January 18th, 1900
Yesterday began the action upon which in all probability depends the future
course of the war. By the time these lines are in the reader's hands more
will be known of the battle that can be guessed to-day by the wisest, though
several days may pass before the result is fully known.
Sir Redvers Buller on Wednesday, the 10th, had under his command three
infantry divisions, a cavalry brigade, some two thousand mounted infantry,
and probably altogether about eighty guns. Clery's division consists of
Hildyard's and Lyttelton's brigades; the third division, comprising Hart's
and Barton's brigades, is not known to have had a commander appointed;
Warren's division is composed of Woodgate's brigade and of half of Coke's
brigade, to which another half may have been added by taking two battalions
which have been some time in Natal, and belong neither to Clery's nor to the
third division. The whole force ought to be thirty thousand strong for a
fight, taking the division at nine thousand instead of ten thousand, for
though there have been losses there have also been drafts to fill up gaps. A
party of mounted troops probably one thousand strong is reported to have
been detached a few days ago by rail to Stanger on the coast near the mouth
of the Tugela, and thence to have disappeared on a mission of which the
purpose is as yet unknown, though it looks like a raid upon the railway
between Dundee and Newcastle. The strength of the Boers in Natal has never
been accurately known, and the estimates differ widely, ranging from
thirty-five thousand to more than double that number. Sir George White may
have nine thousand effectives at Ladysmith and might be contained by fifteen
thousand Boers, perhaps by a smaller number. There will, therefore, be
available against Sir Redvers Buller a force on the lowest estimate about
equal to his own, and possibly outnumbering it by two to one.
On
Wednesday, the 10th, the British force started westward. No telegram as yet
gives its distribution, but it is plain that Clery's and Warren's divisions
moved out, together with the cavalry brigade and whatever mounted infantry
had not been sent south. Hart's and Barton's brigades, or one of them, with
a proportion of artillery may be assumed to have been left in the
entrenchments which face Colenso and cover the British line of
communications by the railway. On Thursday morning Lord Dundonald with the
cavalry brigade and some of the mounted infantry was in possession of the
hills overlooking Potgieter's Drift and of the pont or ferry-boat. The same
day the infantry or the leading division, Clery's, was in the hills north of
Springfield. Lord Dundonald's force commanded the river at Potgieter's
Drift, and the crossing there was thus assured. A pause of four days
followed: a pause probably not of inaction, but of strenuous preparation in
order to make the final advance vigorous. During those days, no doubt,
supplies would be accumulated at Springfield Bridge Camp, at Spearman's
Farm, and at some point near to the next drift to the west. This would save
delays when the advance began, for if the force depended upon magazines at
Frere the transport would break down in the advance beyond the Tugela,
whereas if the transport had in the later stages merely to start from the
south side of the Tugela, the force could be kept supplied for a few days.
Lord Dundonald was engaged in strengthening his position at Zwart's Kop, so
that in any case there would be a secure retreat across the river if need
be. The river itself seems also to have been properly reconnoitred.
The enemy's position could be seen four or five miles to the north, and he
was known on Thursday to be strongly entrenched. A passage for Warren's
division was chosen at Trichardt's Drift five miles above Potgieter's and
near to Wagon Drift which is marked on the sketch map issued by the
Intelligence Division. From Trichardt's Drift there is evidently a road
leading into the Bethany-Dewdrop Road, and parallel to that which runs from
Potgieter's Drift. On Tuesday, the 16th, Lyttelton's brigade of infantry
with a battery of howitzers crossed the Tugela at Potgieter's Drift and
gained a line of hills to the north, probably the edge of the plateau on
which lies the Boer position. The telegrams say nothing of bridge-making at
Potgieter's Drift, but are explicit as to the crossing of at least some of
the artillery. On Wednesday General Lyttelton shelled the Boer position with
howitzers and naval guns without drawing a reply. This silence of the Boer
guns is correct for the defenders of a position, as a reply would enable the
assailant to fix the position of the guns and to concentrate his fire upon
them. The same day (Wednesday) Warren's division crossed the Tugela at
Trichardt's Drift, and driving in the enemy's outposts secured a lodgment on
the low wooded hills about a mile north of the river; this division, after
its advance guard had crossed, was passed over by a pontoon bridge. The
remainder of yesterday may have been spent in reconnaissance, bridge
building--for an army that has crossed a river needs to have behind it as
many bridges as possible--in bringing up all the forces destined for the
battle, perhaps including Hildyard's brigade, and in making complete
arrangements for the attack which was probably delivered this morning.
Sir Redvers Buller has aimed his blow in a right direction, for, if it can
be delivered with effect, if he can drive the Boers back, their army will be
in a perilous situation. The plan evidently is that while Clery's division
holds the Boers in front, Warren's should strike upon their right flank. If,
then, the combined attack of the two divisions forces the Boers back the
situation would be that the Boer army would have to retreat eastward across
the Klip River, its retreat in any other direction being barred by the
defences of Ladysmith, by Warren's and Clery's divisions, and by the British
force in the lines at Chieveley. In such a situation a forced retreat would
be disastrous for the Boers, as Sir Redvers Buller's two divisions would be
nearer to the Boer line of retreat through Glencoe than the Boer army.
Of
the probabilities of success it would be rash to speak. But though numbers
are against the British we must never forget the splendid qualities which
British troops have displayed in the past and which, as the actions of this
war have proved, are possessed by our officers and men to-day. The
experiences of the last few weeks have taught them what are the formations
to avoid and have shown them that they shoot at least as well as the Boers.
We may, therefore, hope for victory even against numbers.
But even if Sir Redvers Buller finds positions as strong as that at Colenso,
the Boers will probably be baulked of their prey, the garrison of Ladysmith.
Sir George White has with him the flower of the British Army, and he does
not mean to be reduced by degrees to the extremity of famine and
helplessness. During Sir Redvers Buller's attack the Ladysmith's force will
not be idle, but will attack the Boers who are investing the place. Signals
must have been prearranged between the two commanders, and it can hardly be
doubted that if and when Sir George White should have reason to believe that
Sir Redvers Buller may be unable to force his way through the Boer positions
he would himself set out to cut his way through the investing lines, and at
whatever sacrifice to carry the remnant of his force into Sir Redvers
Buller's camp, and thus to vindicate the honour of the British arms and the
character of the British soldier.
