The lassitude induced by the battle of Colenso affected each combatant on
the Tugela. The Boers put the finishing touches to their works on the left
bank, and at their leisure continued the position across the river eastwards
from Hlangwhane. They did not seem to have been withdrawn in force26
to assist the besiegers of Ladysmith in the great assault on Wagon
Hill and Caesar's Camp on January 6, for a demonstration ordered by Buller
at White's request during the crisis showed that the Tugela front was as
strongly held as ever.
On
January 8, Buller, whose Head Quarters were at Frere, was reinforced by the
Vth Division under Warren, and he now resumed his original plan, out of
which he had been scared by Magersfontein, of advancing on Ladysmith by way
of Potgieter's Drift, rejecting an alternative plan proposed by Warren,
which differed little from that by which the relief of Ladysmith was
effected six weeks later, of a direct advance by way of Hlangwhane and
Pieter's Hill. Between Buller's army and Ladysmith lay not only the tortuous
and difficult Tugela, but also a barrier of heights and ridges through which
there were but four or five possible ways of access, one of which had
already been tried without success, to the beleaguered city lying on a plain
considerably above the level of the open ground on the right bank of the
Tugela.
Buller, having selected the route which seemed at the time to be the line of
least resistance, began on January 9 to transfer the bulk of his force from
Frere to Springfield, a distance of sixteen miles, but owing to difficulties
of transport and the necessity of accumulating a large stock of supplies at
the new base, it was six days before the concentration was effected. One
brigade was left at Chieveley to watch the Boer front at Colenso.
In
Orders issued at Frere on January 9, Buller announced that he "proposed to
effect the passage of the Tugela in the neighbourhood of Potgieter's Drift,
with a view to the relief of Ladysmith." His scheme was based upon imperfect
information and misleading maps, and was in fact not so much a surprise
flank attack, as all his movements had to be made in full view of the enemy,
as an attack from a position higher up the river that must be frontal,
because the enemy would have ample time to make it so: and herein lay its
weakness. When, however, he personally surveyed the situation from Mount
Alice, which overlooks Potgieter's Drift, the aspect of the curving
amphitheatre showed the danger of attempting to force the river at that
point. On the N.E. was Vaalkrantz and Doornkop, and the high ridge of
Brakfontein, which the enemy had already begun to entrench, and over which
passed the road by which he proposed to reach Ladysmith, everywhere
commanded by the heights, filled the quadrant towards Spion Kop on the N.W.
On
January 13, Buller reported to the War Office that, having found the
Potgieter's Drift scheme impracticable, he proposed as "the only possible
chance for Ladysmith" to send Warren across at Trickhardt's Drift, five
miles higher up the river. The new scheme was based upon a theory which had
been evolved out of the experiences of autumn manoeuvre battles collated on
the office desks of Pall Mall, that the easiest method of defeating the
enemy with a small casualty list was to contain his front and attack one or
both of his flanks; and General Officers had come to regard this as the
regulation opening to which they were bound to conform.
Buller divided his force into two unequal portions. Warren with the stronger
portion was to attack the Boer right which Buller believed to be weak, while
Lyttelton with the remainder demonstrated at Potgieter's Drift. To himself
Buller reserved the part of the Chorus in a Greek play, taking a general
interest in the action, yet not personally concerned in it; and in that
capacity he issued a stirring appeal to the relieving force.
On
January 15 "secret instructions" were given to Warren. He was recommended,
after crossing the Tugela at Trickhardt's Drift, to proceed west of Spion
Kop, and to pivot his right and swing round on to the open plain in rear of
the Boer position facing Potgieter's Drift.
Warren, who was not of opinion that the Boer right was weak, marched out of
Springfield on the evening of January 16. Lyttelton had already started, and
during the night occupied a position on the north side of the river near
Potgieter's Drift.
The task before Warren was hard. In order to carry out Buller's plan he must
cross an unbridged river and struggle through a country of which little was
known. Next day two bridges were thrown over the Tugela above Trickhardt's
Drift, which recent rains had made dangerous, and Hart's and Woodgate's
Brigades were transferred to the left bank to cover the crossing: but it was
not until sunset on January 18 that the entire force with its tedious
transport was established on the north side of the river.
