“Les bombes ne sont
rien, absolument rien; elles ecraseront quelques maisons; mais cela n'a
jamais influe sur la reddition d'une place." Napoleon.
BOER SIEGE GUN
BOMBARDS KIMBERLEY: A CIVILIAN THREAT TO CALL A PUBLIC MEETING TO DISCUSS
THE MILITARY SITUATION
"LONG TOM" COMES INTO
ACTION AT KAMFERSDAM
Rumours had for some
time been current on the Diamond Fields that the Boers were bringing one of
their "Long Toms," a 6-inch gun firing a projectile weighing about 90 lb.,
from Ladysmith to Kimberley. Kekewich had long expected that some such move
might be made by the enemy to hearten their own people. The diary of a
Frenchman which contains an account of the journey of the gun from Pretoria
to Kimberley later fell into British hands. It appears that this piece of
ordnance had been sent to Pretoria for repairs, on the completion of which
it started for the Diamond Fields with an escort of Frenchmen, who had
accepted military service under the Boer Republics. The first part of the
journey was made by rail; leaving Pretoria at 6 p.m. on 30th January, the
gun and its escort arrived at Brandfort one and a half hours later, and
detrained. The march to Kimberley was in the nature of a triumphal progress;
leaving Brandfort on 31st January, the gun arrived at Kamfersdam Mine, some
8,000 yards to the northwest of the Conning Tower, at 7 p.m. on 6th
February, and was at once hoisted to the top of the debris heap, upon which
an emplacement had been constructed.
At 11 a.m. on 7th
February the officer on watch at the Conning Tower observed a puff of smoke
at the head-gear of the Kamfersdam Mine; it was "Long Tom" confirming the
accuracy of the rumour that had preceded his advent. His monster shells were
soon bursting over different parts of Kimberley and Beaconsfield; all parts
of our defended area, with the exception of the Premier Mine Redoubt, were
within his range from the Kamfersdam position. The cases of the shrapnel
shell fired by "Long Tom," after shedding their contents, followed most
erratic courses in the air; their flight gave rise to peculiarly weird
noises, which greatly terrified the women and children. "Long Cecil" was at
once ranged on Kamfersdam and succeeded to some extent in keeping down the
fire of the Boer big gun; indeed, one of the former's shells struck the
timber head-gear on the debris heap and sent splinters of metal, and of
timber also, flying in all directions. Later, it was learnt that some of
"Long Cecil's" projectiles had caused casualties among the team working
"Long Tom."
When Bloemfontein was
occupied some weeks later, a large-scale map of Kimberley was found at the
Raadzaal; thereon were prominently marked all the buildings of importance,
such as the military Headquarters in Lennox Street, the Kimberley Club, the
Town Hall, the Hospital and several other premises of similar importance. A
note on the map indicated that it was used at Kamfersdam for the purpose of
laying "Long Tom" indirectly on the various targets fired at on the Diamond
Fields.
We had become quite
accustomed to the shelling by the Boer 9-pdrs. and 15-pdrs., and found no
difficulty in carrying on our work at the headquarters office during the
severest bombardment. But when "Long Tom" was in action, the noise made by
the bursting-shell and the shrapnel shell cases was such as to render it
impossible to concentrate one's thoughts. Many of the clerks and telephone
operators employed at the military Headquarters and in the redoubts were
civilians; in some cases the bombardment was too much for them and they
absented themselves from duty and the soldiers had to carry on as best they
could. The fact that "Long Tom" had come into action against Kimberley was
at once communicated to Methuen. Within a very short time of the arrival of
the first six-inch shell in the town it became evident that a prolonged
bombardment with this type of projectile would have a very demoralizing
effect on the civil population, particularly in view of the circumstance
that very little bomb-proof cover existed on the Diamond Fields. On 8th
February Kekewich reported that, "having regard to the population and the
class of troops defending the town," the situation was serious. Several
buildings were struck by six-inch shell this day, one of them being set on
fire. The Fire Brigade gallantly got to work to deal with the conflagration,
which could be seen at Kamfersdam; the Boer artillerymen now shelled the
burning building with increased vigour.
On the second day of
the bombardment, a system of signalling was introduced to give the people
warning that "Long Tom" had speeded one of his shell towards Kimberley. A
signaller was posted at the Conning Tower and kept observation on
Kamfersdam; as soon as he noticed a puff of smoke issue from the muzzle of
the Boer gun, he waved a flag. On this signal, buglers who had been
stationed in suitable positions sounded a "G". "Long Tom" being some 4 miles
from the centre of the town, the people were in many instances able to seek
the protection of some kind of shelter and thus avoid being hit by fragments
or splinters of the shell. Usually about 15 seconds elapsed between the
sounding of the bugle alarm and the arrival of "Long Tom's" messenger of
death.
