the
right of passage for a field force to be used against the natives in
Mashonaland.[13] But that was a case of warfare against a savage tribe, and
was not to be considered as a reliable precedent for similar action against
a civilized State such as the South African Republic.
[Footnote 13: Times Military History of the War in South Africa, Vol. IV
p. 365]
The principles of the
international law of modern times leave little or no doubt as to the proper
course for a neutral to follow in such a case.
Oppenheim says: "In contradistinction
to the practice of the eighteenth century, it is now generally
recognized that a violation of the duty of
impartiality is involved when a neutral
allows a belligerent the passage of troops or the transport of war
material over his territory. And it matters not whether a neutral give such
permission to one of the belligerents only, or to both alike."[14] And
Lawrence points out that "It is now acknowledged almost universally that a
neutral state which permits the passage of any part of a belligerent army
through its territory is acting in such a partial manner as to draw down
upon itself just reprobation." The permission given of necessity "to further
a warlike end" is "therefore inconsistent with the fundamental principle of
state neutrality." "These considerations," he says, "have influenced
practice during the present century,
and the weight of modern precedent is against the grant of passage in
any case."[15]
[Footnote 14:
International Law (1906), Vol. II, p. 345]
[Footnote 15:
Principles of International Law, p. 526. The older writers differed from
this view. Grotius maintained the right of passage, even by force; Vattel
practically agreed with Grotius that it might be taken by force, but
contended that it should be asked and force used only
under extreme necessity, or when the
refusal was unjust; Wheaton denied that the right of passage was a
"perfect right" and consequently could not be enforced against the will of
the neutral; Hall, International Law
(1880), Sec.219, points out that more recent writers take an opposite view,
namely, that a grant of passage is incapable of impartial
distribution. See also Wheaton,
International Law, Sec.427; Vattel, Droit des gens, III, Sec.110;
Calvo, Droit international, 3d Ed., III, Sec.Sec.2344-2347.]
Mr. Baty, who has made
a careful study of the precedents upon the subject, states that while
"writers vary in their treatment of the question" of the passage of troops
over neutral territory, "the modern authorities are all one way."[16] He
points out that the jurists of the first half of the nineteenth century,
with the possible exception of Klueber,
were "unanimous in following" Grotius and Vattel, and allowing
neutrals to permit belligerents passage as long as they did it impartially.
But since the middle of the century a total and violent
change in the opinion of authors has
operated. Every modern author holds that passage is now a benefit
which must be refused absolutely, and not offered impartially.[17]
[Footnote 16:
International Law in South Africa, p. 71.]
[Footnote 17: Ibid., p.
73.]
[Footnote 18: Times Military History of the War in South Africa, Vol.
IV, p. 369]
In February the Transvaal Government had attempted to bring troops into
Rhodesia by way
of Portuguese territory. Portugal had promptly sent out forces to prevent
such an evasion of Portuguese neutrality and had guarded the railway bridges
along the line to Rhodesia. And in March Great Britain had met with a
refusal to allow a large quantity of foodstuffs, mules, and wagons to be
landed at Beira for the purpose of transportation to Rhodesia. Nevertheless,
on April 9, General Sir Frederick Carrington landed at Cape Town under
orders to proceed immediately to Beira.[18] He was to use transports put at
his disposal by his government for the
purpose of collecting a full equipment for his command of five thousand men
to be mobilized at Beira, and from that port was to enter Rhodesia. This
province was then to be made the base for an expedition against
Pretoria in concert with the English forces advancing from the south.
It is undoubted that
the laws of neutrality demanded of Portugal not only an impartial treatment
of both belligerents, as the earlier writers held, but an absolute
prohibition against such a warlike expedition by either of them, as
unanimously held by all the more recent authorities. At the time English
public expression contended that absolute equality of neutrality was not
incumbent upon independent States in the performance of their neutral
duties. English writers spoke of a "benevolent neutrality" as possible, and
cited such cases as that in 1877, when Roumania, before taking an active
part in the war against Turkey, permitted Russian troops to march through
her territory; and the incident which occurred during the Neuchatel Royalist
insurrection in 1856 when the Prussian
Government requested permission to march through Wurtemberg and Baden
"without any idea of asking those states to abandon their neutrality,
or assist Prussia against Switzerland."
It was alleged upon the
authority of such precedents that the privilege
of passage for troops might be granted
by Portugal to England without a breach of neutrality really
occurring. Portugal would be merely giving her neutrality a benevolent
character towards one of the belligerents, which it was asserted she was
perfectly entitled to do, a view of the situation which is too obsolete in
the light of modern times to need criticism. Although public opinion
throughout Europe is usually hostile to
England when she is at war, the general condemnation of the proposed
use of neutral territory seems therefore to have been well founded in this
particular case.
