The next six weeks will be an anxious time for the British Empire. The war
which begins as I write between three and four on Wednesday afternoon,
October 11th, 1899, is a conflict for supremacy in South Africa between the
Boer States, their aiders and abettors, and the British Empire. In point of
resources the British Empire is so incomparably stronger than the Boer
States that there ought to be no possibility of doubt about the issue. But
the Boer States with all their resources are actually in the theatre of war,
which is, separated by the wide oceans from all the sources of British
power, from Great Britain, from India, from the Australian and Canadian
colonies. The reinforcements ordered on September 8th have not yet all
arrived, though the last transports are due to arrive during the next four
or five days. After that no further reinforcements can be expected for a
month, so that during the next few weeks the whole strength of the Boers, so
far as it is available at all, can be employed against a mere fragment of
the British power. To the gravity of this situation it would be folly to
shut our eyes. It contains the possibility of disaster, though what the
consequences of disaster now would involve must for the present be left
unsaid. Yet it may be well to say one word on the origin of the unpleasant
situation which exists, in order to prevent needless misgivings in case the
first news should not be as favourable as we all hope. There is no sign of
any mistake or neglect in the military department of the Army. The quantity
and character of the force required to bring the war to a successful issue
has been most carefully estimated in advance; every preparation which
forethought can suggest has been thought out, so that the moment the word
was given by the supreme authority, the Cabinet, the mobilisation and
despatch of the forces could begin and proceed without a hitch. The Army was
never in better condition either as regards the zeal and skill of its
officers from the highest to the lowest, the training and discipline of the
men, or the organisation of all branches of the service. Nor is the present
condition of the Army good merely by comparison with what it was twenty
years ago. A very high standard has been attained, and those who have
watched the Army continuously for many years feel confident that all ranks
and all arms will do their duty. The present situation, in which the Boers
start favourably handicapped for five weeks certain, is the foreseen
consequence of the decision of the Cabinet to postpone the measures
necessary for the defence of the British colonies and for attack upon the
Boer States. This decision is not attributable to imperfect information. It
was regarded as certain so long ago as December last, by those in a position
to give the best forecast, that the Boers of both States meant war with the
object of establishing Boer supremacy. The Cabinet, therefore, has knowingly
and deliberately taken upon itself the responsibility for whatever risks are
now run. In this deliberate decision of the Cabinet lies the best ground for
hoping that the risks are not so great as they seem.
The two Boer Republics are well supplied with money, arms, and ammunition,
and I believe have collected large stores of supplies. Their armies consist
of their burghers, with a small nucleus of professional artillery, officers,
and men. The total number of burghers of both States is about fifty
thousand, and that number is swollen by the addition of non-British
Uitlanders who have been induced to take arms by the offer of burghership.
The two States are bound by treaty to stand or fall together, and the treaty
gives the Commander-in-Chief of both armies to the Transvaal
Commander-in-Chief, who is however, bound to consult his subordinate
colleague of the Orange Free State. The whole of the fifty thousand burghers
cannot take the field. Some must remain to watch the native population,
which far outnumbers the burghers and is not well affected. Some must be
kept to watch the Basutos, who are anxious to raid the Free State, and there
will be deductions for sick and absentees as well as for the necessary
duties of civil administration. The forts of Pretoria, Johannesburg, and
Bloemfontein require permanent garrisons. In the absence of the accurate
data obtainable in the case of an army regularly organised into tactical and
administrative units, the most various estimates are current of the force
that the two States can put into the field as a mobile army available for
attack as well as for defence. I think thirty-five thousand men a safer
estimate than twenty-five thousand. The Boers are fighting for their
political existence, which to their minds is identical with their monopoly
of political rights, and therefore their States will and must exert
themselves to the uttermost. This view is confirmed by the action of the
British military authorities, who estimate the British force necessary to
disarm the Boer States at over seventy thousand men, a number which would
seem disproportionate to a Boer field force of only twenty-five thousand.
The British forces now in South Africa are in two separate groups. In Natal
Sir George White has some ten thousand regular troops and two thousand
volunteers, the regulars being eight or nine infantry battalions, four
regiments of cavalry, six field batteries, and a mounted battery. He appears
to have no horse artillery. In the Cape Colony there are seven British
battalions and, either landed or on passage, three field batteries. A part
of this force is scattered in small garrisons of half a battalion each at
points on the railways leading to the Free State--Burghersdrop, Naauwpoort,
and Kimberley. At Mafeking Colonel Baden-Powell has raised a local force and
has fortified the place as well as its resources permit. A force of
Rhodesian volunteers is moving from Buluwayo towards Tuli, on the northern
border of the Transvaal. There are volunteer corps in the Cape Colony with a
total of some seven thousand men, but it is not clear whether the Schreiner
Ministry, whose sympathies with the Boers are undisguised, has not prevented
the effective arming of these corps.
The reports of the distribution of the Boer forces on the frontiers must be
taken with caution. Apparently there are preparations for the attack of
Mafeking and of Kimberley, and it is open for the Boers to bring against
either or both of these places forces largely outnumbering their defenders.
Both places are prepared for defence against ordinary field forces. The
actions at these places cannot very greatly affect the general result. Their
nearness to the frontier makes it likely that the first engagements will
take place on this border. On the other side of the theatre of war the Boers
may be expected to invade Natal and to attack Sir George White, whose forces
a few days ago were divided between positions near Ladysmith and Glencoe,
places nearly thirty-five miles apart. The bulk of the Boer forces are
deployed on two sides of the angle formed by the Natal border, where it
meets the frontiers of the Transvaal and of the Free State. From the Free
State border Ladysmith is about twenty-five miles distant in a straight
line, and from the Transvaal border near Vryheid to Ladysmith is about twice
that distance. If the Boers move on Thursday morning they would be able
easily to collect their whole force at Ladysmith on Sunday morning,
supposing the country contained no British troops. By Sunday, therefore, the
Boer commander, if he knows his business, ought to be able to attack Sir
George White with a force outnumbering the British by something like two to
one.
If
I were a Cabinet Minister I should not sleep for the next few days, but as
an irresponsible citizen I trust that the Boers will be shocked to find how
much better the British soldier shoots in 1899 than he did in 1881.