The mounted troops under Dundonald were sent out at mid-day to reconnoitre
towards the N.W. and in the course of the afternoon his advanced squadrons
came upon a Boer commando which was easily dealt with, but before the issue
was decided, he had reported that he was engaged near Acton Holmes, and
asked for help. Warren assumed that the mounted troops, which he had sent
out to reconnoitre, had wilfully and prematurely forced on an action, and
were now in trouble; and it was not until the next morning, after an
infantry brigade had been moved out to support them, that Warren heard from
Dundonald, whose previous messages had not clearly described the situation,
that he was able to take care of himself. Dundonald had at first expected
that the main body would follow him, and his reports seem to show that he
had hoped to induce Warren to move towards Acton Holmes. He was rebuked for
assuming, not unnaturally, that the objective of the operations was
Ladysmith, and instructed that the objective was a junction with the other
portion of Buller's force. He was summoned to Warren's headquarters and
ordered to abstain from further attempts to ride round the enemy's right.
Thus, as before at Hlangwhane, a promising cavalry movement by Dundonald was
thrown away.
The deliberate march of the British Army from Frere and the delay at the
Drifts gave the Boers ample time to prepare for the attack. On January 19,
on which day Warren moved to Venter's Spruit three miles from Trickhardt's
Drift, they were in occupation of the whole line from Vaalkrantz to the
Rangeworthy Heights. Fourie was in command of the left, Schalk Burger of the
centre, which included the important features of Green Hill, Spion Kop, and
the Twin Peaks; and L. Botha of the right, in which was Bastion Hill.
There were two roads by which Warren could advance; one running by Fairview
northwards from Trickhardt's Drift between Green Hill and Three Tree Hill,
and the other eight miles longer by Acton Holmes. The length of the latter
and a report from White that several commandos were on their way to Acton
Holmes from Ladysmith, led Warren to adopt the former route.
He
informed Buller of his decision, adding that certain "special arrangements"
which he had made would oblige him to remain near Trickhardt's Drift, and
that he must therefore have further supplies. The "special arrangements"
were in fact the steps which every general would take before attacking a
strong position not immediately accessible; namely to acquire ground from
which it could be threatened and shelled. Clery was ordered to direct the
operation, which Warren believed would entail "comparatively little loss of
life."
Early on January 20 Clery with one brigade and artillery advanced up the
re-entrant which springs from the river towards the east end of the
Rangeworthy Heights, and posted his guns half way up the valley on Three
Tree Hill. Hart, with a brigade of five battalions, was sent to occupy the
irregular southern crest of the heights running from Three Tree Hill towards
Bastion Hill. He drove the Boers out of their advanced trenches, but found
that the northern and higher crest to which they had retired, could only be
won by a frontal advance across open ground. He and his brave Irishmen were
as ready as ever to push on in the line of the greatest resistance, but he
was ordered by Clery to forbear. Meanwhile Dundonald, not deterred by the
damping of his trek on the 18th, and while obeying an order from Warren to
come to heel, seized Bastion Hill, thereby securing Hart's left flank on the
crest. So far as they went, the operations of January 20 were successful.
Warren's pivot movement was in train, the whole of his force was now
threatening the Boer right which was widely extended but deficient in depth;
and the day's casualties were few. Following the example of Buller, who
delegated his authority to Warren, the latter entrusted the conduct of the
day's operations to Clery, who in succession ordered the chief movement to
be carried out by Hart. Next day the mounted troops on Bastion Hill were
relieved by infantry.
Buller was aware that the Ladysmith garrison, weakened by sickness and
privation, could give him little or no help; but at least during the earlier
phase of the Trickhardt's Drift operations he was confident. On January 17
he told White that "somehow he thought he was going to be successful this
time," and that he hoped to be within touch of Ladysmith in six days. His
Head Quarters were at Spearman's Camp, a few miles south of Mount Alice,
whence he rode over daily to note and criticize the tactics.
It
now occurred to Warren that he might have been mistaken as to the
significance of the position occupied by the enemy on the Rangeworthy
Heights, and that it might be in reality a screen to hide a trek of the Free
Staters back to their own country; and on this supposition, which was
founded upon reports that the Siege of Ladysmith had been raised and that
some wagons had been seen on trek westwards towards the Drakensberg passes,
he applied for reinforcements to enable him to block the way.