The Cabinet at Paris refused to entertain any question or debate on the
proposed passage
of English troops through Portuguese territory. On
April 11, however, a discussion of the
subject occurred in the Chamber of Deputies in which two
interpellations were announced by the
President. One of these questioned the Government as to what steps had
been taken to protect French interests in Mozambique; the other had
reference to the proposed passage of English troops inland from Beira. M.
Delcasse said that the Chamber did not feel that the Government should
discuss a current question of international law, but he pointed out the fact
that France with the other Great Powers had declared her neutrality at the
beginning of hostilities. He added, however, that it was not the part of
France to guarantee the neutrality of others. One member asserted that the
proposed act would be a distinct violation of her neutral duties by
Portugal. Another declared that Europe, by concerted action, should prevent
such a flagrant violation of neutrality during a war in which a small nation
was already contending against great
odds; that France, surrounded by neutral nations, could not afford to
see such a precedent established and should appeal to Europe to join with
her in protesting.
Although such concerted action as was proposed by the different members was
improbable, and although the proposals may have been dictated by the
usual French bias in
situations where English interests are at stake, these opinions indicate
pretty well the real sentiment in Europe at the time.
The Transvaal Government formally notified Portugal that the passage of
British troops and munitions of war through Beira would be considered in
the Transvaal as
tantamount to hostile action. Nevertheless, on May 1,
the Chamber of Deputies at Lisbon
rejected an interpellation made by one of its members to question the
action of the Government with reference to the privilege which Great Britain
sought. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, stated that the Transvaal
Government had not ordered the Portuguese consul to leave Pretoria. He
denied emphatically that any incident whatever had followed Portugal's
notification to the Transvaal. When
further interrogated, the Minister declared that the English troops
had been granted permission to use the railway inland from Beira upon the
plea of treaty rights already possessed by Great Britain. No power, he
asserted, had protested except the South African Republic. It was promised
that the Government would later justify its action in granting
the permission by producing the
documents showing the right of England to the privilege, but it was
not considered convenient at that time to discuss the question.[19]
[Footnote 19: London
Times, April 21, 1900, p. 7, col. 3.]
The protest of the
Transvaal against the alleged breach of neutrality on the part of Portugal
was without effect, and this was the only means the Republic had of
declaring itself. To have entered upon hostile action against Portugal at
that time would have had only one result, the
stoppage of all communication with the
outside world by way of Delagoa Bay. The
British forces were sent into Rhodesia, and though the subsequent
part they played in the war was not important the purpose of the
expedition was admitted. It was to cut off any possibility of a retreat
northward into British territory by the Boer forces which were being driven
back by the English advance upon Pretoria. The British military plan was
that General Carrington should march with his forces
and reach Pretoria from the north at
the same time that General Roberts reached that point from the
south.[20] Thus, the end for which the troops were to be used was not to
quell an insurrection of the natives in Rhodesia, as was alleged, but to
incorporate the expedition into the regular campaign of the war against the
Republics. This being the case, the
contractual grounds upon which the English Government claimed the
right of passage should have been beyond question in order to furnish a
justification for Portugal or for England in what is viewed by international
law writers of the present day as a distinct breach of
neutrality. When the expedition was
sent out the statement was made that England was merely availing
herself of existing treaty rights, but it was felt necessary to add that the
action was not illegal as was that of the Boers in making Delagoa Bay their
virtual base earlier in the war. And on May 31, in legalizing the
proceeding, the Cabinet at Lisbon also felt impelled to say that the
Portuguese Government had not become an instrument of British ambition; that
it was not a question of putting into execution in the territory of
Mozambique conventions recently concluded with England, but merely of
profiting by stipulations agreed upon
in the treaty of 1891 between Great Britain and Portugal. President
Kruger was, therefore, informed that the legality of the incident was not to
be questioned at Pretoria.
[Footnote 20: Times
Military History, Vol. IV, p. 364 ff.]
