The course of the war north of the Vaal after the battle of Diamond Hill up
to the date of Lord Roberts' arrival at Belfast seven weeks later was
tortuous and difficult. The main Army changed front as soon as Pretoria was
reached and faced to the east in the direction of the retreating Transvaal
Government. Its line of communication became a prolongation of its front;
its left flank towards the north was open; and on its rear was the unsubdued
country west of the capital in the direction of Mafeking and Vryburg.
Through this district, which is intersected by ranges running generally east
and west, and which contains some towns of importance, the troops set free
by the relief of Mafeking advanced in two columns towards Pretoria and
Johannesburg. The southern column was Hunter's Xth Division, which after
easily occupying Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, passed through Johannesburg,
and on Hunter's being sent into the Free State was broken up at Heidelberg.
The northern column, under Baden-Powell, occupied Rustenburg and met with
little opposition during the month of June. It was intended by Lord Roberts,
if all went well, that this column should eventually take up a position on
the Pietersburg railway, north of Pretoria, which was unprotected in that
direction.
The inactivity of the Boers seemed to show that they had really lost heart,
and that an awakening such as that which came a few weeks after the entry
into Bloemfontein was improbable. Earlier in the month of June there had
been negotiations for peace, not only between subordinate leaders in the
Free State and Natal, but also between the two Commanders-in-Chief in
Pretoria; and although they were broken off, the fact that they had occurred
made the silence more significant and gave hope that the enemy was
reconsidering his position.
The illusion was soon dispelled. Whether owing to the natural resilience of
the Boer character after a brief phase of doubt, or to the news of De Wet's
successful attacks on the railway in the Free State, the smouldering fires
broke out anew early in July. Delarey, who had checked French at Diamond
Hill, came out of the east to quicken the west; the baffled burghers of
Snyman, released from the siege of Mafeking, were trickling vaguely into the
district; a force under Grobler of Waterberg was reported north of Pretoria;
an incursion was made across the Vaal from the Free State; and commandos
appeared south of the Magaliesberg near Olifant's Nek and Commando Nek, thus
threatening the movements of Baden-Powell, who was operating north of the
range and who had occupied Commando Nek and the adjacent Zilikat's Nek on
July 2, leaving only a small force at Rustenburg. Five days later the Boers
failed in an attempt to recapture the town, which was saved by a detachment
of the Rhodesian Field Force.
This force, which was under the command of Sir F. Carrington, was composed
mainly of mounted contingents from the Colonies. It had been raised a few
months before at
the instance of the British South Africa Company to hold the northern
frontier of the Transvaal, which after Plumer's departure for the south was
unguarded, and to deny Rhodesia to the Boers should they attempt to break
out northwards. It was from the first under a sort of dual control which
militated against its efficiency. The Company made the arrangements for its
enrolment and equipment, while the War Office provided the staff. It was in
difficulties from the first. By a somewhat strained interpretation of a
treaty between Great Britain and Portugal, and after some weeks of
diplomatic discussion and in spite of a protest naturally made by the
Transvaal Government, the Rhodesian Field Force was permitted to land on
Portuguese territory at Beira in April and to move up country. Its advance
was further delayed by a break of gauge on the railway between Beira and
Buluwayo; it was pulled hither and thither, and was never able to co-operate
effectively with the general operations. It was moved in driblets, and some
details did not reach Buluwayo until September. A portion of it came along
the Western line, and Rustenburg was saved by the Imperial Bushmen. At the
end of the year it was disbanded.
On
July 11 three blows were struck by the Boers with success. The attempt on
Rustenburg drew back Baden-Powell, whose place at Zilikat's and Commando
Neks was taken by a regiment of regular cavalry which happened to be passing
that way. As it was required elsewhere, a body of infantry was sent out from
Pretoria to take over the Neks, and on the night of July 10 Zilikat's Nek
was held by three companies and a squadron. Next day, after a struggle which
lasted throughout the day, it was captured by Delarey, and two guns and
nearly 200 prisoners of war fell into his hands. The disaster, the first of
its kind in the Transvaal, was due to two causes. The British force actually
at the Nek was insufficient to hold it; and the main body of the cavalry
stood aloof. The latter was no doubt in a dubious position. It was under
orders, which were brought by the infantry relief, to meet Smith-Dorrien
nearly twenty-five miles away on July 11; and when the enemy was seen
occupying a strong position on the Nek, it assumed that assistance would be
of no avail, and beyond a short artillery bombardment nothing was done. Even
the squadron holding Commando Nek was ordered to retire at midday. A
relieving force was sent out from Pretoria, but it arrived too late to avert
the disaster.