RHODES PROPOSES TO
CALL A PUBLIC MEETING
Of the total of
approximately 50,000 people in Kimberley and Beaconsfield at this time,
about 20,000 were whites, one half of them being of Dutch extraction.
Consequently, there was quite a large body of persons within our defence
lines whose sympathies were entirely on the side of the Boers, and many of
them made no attempt to conceal the fact. This was the factor that created
the element of weakness in the military situation on the Diamond Fields. It
had already been reported to military Headquarters both by the Staff Officer
of the Kimberley Town Guard and the detectives of the Cape Police who were
attached to the Intelligence Department that, in a certain Dutch quarter of
the town, a movement had been started for a demonstration in favour of
surrender. Kekewich attached no undue importance to these reports, but, with
the advent of "Long Tom," he had to reckon with the possibility of the
anti-British section of the population attempting to stampede their fellow
citizens into taking a step prejudicial to the military interests.
It will be readily
realized that the existence of the divided allegiance of a large proportion
of the people in Kimberley to which reference has been made was at all times
a source of anxiety to Kekewich. It need hardly be said then that he was
naturally much per turbed when the Mayor of Kimberley (Oliver) called | to
see him early on the morning of 9th February and informed him that Rhodes
had sent a note to him (the Mayor) saying that it was his intention, in
exercise of his rights as a ratepayer, to call a public meeting in
Kimberley. Kekewich asked the Mayor to use his influence with Rhodes to
dissuade him, pointing out the danger those attending the meeting would run
should the Boers shell the building or other place of assembly decided upon
for the meeting. It seemed almost certain that the hour and place of meeting
would be notified to the enemy by their sympathizers; this had been done
already in connection with Scott Turner's funeral, and, in consequence, a
few minutes after the cortege was due to leave the hospital on the evening
of 29th November, the Boer artillery had opened fire and planted a shell in
the middle of crossroads, near the hospital, which the procession was to
pass. Fortunately, on that occasion some delay had occurred in moving off
from the hospital and, in consequence, no one was hit; the Boer artillery
fire was kept up that evening until after the three volleys at the
graveside, the cemetery also being shelled. Kekewich, at the same time,
stated that if Rhodes should still persist in requisitioning such a meeting,
an order would be issued forbidding it on military grounds. The Mayor was
one of the few independent men on the Diamond Fields; he was clear-headed
and fully appreciated Kekewich's point of view, and was ready to support the
Commandant in the matter.
Later in the morning,
Rhodes called at the military Headquarters and informed Kekewich that he was
arranging with the Mayor for a meeting of the citizens of Kimberley, in
order that their views should be forwarded to Lord Roberts. Kekewich
informed Rhodes that such a meeting might seriously prejudice the military
interests and that he had already most strongly impressed the seriousness of
the situation on the Field-Marshal who was therefore fully informed thereon.
Kekewich intimated that he would forbid the holding of any such meeting if
the matter was persisted in. Rhodes thereupon became exceedingly violent and
let himself go; he stated that unless full and definite information were
given him within 48 hours of every step and measure being taken by the
military for the relief of Kimberley, he would call a meeting in spite of
any orders forbidding it. "Before Kimberley surrenders," he shouted, "I will
take good care that the English people shall know what I think of all this."
After this outburst, Rhodes rushed out of the office.
In the meantime,
"Long Tom" continued to bombard the town; it opened fire at 6 a.m. on the
9th. The shelling was particularly heavy this day and several buildings were
struck and badly damaged; some civilians were, unfortunately, also hit and
injured by fragments of Boer six-inch shell—these fragments in some cases
did damage at a distance of over 200 yards from the spot where the shell of
which they formed part first struck the ground. "Long Tom" remained in
action until dusk; the last shell fired by it before the gun-team ceased its
labours for the day was responsible for a terrible tragedy. This projectile
struck the south-east corner of the roof of the Grand Hotel, causing the
walls of the building to collapse inwards. Labram, who had been directing
the fire of "Long Cecil" during the day, had but a few minutes earlier
entered his bedroom, which was situated in the top story of the hotel, in
order to get ready for dinner. He appears to have been standing at a
wash-stand placed in the very corner of the building that was struck; he was
crushed to death by the falling masonry. The event caused immense sorrow in
the town, no one being more grieved at the fatality than Kekewich, who had
made so close a friend of Labram that it almost seemed they had known one
another all their lives.