Buller sent him Talbot Coke's brigade with some howitzers; and came over to
consult with him on January 22. The situation was not satisfactory. Time was
being wasted, Warren's "special arrangements" had done little, and now he
had a new idea. Buller still advocated an attack on the enemy's right, while
Warren wished to persevere with his advance by the Fairview Road; but he
pointed out that Spion Kop, which his reading of the "secret instructions"
had led him to regard as out of bounds, must first be taken. No definite
action seems to have been decided on, and Warren was left to act within
certain limits on his own responsibility. Finally, with the approval of the
four infantry generals, he resolved to seize Spion Kop that night. The
attack, however, was postponed until the following night, to give time for
the position to be reconnoitred.
Spion Kop is a ridge of which the chief features are a pair of high peaks
joined by a nek to a plateau, from which a spur, ending in a kopje called
Conical Hill, juts out at right angles to the nek, which becomes a spur of
the plateau at a Little Knoll east of the summit. Its tactical importance
was derived from its height, as the summit, though not the peaks, is higher
than any of the ground held by the enemy; and from its position, as it was
on the obtuse angle formed by the meeting of Botha's line on the Boer right
with Schalk Burger's on the centre, and enfiladed each of them. It was
accessible from the British front by a slope which rises from the lower
ground to another spur running S.W. from the plateau.
On
the morning of January 23, Buller saw Warren, and again pressed him to make
an attack on the Boer right; but finding that the orders for the assault on
Spion Kop had already been issued, he refrained from vetoing it. He
threatened, however, that if immediate action in some direction were not
taken, Warren's force would be withdrawn to the south of the Tugela.
On
the previous day Warren, betraying the Engineer officer unused to handling
large bodies of men, and unfamiliar with the military unities, rearranged
his command with a straight edge, and distributed it in one way for
tactical, and in another for administrative purposes. All the troops lying
west of an imaginary line became the left attack under Clery, while those
east of it became the right attack. The latter, under Talbot Coke, were
ordered to seize the Spion Kop position by night, and entrench it before
daybreak, the actual assault being made by Woodgate with two battalions,
some mounted infantry on foot, and a few Engineers. At sunset on January 23,
the curtain fell upon the first act of the Tragedy of Spion Kop.
On
the night of the January 23 Spion Kop was held as an observation post by a
party of seventy burghers. When Buller first appeared at Potgieter's Drift,
it was on the right of the Boer line, but now it was only the right of the
centre under Schalk Burger. Little was known of its features and tactical
value, beyond the information obtainable by a telescopic reconnaissance. It
was a prominent object in the Boer position, and it seemed to be within the
grasp of a night adventure. Woodgate left his rendezvous at 9 p.m., but it
is doubtful whether he would have reached the summit before daybreak but for
Thorneycroft, who was in command of the mounted infantry which bore his
name, and who had before nightfall picked out and noted the recognizable
objects on the slope. A staff officer from Head Quarters, who accompanied
the column to direct the march, had had no opportunity of making himself
acquainted with the way of access to Spion Kop, and Thorneycroft was ordered
to act as guide.
The summit, but fortunately little more than the summit, was veiled in mist,
and the crest was reached. Bayonets were fixed before the Boer picket was
alarmed and opened fire, but the ammunition was spent without effect, as
Thorneycroft's men had by order thrown themselves on the ground as soon as
they were discovered. A charge into the mist drove back the picket and
scared the main body off the summit. Thus before dawn on January 24, Warren
was in possession of the hill which was believed to be the key of the Boer
position, and the chief obstacle in the way of his advance seemed to be
thrust aside: but the mist on Spion Kop was the forecast of the Fog of War
which was soon to envelope him.
Woodgate, having the men, the tools and the ground, at once began
impulsively to dig, without endeavouring to inform himself of the features
of the position he had so easily won. A sort of a trench had been scratched
on the summit by the weary men, when the mist rolling away for a little
while disclosed the startling topography of the position. The surface of the
plateau sloped gently at first, and then abruptly fell away, and the trench
was found to be of little use. The enemy could approach on dead ground to
within two hundred yards of it. Woodgate, seeing that the real defensible
line was not the highest part of the summit, but the edge lower down, where
the steep descent began, sent working parties to the front, but they at once
came under fire. Soon the mist again enveloped the hill, and having disposed
his force, he reported to Warren that he had established himself on Spion
Kop.