The cavalry thus delayed was intended to reinforce a column under Smith-Dorrien,
who had come up into the Transvaal with Ian Hamilton's column, and who was
marching from Krugersdorp to take off the pressure from the south on
Baden-Powell at Rustenburg; Olifant's Nek, over which the road to the town
passed, being in the possession of the Boers. On July 11, when Smith-Dorrien
had marched about ten miles from his starting point, he met a commando at
Dwarsvlei, which was so well handled that not only was he compelled to
retire on Krugersdorp, but also had much difficulty in bringing away his
guns. The failure was chiefly due to the non-appearance of the cavalry,
without which he did not feel himself justified in standing up to the enemy.
On
the same day another cavalry regiment was in trouble. Onderste Poort, a few
miles north of Pretoria, was attacked by Grobler of Waterberg, and while
reinforcements were on their way he drove back still nearer to the capital
the force which was holding the outpost, and forced one troop to surrender.
The situation was alarming. The districts west and south-west of the capital
were infested by energetic commandos which had thwarted all Baden-Powell's
and Smith-Dorrien's efforts to suppress them, and Grobler was threatening
Pretoria from the north. There were indications that the enemy's plan was to
transfer the opposition from the east to the west; and if so, then Lord
Roberts' force, whose front after Diamond Hill faced eastwards, would have
to conform to the movement. A few weeks previously it had been weakened by
the departure of Hunter's strong column for the Free State, and now Lord
Roberts was compelled to redress the balance by calling up Methuen's
Division from Lindley to Krugersdorp, where it arrived on July 18. French
was ordered to operate north of Pretoria with cavalry, and a column under
Ian Hamilton49 was also sent up.
Methuen marched at once on Rustenburg, and cleared Olifant's Nek on July 21.
The scheme of shutting up the Boers in it failed, as Baden-Powell was unable
to close the northern exit, and they escaped with slight loss.
At
the beginning of August the situation was, if anything, worse. The events
which succeeded the occupation of Bloemfontein were repeating themselves in
the Western Transvaal. Methuen had been recalled from the Rustenburg
expedition to deal with an outbreak on the line from Johannesburg to
Klerksdorp, which fell into the hands of the enemy; 5,000 Boers were
reported to be on or near the Magaliesberg; a small British force was
besieged in Brakfontein, west of Rustenburg, on the road to Mafeking; De Wet
was at large in the Free State, and it seemed probable that he would come up
into the Transvaal and add to the trouble.
At
the end of July Ian Hamilton's force was diverted from its movement towards
the north and ordered westward to relieve and bring away Baden-Powell; and
Carrington was instructed to co-operate from Mafeking. Lord Roberts had
decided to abandon Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek and the greater part of the
Magaliesberg. These detached positions detained more troops than he could
spare50 and were difficult to supply. Ian Hamilton's trek lasted
only a few days. He recaptured Zilikat's Nek, and on August 5 brought away
Baden-Powell, who left Rustenburg most unwillingly and who was ready to
sustain another siege in it. Lord Roberts, however, would not heed his
repeated protests, and the only section of the Magaliesberg held after the
withdrawal from Rustenburg was that lying between Pretoria and Zilikat's and
Commando Neks. Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek had called for the diversion of
three columns in succession: Smith-Dorrien's, which did not reach them, and
then Methuen's and Ian Hamilton's; and the abandonment of them was
imperative. From the west Carrington made an attempt to relieve Brakfontein
on August 5, but was compelled by the presence of the enemy in superior
force to return to Mafeking. The relief was effected ten days later, not
from the west, but by Lord Kitchener with a column that had been engaged in
the pursuit of De Wet.
