The agile mind of Lord Roberts rather than the heavy hand of his Chief of
the Staff is discernible in the method of the advance on the Transvaal.
There were two courses open to the British Army. It might have deliberately
pulverized and extinguished each atom of opposition within reach in the Free
State, and have taken no step to the front until the rear and the flanks
were absolutely and finally clear of the enemy; or it might have advanced
boldly towards the Transvaal with the ordinary precautions for the
protection of the lines of communication and of the flanks.
Lord Roberts adopted the latter course. He had tried it with success in the
Afghan War twenty years before, when he marched even more "in the air" from
Kabul to Kandahar. The tedious process of "steam-rollering" the Free State
was not to his taste, nor would the expectant British public at home have
understood it; and it would have been severely criticized by the military
experts. It would have concentrated before him north of the Vaal all the
Boer forces which could not be crushed on the spot, and have left the
resources of the Transvaal for some time untouched: free communication with
the outer world by way of the neutral port of Lorenzo Marques, the treasury
of the Johannesburg gold mines upon which the enemy could draw, and the
railway and mining workshops in which munitions of war could be
manufactured.
Lord Roberts therefore determined upon a swift advance from Bloemfontein. He
was confident that the occupation of places would bring the war to an end
without an excessive loss of life; and he would probably have been right if
he had been engaged in a European war. He did not see, however, that the
Boers derived little or no strength from their towns, which were rather a
source of weakness; they were men of the veld and the veld was their
strength.
De
Wet's guerilla advanced Chermside to the command of the IIIrd Division, in
place of Gatacre sent home. A new Division, numbered the VIIIth, under a new
commander, Sir Leslie Rundle, a general with an Egyptian reputation, was
assembled south of Bloemfontein in April.
The siege of Wepener called for activity from Bloemfontein as well as from
the Orange, and Lord Roberts sent Rundle to Dewetsdorp, where his presence
would, it was hoped, not only draw the Boers away from Wepener, but deny
them a retreat to the north. Pole-Carew with the XIth Division and French
followed Rundle, but De Wet abandoned the siege on the approach of Hart and
Brabant from the south, and his brother P. De Wet scuttled away from
Dewetsdorp on the approach of Rundle; and the commandos ran the gauntlet
successfully. Their hereditary trekking instincts told them when to move and
how to move, and their mobility had not at that period been recognized by
the British Staff. Wepener was indeed relieved, though not from Bloemfontein,
but the subsequent divagations of the Boers baffled three British divisions
which were endeavouring to squeeze them northwards and head them off. A
strong rearguard was left by the Boers at Houtnek, ten miles north of
Thabanchu.
Lord Roberts' position at Bloemfontein, and on the line of communication,
had never been seriously endangered. The brilliant affairs of Sannah's Post
and Mostert's Hoek were no doubt annoying to the British Army and
encouraging to the enemy. At home the importance of them was greatly
exaggerated. If the advance on the Transvaal was delayed by them and the
subsequent operations arising out of the siege of Wepener, more time was
given to prepare for it; and the British Army was usefully informed of a
fact which hitherto had hardly been suspected, namely, that the enemy
derived much of his power from mobility, resourcefulness, and aptitude for
guerilla.
Lord Roberts' plan for the movement on the Transvaal was an advance in line,
on a front which extended from Ladysmith to Kimberley. It soon became an
echelon owing to the slow movements of Buller in Natal. In the centre at
Bloemfontein were the troops under the immediate orders of the
Commander-in-Chief; on the left at Kimberley were Methuen, and Hunter with
the Xth Division which had been brought round from Ladysmith. Between the
centre and the right the intervention of Basutoland and the Drakensberg
prevented the effective co-operation of the Natal Army with Lord Roberts;
and a portion of the interval was occupied by the enemy.