The Boer outpost which had been driven from the summit belonged to Schalk
Burger's command. With Botha's co-operation a storming force was soon
brought together, and almost every point from which Spion Kop could be
brought under fire was seized, even the Little Knoll near the summit, which
enfiladed the main trench. Joubert telegraphed from Ladysmith that the
position must be re-captured, and Kruger at Pretoria asked what was being
done to win it back.
Little did Woodgate's force realize what the morning mist was hiding. Soon
after 8 a.m. the sun dissolved the veil, and the storm burst. From the right
the men in the trench and lower crest were enfiladed by the Little Knoll and
the Twin Peaks; on their front and left they were rained on by bullet and
shrapnel from Conical Hill, Green Hill, and beyond; with such effect that
the lower crest had to be temporarily abandoned. Woodgate was soon mortally
wounded and the command devolved upon Crofton. Spion Kop was the first
position of great tactical importance won by the British Army on the Tugela,
and the Boers were determined to recover it.
The naval guns posted on Mount Alice and at Potgieter's Drift opened fire
not only on the Little Knoll near the Spion Kop plateau and on the Twin
Peaks, but were also pitching their shells over the summit on to the Boer
positions supposed to be in line with it, and a field battery on Three Tree
Hill shelled the open ground on which the enemy was advancing.
Heliograms and flag messages from Spion Kop, orally handed in and
incorrectly transmitted by scared signallers, bewildered the recipients and
increased the density of the Fog of War upon the Tugela. To Lyttelton was
flashed an appeal for help without a signature. A message sent by Crofton
soon after he assumed command, in which he reported Woodgate's death and
said that reinforcements were urgently required, was transmuted into a
despairing cry which made Warren think that he had lost his head, and which
led to his supersession. Warren replied that there must be no surrender, and
that Coke was on his way up with reinforcements.
Warren and Lyttelton, as well as the Umpire in Chief, Buller, were too far
away to be able to appreciate the situation on Spion Kop, or to know how
much or how little of the ridge was in possession of the British troops.
Lyttelton's naval guns, playing upon the Little Knoll, were twice silenced
by a message from Warren, who was under the impression that the whole of the
ridge from the Twin Peaks to the main position on Spion Kop was held. A
demonstration made earlier in the day by Lyttelton towards Brakfontein was
checked by Buller, who was unwilling to engage the enemy in that direction.
The Boers, a small party of whom before Woodgate's death had climbed the
dead ground, and had come within fifty yards of the main trench, again
attained the outer crest, and a counter attack led by Thorneycroft in person
partially failed, and although the verge was not wholly abandoned, only the
main trench filled with dead, wounded, and unwounded men parched with
thirst, remained for effective resistance. Woodgate had already paid the
penalty for the hasty and fatal act of squatting down in an indefensible
position, and lay among the other victims strewn upon the plateau; but the
British soldier is not easily discouraged by the errors of his leaders. The
cry "nous sommes trahis" is never heard from his lips, and when called upon
on active service,
To
live laborious days and shun delights,
he rarely fails to do his duty.
At
mid-day the situation on Spion Kop was hazardous but not hopeless.
Reinforcements had arrived and were quickly absorbed in the works which they
quickened with patches of new vigour, but the terrible hail of bullet and
shrapnel was not abated. No definite orders had been given to Clery, who was
on the southern crest of the Rangeworthy Heights, except that he was to "use
his discretion about opening fire against the enemy to his front, with a
view to creating a diversion," a discretion which he exercised by doing
nothing.
Shortly before noon a step was taken by Buller, who was four miles away on
Mount Alice, which enlarged the area of the Fog of War and brought Spion Kop
within its chilling grasp. Thorneycroft was ordered to take command on the
summit with the local rank of Brigadier-General, although there were several
officers present senior to him: but many hours elapsed before the
appointment was made known to all of those whom it most concerned. Coke, who
was now on the S.W. spur, was unaware of it, and without communicating with
Thorneycroft, sent at 12.50 p.m. to Warren a message which was not delivered
till 2.20 p.m., that as the summit was crowded and the defence was
maintaining itself, he had stopped further reinforcements.
Almost simultaneously with the despatch of this not unfavourable report, and
long before it was received by Warren, two companies posted in a detached
trench on the right threw up their hands, but not before they had lost all
their officers. Out of the crest line sprang the Boers, who having made them
prisoners, endeavoured to impose the surrender upon the men in the main
trench.27 Thorneycroft saw that if these wavered, as they seemed
inclined to do, all was lost; and rallying the details within reach, he
succeeded in thrusting back the intruders, who, however, had already sent
their prisoners below the hill. His prompt action stayed the wave of doubt
which threatened to flood the position, and compelled it to break before it
could do much harm.