Suddenly all the operations were deranged by the news that De Wet had
crossed the Vaal at Schoeman's Drift on August 6, and the greater part of
the British Army in the Transvaal was either directly or indirectly turned
on to the pursuit of one man; Lord Kitchener, as usual when energy and
pushing power rather than tactical skill were looked for, being placed in
general charge of the operations. The two most determined and unfaltering
men in South Africa were now pitted against one another.
De
Wet's escape from the Brandwater Basin on July 15 was soon discovered and he
was unable to get a good start. Broadwood's and Little's mounted brigades
were sent after him, now and then taking long shots at him or worrying his
rearguard. His object was to conduct Steyn and the Free State Government
officials into the Transvaal, where they could co-operate with Kruger. He
chose the route which appeared to him, and rightly so, to be the line of
least resistance, namely, towards the Vaal Drifts near Potchefstroom;
instead of making for the upper reaches of the river, on the other side of
which Buller was established on the Natal railway.
It
was soon found impossible to overtake him, even with mounted troops. The
only course was to shepherd him into a fold from which he could not escape.
The tracery on the map of his movements and of those of his chief scout
Theron, intersected by the reticulations of the pursuing columns, resembles
a spider's web in disorder.
Finally he was hemmed in on the left bank of the Vaal near Reitzburg. On the
right bank Methuen, supported by Smith-Dorrien, was watching the drifts. He
did his best, but his force was insufficient for the purpose, and on August
6 De Wet, with it is said no less than 400 wagons, entered the Transvaal at
Schoeman's Drift, the greater part of Methuen's force having been sent to
hold a drift lower down. Methuen doubled back and fell upon the Boer
rearguard, which, though driven out of successive positions, maintained
itself long enough to allow the main body to escape unscathed.
De
Wet's subsequent movements greatly puzzled his pursuers. He divided his
column into two portions which did not always march in the same direction,
and it was
therefore difficult to discern the ruling movement of his trek. At one time
it appeared that he was about to re-cross into the Free State, and the plans
for the northward pursuit were temporarily suspended; to be resumed when he
had received an allowance of one day's start. It is probable that his
original intention had been to return to his own country as soon as he had
put Steyn and the officials into the Transvaal, leaving them with an escort
to find their own way to Kruger, and that he was prevented by the appearance
of a strong column under Kitchener on the left bank. As a Free Stater,
moreover, he would be disinclined to give his services to the Transvaal.
Kitchener crossed the Vaal on August 8, and hung to De Wet's right rear,
Methuen hanging on to the left rear; but neither was able to do more than
clutch vainly at the skirts of the elusive column. In front of De Wet,
Smith-Dorrien was holding the Klerksdorp railway, but again he misled his
pursuers, and instead of trekking north after he had crossed the Gatsrand, a
movement which Smith-Dorrien anticipated and provided for, he changed
direction, and on August 11 passed over the railway at a section which had
been left unoccupied on Smith-Dorrien's right flank.
Lord Roberts saw that Methuen's and Kitchener's pursuit would probably fail,
and that De Wet would reach the Magaliesberg. Ian Hamilton was instructed to
prevent him crossing it, and on August 11 he was specifically ordered to
occupy Olifant's Nek. Commando Nek was held by Baden-Powell. There was a
third pass, the Magato Nek, a few miles west of Rustenburg, for which De Wet
was apparently making, and which seemed to be his only possible way of
escape, as it was confidently assumed that the other passes were held by
British troops. It was, therefore, only necessary to head him from Magato
Nek, and this was done by Methuen. But the movement threw De Wet towards
Olifant's Nek, which to his great astonishment was not occupied, and through
which he passed with Steyn on August 14 and shook off his pursuers. Ian
Hamilton had not been made to understand that the actual closing of
Olifant's Nek was an urgent matter; and he, in fact, informed Lord Roberts
that he did not propose to do so except indirectly by a movement which would
command the approach to it.