Kekewich recognized
that it was imperative that strong measures should be taken to keep down
"Long Tom's" fire; the damage that was being done by it was considerable. He
hit upon the expedient of pushing forward "snipers" as close up to the gun
emplacement on the Kamfersdam debris heap as possible. A natural bank,
giving good cover to riflemen, existed some 1,500 yards to the southward of
"Long Tom's" position; a dozen picked shots occupied this bank one hour
before daybreak on the morning of the 10th, taking their rations with them.
The duty was assigned to them of dealing with "Long Tom"; throughout the
whole day, as soon as the muzzle of the gun showed signs of movement, i.e.,
when the Boer artillerymen started to run it up into the firing position,
our "snipers" poured well-sustained volleys directed on the embrasure
through which the gun fired. How very efficacious was the fire of our
"snipers" can be gathered from a record in the diary of the Frenchman to
which allusion has already been made. He states under the date 10th
February:
"Reveilles ce matin 1
5 h. par obus qui tombent dans notre camp de waterworks. Entendons vive
fusillade cote Kimberley; courons Camfordam. Tranchees anglaises etablies
pendant nuit a 1,200 m.; tres dangereux pour pointeur. Dum dum et lee
sifflent dru; impossible repondre. Rentrons camp."
The success met with
by our "snipers" was quickly apparent to us and was so marked that the
experiment was repeated daily for the remainder of the siege; the practice
adopted was for the detachment to take up its position in the advanced
trenches before it was daylight and to retire therefrom after dark each day,
the men laying out all day on the qui vive.
CIVILIANS DEMAND
IMMEDIATE RELIEF
The issue of the
Diamond Fields Advertiser for 10th February contained an article
entitled "Why Kimberley cannot wait"; it was really, in great part, a
repetition of Rhodes' tirade of the previous day; many of the phrases
uttered by him in Kekewich's office during the interview of the 9th being
reproduced almost word for word. This leading article, as was the case with
the one entitled "An Impossible Rumour,"
was not submitted to the Press Censor before publication. The article was a
hysterical one and particularly mischievous, since it disclosed very fully
the majority of the weak features in the military situation in Kimberley.
This being the second occasion on which the editor of the paper had wilfully
defied the military authorities, Kekewich issued orders for his arrest.
Apparently, Rhodes had foreseen that Kekewich would take such a step and had
taken the precaution to hide his man, who could not be found; reports
indicated that Rhodes had sent him down into one of the mines.
Rhodes called at
military Headquarters with the Mayor of Kimberley at about 2.30 on the
afternoon of the 10th. Addressing Kekewich, who was at the time seated at
his desk, Rhodes started off: "Yesterday, you forbad a public meeting, but I
have held a meeting all the same; it was attended by the twelve leading
citizens in Kimberley." He then informed Kekewich that at the meeting in
question a document had been drawn up containing the views of these
gentlemen; he had it in his hands and tendered it to Kekewich. The latter
then stated that he had received two heliographic messages from Lord Roberts
in reply to the representations which he, as Commandant, Kimberley, had made
as to the situation in the besieged town. Kekewich expressed the view that
Rhodes should, before handing in the document in his possession, read the
Commander-in-Chief's messages— these messages were framed in a most friendly
tone and counselled patience for a few days longer. Having read these
communications and stated that he was not satisfied with their contents,
Rhodes now persisted in his request that Kekewich should receive the
communication containing the views of the leading citizens of Kimberley and
demanded that the representations therein contained should immediately be
"flashed" in extenso to Lord Roberts. Kekewich told Rhodes that, as our
messages could all be read by the Boers, the communication he had handed in
would have to be put into cipher, and, being so very long, no promise could
be made that the whole of it would be sent off the same day, as the
signallers were very busy dealing with military work. Kekewich, however,
undertook to send a precis of it off as soon as it had been coded. Rhodes
thereupon flew into a violent rage and was most vituperative; inter alia, he
accused Kekewich of having withheld the text of Wessels' ultimatum from the
people of Kimberley (for the part Rhodes played in this matter, see p. 52 et
seq.) and of keeping him in ignorance of the fact that the
Commander-in-Chief had arrived at the Modder River (Kekewich was at this
time himself ignorant as to the whereabouts of Lord Roberts, who, for
obvious reasons, wished to keep his movements secret).