The centre columns under Lord Roberts were about 43,000 strong. Hunter and
Methuen in the west had each under his command about 10,000 troops, while
Buller's force, which was much nearer to the Transvaal objective than the
centre, and which was still lingering on the banks of the Klip River two
months after the relief of Ladysmith, numbered about 45,000. Ian Hamilton,
who had done so well in the Elandslaagte and Caesar's Camp affairs, was not
allowed to waste himself in the Natal lethargy. He was recalled from
Ladysmith, and after taking part from the Bloemfontein side in the Wepener
operations, was given command of a column which was sent on, a few days
before the general movement, in the direction of Winburg to protect the
right flank of the central advance and to fend off from it the hovering Boer
commandos which had been pressed northwards by the April operations. He
started from Thabanchu on April 30 and was soon in action with the Boer
force a Houtnek under P. Botha. The battle lasted until nightfall and was
renewed next day, when, with the help of reinforcements from French and
Colvile, Ian Hamilton forced the Boers to retire on Clocolan.
Meanwhile there was energy on the left. Methuen had been for some time in
occupation of the Boshof district, where he was in a position to threaten
Kroonstad as well as the commandos at the Vaal bridge at Fourteen Streams
between Kimberley and Mafeking. The relief of the latter was to be
undertaken by a flying column under Mahon supported by Hunter's division. On
May 3 Lord Roberts left Bloemfontein for the north. Kelly-Kenny's Division
remained in charge of the Free State capital, while Chermside's policed the
railway and the country in rear. Rundle at Thabanchu was instructed to
prevent the enemy from regaining a footing in the districts east and south
of Bloemfontein, and Methuen to push on towards the left bank of the Vaal
beyond Hoopstad. No definite orders were sent to Buller, but for two months
there had been a constant interchange of suggestions, counter-suggestions,
plans, and projects for co-ordinate action.
Lord Roberts' objective was now Pretoria. The country in front of him was
not difficult and he had a railway behind him. The line of communication
with the south was fairly safe, and it was estimated that not more than
12,000 Boers with twenty-eight guns, under Delarey and L. Botha, who had
been brought round from Natal to take chief command during the crisis,
barred the way into the Transvaal; not including the loosely associated
commandos operating on the right flank under the general control of De Wet,
the Prince Rupert of the Boer War.
The nearest Boer post was at Brandfort, a few miles north of Karee Siding.
On the right was the Winburg intervening column, 14,000 strong, under Ian
Hamilton, who dragged in his train a weak supporting Division under Colvile,
his superior officer in an anomalous position obliged to conform to his
movements, and without authority to direct them. Brandfort was occupied that
evening by Lord Roberts at the cost of six men killed. Vet River, the next
obstacle, was secured on May 5, and crossed on the following day by the
greater part of the main column. Ian Hamilton went into bivouac eight miles
north of Winburg, which was occupied by his henchman Colvile.
Up
to this time, Lord Roberts was acting without the cavalry under French, who
since the Sannah's Post affair had been working in the Thabanchu district,
and who joined the main column on May 9. Though his horses were not in good
condition, his arrival increased the power of the centre to strike rapidly
at the next obstacles, the Zand River and the town of Kroonstad forty miles
beyond, which was now the seat of the Free State Government. The drifts on a
section of the river nearly twenty miles in length were seized, the most
easterly being taken by Ian Hamilton, who had gradually converged on the
centre column and was now on the right of the line. Next day the passage of
the river was effected; but Lord Roberts' hope of getting round and
grappling each flank of the enemy, who numbered about 3,000 Transvaalers and
5,000 Free Staters, was not realized, and Botha withdrew without serious
loss. That night the Army went into bivouac astride the railway between Zand
River and Kroonstad.