In
this, the first of the De Wet hunts, nearly 30,000 British troops were
directly or indirectly engaged in heading or pursuing over an area of 7,000
square miles. Nine columns blindly zigzagged and divagated to false scents
and imperfect information in chase of one man encumbered with a civil
government on the run and several hundred wagons. Again and again the
fowler's net was cast upon the migrant, who always wriggled through the
meshes. In one month he trekked 270 miles from the Brandwater Basin to the
north of the Magaliesberg, with British troops continuously to his flanks,
his front, and his rear.
It
would have been regarded as the most notable personal exploit of the war if
De Wet had not himself twice repeated it under circumstances of even greater
difficulty. It must be acknowledged that his daring and resolution deserved
success. He did not attain it by the means of followers eager to serve a
trusted and beloved leader, for they by no means rose to him. When he
reached the Vaal he was careful to throw the burghers' wagons across the
river first of all, knowing that their unwillingness to leave the Free State
would be overcome by their greater reluctance to sever themselves from their
oxen and stuff. He owed his success mainly to the power of a strong will to
make weaker wills work for it; and in a less degree to the accuracy of the
information which Theron, his chief scout, obtained for him.
It
is at least doubtful whether Lord Roberts did not take De Wet too seriously.
Was the capture of a guerilla leader worth the withdrawal of so many British
troops from the main operations, and would not the sounder strategy have
been to ignore him? If he had been severely let alone, he would hardly have
done more than that which he did with the strength of an Army Corps against
him, and his prestige with his own people would not have been so surely set
up.
The escape of De Wet was an incident of war, which, having regard to all the
circumstances of the campaign, could not be made impossible. Columns working
independently under directions from Head Quarters cannot be made aware of
all that each has or has not done, and must take many things for granted;
and the information of the enemy's movements which reaches them from the
same source must often be received too late for effective action. If Lord
Roberts had listened to Baden-Powell's protest against the evacuation of
Rustenburg and Olifant's Nek, De Wet would probably have followed Cronje to
St. Helena; but that does not prove that the policy of withdrawing from
remote and exposed positions was unsound. All that can be said against it is
that it chanced to be carried out a few days too soon.
Steyn and the officials left for Machadodorp. De Wet felt that his own
country had a claim upon his services, and desired to return to it without
delay. He divided his force, leaving the greater part under Steenekamp north
of the Magaliesberg, himself going south with a small commando. The division
materially aided his return, for it was not known for certain at Head
Quarters with which portion he was marching. While he was in imagination
being chased north of Pretoria, he was in fact scaling a rough mountain
path, for all the passes had been closed, near Commando Nek, and looking
down from the heights upon a British force by which he was not discovered.
On August 21, after an absence of sixteen days, he recrossed the Vaal, and
entered the Free State. The net result of all the labour, all the efforts,
and all the consequent distress and exhaustion to which the British troops
had willingly subjected themselves, was to re-establish De Wet as a greater
power for mischief than ever.
The Free Staters under Steenekamp joined Grobler of Waterberg, but the
combination was hustled to the north out of striking distance of Pretoria by
Baden-Powell, whose purely military service in South Africa ceased soon
after. He had been selected to raise and to command the South African
Constabulary, a semi-military body, which it was hoped the approaching end
of the war would ere long permit to take over some of the duties of the
troops.
For some weeks after the escape of De Wet the various columns operating
north and west of Pretoria were engaged in patrolling the country. They
nowhere encountered serious resistance, but Delarey was neither taken nor
crippled.
While these events were occurring in Lord Roberts' rear, he was advancing
eastwards from Pretoria. The battle of Diamond Hill was followed by a brief
period of quietude in the east as well as the west. The objective of the
British Army was the railway from Pretoria to Komati Poort, on which the
Transvaal Government, covered by Botha at Balmoral, was now dwelling at
Machadodorp. The movements of Lord Roberts were for some time controlled by
the situation in the Free State and the Western Transvaal, which called more
pressingly for attention than the eastward advance.