Rhodes also again made grossly insulting remarks about the British Army and,
finally, clenching his fist, made a rush at Kekewich, shouting the
meanwhile: "I know what damned rot your signallers are wasting their time in
signalling. You low, damned, mean cur, Kekewich, you deny me at your peril"
The Mayor and a staff officer were standing in front of Kekewich's desk and
Rhodes' doubled fist shot over their shoulders. Kekewich at once rose from
his desk; he was ashen pale and the fire of fierce anger shone in his eyes.
For a moment it looked as if the two men would come to blows, but Rhodes
suddenly turned round and made for the door and was hastily followed out by
the Mayor.
Murray had been
waiting in an adjacent room for an interview with the Commandant; he had
heard all that had passed during Rhodes's visit and tactfully made his
business short. Kekewich then went into the question as to the manner in
which the communication left by Rhodes should be dealt with; he decided that
the essential parts of the communication should be put into code, the
language used in the original text being followed without alteration. The
full text was as follows:
" On behalf of the
inhabitants of these towns, we respectfully desire to be informed whether
there is any intention on your part to make an immediate effort for our
relief. Your troops have been for more than two months within a distance of
little over twenty miles from Kimberley, and if the Spytfontein Hills are
too strong for them there is an easy approach over a level flat. These towns
with a population of over 45,000 people have been besieged for 120 days and
a large portion of the inhabitants has been enduring great hardships. Scurvy
is rampant amongst the natives; children, owing to a lack of proper food,
are dying in great numbers, and dysentery and typhoid are very prevalent.
The chief food of the whites have been bread and horseflesh for a long time
past, and of the blacks meal and salt only. These hardships we think you
will agree have been borne patiently and without complaint by the people.
During the past few days 'die enemy has brought into action from a position
three miles from us a 6-inch gun, throwing a 100-pound shell, which is
setting fire to our buildings and is daily causing death among the
population. As you are aware the military guns here are totally unable to
cope with this new gun. The only weapon which gives any help is one locally
manufactured. Under these circumstances, as representing this community, we
feel that we are justified in asking whether you have any immediate
intention of instructing your troops to come to our relief. We understand
that large reinforcements have recently arrived in Cape Town and we feel
sure your men at Modder River have at the outside 10,000 Boers opposed to
them. You must be the judge as to what number of British troops would be
required to deal with this body of men, but it it absolutely essential that
immediate relief should be afforded to this place."
As a first step, a
short summary of the above communication was at once prepared and embodied
in cipher message which was sent to the Chief of Staff the same day; it ran
as follows:
"F. M.'s of 9th Feb.
and C 85 this date communicated three leading citizens and I trust will have
excellent effect. Mayor, Rhodes and nine other leading citizens held private
meeting to-day before F. M.'s two messages received. Rhodes and Mayor called
at my office this afternoon presenting lengthy document for communication by
flash to yon. Summary as follows: first, answer required whether immediate
effort being made to relieve Kimberley; second, duration siege, shortness
proper food, hardship endured, disease prevalent strongly represented;
third, consternation destruction life and property caused by enemy's siege
gun pointed.out; fourth, their views military situation stated."
LORD ROBERTS REPLIES
During the afternoon,
and within a very short time of the transmission, of the foregoing
communication, Kekewich received a message from the Commander-in-Chief, with
instructions that a certain part thereof should be communicated to Rhodes
and the Major of Kimberley. The message to the civilians ran as follows:
" I beg you represent
to the Mayor and Rhodes as strongly as you possibly can disastrous and
humiliating effect of surrendering after so prolonged and glorious defence.
Many days cannot possibly pass before Kimberley will be relieved, as we
commence active operations to-morrow. Our further military operations depend
in a large degree on your maintaining your position a very short time
longer."
In the latter part of
this message Kekewich was instructed to forbid any public meeting in
Kimberley and to go even to the length of arresting any person, however high
or influential his position, who might attempt to act in defiance of his
orders. No name was mentioned, but it was quite clear that Lord Roberts
realized who was the prime mover in the agitation now on foot in the Diamond
Fields in relation to immediate relief. Finally, Kekewich was informed that
arrangements for the relief of Kimberley were complete. Certain information
had been asked for concerning the topography of the country and the water
supply in the region southward of Kimberley, and particularly in the
direction of Jacobsdal, and this had been furnished, with blue-prints of a
map prepared in Kimberley from route reconnaissances made by a Special
Service Officer only a short while before the Diamond Fields were isolated.