On
the left was the cavalry under French, who next morning raided northwards;
but although he was unable, owing to the opposition of a force which came
out of Kroonstad, to reach the railway north of the town, a small party of
pioneers whom he had sent on succeeded during the night in blowing up the
line at America Siding within a few yards of the high-road by which the
enemy was retreating. This daring exploit, which although it had not much
effect on the situation was not the less meritorious, was carried out by
Hunter-Weston, who, just two months previously, had similarly cut the line
north of Bloemfontein. The Boers had taken up a position at Boschrand to
defend Kroonstad on the south, but French's turning movement scared them,
and the position as well as the town was abandoned, in spite of efforts made
by Steyn and Botha to arrest the flight. The seat of Government was
transferred to Lindley.
The Zand River affair was an incident in the advance rather than a battle.
Lord Roberts suffered but 115 casualties. Its effect on the enemy was
chiefly moral. The Transvaalers, whose country had not yet heard the sounds
of war, were alarmed, but the Free Staters were dismayed. The ties of race
and kindred had engulfed them in a war which was not for their own cause,
and the brunt of which they had borne for ten weeks. They thought that they
had done all that could be expected of them and that the Transvaal must now
look after itself. From that time there was no organized co-operation
between the allies.
On
May 12 Lord Roberts entered Kroonstad. In his advance, averaging thirteen
miles per day, he had outstripped the reconstruction of the railway, of
which almost every bridge and culvert had been blown up by the retreating
Boers, and many miles of the permanent way had been destroyed. A halt was
therefore necessary until the railhead could be brought nearer, and to give
the Army an opportunity of pulling itself together, which was especially
required by the cavalry. Little more than one-half of the 6,000 horses with
which French marched out of Bloemfontein on May 6 were fit for service at
Kroonstad seven days later.
Ian Hamilton was sent out in chase of the flitting Free State Government. He
found it not at Lindley, nor at Heilbron, for it had trekked away to
Frankfort. Between Lindley and Heilbron he was attacked in rear by a body of
Boers, who emerged from the presumed vacuum behind him, but they were beaten
off.
The bulk of the enemy's force which had evacuated Kroonstad, was now in the
triangle formed by the railway, the Vaal and the Rhenoster. On its left
flank was Ian Hamilton; and French was ordered out to hook the right flank,
a repetition of the movement which had failed at Zand River. On May 22 Lord
Roberts left Kroonstad.
The enemy, however, again evaded the net. Reconnaissances by French on May
23 showed that Botha had been frightened by the appearance of Ian Hamilton
at Heilbron, and had crossed into the Transvaal. The discovery necessitated
the recasting of Lord Roberts' plan, and brought about an interesting and
entirely successful strategic movement. It was evident from Botha's
dispositions that he expected Ian Hamilton to march straight to his front
and endeavour to cross the Vaal above the railway bridge at Vereeniging. The
difficult drifts and country below it were considered to be a sufficient
protection, and were not strongly held by Botha, who on this occasion was
completely out-generalled by his opponent.
Lord Roberts ordered Ian Hamilton to march from the right flank to the left,
across the front of the main Army, and then in conjunction with French to
wheel round to Meyerton on the line between Johannesburg and Vereeniging. On
the evening of May 26 he entered the Transvaal at Wonderwater Drift. But Ian
Hamilton's column had not the honour of being the first troops of the main
body to enter the Transvaal, for he found the cavalry in front of him.
French,43 who had been sent out from Kroonstad on May 20, reached
the Vaal at Paris on the 24th, and at once threw part of his force into the
Transvaal, the rest crossing higher up at Old Viljoen's Drift. He thus
fittingly celebrated the last birthday festival of Queen Victoria, which was
also appropriately honoured by a proclamation issued on the same day by Lord
Roberts, by which the Orange Free State was annexed to the dominions of Her
Majesty under the designation of the Orange River Colony—a suitable birthday
offering from a distinguished soldier to his Sovereign.