Early in July a column under Hutton was sent out to feel towards Botha's
left. As he was opposed and made little progress, Lord Roberts a few days
later reinforced him with French and a cavalry brigade, and on July 11 the
combined columns thrust back the Boers from their positions at Witpoort, a
few miles south of Diamond Hill. Botha had arranged with the commandants on
the other side of Pretoria for concurrent attacks on the British forces in
the vicinity of the capital, and his own was the only operation that was
foiled on July 11. French's success, however, could not be followed up. He
proposed to raid the railway near Balmoral, but Lord Roberts had been made
anxious for the safety of Pretoria by the news of the affairs of Zilikat's
Nek and Onderste Poort, and recalled him. Hutton was ordered to remain where
he was, about twenty-five miles south-east of the capital, with a reduced
force.
There were indications that an attack not only on Pretoria but also on
Johannesburg was contemplated by the enemy, in collusion with plots for
risings against the British which were hatching in each city. It was no time
yet for an eastward advance. The successes north and west of Pretoria
stimulated Botha to attack what he supposed would strategically now be the
most vulnerable section of the perimeter of defence, namely, the section
facing him. If it had not been weakened by the withdrawal of troops to the
west, troops would probably have been withdrawn from the west to meet him,
and the task of Delarey thereby lightened. Either alternative would forward
his policy.
East of Pretoria Pole-Carew with the XIth Division was in touch with Hutton.
Botha recalled Grobler of Waterberg from the north, and on July 16 threw
himself upon Pole-Carew and Hutton, near Witpoort. The brunt of the attack
fell upon the latter, who, though at first pressed back and outflanked on
his right, recovered himself and forced the enemy to retire. His immediate
opponent was B. Viljoen, a leader who showed great military capacity in his
management of the action. Against the XIth Division Botha demonstrated only.
The chief incident of the affair was the holding of an outflanked and
commanded kopje position by a few companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers for
six hours.
The scheme for the eastward advance, which Lord Roberts did not feel himself
justified in initiating until after the affair of July 16, was that French
should rejoin Hutton and take charge of the right; with Ian Hamilton,
brought down from his northward demonstration against Grobler, on the
extreme left north of the railway, while Pole-Carew advanced with Lord
Roberts centrally along it.
The advance began on July 23. French, with the natural spirit of a cavalry
officer, chafed at being restricted to the slower progress of Pole-Carew's
infantry and proposed to push forward boldly and cut the railway east of
Middelburg, but Lord Roberts was reluctant to part with the only cavalry he
had, and vetoed the movement. Botha was soon frightened out of Balmoral,
which had been his Head Quarters since the battle of Diamond Hill, and which
was entered by Lord Roberts on July 25. Two days later French rode into
Middelburg.
The eastward advance had now gained possession of eighty miles of the
Delagoa Bay railway, but the De Wet trouble and the disturbed state of the
Western Transvaal made the continuation of the movement unsafe, and Lord
Roberts called a halt. It was also advisable to wait until supplies had been
collected at Middelburg, and until Buller, who was coming up from the south,
was in a position to co-operate. Lord Roberts returned to Pretoria, leaving
French in charge. Ian Hamilton, the emergency man, was sent to the west to
deal with Delarey and De Wet. Towards the end of August Pole-Carew advanced
to near Belfast, where he hoped soon to report himself to Buller.
Nearly three months had now elapsed since the battle of Diamond Hill. The
progress of the Transvaal campaign was not very apparent, but it was real.
Botha had been driven back along the Delagoa Bay railway, and neither the
outbreaks in the Western Transvaal nor the meteoric incursion of De Wet had
availed him. Nothing that had occurred elsewhere weakened the western
advance to an extent that gave him an opportunity of effectively
withstanding it. Buller was approaching, and Lord Roberts was no longer
dependent upon one line of communication. The fugitive Free State Government
had been driven into asylum with the fugitive Transvaal Government. No
commandos were at large which could seriously threaten Bloemfontein,
Johannesburg, or Pretoria; and the only organized body which the enemy could
bring into the field was confronted by a British Army and had the barrier of
the Portuguese frontier behind it. There was good hope that in a few weeks
the already undermined fabric of Boerdom would totter to the ground, and
that the worst that could happen was that some of the fragments might not
fall clear of the British troops.
