February 22nd, 1900
A
week ago the news was that Lord Roberts had begun his movement, that he was
moving with fifty thousand men against Commandant Cronje, and that General
French with the cavalry division had crossed the Modder, the sixth and
seventh divisions following him between the Riet and the Modder.
The great object was to strike down Cronje's force before it could receive
help, and the design must have been to cut off his retreat to the eastward.
On Thursday, the 15th, French marched from the Modder to Alexandersfontein,
attacked the rear of the Boer line investing Kimberley, and in the evening
entered the town. He had left the sixth division at the drifts of the Modder.
This movement of French's appeared to imply that Cronje's army was known to
be retreating to the west or north-west, and that French took the road
through Kimberley as the shortest way to reach a position where that retreat
could be intercepted. It could hardly be imagined that the move was made for
the sake of Kimberley, of which the relief was assured whether Cronje stood
to fight or retreated in any direction. The essential thing was to find
where Cronje's force was--if it was at Magersfontein to surround it or drive
it to the west; if elsewhere to delay it with the cavalry and pursue it with
the infantry. But Cronje was not found. When French was in Kimberley, Cronje,
retreating eastwards, passed through the fifteen miles gap between the town
and Kelly-Kenny. Kelly-Kenny on Friday discovered this and set off in
pursuit while French was following a Boer force retreating northwards,
probably part of the force that had invested Kimberley. Kelly-Kenny shelled
the Boer laager and captured a number of waggons, but the Boers retreated
eastwards along the north bank of the Modder with Kelly-Kenny at their
heels. To assist Kelly-Kenny French was recalled from the north, and
Macdonald with the Highland Brigade pushed out by a forced march from
Jacobsdal. Accounts differ as to the site of the fighting, but there was a
three days' running fight, during which Cronje may have crossed the Modder
and approached Paardeberg or may have been stopped on the north bank. The
Boer reports, which imply at least that Cronje was hard pressed, were sent
off before the finish, and the first British official reports, consisting
only in a list of officers killed and wounded, show that each of the three
infantry brigades had hard fighting with considerable losses.
Of
eight infantry brigades with which Lord Roberts began his movement three
were engaged against Cronje; one has probably been sent to Kimberley, with
which town railway communication has been re-opened, so that it will be soon
an advanced base for the Army. Lord Roberts, therefore, who was at
Paardeberg on Monday evening, may have had with him four brigades or two
divisions, representing twenty thousand men, besides the three brigades
engaged, which represented before the battle something like fifteen
thousand.
Of
French and the cavalry division there is no report. The Boers publish a
telegram from Commandant de Wet, who seems to have brought up reinforcements
while Cronje's action was in progress on Sunday.
The Boer commander evidently counted on reinforcements from all quarters; a
party from Colesberg cut off a British waggon train at the Riet on or about
Friday, the 16th, and reinforcements from Natal arrived during Cronje's
action. Lord Roberts has thus drawn the Boers away from the circumference
towards the centre. He has lightened the tasks of Buller, Clements, Gatacre,
and Brabant, but has thereby brought the chief load on to his own shoulders.
It seems a misfortune that Cronje was able to escape eastwards from
Magersfontein, though it would be wrong until full knowledge of what took
place is obtained to assume that this could have been avoided.
Cronje, however, has not been able to make good his escape. A Renter's
telegram from Paardeberg dated. Tuesday explicitly states that Cronje's
force was enclosed and remained enclosed. Lord Roberts on Tuesday reported
that after examination of the enemy's position by reconnaissance in force,
he decided to avoid the heavy loss involved in an assault, but to bombard
the enemy and to turn his attention to the approaching reinforcements. The
result was that the reinforcements were driven off and dispersed with heavy
loss to them and trifling loss to the British. This seems to have been
effected on Tuesday. Boer prisoners reported that they have come from
Ladysmith, and the commander of the reinforcements is said to have been
Commandant Botha, who was last heard of at Spion Kop. On Tuesday also the
shelling of Cronje's position is said to have induced him to ask for an
armistice, which must be assumed to be the prelude to a surrender; at any
rate the request would hardly be granted except to settle the terms of a
capitulation or to enable the Boer general to be told that unconditional
surrender was the only alternative to a continuance of the bombardment.
The advance into the Free State implied that Lord Roberts meant to take the
benefit of acting on "interior lines," that is, in plain English, of getting
in between his enemies and striking them in turn before they can unite or
combine. This plan required him with his main body to attack the enemy's
reinforcements in detail as they came up. In that way he secured time for
the completion of the action against Cronje, and upon its favourable issue
he will be master of the situation.
In
Natal the situation has been changed by the action of Lord Roberts. The two
Boer Republics are well aware that they must stand or fall together. Either
the Boer Commander-in-Chief has decided to strike at Lord Roberts, in which
case he must move the bulk of his force into the Free State, or he hopes to
be in time to resist Lord Roberts after making an end of Sir George White.
In the former case he must raise the siege of Ladysmith, for he cannot carry
it on without a strong covering force to resist Sir Redvers Buller. Then
there will be forty thousand British troops in Natal, whose advance will be
almost as dangerous as that of Lord Roberts. In the latter case there can be
little chance of a successful resistance to Lord Roberts, whose advance
northwards from Bloemfontein would in due time compromise the safety of the
Boer army. The reports do not enable us to feel sure which decision has been
taken. Sir Redvers Buller's telegram of Wednesday to the effect that one of
his divisions had crossed the Tugela and was opposed only by a rear guard
looks very like a Boer withdrawal from Natal. A later unofficial telegram,
describing a very strong position north of the Tugela held by the Boers to
cover the siege, suggests that the Boer commander is again trying to lead
his adversary into attack upon a prepared position. Each case has its
favourable aspect. If the Boers are raising the siege the forces of Buller
and White will in a few days be united, and need only good leading to force
the passes and invade either the Free State or the Transvaal. If the Boers
are determined to hold on to Ladysmith, they cannot effectively check the
advance of Lord Roberts.
While the war is going on the Nation ought to set its military forces in
order. The Militia should be formed into divisions for the field and be
shipped off to manoeuvring grounds at the Cape; they can be brought home as
soon as it is certain they will not be wanted. The Volunteers could soon be
formed into an army if the War Office would carry out the measures which
have for years been urged upon it by Volunteer officers. The first step is
to give the officers the authority which has hitherto been withheld from
them, so that by its exercise they may form their characters; the second to
give them the best instruction and encouragements to learn; the third to
find them ground for ranges, for field firing and for manoeuvres. A minister
of war who combined knowledge of war and of the Volunteers with a serious
purpose would be able in two months to infuse the whole Volunteer force with
the right ideal, and then, by mobilising them for another two months, to
transform them into an army. It is for the Navy and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs to secure the four months that are needed.