The main body of the Army with the Commander-in-Chief at its head entered
the Transvaal at Viljoen's Drift on May 27, and, like the pioneer columns of
French and Ian Hamilton, met with no opposition. It was of good augury for
the speedy subjugation of the South African Republic. The expected firm
stand of the enemy along the right bank of the Vaal, where the great battle
of the war was to be fought, was not made. Vereeniging and subsequently
Meyerton were abandoned in spite of all Botha's efforts to keep his
burghers' faces to the front. He held a strong line enclosing Vereeniging
and the drifts and extending from near Heidelberg to Potchefstroom, but it
impotently watched the British troops crossing the river. Some opposition
was indeed offered to French when he was a day's march from the drift by
which he had crossed into the Transvaal, but the bulk of the commandos fell
away to the north and took up positions between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp.
By arrangement between the Governments, none of the Free Staters accompanied
Botha into the Transvaal; but he was in communication with De Wet at
Frankfort, and was urging him to act against the railway in the Free State.
He must have regretted that the strong hand and will of the man of Waterval
Drift, Kitchener's Kopje, Sannah's Post, and Mostert's Hoek, were not with
him on the right bank of the Vaal to animate the shrinking burghers of the
South African Republic.
The immediate purpose of Lord Roberts was now the capture of Johannesburg,
the relations of some of whose inhabitants towards Pretoria had brought on,
not only the Jameson raid, but also the war. Although it was not defended by
permanent military works, the burghers had taken up a position before it
which might be very hard to capture, and there was another and greater cause
for anxiety. The task before Lord Roberts may be likened to an attack on a
ship manned by pirates, who threaten to fire the magazine as soon as a hand
is laid upon the bulwarks. It was seriously proposed by certain persons in
authority under Kruger, that on the appearance of the British Army before
the city, the mines in which so many millions of British capital were
invested should be wrecked; and it is probable that the threat would have
been carried out with official sanction if Botha had not set his face
resolutely against such a piratical act.
Lord Roberts proposed to effect the capture of Johannesburg by surrounding
it. While with the main body of his Army he occupied Elandsfontein on the
east, French and Ian Hamilton, the pioneers of the advance from
Bloemfontein, would deal with the enemy posted south of the city and then
establish themselves, the former near Klipfontein, north of it, and the
latter near Florida, west of it. The right and the most vulnerable part of
the Boer line was posted on Doornkop near the scene of the surrender of
Jameson, the enthusiast, who, a few years before, had endeavoured with a few
hundred adventurers and soldiers of fortune to solve the South African
question which Great Britain was now tackling with a quarter of a million of
trained soldiers.
On
May 29 Ian Hamilton attacked the Doornkop position and won it after some
hard infantry fighting; French, reinforced by the loan of Hamilton's mounted
troops, having thrown a grappling iron round it, thereby rendering it
untenable. At nightfall the two leaders were firmly planted west of the
city. The movement deceived the enemy, to whom the advance of the main body
under Lord Roberts on Elandsfontein came as an unwelcome surprise, though
Botha had to some extent prepared for it. The detachments posted by him at
various places east of the city offered no effectual resistance, and Lord
Roberts went into bivouac that night at Elandsfontein. Johannesburg was
entrapped between him on the east, and French and Hamilton on the north and
west.
On
May 30 the city agreed not unwillingly to surrender, but having regard to
the presence in it of splinters of the lately shattered commandos, to the
probability of street fighting, and to the risk of injury to the mines, Lord
Roberts consented to postpone his formal entry until the following day; by
which time the judicious action of the representatives of the Boer
Government had averted the impending danger, and the troops took peaceful
possession of Johannesburg.
In
spite of disquieting news from the Free State, Lord Roberts remained firm in
his purpose of advancing on Pretoria without delay. Not only was it the head
quarters of Krugerism, but also the place in which the Boer harvest of
war—more than 4,000 British prisoners, some of whom had been in captivity
since the day of Talana Hill— was garnered.