The arrival of Buller's force from the south gave Lord Roberts, who returned
from Pretoria on August 25, the reinforcement justifying the resumption of
the eastward advance. He found the troops unfavourably placed for immediate
action. Botha was posted on each side of the railway near Belfast; the
junction of his right with his left, which had different fronts, forming an
obtuse salient angle. The greater part of the British force was south of the
line and prevented by the nature of the ground from undertaking an
enveloping movement on the enemy's left. Buller had kept the cavalry to
heel, and it was lying compressed between him and Pole-Carew, who was
entrenched round Belfast.
Lord Roberts' first act was to distribute over a wider front the
conglomeration of troops, which were hampering each other's movements.
French with his own cavalry, but without Buller's, was sent north of the
line to face Botha's right flank and to clear Pole-Carew's left flank, while
Buller worked up from the south towards the line.
The movement began on August 26, and by the afternoon French, having made a
wide detour, had established himself north of Belfast; thus enabling
Pole-Carew to leave the town and extend his division in front of the enemy's
right. Buller's movement was at first directly northwards, on account of the
soft ground. His march, like that of Pole-Carew on the other flank, was
across the enemy's front, but neither of them was seriously checked and the
casualties were few.
Buller had proposed to move eastward in the direction of Dalmanutha as soon
as the ground permitted, but a cavalry reconnaissance discovered the enemy
posted at Bergendal, close to the railway. The position was, in fact, the
point of the obtuse angle formed by the two sections of the Boer front, one
of which faced S.W. towards Buller, and the other west, towards Pole-Carew;
and if it could be carried not only would Botha's line be broken, but Buller
would be in a good position to deal with a retreat from either section,
The battle of Bergendal on August 27 was mainly a struggle between less than
fourscore Transvaal Police and two battalions and forty guns of Buller's
Division. The
"Zarps" held a rocky ridge at the end of a spur, where they were bombarded
for three hours, yet when the infantry advanced it was met with a vigorous
rifle fire, which was continued almost without intermission until at last
the kopje was carried by assault. The defence of the kopje was one of the
most conspicuous feats of the war on the Boer side, and it is noteworthy
that it was made by a body of regularly disciplined men. Owing partly no
doubt to the difficulty of reinforcing such an isolated position, no
effective support was given by Botha to the gallant little band, neither did
he trouble Buller seriously with artillery fire; and the commandos east and
north of the Zarps' kopje did little. He does not seem to have recognized
that Bergendal was not a mere strong post, but the key of an unsound
position which should at all hazards have been safeguarded. This Buller saw
at once, and he moved so as to meet with the least interference from the
enemy, who, having two fronts, could not act solidly upon either of them.
The capture of Bergendal dissolved the Boer position. The commandos facing
Buller were driven off; and the right, which had been opposing French and
Pole-Carew so feebly that neither of them suffered a single casualty, fell
away. Buller went in pursuit, but was unable to worry the retreat. Some
commandos withdrew eastwards along the line, others broke off towards
Lydenburg and Barberton. The Boer Governments retired from Machadodorp to
Nelspruit. Buller crossed the railway, and on August 29 Helvetia was taken.
Next day the British prisoners of war, whom the Boers had brought away in
the scuttle from Pretoria when Lord Roberts entered the city, were released
at Noitgedacht by their captors, who were no longer in a position to detain
them.
Botha had indeed been forced into retreat, but not cut off, and he escaped
with all his guns and his losses were comparatively slight. His burghers
were, as usual after a lost battle, demoralized and disheartened for the
time being, but not, as was thought by the British Army, scared by their
reverses into abject impotence. From the time of the occupation of
Bloemfontein guerilla had been gradually taking the place of organized
warfare, of which Bergendal was the last act, and which the burghers saw
that they could not hope to wage successfully. The history of the previous
seven months showed what could be won by guerilla, and what could be lost by
pretending to be an Army. The fact that they were no longer able to act as a
coherent military body did not permanently discourage them, and the struggle
had not yet run more than one-third of its weary course.
It
was, however, the general belief not only in Great Britain but also in the
Army in South Africa, that the Boers had kicked their last kick at
Bergendal. There might be a final wriggle or two; but the end was in sight,
and before the first anniversary of the declaration of war, peace would
again reign in the land. These not ill-founded hopes justified Lord Roberts'
Proclamation of September 1, by which the Transvaal was formally
incorporated in the British Empire.