The consensus of opinion among European Powers was that the landing of
troops at Beira
and the passage by rail to Rhodesia with the consent of Portugal constituted
a breach of neutrality on the part of the latter. The opinion was freely
expressed that the British Government not only placed a strained
interpretation upon the only basis for her action, the treaty of 1891, but
that even upon this interpretation she possessed no real servitude over the
territory used by her for warlike purposes. The only claim of justification
advanced by the British Government which would appear at all tenable rests
upon the statement of Calvo: "It may be that a servitude of public order, or
a treaty made antecedently to the war, imposes on a neutral State the
obligation of allowing the passage of the troops of one belligerent." "In
such a case," Calvo concludes, "the fulfilment of the legal obligation
cannot be regarded as an assistance afforded to that belligerent and a
violation of the duties of neutrality."[21]
[Footnote 21: Baty,
Int. Law in South Africa, p. 73, quoting Calvo. But Calvo calls attention to
the fact that this is his own "exception to the general rule," in support of
which he cites no authorities and only one precedent--that of the passage of
foreign troops across the Canton of
Schaffhausen in 1867 by virtue of a prior treaty between Switzerland and the
Grand Duchy of Baden. Obviously no general conclusion can be drawn
from the conduct of a neutralized state, such as Switzerland. The general
rule, not the exception, is sought in determining international rights.
Droit international, 3d Ed., III, Sec.2347.]
Basing his argument
largely upon this authority, Mr. Baty asserts that Calvo approves the
granting of passage where this privilege has been secured by previous
treaty. But the following statement which he cites
from Calvo, taken in connection with
the rule given above, would appear to deny this conclusion: "During war
neutrals may oppose, even by force, all attempts that a belligerent
may make to use their territory, and may, in particular, refuse one of the
belligerents a passage for its armies to attack the enemy; so much the more
so, inasmuch as the neutral who should allow a passage of the troops of one
belligerent would be false to its character and would give the other just
cause of war."[22]
[Footnote 22: Int. Law
in South Africa, p. 73. This quotation is
slightly misleading, but even as used
it clearly denies the English claim.]
What Calvo says is: "Tous
les publicistes sont d'accord pour admettre que le territoire d'une nation
constitue une veritable propriete ... le territoire neutre doit etre a
l'abri de toutes les entreprises des belligerants de quelque nature qu'elles
soient; les neutres ont le droit
incontestable de s'opposer par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, meme par
la force des armes, a toutes les tentatives qu'un belligerant
pourrait faire pour user de leur territoire."[23] He also calls attention to
the fact that Grotius, Wolff and other authors held that a belligerent, "dont
la cause est juste peut, pour aller a la rencontre de son ennemi, traverser
avec ses armees le territoire d'une nation neutre."[24] But his statement of
the modern rule is conclusive: "Par contre, Heffter, Hautefeuille, Manning
et d'autres auteurs modernes se sont avec juste raison eleves contre des
principes dans lesquels ils entrevoient la negation implicite des droits et
des devoirs stricts de la neutralite. A leur yeux, la nation neutre qui
consent au passage des troupes de l'une des parties belligerantes manque a
son caractere et donne a l'autre partie un juste motif de lui declarer la
guerre."[25]
[Footnote 23: Calvo,
Sec.2344.]
[Footnote 24: Ibid., Sec.2345.]
[Footnote 25: Ibid., Sec.2346.]
Mr. Baty, without reaching any definite conclusion in the matter, admits
that the point
to be decided in any case is not so much the fact that there is an
antecedent treaty, as the nature of that treaty. He says, "If it granted a
real right of way of the nature of a right in rem
there is no reason why the way should
be stopped against troops any more than why a purchaser of territory
should be debarred from using, it as a base of military operations." But he
points out, "If the treaty only created a right in personam the case is
different." In the latter case it is obvious that the power which claims the
way depends entirely on the promise of the territorial power for the
exercise of that advantage. "In such a case," he concludes, "it may well be
that the performance of its promise by the territorial power becomes
unlawful, on the outbreak of war between the promiser and a third
party."[26] For international purposes the true test is, "Could the power
claiming the right of way, or other servitude, enforce its claims during
peace time by force, without infringing the sovereignty of the territorial
power?" Mr. Baty's opinion is that "if it could, and, if the servitude is
consequently a real right," the promisee might use its road in time of war,
and the owner of the territory would be "bound to permit the use, without
giving offense to the enemy who is prejudiced by the existence of the
servitude."[27] But he continues, "If the right of way is merely
contractual, then the fulfillment of the promise to permit it must be taken
to have become illegal on the outbreak of war and the treaty cannot be
invoked to justify the grant of passage." It is asserted that in the former
case where a real servitude, a right in rem, was possessed, to stop the use
of the road would be analogous to the seizure by a neutral of a belligerent
warship to prevent its being used against the enemy. In the case where the
treaty grants the so-called right in personam, a merely contractual or
promissory right exists, and the exercise of the right would be analogous to
the sale of a warship to a belligerent by the neutral granting the
permission stipulated in the treaty. Mr. Baty is of the opinion that while
the belligerent might have "a right in rem to the ship so far as the civil
law was concerned," it would have only a "quasi-contractual right in
personam against the state in whose waters it lay, to allow it to be handed
over." Obviously, the performance of that duty, to hand over the vessel,
"would have become illegal when hostilities broke out."[28]
[Footnote 26: Int. Law
in South Africa, p. 74.]
