October 18th, 1899
When the Boers sent their ultimatum they knew that fifty thousand British
troops were under orders for South Africa, and that for six weeks the
British forces in the theatre of war could not be substantially increased.
As they were of opinion that no settlement of the dispute satisfactory to
England could possibly be satisfactory to themselves they had resolved upon
fighting. If we assume, as we are bound to do, that they had really faced
the situation and thought it out, they must have had in their minds some
course of action by which if they should begin the war on October 11th they
would be likely to gain their end: the recognition of the sovereignty of the
Transvaal. They could hardly expect to disarm the British Empire and dictate
peace, but they might hope to make the occupation of their country so
difficult that Great Britain would be tired of the effort before the moment
of success. The Boer defence taken altogether could hope to do no more than
to gain time, during which some outside embarrassment might cripple Great
Britain; there might be a rising at the Cape, or some other Power might
interfere.
If
before the arrival of Sir Redvers Buller and his men the Boers could destroy
a considerable fraction of the British forces now in South Africa, their
chance of prolonging the struggle would be greatly improved. These forces
were in two groups. There was the small army of Sir George White in Natal,
something more than fifteen thousand men, and there were the detached
parties holding points on the colonial railway system, Naauwport, De Aar,
Orange River, Kimberley and Mafeking. These detachments, however, are
largely made up of local levies, and the total number of British troops
among them can hardly amount to three thousand. The whole set might be
captured or otherwise swept from the board without any material improvement
in the Boer position. Sir Redvers Buller is not tied to the line of railway
which most of the detachments guard, and the disappearance both of the
railway and of its protectors would be merely a temporary inconvenience to
the British. But if during the six weeks' respite it were possible to
destroy Sir George White's force the position would be very substantially
changed. The confidence of the Boers would be so increased as to add greatly
to their fighting power, the difficulties of Sir Redvers Buller would be
multiplied, the probability of outside intervention might be brought nearer,
and the Army of invasion to be eventually resisted would be weaker by
something like a quarter. For these reasons I think Sir George White's force
the centre of gravity of the situation. If the Boers cannot defeat it their
case is hopeless; if they can crush it they may have hopes of ultimate
success. That was the bird's-eye view of the whole situation a week ago, and
it still holds good. The week's news does not enable us to judge whether the
Boers have grasped it. You can never be too strong at the decisive point,
and a first-rate general never lets a single man go away from his main force
except for a necessary object important enough to be worth the risk of a
great failure. The capture of Mafeking, of Kimberley, and even of Mr. Cecil
Rhodes, would not compensate the Boers for failure in Natal. Neither Colonel
Baden-Powell nor Colonel Kekewich would be likely to make a serious inroad
into Boer territory. I should therefore have expected the Boers merely to
watch these places with parties hardly larger than patrols and to have
thrown all their energy into a determined attack on Sir George White. But
they seem to have sent considerable bodies, in each case several thousand
men, against both Mafeking and Kimberley. This proves either that they have
a superabundance of force at their disposal or that they have failed to grip
the situation and to concentrate their minds, their will, and their troops
upon the key of the whole position. I believe the latter to be the true
interpretation.
If
the cardinal principle is to put all your strength into the decisive blow,
its corollary is that you should deliver the blow as soon as you can, for in
war time is as precious as lives. Here again it is not easy to judge whether
the Boer Commander-in-Chief is fulfilling his mission. When the ultimatum
expired his forces were spread along the border line of the Free State and
the Transvaal, so that a forward movement would concentrate them in the
northern triangle of Natal. The advance has not been resisted, and at the
end of a week the Transvaal wing of the combined army has reached a point a
few miles north of Glencoe, while the bulk of the Free State wing is still
behind the passes. The movement has not been rapid, but as the ground is
difficult--marches through a mountainous country and in bad weather always
take incomparably longer than is expected--the delay may be due not to lack
of energy but to the inevitable friction of movement. The mere lapse of time
throws no light on the Boer plan, for though sound strategy counsels
rapidity in the decisive blow, rapidity is a relative term, the pace varying
with the Army, the country, and the weather.
Sir George White's object is not merely to make the time pass until Sir
Redvers Buller's forces come upon the scene. He has also to prevent the
Boers from gaining any great advantage, moral or material. Time could be
gained by a gradual retreat, but that would raise the courage of the Boer
party, and depress the spirits of the British. Accordingly Sir George White
may be expected to take the first opportunity of showing the Boers that his
men are fighters, but he will avoid an engagement such as might commit a
fraction of his force against the Boer main body. The detachment which was a
few days ago near Glencoe may be expected, as the Boer advance continues, to
act as a rear guard, of which the business is to delay the enemy without
running too great a risk of being itself cut off, or as an advance guard,
which is to be reinforced so soon as the general drift of the Boer movements
has been made out. The next few days can hardly pass without an engagement
in this quarter of Natal, and the first serious engagement will throw a
flood of light upon the aims of both generals and upon the quality of the
troops of both sides. Meantime the incidents of last week, the wreck of the
armoured train, and the attacks which have probably been made upon Mafeking
and Kimberley, are of minor importance.
A
very serious piece of news, if it should be confirmed, is that the Basutos
have begun to attack the Free State. The British authorities have exerted
themselves to the utmost to prevent this and to keep the Kaffir population
quiet. The mere fact of the existence all over South Africa of a Kaffir
population outnumbering Boers and British together made it an imperative
duty of both white races to come to a peaceful settlement. This was as well
known to the Boers as to the British, and forms an essential factor in any
judgment on the action which has caused and precipitated the conflict.
