The year 1901 was drawing to its close,
and the three chief Boer leaders were still at large. Delarey was lurking in
the difficult kloofs of the Western Transvaal; Botha was on watch in the
high veld of the Eastern Transvaal, just outside the "protected area"; and
De Wet was awaiting his opportunity in the N.E. of the Orange River Colony.
De Wet, who had been lying low for some
months, was roused by a certain communication from Botha as well as by
action taken against him by Lord Kitchener. A carefully devised and
accurately carried out centripetal drive of fourteen columns converging,
like meridian lines on the Pole, on a certain point ten miles N.E. of Reitz,
was abortive. When the columns reached it on November 12 they found that the
enemy had wriggled through the intervals, leaving scarcely a burgher at the
place of meeting; and while they were blankly staring at each other, De Wet
at Blijdschap, only twenty miles away, was in conference with Steyn and
discussing with him a suggestion made by Botha that peace negotiations with
Lord Kitchener should be opened.
To this an answer similar to that which
had been given to Botha in May was returned.
De Wet and Steyn scouted the idea of
reconciliation with the enemy. A Council of War was summoned and a
concentration of burghers ordered. By the end of November De Wet had
collected at Blijdschap a force of 1,000 men undetected by Elliott's
columns, which, having taken part in the centripetal failure, were again on
the move after a brief rest at Harrismith. Elliott, while on the march to
Kroonstad, actually brushed past De Wet.
A column under Rimington then came upon
the scene. He had heard of the Council of War from a captured Boer, who
probably with intent refrained from reporting the concentration. Thus when
Rimington expected that the easy task before him was the capture of De Wet
and Steyn and the units of a Council of War, he suddenly found himself
opposed by a considerable force, a detachment of which passed by him and
attacked his train in rear. After an encounter in which a gallant young
cavalry subaltern,61 who but a few weeks before had joined the
Inniskilling Dragoons from the Militia, laid down his life for his country,
Rimington extricated his convoy, but refrained from attacking De Wet's main
body, which was reported to be strong.
Each side thereupon withdrew, Rimington
to Heilbron and De Wet to Lindley, from which he found it advisable to
retire on coming into contact with a column forming part of another Elliott
drive, the second of the series, suggested by Rimington on his return to
Heilbron. De Wet then trekked towards Bethlehem, halting at Kaffir Kop,
where, nine days later, he foiled a third Elliott drive by promptly
dispersing his burghers, who soon reassembled on a range of hills beyond
Bethlehem.
Elliott's units then returned to their
respective bases to refit. A column under Dartnell at Bethlehem, which had
recently been reinforced from Rundle's command by a strong detachment under
Barrington Campbell, was on the point of returning to Harrismith, when it
was informed that De Wet's re-united commandos were lying in wait at a
spruit about twenty miles out on the road to Harrismith. Dartnell marched on
and maintained himself without much difficulty when he arrived at the spruit.
Campbell came up, and De Wet's commandos withdrew without orders; but no
attempt was made to convert their retirement into a rout. Dartnell continued
his march to Harrismith.
After the affair at the spruit De Wet
again dispersed his burghers, with orders to hold themselves in readiness to
muster at short notice. He had not long to wait before he saw another
opportunity of employing them.
A small force, less than 1,000 strong,
was covering, half-way between Harrismith and Bethlehem, the construction of
the main blockhouse line to Kroonstad, under the personal superintendence of
Rundle. The force was broken up into three detachments, which were too far
apart to render each other effective support in case of a sudden attack.
The strongest detachment, consisting,
however, entirely of Yeomanry, was posted on Groen Kop, three miles distant
from Rundle's Head Quarters. The position is fairly strong, and resembles a
wedge lying on the veld, with a gentle ascent from the east to a plateau to
which the normal level rises steeply on three sides. A mile or two to the S.
E. it is commanded by a higher eminence, from which a party of Boers had
already been expelled. It was not, however, occupied, and De Wet promptly
made use of it as an observation post, for which it was admirably adapted,
as it looks down into the British position on Groen Kop. Moreover, the
customary movements for protection, such as the relief of outposts, were
carried out with such extraordinary laxity and neglect that De Wet was soon
able to acquaint himself with almost every detail of the defence. Even the
emplacements of a field gun and a pom-pom were disclosed by shots casually
fired for range-finding purposes.
On Christmas Eve De Wet saw that he had
before him a prey that would fall into his hands as easily as Sannah's Post
or Waterval Drift, and he resolved to clutch it at once. His burghers,
though dispersed, were within call, and a force of over 1,000 was quickly
assembled. With unerring instinct he selected the steep N.W. corner of the
Groen Kop wedge as the point of attack, reasoning that the defenders would
think themselves adequately protected in that direction by the nature of the
ground. On Christmas morning, soon after midnight, over 1,000 Boers were in
position under the broad end of the wedge. They were not discovered, as no
patrols had been sent to watch the ground beneath, and the sentries on the
crest gave no sign.
