October 25th, 1899
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has beyond doubt grasped the situation. His
total force seems to be larger than was usually expected and to exceed my
own rough estimate of thirty-five thousand men, the balance to his advantage
being due probably to the British efforts to keep the Basutos from attacking
the Free State. Thus the Boers have been able to overrun their western and
southern borders in force sufficient to make a pretence of occupying a large
extent of territory in which only the important posts specially prepared by
the British for defence continue to hold out. Of these posts, however,
Mafeking and Kimberley are as yet the only ones that have been attacked or
threatened.
For operations in the northern corner of Natal the Boer commander was able
to collect some thirty thousand men, who on the eve of hostilities were
posted in separate columns upon the various routes leading from the Free
State and from the Transvaal into the triangle of northern Natal. This
triangle is like a letter _A_, the cross-stroke being the range of hills
known as the Biggarsberg, which is intersected near the centre on a north
and south line by the head-stream of the Waschbank River forming a pass
through which run the railway and the Dundee-Ladysmith road. North of the
Biggarsberg the gates of the frontier are Muller's Pass, Botha's Pass, the
Charlestown road, Wool's Drift, and De Jager's Drift, of which Landman's
Drift is a wicket-gate. At each of these points, except perhaps Muller's
Drift, of which I have seen no specific mention, the Boers had a column
waiting. South of the Biggarsberg are on the east Rorke's Drift, and on the
west the passes of Ollivier's Hoek, Bezuidenhout, Tintwa, Van Reenen, De
Beers, Bramkock, and Collins. At all these points there were Boer
gatherings, though on the west the Free Staters, having their headquarters
at Albertina, were likely to put their main column on the road leading
through Van Reenen's Pass to Ladysmith.
By
Thursday morning the Boer advance had developed. The columns from Botha's
Pass, Charlestown, and Wool's Drift had advanced through Newcastle, where
they had converged, and moved south along the main road. The Landman's Drift
column had moved towards Dundee, the Rorke's Drift column had pushed some
distance towards the west, and the forces from Albertina had showed the
heads of their columns on the Natal side of the passes.
The British force was divided between Dundee and Ladysmith. The Biggarsberg
range, the cross-line of the A, is about fifty miles long. It is traversed
from north to south by three passes. In the centre runs the railway through
a defile. Twelve miles to the west of the railway runs the direct
Newcastle-Ladysmith road; eight miles to the east runs the road
Newcastle-Dannhauser-Dundee-Helpmakaar. A third road runs from De Jager's
Drift through Dundee to Glencoe and thence follows the railway to Ladysmith.
Dundee is about five miles from Glencoe on a spur of the Biggarsberg range.
Between the two places by the Craigie Burn was the camp of Sir Penn Symons,
who had under him the eighth brigade (four battalions), three batteries, the
18th Hussars, and a portion of the Natal Mounted Volunteers, in all about
four thousand men. Thirty-five miles away at Ladysmith, the junction of the
Natal and Free State railways, as well as of the Natal and Free State road
systems, Sir George White had a larger force, the seventh brigade, three
field batteries, a mountain battery, the Natal battery, two or three cavalry
regiments, the newly-raised Imperial Light Horse, and some Natal Mounted
Volunteers. It is not clear whether there were more infantry battalions and
it seems probable that one battalion and perhaps a battery were at
Pietermaritzburg. The Ladysmith force was at least six thousand five hundred
strong, and its total may have been as high as eight thousand.
The Boer plan was dictated by the configuration of the frontier and of the
obstacles and communications in Northern Natal. The various columns to the
north of the Biggarsberg had only to move forward in order to effect their
junction on the Newcastle-Dundee road, and their advance southwards on that
road would enable them at Dundee to meet the column from Landman's Drift.
The movement, if well timed, must lead to an enveloping attack upon Sir Penn
Symons, whose brigade would thus have to resist an assault delivered in the
most dangerous form by a force of twenty thousand men. From the point of
view of the Boer Commander-in-Chief, the danger was that the Glencoe and
Dundee force should escape his blow by retiring to Ladysmith, or should be
reinforced by the bulk of the Ladysmith force before his own combined blow
could be delivered. It was essential for him to keep Sir George White at
Ladysmith and also to cut the communications between Glencoe and Ladysmith.
