February 1st, 1900
If
on Tuesday the Bank of England had announced that it could not meet its
obligations I imagine that there would have been a certain amount of
uneasiness in the City and elsewhere, and that some at least of the rich men
to be found in London would have put their heads together to see what could
be done to meet a grave emergency.
On
Tuesday a failure was indeed announced--a failure which must involve the
Bank of England and most of the great banking and trading corporations of
this country. But no one seems to have taken action upon it, and I see no
visible sign of general alarm. The Prime Minister, speaking in his place in
the House of Lords and on behalf of the National Government, said: "I do not
believe in the perfection of the British Constitution as an instrument of
war ...it is evident there is something in your machinery that is wrong."
That was Lord Salisbury's explanation and defence of the failure of his
Government in the diplomacy which preceded the war, in the preparations for
the war, and in the conduct of the war. It was a declaration of
bankruptcy--a plain statement by the Government that it cannot govern. The
announcement was not made to Parliament with closed doors and the reporters
excluded. It was made to the whole world, to the British Nation, and to all
the rivals of Great Britain. Parliament did not take any action upon the
declaration. No committee of both Houses was formed to consider how without
delay to make a Government that can govern. The ordinary normal routine of
public and private life goes on. Thus in the crisis of the Nation's fate we
are ungoverned and unled, and to all appearance we are content to be so, and
the leader-writers trained in the tradition of respectable formalism
interpret the Nation's apathy as fortitude.
Lord Salisbury's confession of impotence was true. From the beginning to the
end of this business the Government has lacked the manliness to do its plain
duty. In the first half of July, before the official reports of the
Bloemfontein conference were published, everyone but the disciples of Mr.
Morley knew that the only honourable course, after the Government's
declaration prior to the conference and after what there took place, was to
insist on the acceptance by the South African Republic of the Bloemfontein
proposals and to back up that insistence by adequate military preparations.
It is admitted that this was not done, and what is the excuse now made? Mr.
Balfour told the House of Commons on Tuesday, January 30th, that if in
August a vote of credit had been demanded "we should not have been able to
persuade the House that the necessity for the vote was pressing and urgent."
The Government charged with the defence of the Empire excuses itself for not
having made preparations for that task on the ground that perhaps the House
of Commons would not have given its approval. Yet the Government had a great
majority at its back, and there is no instance in recent times of a vote of
credit having been rejected by the House of Commons. This shameful cowardice
was exhibited although, as we now know but could not then have imagined, the
Government had in its possession the protest of the Government of Natal
against the intention of the Imperial Government to abandon the northern
portion of that colony. The Natal Ministers on July 25th confidentially
communicated their extreme surprise at learning that in case of sudden
hostilities it would not be possible with the garrison and colonial forces
available to defend the northern portion of the colony.
After shilly-shallying from May to September the Government began its
preparations, and the Boers as soon as they were ready began the war. Of the
conduct of the war the readers of The London Letter have had an account week
by week, as to the truth of which they can judge for themselves, for the
facts are there by which it can be tested. The attempt has been made to
refrain from any criticism which could hurt the feelings of the generals,
who are doing their duty to the best of their power in most trying
circumstances. But is it not plain that the British Army has been hampered
by a lack of sound strategy and of sound tactics such as indicate prolonged
previous neglect of these branches of study and training? Who is responsible
to the Nation for the training of the Army? The Government and the
Government alone. If any military officer has not done his work
effectively--if, for example, the Commander-in-Chief has not taught his
generals rightly or not selected them properly--who is responsible to
Parliament for that? Not the officer, even if he be the Commander-in-Chief,
for the Commander-in-Chief is the servant of the Cabinet and responsible to
the Cabinet, which if it were dissatisfied with him ought to have dismissed
him. Authority over the Army is in the hands of the Secretary of State for
War as the delegate of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne has held his post only
since 1895, and cannot be held responsible for the training of the older
generals; but before him came Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman who for some
years had charge of the preparation of the Army for war as the delegate of
the late Cabinet. For the state of the Army, for the strategical and
tactical training which has resulted in so many failures, the politicians of
both front benches, who in turn have neglected these vital matters, are
responsible.
Here we are, then, in the middle of the war, without a Government, but with
a body of men who fill the place of a Government while admitting themselves
incompetent to do the work entrusted to them and for which they are paid.
The war so far has consisted of a succession of repulses, which at any
moment may culminate in disaster. Sir Redvers Buller has twice led his Army
to defeat and is about to lead it a third time--to what? Possibly to
victory; we all hope that it may be to victory. But possibly to a third
defeat which would mean not merely the loss of the force at Ladysmith; it
would mean that Sir Redvers Buller's Army in its turn would need succour,
and that the plan, so much favoured by the strategists of the Army, of a
march through the Free State would be hampered. For the final and decisive
defeat of Sir Redvers Buller would be followed by the long-deferred general
rising of the Cape Dutch, and probably enough by the action of one or more
of the European Powers. The Times of to-day announces that a foreign
Government has ordered a large supply of steam coal from the Welsh
collieries. That can mean but one thing, that some foreign Power is getting
its Navy ready for action.
What, then, is the situation to-day? That any day may bring the gravest news
from South Africa, to be followed possibly by an ultimatum from a foreign
coalition. In that event the Nation will have to choose between abandoning
its Empire in obedience to foreign dictation, an abandonment which would
mean National ruin, and a war for existence, a war for which no preparation
has been made, which the Government is incompetent to conduct, and which
would begin by a naval conflict during which it would be impossible to
assist the Army in South Africa. That is the situation. It may take a turn
for better; you cannot be quite sure that a storm which you see brewing may
not pass off, but the probabilities are that the struggle for existence is
at hand. What then is our duty, the duty of every one of us? To support the
Government which cannot govern? Not for a moment, but to get rid of it as
soon as possible and to make at once a Government that will try. Lord
Rosebery at least sees the situation and understands the position. There is
no other public man who commands such general confidence, and it is
practically certain that if the Cabinet were compelled to resign by an
adverse vote of the House of Commons Lord Rosebery would be the first
statesman to be consulted by the Queen. Lord Rosebery could make a
Government to-morrow if he would ignore parties and pick out the competent
men wherever they are to be found. Any new Cabinet, except one containing
Mr. Morley or Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, would be given a chance. The
House of Commons would wait a few weeks to see how it bore itself. If there
were prompt evidences of knowledge and will in the measures adopted, even
though half the Ministers or all of them except Lord Rosebery were new men,
there would soon be a feeling of confidence, and the Nation, knowing that it
was led, would respond with enthusiasm. In that case Great Britain might
make a good fight, though no one who knows the state of our preparations and
those of the rest of the world will make a sanguine prediction as to the
result.