To
prevent the enemy escaping to the north or to the south, and to impale him
upon the stakes of the Portuguese frontier, Lord Roberts pushed forward
three columns; one under Pole-Carew to follow the railway towards Komati
Poort, another under French to march towards Barberton, and a third under
Buller to occupy the Lydenburg district; to which Botha had gone after the
battle of Bergendal, and which if held by him would leave in the possession
of the Boers the best line of retreat from the railway to the northern
Transvaal.
Ian Hamilton, on his return from the west after the escape of De Wet, was
lent to Buller for a few days. The occupation of Lydenburg on September 7,
and of Spitz Kop four days later, drove Botha back to the line at Nelspruit.
Buller's operations were carried out with success in a country more
difficult than any that had yet been entered by the British Army in South
Africa. South of the railway, French spread the net, casting it from
Carolina to Barberton, which he entered on September 13, and where he not
only captured a considerable amount of rolling stock and supplies which the
Boers had shoved into the little branch line, but also released a final
remnant of about a hundred British prisoners of war, most of whom were
officers. He had advanced through a country almost as difficult as that in
which Buller was engaged, and although the commandos opposing him had at
first been drawn away to the south by the report that he was making for
Ermelo, they returned in time to offer some resistance east of Carolina; but
he entered Barberton without the discharge of a rifle. Botha had sounded the
Cease Fire.
The Boers had found it necessary to consider the situation seriously. They
had been driven into a relatively minute area, which was morally congested
with a pair of Presidents and their parasites, remnants of Government
offices, superfluous commandants, and commandos some of which were eager and
some of which were not eager to continue the struggle; and physically by the
accumulation of stores, supplies, guns, ammunition, and rolling stock which
had been rammed down into the last section of the Delagoa Bay railway.
Kruger was induced to lighten the ship which he had so signally failed to
keep on her course. He left Nelspruit on September 11 for Lorenzo Marques,
where he was taken under the protection of the Portuguese Government, and
where he remained until the eve of the first anniversary of the opening
scene of the drama, the battle of Talana Hill. On October 19 another nation
offered him asylum, and he sailed for Marseilles in the Guelderland, a
cruiser of the Dutch Navy; thus symbolically repatriating the French and
Dutch emigrants who had quitted Europe for South Africa in the seventeenth
century.
The positions of Buller on the north of the railway, of French at Barberton,
and of Pole-Carew ready to advance centrally, made immediate action
imperative; but Botha was hampered by the presence of not a few unwilling
and unmounted commandos. These he sent under Koetzee to Komati Poort and
left to arrange their own destiny; and with the rest, which numbered 4,000
burghers, he broke away in two directions, himself with B. Viljoen leading
the northward trek, while T. Smuts endeavoured to escape southward into
Swaziland.
Thus when Pole-Carew, who had been joined by Ian Hamilton and whose advance
had been delayed to allow French and Buller to get into position on his
flanks, reached Komati Poort on September 24, he found himself hitting at
vacancy with the wreckage of two lost republics around him, derelict railway
stock, disabled guns, abandoned ammunition, and burning stores. Koetzee's
men had disappeared, most of them into Portuguese territory, which they had
been partly persuaded and partly compelled to enter by the Portuguese
authorities, who, although they had regarded the Boer cause with a more than
benevolent neutrality during the earlier stages of the war, now saw that a
fight near the frontier would be a most embarrassing episode; and, while
offering an asylum to the fugitives, threatened to allow Lord Roberts to
land troops at Lorenzo Marques if it were not accepted. On the 28th
Pole-Carew was engaged not in battle with the Boers, but in celebrating the
birthday of the King of Portugal, a singular interlude between the acts of
the war drama.
Botha in making for the north hoped to establish his remnant and cultivate
the germs somewhere in the Leydsdorp or Pietersburg districts, which were
the only portions of the Transvaal not occupied by British troops. Lord
Roberts' expectations that they would be denied to the enemy by the
Rhodesian Field Force under Carrington were not fulfilled, and he could not
spare any of his own troops to occupy them.