Accordingly, on Wednesday, the 18th, the Free State forces from Albertina,
the heads of whose columns had been shown on Tuesday, moved forward towards
Acton Homes and Bester's Station, and led Sir George White to hope for the
opportunity to strike a blow at them on Thursday, the 18th. At the same time
a detachment from the main column was pushed on southwards, and was able on
Thursday, while Sir George White was watching the Free State columns, to
reach the Glencoe-Ladysmith line near Elandslaagte, to break it up, and to
take position to check any northward movement from Ladysmith. Everything was
thus ready for the blow to be struck at Dundee, but by some want of concert
the combination was imperfect. On Friday morning the Landman's Drift column,
which had been reinforced during the previous days by a part of the
Newcastle column, was in position on the two hills to the east of Dundee,
and began shelling the British camp at long range. At the same time the
column from the north was within an easy march from the British position.
Sir Penn Symons decided promptly to attack the Landman's Drift column and to
check the northern column's advance. Three battalions and a couple of
batteries were devoted to the attack of the Boer position, while a battalion
and a battery were sent along the north road to delay the approaching
column. Both measures were successful. The attack on the Boer position of
Talana or Smith's Hill was a sample of good tactical work, in which the
three arms, or if mounted infantry may be considered a special arm, the four
arms, were alike judiciously and boldly handled. The co-operation of rifle
and gun, of foot and horse, was well illustrated, and the Boer force was
after a hard fight driven from its position and pursued to the eastward.
Unhappily, Sir Penn Symons, who himself took charge of the fight, was
mortally wounded at the moment of victory, leaving the command of the force
in the hands of the brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Yule. The northern Boer column
seems to have disappeared early in the day. Possibly only its advance guard
was within striking distance and had no orders to make an independent attack
on the British delaying force.
On
Saturday morning Sir George White sent a small force of cavalry and
artillery to reconnoitre along the line of the interrupted railway. Some two
thousand Boers were found in position near Elandslaagte, and accordingly
during the day the British were reinforced by road and rail from Ladysmith,
until in the afternoon the Boer position could be attacked by two
battalions, three batteries, two cavalry regiments, and a regiment and a
half of mounted infantry--about three thousand five hundred men. The Boers
were completely crushed and a large number of prisoners taken, including the
commander and the commanding officer of the German contingent. The British
loss, however, as at Glencoe, was heavy, especially in officers. The force
returned on Sunday to Ladysmith.
The British force at Dundee-Glencoe was thus still isolated, and until now
no detailed account of its movements has reached England. On Saturday it was
again attacked and, there is reason to believe, it again repulsed a large
Boer force, probably the main northern column. On Sunday also the attack
seems to have been renewed, this time apparently by two columns, one of
which may have been composed of Free State troops from Muller's Pass. Either
on Sunday or Monday General Yule determined to withdraw from a position in
which he could hardly hope without destruction to resist the overwhelming
numbers brought to bear against him, especially as the Boer forces, either
from the direction of Muller's Pass or from Bester's Station, were
threatening his line of retreat by the Glencoe-Ladysmith road. Accordingly,
leaving in hospital at Dundee those of his wounded who could not be moved,
he retired along the Helpmakaar road, which he followed as far as Beith,
about fourteen miles from Dundee, and near there he bivouacked on Monday
night. On Tuesday he continued his march from Beith towards Ladysmith,
expecting to reach Sunday's River, about sixteen miles, by dark. Sir George
White, informed of this movement and of the presence of a strong Boer force
to the west of the Ladysmith-Glencoe road, set out on Tuesday morning to
interpose between this force and General Yule, and by delivering a smart
attack at Reitfontein was able for that day to cover the retreat of General
Yule's brigade.
The Boer Commander-in-Chief has thus, apparently, failed in his attempt to
crush one wing of the British force, and has accomplished no more than
bringing about its return to the main body, which must have been a part of
the original British plan, unless it was thought that a British brigade was
capable of defeating four times its own number of Boers.
The net result hitherto seems to be that the Boers have had the strategical
and the British the tactical advantage. The British troops have proved their
superiority; the Boers have shown that even against troops of better
training, spirit, and discipline, numbers must tell, especially if directed
according to a sound though not always perfectly-executed plan.