[Footnote 27: Ibid., p. 74.]
[Footnote 28: Ibid., p. 75.]
We have seen in
previous pages that the consensus of opinion among international law
authorities of modern times is that a neutral should in no case whatever
allow the use of its territory for the purposes of a belligerent expedition
against a State with which it is upon friendly
terms. But granting the contention made
by Mr. Baty that such a thing as
a real servitude may exist in international relations, let us examine the
stipulations in the treaty of June 11, 1891, by which it has been
alleged this right was
secured to England.
If the British
Government possessed a right in rem, then to all intents and purposes it
owned the road internationally, in war as well as in peace, for all the uses
to which a road is usually put, namely, that of transporting all kinds of
goods, warlike or peaceable. If England only possessed a right in personam,
this right was a valid one in times of peace and for the purposes stipulated
by the terms of the treaty, but became void in time of war, and, being
purely personal in character, depended
upon the promise of the State through which the road passed. In the
former case it would be a "right of way" in peace or in war. In the latter
case it would be merely a "license to pass," for the granting of which
Portugal would have to show valid reasons in view of her neutral duties.
The parts of the treaty which may by any possibility apply to the case
are Articles 11,
12, and I4.[29]
[Footnote 29: British
and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 83, pp. 27-41,
Treaty between Great Britain and
Portugal, defining the Spheres of Influence of the two Countries in Africa,
signed at Lisbon, June 11, 1891, ratifications exchanged at London,
July 3, 1891.]
A portion of Article 11
reads: "It is understood that there shall be
freedom for the passage of the subjects
and goods of both powers across the Zambesi, and through the
districts adjoining the left bank of the river situated above the confluence
of the Shire, and those adjoining the
right bank of the Zambezi situated above the confluence of the river
Luenha (Ruenga), without hindrance of any description and without payment of
transit dues."[30]
[Footnote 30: Ibid., p.
34]
The only applicable
portion of Article 12 says: "The Portuguese Government engages to permit and
to facilitate transit for all persons
and goods of every description over the water-ways of the Zambezi, the
Shire, the Pungwe, the Busi, the Limpopo, the Sabi and their
tributaries; and also over the land ways which supply means of communication
where these rivers are not navigable."[31]
[Footnote 31: British
and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 83, p. 36.]
The only other clause of the treaty which bears on the case is a portion
of Article 14:
"In the interests of both Powers, Portugal agrees to grant absolute freedom
of passage between the British sphere of
influence and Pungwe Bay for all merchandise of every description and
to give the necessary
facilities for the improvement of the means of communication."[32]
[Footnote 32: Ibid.,
pp. 39-40. Italics our own.]
It is obvious that
Article 14 could not apply to anything more warlike
than "merchandise" being transported
from Pungwe Bay, where Beira is situated, to the British sphere of
influence. It is admitted by Mr. Baty that Article 12 is inapplicable to any
routes other than the water-ways specified and the land routes and portages
auxiliary to them. It is also admitted that the only other stipulation that
might apply, Article II, "obviously applies to the territory far to the
north, and concerns the question of access to British Central Africa."[33]
[Footnote 33:
International Law in South Africa, p. 76.]
Mr. Baty, however, contends that it was not a new right, that of passage
through Portuguese territory, but was one created by this treaty. Upon
the supposition
that if the right still existed in times of war it must have been by virtue
of Article II, he says, "The question arises, 'Was it such a grant as could
be valid in war time?'"[34]
[Footnote 34: Ibid., p.
76.]
It should be remembered that Mr. Baty has concluded that Calvo asserts
the possibility
of a neutral, without violating its neutral obligations, allowing a
belligerent to pass troops over neutral territory for the purpose of
attacking a State which is on friendly terms with the
Government granting the privilege. Mr.