On
June 3 the advance on Pretoria, which it was hoped would be the last
important movement of the war, was resumed; Wavell, with a brigade of
Tucker's Division, being left behind as Bank Guard over the treasure in the
mines. Botha had retired on the capital, but no one knew whether he would
endeavour to defend it, or whether the vaunted forts would imperiously
address the invader. In view of possible eventualities, however, a siege
train, in which were included two 9.45" howitzers which had been hastily
acquired in Austria, was taken up to answer Forts Schanzkop, Klapperkop,
Wonderboom, and Daspoort if they should speak.
Throughout the month of May there had been alarms and excursions in the
capital of the South African Republic. The sound of the plon-plon of the
British Army was daily growing more distinct. The house of Ucalegon was on
fire. The Volksraad met on May 7, and after a session of three days handed
over the situation to the wavering executive Government, which had already
made arrangements for an eastward retirement. Kruger, fearing lest his
retreat by the Delagoa Bay railway should be cut off, slipped away to
Machadodorp on May 29; the forts were emptied and abandoned, and Botha was
bidden to do the best he could with the remnants of the Transvaal forces. On
June 3 he took up a position on a ridge a few miles south of the city and
prepared for the worst.
French, on the left front of the advance, was ambushed in a defile by a
commando which had come up out of the west, but cleared himself with slight
loss. The forts were dumb. Only the ridges between the city and Six-Mile
Spruit were found to be held. The southern ridge was taken, and when the
northern ridge was turned by Ian Hamilton, who was recalled from acting at
large in support of French, the Boers retired. French passed through
Zilikat's Nek and marched on Pretoria north of the Magaliesberg. On June 5
the capital of the South African Republic surrendered to Lord Roberts.
The Boers streamed away towards the east. An attempt made a few days before
to cut the Delagoa Bay railway failed, not, however, through the fault of
Hunter-Weston, who led the enterprise. The force given to him was
insufficient for the purpose, and he was unable to repeat the exploits of
Bloemfontein and Kroonstad.
The prisoners of war, whom to the number of 3,000 the Boers had not been
able to drag away with them in their hurried flight, and who were in
confinement at Waterval twelve miles north of the city, were brilliantly
liberated on June 4 by some squadrons of cavalry; which not only ran the
gauntlet of the Wonderboom defile, but passed through the Boer posts at the
further Poort and snatched away the prize from under the eyes of Delarey,
who was covering Waterval with 2,000 burghers and some guns.
On
the day of Lord Robert's entry into Pretoria, Buller was still in Natal.
They had started simultaneously, and in thirty-four days the main body had
marched 300 miles, but the tardigrade Natal Army was now on Lord Roberts'
right rear. It had been his hope that Buller would advance step by step with
him, and having reached the Transvaal, would strike northwards and establish
himself on the Delagoa Bay railway and deny it to Kruger. At Kroonstad, Lord
Roberts, seeing that he could not expect assistance from Buller,
contemplated detaching Ian Hamilton and sending him into the Eastern
Transvaal, but the fear of unduly weakening the main body in view of
probable opposition at the Vaal, Johannesburg, and Pretoria, caused him to
give up the project. As events turned out, it would in all probability have
been successful.
Pretoria was in the hands of the British Army, Kruger was in flight, the war
was over said the experts. Without having fought a single action that could
be termed a battle, and at a cost of less than 500 casualties, of which but
sixty-one men were killed, Lord Roberts had passed from Bloemfontein and had
seized the perverse city in which most of the South African troubles of the
past twenty-five years had been brewed. The Free State, though kicking, was
apparently helpless. There were, however, not a few observers on the spot to
whom the easy success and the few casualties were of ominous import. A
change in the method of the opposition to be offered in the future to the
invader was indicated. The Boers were discovering that they were incapable
of waging systematic warfare and were on the point of resorting to guerilla,
for which they, as well as the arena, were by nature particularly well
adapted.