The Commander-in-Chief instructed Kekewich to look out for helio signals in
four or five days' time in a direction south-east and south-south-east of
Kimberley. This seemed to indicate that at last the route which Kekewich
had, in his early messages to Orange River, advocated as being the best for
the last stage of the journey into Kimberley was about to be adopted by the
force now being sent to our relief.
Copies of the part of
the message intended for the civilians were, in accordance with Lord
Roberts' instructions, sent immediately to Rhodes, to the Civil Commissioner
and to the Mayor of Kimberley. Kekewich was, however, somewhat uneasy
concerning the publicity which might be given in relation to relief plans by
the recipients of tie message; he felt that it would be unwise to publish
the fact broadcast that the Relief Column was about to advance at once, as
the information was sure to get out to the Boers within an hour or two of
its becoming known to the public, with consequences which might prove
unfortunate. For this reason, not only were the communications marked
"Secret" and the usual precautions taken, but a covering letter was also
sent to each of the addressees; therein they were requested in express
language not to divulge the contents of Lord Roberts' message to anyone.
Rhodes, however, still refused to consider any information concerning
military matters communicated to him either as confidential or secret;
accordingly, he read the message publicly at the Sanatorium Hotel and also
on the stoep of the Kimberley Club, prefacing his act with a statement that
the military authorities had marked the communication to him "Secret" and
had also written requesting that the contents of the message should not be
divulged.
Later, some one
appears to have called Rhodes' attention to the significance of the
introductory words of Lord Roberts' message. Anyhow, at 6 p.m. Rhodes'
private secretary called at military Headquarters with a message from Rhodes
to the Commander-in-Chief and asked that it should be signalled to Modder
River. The message ran: "There is no fear of our surrendering, but we are
getting very anxious about the state of the British Army. It is high time
you did something." Kekewich pointed out to the bearer of the message that
its tone was highly offensive and he could not be a party to its
transmission. The private secretary then returned to his own headquarters,
but only to be back with Kekewich in less than an hour afterwards. Rhodes
had altered the phrasing of his message, which now ran: "Thanks for your
message. We have never thought or spoken of surrendering, but the endless
delay of your predecessor led us to believe that no efforts were being made
for our relief and by force of circumstances this community would have been
crushed. I thought it right to send you the situation from the principal
citizens."
It is necessary to
deal here with a suggestion made by partisans of Rhodes; they have stated
that Kekewich seems to have assumed that Rhodes deliberately intended to
advise the citizens to surrender, and on the 9th communicated this
impression to Lord Roberts. Kekewich made no such assumption. Further, in a
letter dated 11th November 1900, addressed by Lord Roberts' Military
Secretary to the Mayor of Kimberley, a categorical denial is given to the
allegations made against Kekewich to the effect that he reported that
surrender was contemplated and that he mentioned 17th February as the latest
date to which the town could hold out.
The Military Secretary, in the concluding sentence of his letter states,
"his Lordship gathered that the situation was of exceptional gravity." To
represent that a situation is one of "extreme gravity" does not amount to a
suggestion that the citizens of a besieged town have been given counsel to
surrender.
Rhodes, however badly
he behaved, certainly had no intention to counsel surrender, but both in the
language he used to Kekewich and in the letters and communications addressed
by him to the military authorities, he seems to have set to work
deliberately to create the impression that Kimberley might surrender if the
Relief Column did not hurry up. Attention has already been called to the
fact that in his evidence given before the War Commission, Buller stated
that a threat to surrender had been read into the messages sent to Cape Town
by Rhodes and his friends in October;
these messages neither Kekewich nor his Staff had seen. Having knowledge of
these earlier messages, it is perhaps not surprising that when the bare
information was communicated by Kekewich to Lord Roberts that Rhodes was
proposing to call a public meeting, the Commander-in-Chief should have
assumed that the question of surrender might be forced to the front,
possibly by some irresponsible group of persons in the town with strong
leanings towards the cause of the Boer Republics. Kekewich's own view was
that Rhodes was bluffing, and he felt that the latter, a man possessing the
immense power and influence he did, was, in playing the leading part in a
game of bluff adverse to the highest interests of the State, acting in a
particularly reprehensible and dangerous manner.