The pioneers of the storming party
attained the crest at 2 a.m.; and not until then was the alarm given to the
dormant camp. The position, after a struggle which lasted but an hour and a
quarter, was captured by De Wet, who, ere the midsummer sun had risen, was
hurrying away with British prisoners of war, guns and wagons, which neglect
of the ordinary precautions by a body of unprofessional troops had delivered
into his hands.
At Rundle's Head Quarters, only three
miles away, the sound of the firing had attracted attention, and a weak body
of Mounted Infantry, the only mounted force at his disposal, was sent out to
see what was the matter. It was unable to intervene with effect, and
returned to report the situation.
The remaining detachment of Rundle's
force, consisting of two companies of slow-moving Infantry only, was still
further from his Head Quarters; but thirteen miles away in the direction of
Harrismith lay a force of Colonial Horse. When a telegram from Rundle to
summon them to the rescue miscarried, his staff-officer galloped away in the
dawn and put them on the trail of De Wet; but he had had a long start and
escaped into the hills near Bethlehem. Here he remained for a few hours, and
then went towards Reitz.
During a temporary absence for the
purpose of conferring with Steyn he left his commandos in charge of Michael
Prinsloo, who on December 28 was engaged in a rearguard action with Elliott,
who was conducting yet another drive and whom he easily evaded.
On the last day of the year De Wet
disbanded his commandos a few miles from the spot on which he had assembled
them at the end of November. In the interval he had evaded all the Elliott
drives; he had captured a strong British post; he had marched without damage
along the sides of a triangle on which lay the towns of Reitz, Lindley, and
Bethlehem, each of which was from time to time in the possession of his
enemy; and had never been more than thirty miles distant from the central
point of the triangle. The captured guns were sent away beyond the Wilge
River under Mears.
No blame can be imputed to Rundle for
the unsatisfactory issue of the operations. He had little reason to suspect
that any considerable force of the enemy was in his vicinity. He was engaged
in mechanical work, the laying out of a blockhouse line. It was the
immediate task before him, and to the best of his ability he used the
untrustworthy and meagre instruments at hand. It would, however, have been
more in accordance with military principles if he had employed his mounted
troops in duties more suited to their arm, instead of holding with them the
infantry position of Groen Kop.
Only a few days before, a similar
misadventure had attended the construction of the Heilbron-Vrede blockhouse
line. Rimington and Damant had hardly returned to Heilbron after Elliott's
third drive when they were ordered out beyond Frankfort, to the assistance
of the blockhouse builders, who were being worried by a commando under
Wessels, which De Wet had sent out after the Council of War. Near the Wilge
River they acted on a front too extended; and a portion of Damant's force
was deceived by the slim tricks of a party of Boers working in cavalry
formations and many of them dressed in khaki uniforms. In order to keep up
the illusion they fired at detached parties of their own side, and in the
end Damant was overwhelmed on a hill, with a loss of nearly 90 per cent. of
casualties, before the rest of his command came up and drove away the
assailants. Rimington was too far away either to prevent or to retrieve the
disaster.
When the "drives" were renewed in the
northeastern districts of the Orange River Colony at the end of January,
1902, the experience of the last few months had shown that they must be
conducted on new methods. Hitherto the typical "drive" had been a net or
nets cast too often hastily and at random, the meshes of which were large,
irregular, and easily cut. The new "drive" was a bar of steel pushed
steadily forward by simultaneous action throughout its length, and with its
ends resting on the two completed blockhouse lines running eastward from
Heilbron and Kroonstad.
The Drive, Mark II, was inaugurated on
February 3. De Wet, who on January 10 had had a hurried interview with Steyn
near Reitz, was lying at Elandskop between Heilbron and Reitz, and again
concentrating his scattered burghers and planning an escape with them to the
south across the Kroonstad-Bethlehem blockhouse line. Mears, on his way to
rejoin De Wet, ran into a column under Byng, to whom he lost the guns
captured by De Wet at Groen Kop.
On February 5 a force of 9,000 men
under Elliott, Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington formed up on a line stretching
from Frankfort to Kaffir Kop. The composition of this force showed the
altered conditions of warfare. It included very few field guns, but no less
than 2,200 horse and field gunners acting as Mounted Riflemen.
Next day the first impulse was given to
the Bar, the blockhouse lines north and south, as well as the railway,
having been strengthened. The whereabouts of De Wet were approximately
known.