On
the Boer side there was a transitory interval of weakness. Even before Lord
Roberts' occupation of Pretoria Kruger wrote doubtfully to Steyn; and after
it Botha was inclined to negotiate with the invader. He was with his
commandos at Hatherley, a few miles east of Pretoria. A Council of War was
held in the office of a Russian Jew, who was a distiller of whisky. The
leaders complained that they had been deserted by Kruger, who had slunk away
with the civil government and all the money he could lay his hands on, and
the general opinion was in favour of abandoning the struggle. A meeting
between Lord Roberts and Botha was even arranged, when suddenly De Wet
intervened. The news of his successful raids on the line of communication in
the Free State relaxed the tension of the minds of the despondent
commandants. Easily disheartened and easily reassured, they leapt in an
instant from one psychological pole to the other. Botha announced that he
was ready to meet Lord Roberts, not only in conference, but in battle. The
negotiations were, however, not definitely broken off until after the Battle
of Diamond Hill.
Lord Roberts had sent Kitchener with a column to see to the trouble in the
Free State, and could not put more than about 16,000 men into the field
against Botha, who, with 6,000 men, had taken up a strong position astride
the Delagoa Bay railway sixteen miles east of Pretoria. His centre was at
Pienaar's Poort, where the railway passes through a defile, and his front,
which his former experience of Lord Roberts' tactics led him to extend
greatly, was nearly twenty-five miles in length, and ran along an irregular
chain of hills, kopjes, and ridges. Facing the Diamond Hill and Donkerhoek
range, south of the centre, is another range of heights through which the
two poorts Tyger and Zwavel pass, and which circles round the source of
Pienaar's River towards the Diamond Hill range. North of the centre runs a
broken range ending abruptly at the Kameelfontein ridge, which overlooks the
broad Kameelfontein valley leading to the Krokodil Spruit; and across the
valley rises the Boekenhoutskloof ridge, a detached feature with triangular
contours, which, being somewhat in advance, commands the approaches to
Kameelfontein ridge, where the Boer right flank under Delarey was posted.
The left flank was on Mors Kop and curved round indefinitely to Kameelzyn
Kraal with detached posts in the direction of Tygerpoort. The centre north
and south of Pienaar's Poort was the strongest section of the line, and for
this reason and for another it was held by comparatively small numbers.
Botha was an acute observer and had learnt the moves of the British autumn
manoeuvre opening, a holding attack on the centre not intended to be pushed
home in order to eke out paucity of numbers operating on a wide front. Lord
Roberts, in spite of his superiority of strength, could not hope to inflict
a decisive defeat upon Botha's well-posted commandos, but only to remove
them out of striking distance of Pretoria, and he was successful.
The earlier movements of the attack on June 11 were in the nature of a
reconnaissance in force, as it was uncertain how far to the north and south
the Boer front extended. The usual tactics were adopted. French with the 1st
and 4th Cavalry Brigades under Porter and Dickson was to work round the
enemy's right flank and to endeavour to circle round it to the railway; a
demonstrating attack on the centre would be made by Pole-Carew; while Ian
Hamilton acted against the left flank.
French approached the Kameelfontein valley and won a footing on
Boekenhontskloof ridge, which the Boers were only now moving out to occupy,
with his left. His right soon came under heavy fire from Krokodil Spruit
Hill on the Kameelfontein ridge, but he succeeded in seizing Louwbaken,
which he held tenaciously in spite of Delarey's attempts to work round it
and of the shells of a heavy gun posted six miles away near Edendale.
Meanwhile his left had been struggling for several hours on the
Boekenhoutskloof ridge, which it eventually cleared, and was then able to
support the right, which was still clinging desperately to Louwbaken.
Throughout the afternoon the Boers continued their attacks on French, but
were unable to shift him. At nightfall he found that instead of turning the
enemy's right, he had only plastered himself against it. He had already
reported the situation to Lord Roberts, who authorized him to withdraw if
necessary, at the same time cautioning him "not to risk too many
casualties."
Pole-Carew, in the centre, was in action with his heavy guns only,
"demonstrating" according to the rules, pending the development of the flank
attacks.