At
3.50 p.m. Coke, who was still on the S.W. spur, and therefore not in direct
touch with Thorneycroft, informed Warren that the enemy was being gradually
cleared from the summit, and that he had been reinforced with the Scottish
Rifles from Potgieter's Drift by Lyttelton, whom Warren, after receiving
Crofton's mis-transmitted message, had ordered to co-operate. He had already
forwarded a letter written at 2.30 p.m. by Thorneycroft, stating that the
force on Spion Kop was being badly punished by artillery, was in want of
water, and was insufficient to hold the position. To this letter he had
added a note of his own which showed that he did not attach much importance
to it, saying that he had ordered more troops on to the plateau, where "we
appear to be holding our own." This letter, with Coke's covering note, did
not reach Warren until after he had received Coke's message sent nearly an
hour later, and he assumed that the latter indicated the existing hopeful
situation with which he had to deal. Of the physical features of the Spion
Kop position he knew little more than what his telescope told him, and he
read optimistically the meagre, inconsistent, and misleading reports which
reached him occasionally from the summit. He hoped during the night to place
some naval guns on the plateau: he was informed that an accessible spring of
water had been discovered: reinforcements were at hand: there was nothing
more to be done.
Lyttelton, when ordered to "assist from his side," acted with intelligence
and discernment. Noticing that Spion Kop, whither he had already dispatched
the Scottish Rifles, was full of men, he sent the King's Royal Rifles
towards the flanking position on the Twin Peaks, and the battalion supported
by the naval guns, and ignoring messages of recall prompted by Buller, who
was watching the advance with anxiety, worked its way up and expelled a
Transvaal contingent and a small body commanded by an Irish renegade, all of
whom were hurled by the impact into a flight of eight miles. The position
was at once entrenched and at 5 p.m. the right flank of Spion Kop was
secured, but only for a time. Again, as after Lord Dundonald's movement on
Acton Holmes, a promising enterprise was thrown away. Buller had from the
first disapproved of Lyttelton's action, which still more widely distributed
his already scattered command. He was too far away to see its bearing upon
the situation, and now ordered him to recall the King's Royal Rifles, who
after sunset were withdrawn from the position, which they had so gallantly
captured in spite of warnings signalled from Spion Kop that it was strongly
held by the enemy.
On
Spion Kop the Fog of War hung more densely than ever. Coke, who was lame and
unable to move freely about the position, believed that Hill, who had come
up with a reinforcement soon after noon, and who was next in seniority to
Crofton, was in command on the summit. He thought that Crofton had been
wounded, and neither saw Thorneycroft nor knew until the following day that
Warren had given him the local rank of Brigadier-General at Buller's
suggestion. Thorneycroft was a junior major in the Army, having the local
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel: and with two colonels senior to him present as
well as a major-general, he was doubtful as to his status. No instructions
reached him from Coke; he was unaware that the Twin Peaks had been taken by
one of Lyttelton's battalions, and he was without means of signalling to
Warren. He had no information of the measures which were being taken, such
as the dispatch of guns, to make the retention of Spion Kop possible.
The men on the summit were utterly exhausted by fatigue, hunger, thirst,
want of sleep, and exposure to the summer sun beating down upon the rocky
surface, and their ammunition was running short. At 5.50 p.m. Coke reported
"that the situation is extremely critical" and that the men "would not stand
another day's shelling," but it was two hours before the message reached
Warren. He ordered Coke to come down to consult him. Coke endeavoured to
obtain permission by flash signal to stay where he was, but no oil could be
obtained for the lamp, so regarding the order as imperative, he quitted
Spion Kop at 9.30 p.m., leaving, as he thought, Hill in command. For four
hours he strayed in the Fog of War before he found Warren's Head Quarters,
which had come under shell fire, and which, unknown to him, had been moved
from their original position.
Between 8 and 9, Warren received a letter written at 6.30 p.m. by
Thorneycroft, who reported that the enemy's shell fire rendered the
permanent occupation of Spion Kop impossible, and asked for instructions.
