January 5th, 1900
There has been no substantial, visible change in the military situation
since the battle of Colenso on December 15th. The actions of General French
at Colesberg and of Colonel Pilcher at Sunnyside are valuable mainly as
evidence that with sound tactics the Boers are by no means invincible, and
that British troops only require intelligent leading to be as capable of the
best work as any troops in the world. General French, however, until the
hour at which I write had not finished his wrestle with the Boers at
Colesberg, and until it is over no military action can be classed either as
success or failure. Colonel Pilcher's opponents were colonial rebels,
probably not as good as Transvaal Boers, who have had in peace more rifle
practice. The losses were small, proving that the resistance of the enemy
was by no means desperate, and as the retreating force was not pursued the
defeat was not crushing. Colonel Pilcher by the temporary occupation of
Douglas reaped the fruits of his victory, but the whole small campaign is of
no very great importance, as the possession of the triangle between the
railway and the Riet and Orange Rivers depends in the ultimate issue not
upon the event of local skirmishes, but on the issue of the decisive
fighting between the British Army and the forces of the Republics. Lord
Methuen's communications appear to be now well organized and guarded, so
that his position need cause no special anxiety. A good deal depends on the
outcome of the struggle between General French and the Colesberg Boers, for,
while a Boer defeat would render the line from the Cape to Orange River
quite safe, a Boer victory would endanger not only Naauwpoort but De Aar.
General Gatacre's cue should be to risk nothing. If he waits where he is and
merely holds his own until the sixth division is ready for use no harm will
have been done; if he makes any mistakes the consequences may be more than
the sixth division can remedy. The centre of interest still lies between
Ladysmith and Frere. The tone of the telegrams from Ladysmith, which declare
that though the bombardment has been more effective since Christmas, and
through dysentary and enteric fever are busy, "all is yet well," proves that
the situation of Sir George White's force is critical, and may at any moment
become desperate. The Boers by occupying and fortifying positions south of
the Tugela have taken the best means of making sure that Sir Redvers
Buller's advance, even if successful, shall be delayed and the time taken
over it prolonged. The Boer commander sees clearly that his present object
is to delay Sir Redvers Buller, so as to gain the time needed to bring about
the fall of Ladysmith. If that can be secured the next question will be how
to damage Sir Redvers Buller. Of the prospects of Sir Redvers Buller's
attack no estimate can be made. He is stronger than he was by the greater
part of Sir Charles Warren's division, and it is to be hoped, by plenty of
heavy artillery and by an organised transport; but the Boers are stronger
than they were by a new position, by three weeks of fortification, and by
the consciousness of their last victory. Upon Sir Redvers Buller's fate
depends more than anyone cares to say. If he wins and relieves Ladysmith the
success of Great Britain in the war will be assured, though the operations
may be prolonged for months; but if he should again fail there is no
prospect of success except by exertions of which the Government as yet has
not shown the faintest conception. His action can hardly be completed in a
single battle or in a day; the first telegrams, therefore, need not
necessarily be taken as giving the result; more probably his operations,
except in the most unfavourable case, will be continuous for something like
a week.