Baty asserts that a real easement existed in favor of England if she
might "force her way along" the routes stipulated in the treaty, "without
going to war with Portugal," But he says this interpretation is always
"subject to the consideration, that the terms of the treaty do not seem to
contemplate the use of the road as a military road at all," a conclusion
which would seem to settle the question, and deny that any shred of
justification existed for the use to which neutral territory was put in time
of war. But Mr. Baty in the same breath says: "There can be such a thing as
a military road across neutral
territory. The German Empire has such a road across the canton of
Schaffhausen, and there used to be one between Saxony and Poland. But it
seems very questionable whether the roads indicated by
the treaty of 1891 were not simply
commercial, and not for the purposes of war at all."[35] And this
English writer reluctantly admits, "The treaty has, therefore, to be pressed
very far to cover the grant of an overland passage for troops from Beira
inland."[36]
[Footnote 35:
International Law in South Africa, p. 77.]
[Footnote 36: Ibid., p.
76.]
The conclusion reached by Mr. Baty is far more favorable to England than
the
circumstances of the case warrant. "One may regret," he says, "that the
British Government should have found it necessary to place a somewhat
strained interpretation on a treaty which, even then did not give them in
anything like clear terms, an absolute servitude of the kind contended
for."[37]
[Footnote 37: Ibid., p.
77.]
Such a conclusion is
misleading in the first place because the British
Government was contending for a right
which was not recognized among independent nations at the time the
treaty was formed; in the second place, granting that ancient authorities
may have declared the possibility of such a right existing in time of war,
the stipulations of the treaty itself are the strongest argument against the
interpretation used by England. Hall has pointed out that, "When the
language of a treaty, taken in the ordinary meaning of the words, yields a
plain and reasonable sense, it must be taken to be read in that sense."[38]
The only reasonable sense in which the stipulations of the
British-Portuguese treaty of 1891 could be taken was that of a purely
commercial agreement. The spirit of the treaty, the general sense and the
context of the disputed terms all seem to indicate that the
instrument considered only times of
peace and became absolutely invalid with reference to the
transportation of troops in time of war. The authority already cited says,
"When the words of a treaty fail to yield a plain and reasonable sense they
should be interpreted by recourse to the general sense and spirit of the
treaty as shown by the context of the incomplete, improper, ambiguous, or
obscure passages, or by the provisions of the instrument as a whole,"[39]
[Footnote 38:
International Law (1880), p. 281.]
[Footnote 39: Hall,
Int. Law (1880), p. 283.]
Unquestionably the
provisions of the instrument as a whole yield but one meaning. The treaty is
not broad enough to sustain the passage of troops in time of war. Nor would
there seem to be any plausibility in the claim
that certain mutual explanations
exchanged between the two Governments at the time of the signing of
the treaty gave tenable ground for the fulfilment of such a right as that
which was granted by Portugal.
The words of the Portuguese notification to the Transvaal condemn the
action of Portugal
rather than justify the proceeding in view of the
requirements of the neutrality of the
present day. This communication read: "The Portuguese Government has
just been informed that in accordance with the mutual explanations exchanged
in the treaty of 1891 with regard to the right of moving troops and material
of war through the Portuguese territory in South Africa into English
territory and vice versa, the British Government has just made a formal
demand for all troops and material of war to be sent through Beira to the
English hinterland. The Portuguese
Government cannot refuse the demand and must fulfill a convention
depending on reciprocity, a convention which was settled long before the
present state of war had been foreseen. This agreement cannot be regarded as
a superfluous support of one of the belligerent parties or as a violation of
the duties imposed by neutrality or indeed of the good friendly relations
which the Portuguese Government always wishes to keep up with the Government
of the South African Republic."[40] The fact that the assent of the
Portuguese Government was obtained only after ten weeks of pressure brought
to bear upon the Lisbon authorities would seem to indicate that intrigue is
more potent in international relations than accepted precedent.
[Footnote 40: Times Military History of the War in South Africa, Vol.
IV, p. 366, note.]
In its reply to the
Portuguese dispatch the Transvaal reasonably
protested that the treaty in question
had not been made public and that no notice of it had been received
by the Republic at the outbreak of war.[41] It was pointed out that this
being the case the treaty could not be applied even if it granted the right
contended for by England. And even
stronger was the Transvaal argument that in no case after war had
begun could such a treaty be applied by a neutral State to the disadvantage
of third parties. The fact of neutrality had suspended the working of the
agreement. The action of Portugal, it was justly alleged, put her in the
position of an enemy instead of a neutral.
[Footnote 41: Ibid., p.
367, note.]
The Transvaal
contention would appear to be fully warranted. In the light of modern
international law the action of England in sending troops through neutral
Portuguese territory against a nation at peace with Portugal was based upon
a flagrant misreading of a purely
commercial treaty. The action of the Portuguese Government in allowing this
to be accomplished was a gross breach of the duties incumbent upon a
neutral State in time of war.