The force on the right under Ian Hamilton was strong in mounted troops. He
entered the arena through Zwavelpoort, and thrust at the bristling but
indeterminate left flank of the enemy. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade under
Broadwood evicted a small body of Boers from Tygerpoort, and when the 3rd
Brigade under Gordon came up to hold the position until the arrival of an
infantry regiment, Broadwood advanced across the valley in the direction of
Mors Kop, and soon was not only under shell fire from Diamond Hill, but also
under rifle fire from some vague detachments of Boers on his right rear.
Nor was this all, for as he proceeded, the enemy was seen pouncing down from
Diamond Hill on to the Kleinfontein ridge upon the line of his advance, and
simultaneously he was fired on from the right. Two horse artillery guns,
which had been sent out, with an insufficient escort, to deal with the
swoop, were almost captured, and were only saved by Lord Airlie at the cost
of his own life. The attack on the right was soon checked, but the cavalry
instead of outflanking the enemy was itself outflanked and unable to make a
further advance.
Gordon had now come away from Tygerpoort, and, in touch with Broadwood,
screened the right flank of Ian Hamilton's infantry attack; which after the
failure to turn the enemy's left flank, had necessarily to be a frontal
movement against the strongest section of his line. Bruce Hamilton, with a
brigade of Ian Hamilton's command, crossed Pienaar's River near Boschkop and
expelled the Boer advanced front from the Kleinfontein ridge. Ian Hamilton
was now face to face with Diamond Hill, but the afternoon was too far spent
for further action.
The general idea for the right attack on the following day was a movement by
Bruce Hamilton, reinforced by the Brigade of Guards from Pole-Carew's
command in the centre. Diamond Hill was taken without much difficulty early
in the afternoon, and the Donkerhoek plateau was cleared. A gap was now made
in the Boer line, the commandos driven off making for the Donkerpoort ridge
on the one side, or the Rhenosterfontein heights on the other. From three
positions a double rain of bullets poured upon Bruce Hamilton on the
plateau, until the heights were reached by De Lisle's mounted infantry from
Broadwood's brigade. Bruce Hamilton's right flank was thus relieved, but
between him and the enemy clustering on the ridge intervened the impassable
ravine of the Donkerpoort. Night was approaching and nothing more could be
done.
On
the left, French held his own but no more during the day, and Pole-Carew in
the centre had no opportunity of going into action. The capture of the
Rhenosterfontein heights occurred at an opportune moment and perhaps averted
a disaster. At Delarey's request Botha was on the point of sending
reinforcements to the Boer right to enable it to drive away French and fall
upon the weak British centre, when De Lisle's success vitally changed the
situation.
Next morning, June 13, the British Army found that it had won a victory
without knowing it. The Boers had faded away during the night and had
abandoned the strongest position which they had ever held in the Free State
or the Transvaal. French and Ian Hamilton went in pursuit with no results.
Delarey succeeded in circling round towards the Western Transvaal, Botha
retired to the east. The casualties on the British side were 176; the Boers
professed to have lost but four burghers killed and twenty wounded.
Lord Kitchener was away in the Free State, and the battle was fought under
the usual restrictive conditions, that no operation likely to entail serious
loss of life was to be undertaken: and the enemy found that the ordeal of
combat was not very dreadful.
With the occupation of Pretoria, which was not virtually effected until
Botha's retreat from Diamond Hill, the ranging phase of Lord Roberts'
campaign was nearly at an end. At the two capitals and at other towns
already occupied, he had places of arms, from which without wide divagations
of large bodies of troops, he could hope soon to control and eventually to
dominate the Republics.
To
see to the long and lonely furrow which he had ploughed across the veld from
the Orange to the Magaliesberg, and to prevent its being obliterated by the
wayward and shifting sand of the desert, was the present task before him.
Footnote 43:
Plumer raided across the Limpopo into the Transvaal as far back as December,
1899, and Hunter occupied Christiana on May 15.