KEKEWICH EXPLAINS THE
DIFFICULTIES OF HIS POSITION
In order that Lord
Roberts should fully appreciate the conditions under which the defence of
Kimberley was being carried on by him, Kekewich sent a telegram in the
following terms to his Lordship on the morning of 11th February:
"Rhodes during siege
has done excellent work; and also, when his views on military questions have
coincided with mine, he has readily assisted me, but he desires to control
the military situation. I have refused to be dictated to by him. On such
occasions, he has been grossly insulting to me, and in his remarks on the
British Army. More can be explained when we meet. I have put up with insults
so as not to risk the safety of the defence: the key to the military
situation here in one sense is Rhodes, for a large majority of the Town
Guardsmen, Kimberley Light Horse and Volunteers are De Beers' employes. I
fully realize the powers conferred on me by the existence of Martial Law,
but have not sufficient military force to compel obedience. Conflict between
the few Imperial troops here and the local levies has been, and must
continue to be, avoided at all costs."
Was ever another
British commander placed in a more trying position? The above message
vividly describes the personal policy pursued by Kekewich . during the
siege; he wished to avoid taking any step or adopting any measure which
might "risk the safety of the defence." In the last quoted phrase lies the
explanation as to why Kekewich did not act with a violent hand against
Rhodes. It has been suggested that as the situation on the Diamond Fields
was a military one, Kekewich should, the moment Rhodes began to interfere,
have taken the strongest possible action against him. This is not the place
to discuss what should or should not have been done by Kekewich, but it may
be of interest to record that it has been argued at different times that one
or other of the following courses might have been adopted by Kekewich.
Rhodes ought to have been arrested and kept in military confinement until
the Relief Column arrived in Kimberley; he ought to have been ordered to
leave Kimberley at once and made to take his chance of avoiding capture by
the Boers; or he ought to have been tried under Martial Law, and even the
extreme penalty of that Law enforced against him.
Those who have made
the foregoing suggestions cannot have correctly appreciated the difficulties
of Kekewich's position. The very close contact in which the Commandant of
Kimberley lived with the people on the Diamond Fields had taught him that
although there were many who distrusted Rhodes, and even disliked him
intensely, yet his partisans were undoubtedly in the majority. Shortly after
Kimberley was isolated Kekewich had set up a Court of Summary Jurisdiction
to deal with offences under Martial Law. The Court was a mixed tribunal
presided over by a Judge of the Cape Supreme Court; its members were partly
civilians (Government officials whose normal duties were connected with the
administration of justice) and partly of soldiers (senior military
officers). The military members were too occupied with their purely military
duties to attend the meetings of the Court, which dealt extremely leniently
with the ordinary offenders brought before it. Rhodes could, of course, have
been arraigned before this Court, but the idea of the adoption of such a
course did not enter the mind of anyone at the military Headquarters in
Kimberley. Such a proposal would not have commended itself to Kekewich, had
it been made; even a threat to deal with Rhodes in this way would probably
have brought the two factions in Kimberley into collision and precipitated
matters.
Being a Sunday, there
was no shelling on this day (the 11th); however, in the afternoon a regular
panic prevailed in the town.
There had been rumours flying about the town that "Long Tom" would start
bombarding us again at midnight and that we were to have a very hot time of
it on Monday. Early in the afternoon, notices in bold letters were exhibited
in many places, and a cart, with a similar notice, was sent round the town;
they ran:
SUNDAY.—I RECOMMEND
WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO DESIRE COMPLETE SHELTER TO PROCEED TO KIMBERLEY AND
DE BEERS' SHAFTS. THEY WELL BE LOWERED AT ONCE IN THE MINES FROM 8 O'CLOCK
THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT. LAMPS AND GUIDES WILL BE PROVIDED. C. J. RHODES.
The suggestion that
the women and children should take shelter in the mines was a good one, but
in this matter Rhodes acted without in any way consulting either the
Commandant of Kimberley, or the Mayor. As soon as the people saw these
notices they concluded that Rhodes had private information of what was going
to happen on the morrow; in consequence, taking serious alarm, the young and
the old, whites and blacks, rushed for the mine-heads; they were lowered
promiscuously down into the galleries of the two mines named in the notice.
These operations began at 5.30 p.m., but were not completed until long after
midnight; more than 1,000 persons took refuge in tie Kimberley Mine and
about 1,500 in the De Beers Mine. Had the military and civil authorities
been consulted by Rhodes, as they ought clearly to have been, the end in
view could have been accomplished without causing any panic and, at the same
time, proper arrangements could have been made for feeding the people and
making other arrangements for their comfort. As it was, all the supply
arrangements in the town were disorganized and wastage occasioned. Moreover,
the women and children of all classes and colours were huddled together in
the galleries in the utmost confusion; no latrines were provided and the
conditions existing in the mine galleries were reported to beggar
description.