Botha, preceded by a few days by Steyn, left the Delagoa Bay line on
September 17, and succeeded in scraping past Buller without serious
excoriation, but he was compelled to send the greater part of his force
under B. Viljoen by a circuitous route through the unhealthy lower veld.
The enemy was now to all appearances chased to the ends of the earth, but
throughout October and November roving bodies worried the railway and
detained a considerable British force upon it.
Commandos that could not be accounted for by the British Intelligence Staff
seemed to spring out of the ground. Trains were de-railed, raids and
counter-raids north and south were the order of the day. Lydenburg was
prowled upon. Botha and Viljoen, stirred by Steyn, hovered in the north, and
Viljoen went south to co-ordinate the several activities. On November 19 he
effected a temporary success at Balmoral, capturing a small post and cutting
the railway, but it served him little and he soon retired.
Of
the force engaged in the Komati Poort advance, the Guards' Brigade, which
the hopeful situation would soon, it was thought, allow to be sent home, as
well as French's cavalry and other troops, had been withdrawn; and a column
under Paget which was operating west of Pretoria had to be called up to
expel Viljoen from a position which he afterwards took up twenty miles north
of the railway at Rhenosterkop. The affair was the only serious action
during October and November.
French did not advance beyond Barberton. Early in October he was ordered to
clear the country lying between the Natal and the Delagoa Bay railways. At
first opposed by Smuts and subsequently impeded by bad weather, transport
difficulties, and constant sniping, his movement resembled a retreat rather
than a voluntary advance, and it was so regarded by the commandos. When he
reached Heidelberg on October 26, he had lost half his oxen and a third of
his wagons.
After the conclusion of the Komati Poort operations Buller returned to
England. No general officer serving in South Africa was regarded by the
non-commissioned officers and men under his command with greater affection
and admiration. The Natal Army was held together in spite of disasters and
failures by the personality of its leader. He had made not a few mistakes,
but they never lost him the confidence of his troops, who, when he left
their camp at Lydenburg, said farewell to him with an extraordinary
demonstration of genuine regret.
At
the end of November the command of the British Forces in South Africa was
taken over by Lord Kitchener from Lord Roberts, who sailed for England in
the belief that the war was practically over. He had completed the task
which he had set himself when he landed at Capetown ten months before. At
that time hardly even a scout had quitted British territory; now almost
every mile of railway and every considerable town of the two republics,
except Pietersburg, was in the possession of the British Army; the Boer
Governments had been expelled; Natal was free; organized resistance had
ceased; the remnants of a baffled and bewildered enemy were prowling
aimlessly in small bodies. All the precedents indicated a speedy termination
of the War.
When Lord Roberts left the shadow of Table Mountain the last word in
Strategy and Tactics had been spoken, and the war gradually became a problem
in Mechanics. His strategy was freely criticized at first, but it proved to
be sound; and the only fault that could be found with his tactics was that
like a skilful chess player he always endeavoured to defeat his opponent
with the least possible loss on either side.
The organization of a European Army had been found inefficient for dealing
with Boer guerilla. The Army Corps fell to pieces as soon as it landed in
South Africa; and as time went on the Divisions, the Brigades, and even many
of the regimental units were one by one liquidated and re-shuffled into
columns.51
Lord Kitchener, who had been General Manager to Lord Roberts, was admirably
qualified to succeed him, and to deal with a situation which seemed to call
for the exercise of a strong will and of the power of organization rather
than for the display of purely professional qualities, in which he was
somewhat deficient. It is doubtful whether he would have commanded a large
army successfully on the field of battle, but no better man could have been
chosen to control the vast area over which the British Forces were
distributed.
Footnote 49:
Not the column with which he had come up to Pretoria with Lord Roberts, and
which after his accident had been taken over by Hunter, but a
newly-constituted column.
Footnote 50:
Lord Roberts said that if he had been free to send Ian Hamilton into the
Free State instead of to Rustenburg, De Wet must have been surrounded.
Footnote 51:
After June, 1901, the classification of the South African Army in Divisions
and Brigades disappeared from the Army List.