The first drive of the new pattern
lasted three days, the columns reaching the railway on February 8. It was so
far effective that none of the enemy broke back through the advancing line,
which was vigorously maintained in continuity of pickets by night and of
scouts by day; but De Wet was not on the roll of nearly 300 Boer casualties.
Although hampered with live stock from which his followers refused to be
parted, and in spite of two hovering columns which were acting in support of
the southern blockhouse line, he not only broke through it owing to its want
of vigilance, but even succeeded in dragging the cattle across it after him.
He then retired as usual to the Doornberg. Other parties of Boers broke
through the northern blockhouse line; and thus the first of the new drives
ended with poor results. As soon as the trouble was over De Wet with his
followers again crossed the southern blockhouse line and quietly returned to
Elandskop, where he dispersed them.
A second drive to sweep those districts
which had not been touched by the first drive was soon put in hand. It was
to be performed in two movements by two sets of columns. A force under the
Driver-in-Chief Elliott starting eastwards from Kroonstad and the Doornberg
would advance in line, resting its right first on Lindley and then on
Harrismith, in the vicinity of which it was proposed that it should meet the
other set of columns, under Rawlinson, Byng, and Rimington. These, starting
on an extended front which ran from near Johannesburg to within a few miles
of Heilbron with their centre astride the Vaal and their right touching the
Natal Railway, would advance S.E. to near Vrede; then wheeling to the right
march southwards with their left on the Drakensberg; finally, in conjunction
with Elliott, pushing the fugitives on to the eastern section of the
Harrismith blockhouse line. The operation may be likened to the sweep of two
brooms, one acting with a semicircular and the other with a forward
movement.
It was begun by Elliott, who started on
February 13, and after an abortive attempt to snap up De Wet reached Wilge
River on February 22 and awaited the arrival of the other columns; his left
being near Tafelkop.
Rawlinson and Byng meanwhile were
advancing. On February 19 they wheeled to the right and with their centre
near Vrede were now wholly within the Orange River Colony. The two forces
were now disposed at right angles to each other, one of the lines containing
the angle being the Wilge River, which Elliott was unable to hold in
sufficient strength as his front was widely extended. In the vicinity of
Harrismith the southern blockhouse line was reinforced by Brook, who
succeeded Rundle in the command of the district.
The northern blockhouse line was unable
to stem the tide of fugitives flying before Rawlinson and Byng, whose
columns were now strung out on a much wider front than that on which they
had begun their march. The advance of Elliott had also driven various Boer
details into the right angle, in which were now conglomerated not only
combatants, but women, children, stock, and transport. Included among the
fugitives from Elliott were De Wet and Steyn, who had again come together.
With Elliott at their heels, their only chance of escape was to break
through the attenuated line of Rawlinson's columns. De Wet's good fortune
did not fail him, and with Steyn and a few hundred burghers he severed it at
Langverwacht at midnight on February 23 and was again at large. The remnant
of the commandos was left behind within the pale with their women, children,
cattle, and stuff; and these, augmented by the Harrismith commando, were the
prisoners of Elliott and Rawlinson when the drive, in which 30,000 British
troops were directly or indirectly engaged, completed its task.
Yet another drive, the third of the new
series, ensued. It had, of course, for its objective the capture of De Wet,
as well as the "tidying up" of the district, in which certain commandos,
which had not been netted in former drives, still lurked. It was composed,
like the second drive, of two sets of converging columns and traversed the
terrain of the first drive.
It happened that the point of
convergence lay near the spot, not far from Reitz, where De Wet and Steyn
were in hiding. The propinquity of the columns drove them out of their
retreat, and taking a circuitous route past Heilbron and thence along the
left bank of the Vaal they crossed the river near Commando Drift, and on
March 17 joined Delarey near Wolmaranstad in the Transvaal. Little was done
after the junction of the two sets of columns, and they returned to the
railway on March 11, with a stray commando in front of them, which easily
rushed the blockhouse line near Heilbron. A portion of the troops was
hastily withdrawn to deal with the crisis in the Transvaal.
Hardly had the dust raised by the
trampling of the third drive settled down upon the veld when the fourth
drive was in progress, and 14,000 men on a front which stretched from one
blockhouse line to the other were plodding eastward to the Drakensberg. It
was held up for a time by two rivers in spate, the Wilge and the
Liebenberg's, and when released it trudged on to the mountain range, where
on April 5 its components were dissolved, having disposed of less than 100
of the enemy.
Yet one more drive, the fifth and last
of the series, was called for. Early in May Bruce Hamilton swooped down from
the Eastern Transvaal upon the harassed land, and in co-operation with
Elliott worried it for the space of ten days. Many small parties of Boers
broke through—the last wriggle in the Orange River Colony.
Footnote 61:
L.M.O. Requiescat in pace.