Coke's departure left the position without a clearly recognized commander,
although he had done little more than attend to and distribute the supports
and reinforcements on the S.W. spur. After the dispatch of Thorneycroft's
letter at 6.30 p.m., the situation grew more hopeless every minute. The
enemy's artillery was out of reach, the nature of the ground and the want of
tools made it impossible to cut properly designed trenches, rations and
water were exhausted, and nothing was known of assistance to be brought up
during the night except that a mountain battery, which would be of little
use against the enemy's guns, was at the foot of the slope.
For these reasons Thorneycroft justified in his official report his decision
to retire from Spion Kop. With the acquiescence of all the senior officers,
except Hill, who could not be found, he ordered a withdrawal at 10 p.m. The
alternative seemed to be a Majuba surrender next morning. At 10.30 p.m. as
the troops were beginning to move off the hill, he received a letter from
Warren, asking for his views on the situation, and as to the measures to be
adopted. It was now unnecessary to give these, and he sent a brief reply
that he was obliged to abandon Spion Kop as the position was untenable.
The retirement was not made without protests from Hill and from Coke's staff
officer who was still on the plateau. The former, eleven hours after
Thorneycroft's appointment as Brigadier-General, believed, as he had every
right to do, that he was in command, and halted the men; the latter sent
round a memorandum to the commanding officers, asserting that there was no
authority for the withdrawal. But the force of Thorneycroft's local rank
prevailed, and the retreat was not stayed. Near the foot of the slope he
found the mountain battery, and met a fatigue party on its way to prepare
emplacements for two naval guns which were coming up, and received a message
from Warren urging him to hold on to the position. It was too late. Ordering
back the party and the battery, he went on to report himself to Warren, and
arrived at Head Quarters almost simultaneously with Coke.
The Boers meanwhile were greatly discouraged by their expulsion from the
Twin Peaks, and their failure to occupy the main position on Spion Kop. The
guns which had tormented Thorneycroft for so many hours, and which were the
chief cause of his retirement, were withdrawn, and Schalk Burger's commandos
oozed away towards Ladysmith. But there was, however, a stalwart and not
inconsiderable remnant of burghers who responded to Botha's expostulations,
and stood fast as a forlorn hope determined to win back Spion Kop and the
Twin Peaks. Their constancy was rewarded, and when at sunrise on January 25
they once more climbed the hill, they found to their astonishment and relief
that it was still held—by more than 300 bodies of their fallen foes.
Such in brief is the tale of Spion Kop so far as it can be disentangled from
the accumulation of messages, orders, reports, dispatches, and personal
accounts, which obscure the subject. Many of these are inconsistent, not a
few contradictory, and sufficient evidence might be found to support
plausibly half a dozen conflicting theories of the cause of the disaster,
and as many variants of the narrative.
At
2 a.m. Warren heard from Thorneycroft's lips—the latter's written message
sent off at 10.30 p.m. on the previous evening not having reached him—of the
evacuation of Spion Kop. At sunrise he was joined by Buller, who viewed the
situation in a spirit of philosophic detachment. He had never cordially
approved of the Spion Kop adventure, and was not surprised to hear that it
had failed. Warren was inclined to persevere, but Buller decided to retire
south of the Tugela and assumed the direct command of the Army, which on
January 27 was once more drawn up on the right bank after an absence of ten
days; with most of its superior officers discredited, with Ladysmith
unrelieved, and the nation at home aghast at the disaster.
The lonely figure of Thorneycroft, the only man of action on the summit
energizing and quickening the defence, stands out prominently in the
confusion, gloom, and half lights of Spion Kop. Buller's impulsive
intervention made him responsible for the position, and he tried to do his
best. If the final act was an error of judgment, there is little doubt that
but for Thorneycroft, the Boers would have rushed the plateau on the
afternoon of January 24. He received no effective support from Clery and
little from Warren, and was out of touch with Coke and the Colonels. His
uncertainty as to his authority caused him to refrain from exercising it
fully until the last moment. For the pain which the decision to withdraw
must have given him, he deserves much sympathy. But although it was approved
of by Buller, who probably felt bound to support his nominee, it was at
least premature. He might reasonably have expected that an effort would be
made during the night to relieve him, and might have postponed it for a few
hours. It is unjust to judge a man in the light of eventualities which he
could not reasonably be expected to foresee, but subsequent accounts from
the Boer side show that the attack would not have been renewed the next
morning if the enemy had found the Twin Peaks, for the evacuation of which
Buller and not Thorneycroft was responsible, and Spion Kop still occupied.