For the Nation there is a question even more vital than the fate of Sir
Redvers Buller, and more practical. Nothing that was at home can do can
affect the impending battle by the Tugela. The issue of that battle, as of
the war, though it is not yet known and can be revealed only by the event,
is in reality already settled, for it depends on the proportion of the
forces of the two sides, which has been determined by British strategy and
cannot now be modified, upon the qualities, armament, and training of the
troops, which are the results of the conditions of their enlistment,
organisation, and education, and upon the judgment and will of Sir Redvers
Buller, also the outcome of his training and of the Army system. But
whatever happens on the Tugela the British Nation has its to-morrow, a very
black one in case of a defeat, and a very difficult one even in case of
victory, for all the great Powers are for ever competitors for the
possession and government of the world, and Great Britain having shown a
weakness, expected by others though unsuspected by her own people, will in
future be hard beset. The Russians have just moved a division from the
Caucasus towards the Afghan frontier, which portends trouble for India. The
Austrians, as well as the Germans are setting out to build an extra
fleet--what for? Because the Austrian Government, like the German and
Italian Governments, know, what our recent Governments have never known,
that Great Britain has for two or three centuries been the balance weight or
fly-wheel of the European machine, by reason of the prescience with which
her Navy was handled. Those Governments now see that statesmanship has gone
from us; they divine that the great Navy we now possess cannot be used by a
timid and ignorant Government, and that no reliance can be placed upon Great
Britain to play her own true game. Accordingly, they see that they must
strengthen their own navies with a view to the possible collapse of the
British Power. In the near future the maintenance of the British Empire
depends upon the Nation's having a Government at once far-seeing and
resolute, capable of great resolves and prompt action. Of such a Government
there is, however, no immediate prospect. The present Cabinet has given its
testimonials: a challenge sent to the Boers by a Government that did not
know it was challenging anyone, that did not know the adversary's strength,
nor his determination to fight; and a war begun in military ignorance
displayed by the Cabinet, and carried on by half measures until the popular
determination compelled three-quarter measures. Does anyone suppose that
this Cabinet, that did not know its mind till the Boers declared war, knows
or will know its mind about the conflict with Russia in Asia, or about any
other of the troubles, foreseen and unforeseen, which await us? A victory in
Natal would save the Cabinet and drown the voices of its critics; and in
that case the present leaders will infallibly go halting and irresolute into
the greater contests that are coming. A defeat in Natal would destroy the
Government at once if there were before the public a single man in whose
judgment and character there was confidence; but there is no such man, and,
as the Opposition leaders are discredited by their conduct in regard to the
quarrel with the Boers, the present set will remain at their posts to
continue the traditional policy of waiting to be driven by public opinion.
The Nation, therefore, has before it a necessary task as urgent as that of
reinforcing the Army in the field, which is to find the man in whose
judgment as to war and policy as well as in whose character it can place
confidence.
The man to be trusted is, unfortunately, not Lord Wolseley. I have for years
fought his battle by urging that the Government ought to follow the advice
of its military adviser, a theory of which the corollary is that the adviser
must resign the moment he is overruled. I have never meant that the adviser
is to be a dictator, nor that the Cabinet should follow advice of the
soundness of which it is not convinced. The Cabinet has the responsibility
and ought never to act without full conviction. The expert who cannot
convince a group of intelligent non-experts that a necessary measure is
necessary is not as expert as he should be; and if he still retains his post
after he has been overruled on a measure which he regards as necessary he
has not the strength of character which is indispensable for great
responsibility. Now, though the relation between a Cabinet and its advisers
ought to be secret, in the present case each side has let the cat out of the
bag. Lord Wolseley's friends defend him by declaring that he has been
overruled. But that defence kills him. If he has been overruled on a trifle
it does not matter, and the defence is a quibble; if he has been overruled
on an essential point why is he still Commander-in-Chief? No answer can be
devised that is not fatal to his case. Lord Lansdowne's friend, for such
Lord Ernest Hamilton may be presumed to be, says: "Supposing, for the sake
of argument, that the short-comings of the War Office in and before the
present war were due not to neglect of military counsels, but to the
adoption of such counsels, contrary to the more far-seeing judgment of the
civil side." That is a condemnation of the civilian Minister and of the
Cabinet, for no man in charge of the Nation's affairs ought to take the
responsibility for a decision of the soundness of which he is not convinced.
If Lord Lansdowne disagreed with Lord Wolseley and was not prepared to ask
for that officer's retirement, why did he not himself retire rather than
make himself responsible for measures which he thought wrong or mistaken?
These are not personal criticisms or attacks. Lord Wolseley and Lord
Lansdowne have both of them in the past rendered splendid services to the
Nation. But the Empire is at stake, and a writer's duty is to set forth and
apply the principles which he believes to be sound, without being a
respecter of persons yet with that respect for every man, especially for
every public man, which is the best tradition of our National life. What at
the present moment ought not to be tolerated is what Lord Ernest Hamilton
suggests, an attack upon the generals at the front, to save the War Office
or the Cabinet; and what is needed is that the Ministers should choose a war
adviser who can convince them, even though to find him they have to pass
over a hundred generals and select a colonel, a captain, or a crammer.