Not only the inconvenience, but also the danger of suddenly conferred local
rank were illustrated on January 24. Buller, hastily concluding from a
garbled message that Crofton was incompetent, asked Warren to put
Thorneycroft in charge. Thorneycroft heard of his appointment orally through
an officer who had chanced to be at the signalling station, and the written
message which never reached him was, it is said, picked up next day by a
Boer! If the exigencies of war should ever require the sudden promotion of a
junior officer to a position of great responsibility, it should not take
effect until all concerned are notified. The defence of Spion Kop was,
during the greater part of the day, conducted by a syndicate of officers
acting severally.
The curtain had fallen, the drama was over, and the critics took up their
pens. With Thorneycroft's report on the retirement from Spion Kop began a
controversy which lasted for more than two years. Warren enclosed it in his
own report to Buller, with the suggestion that a Court of Enquiry should be
held to investigate the circumstances of the unauthorized withdrawal, and in
succession each grade of the military hierarchy passed censure on the grades
below. In Buller's covering despatch of January 31 with which he forwarded
to the War Office, through Lord Roberts, Warren's Spion Kop report, he
commented very unfavourably on Warren's arrangements and disposition of
troops; and said that Thorneycroft had "exercised a wise discretion, and
that no investigation was necessary": while to Warren's general report on
the whole operations of January 17-27, he attached a memorandum to the
Secretary of State for War, "not necessarily for publication," in which he
not only blamed himself for not having taken command on the 19th, when he
saw "that things were not going well," but also said that he could "never
employ Warren again in an independent command"; as his slowness had allowed
the enemy to concentrate and to increase the force opposed to him more than
twenty-fold.
With this accumulation of censure Lord Roberts dealt in his despatch to Lord
Lansdowne of February 13, written at a drift on the Riet River during the
advance on Kimberley. The Commander-in-Chief confirmed all the censures
passed by his subordinates and added some of his own. Buller was rebuked for
not having intervened when he saw that a most important enterprise was not
being "conducted in the manner which in his opinion would lead to the
attainment of the object in view with the least possible loss of life on our
side"; Warren was reproved because he did not visit Spion Kop during the
crisis, and had instead ordered Coke to come to him; and while
Thorneycroft's gallantry and exertions, without which the troops would
probably have been driven off the hill during the day, were acknowledged,
his action in ordering the retirement without endeavouring to communicate
with Coke or Warren was pronounced to be a "wholly inexcusable assumption of
responsibility and authority."
Never before had such an inconvenient batch of despatches been laid upon the
desks of Pall Mall. To publish them and to proclaim to the world that the
Natal Generals, when they were beaten by the enemy, had began to fight among
themselves, was impossible. If they were withheld from publication, many
awkward questions would be asked. The War Office temporized, and endeavoured
to steer a middle course. Would Buller kindly substitute a simple narrative
for his despatch? This Buller refused to do, and in April, 1900, the War
Office published the despatches, imperfectly sterilized. As they now
appeared, they were neither a simple narrative, nor a full revelation. Lord
Roberts' criticisms on Buller were cut out. The memorandum, "not necessarily
for publication," in which Buller reflected severely on Warren's incapacity
was withheld. Only the censure passed upon Thorneycroft was allowed to
appear. The junior officer was made the scapegoat of his superiors'
mistakes. Of all the officers concerned, he alone had failed. The War Office
had taken a politic but not straightforward course. The blame must be laid
upon some one, and if it were laid upon Thorneycroft alone it would affect
public opinion less mischievously.
It
soon became suspected, however, that certain things were being kept back,
and the controversy dragged on for two years; Buller to the end maintaining
that as he was not present at, nor in command of, the Spion Kop operations,
it was not incumbent on him to write a simple narrative of them; and that
his duty was to write a critical account of the affair, such as would be
sent in by an Umpire in Chief during peace manoeuvres.
Not until April, 1902, did the Epilogue of the Tragedy of Errors appear. The
despatches, with the memorandum "not necessarily for publication," were
published in full, as well as the "Secret Orders" given to Warren at
Springfield, which were its Prologue.
Footnote 26:
A
detachment numbering about 600 only was sent.
Footnote 27:
In
the Fog of War some of the British soldiers thought that the Boers were
coming up to surrender themselves, and acted in this belief for a brief
period.
