It
was now March, 1901. For some time our burghers had been complaining of
inactivity, and the weary and monotonous existence was gradually beginning
to pall on them. But it became evident that April would be an eventful
month, as the enemy had determined not to suffer our presence in these parts
any longer. A huge movement, therefore, was being set on foot to surround us
and capture the whole commando en bloc.
It
began with a night attack on a field-cornet's force posted at Kruger's Post,
north of Lydenburg, and here the enemy succeeded in capturing 35 men and a
quantity of "impedimenta;" the field-cornet in question, although warned in
time, having taken no proper precautions. By the middle of April the
enemy's forward movement was in full swing. General Plumer came from
Pietersburg, General Walter Kitchener from Lydenburg, and General Barber
from Middelburg. They approached us in six different directions, altogether
a force of 25,000 men, and the whole under the supreme command of General
Sir Bindon Blood.
No
escape was available for us through Secoekuniland on the north, as the
natives here, since the British had occupied their territory, were avowedly
hostile to us. To escape, therefore, we would have to break through the
enemy's lines and also to cross the railway, which was closely guarded.
The enemy were advancing slowly from various directions. All our roads were
carefully guarded, and the cordon was gradually tightening around us. We
were repeatedly attacked, now on this side, now on that, the British being
clearly anxious to discover our position and our strength. In a sharp
skirmish with a column from Lydenburg my faithful Fighting-General Muller
was severely wounded in his shoulder, and a commando of Lydenburgers had
been isolated from me and driven by the enemy along Waterfal River up to
Steelpoort, where they encountered hostile tribes of kaffirs. The commandant
of the corps after a short defence was obliged to destroy his guns, forsake
his baggage, and escape with his burghers in small groups into the
mountains.
Our position was growing more critical, but I resolved to make a stand
before abandoning our carts and waggons, although there seemed little hope
of being able to save anything. In fact the situation was extremely
perilous. As far as I could see we were entirely hemmed in, all the roads
were blocked, my best officer wounded, I had barely 900 men with me, and our
stock of ammunition was very limited.
I
have omitted to mention that early in April, when we first got an inkling of
this move I had liberated all the British officers whom I had kept as
prisoners at Middelburg, and thus saved the British authorities many a D.S.O.
which would otherwise have been claimed by their rescuers.
The British around us were now posted as follows: At Diepkloof on the
Tautesberg to the north-west of us; at Roodekraal, between Tautesberg and
Bothasberg, to the west of us; at Koebold, under Roodehoogte; at Windhoek,
to the east of us; at Oshoek, to the north-east; and to the north of us
between Magneetshoogte and Klip Spruit. We were positioned on Mapochsberg
near Roos Senekal, about midway between Tautesberg and Steenkampsberg. We
had carts, waggons, two field-pieces, and a Colt-Maxim.
We
speedily discovered that we should have to leave our baggage and guns, and
rely mainly on our horses and rifles. We had placed our hospitals as well as
we could, one in an empty school-building at Mapochsberg with 10 wounded,
under the care of Dr. Manning; the other, our only field-hospital, at
Schoonpoort, under the supervision of Dr. H. Neethling. Whether these poor
wounded Boers would have to be abandoned to the enemy, was a question which
perplexed us considerably. If so, we should have been reduced to only one
physician, Dr. Leitz, a young German who might get through with a
pack-horse. Many officers and men, however, had lost all hope of escape.
It
was about the 20th of April when the British approached so close that we had
to fight all day to maintain our positions. I gave orders that same night
that we should burn our waggons, destroy our guns with dynamite, and make a
dash through the enemy's lines, those burghers who had no horses to mount
the mules of the convoy. Hereupon about 100 burghers and an officer coolly
informed me that they had had enough fighting, and preferred to surrender. I
was at that time powerless to prevent them doing so, so I took away all
their horses and ammunition, at which they did not seem very pleased. Before
dusk our camp was a scene of wild confusion. Waggons and carts were burning
fiercely, dynamite was being exploded, and horseless burghers were
attempting to break in the mules which were to serve them as mounts.
Meanwhile a skirmish was going on between our outposts and those of the
enemy.
It
was a strange procession that left Mapochsberg that night in our dash
through the British lines. Many Boers rode mules, whilst many more had no
saddles, and no small number were trudging along on foot, carrying their
rifles and blankets on their shoulders. My scouts had reported that the best
way to get through was on the southern side along Steelpoort, about a
quarter of a mile from the enemy's camp at Bothasberg. But even should we
succeed in breaking through the cordon around us, we still had to cross the
line at Wondersfontein before daybreak, so as not to get caught between the
enemy's troops and the blockhouses.
About 100 scouts, who formed our advance-guard, soon encountered the enemy's
sentries. They turned to the right, then turned to the left; but everywhere
the inquisitive "Tommies" kept asking: "Who goes there?" Not being over
anxious to satisfy their curiosity, they sent round word at once for us to
lie low, and we started very carefully exploring the neighbourhood. But
there seemed no way out of the mess. We might have attacked some weak point
and thus forced our way through, but it was still four or five hours' ride
to the railway line, and with our poor mounts we should have been caught and
captured. Besides which the enemy might have warned the blockhouse
garrisons, in which case we should have been caught between two fires.
No; we wanted to get through without being discovered, and seeing that this
was that night hopeless, I consulted my officers and decided to return to
our deserted camp, where we could take up our original positions without the
enemy being aware of our nocturnal excursion.
Next morning the rising sun found us back in our old positions. We
despatched scouts in all directions as usual, so as to make the enemy
believe that we intended to remain there permanently, and we put ourselves
on our guard, ready to repel an attack at any point on the shortest notice.
But the enemy were much too cautious, and evidently thought they had us
safely in their hands. They amused themselves by destroying every living
thing, and burned the houses and the crops. The whole veldt all round was
black, everything seemed in mourning, the only relief from this dull
monotony of colour being that afforded by the innumerable specks of khaki
all around us. I believe I said there were 25,000 men there, but it now
seemed to me as if there were almost double that number.
We
had to wait until darkness set in before making a second attempt at escape.
The day seemed interminable. Many burghers were loudly grumbling, and even
some officers were openly declaring that all this had been done on purpose.
Of course, these offensive remarks were pointed at me. At last the situation
became too serious. I could only gather together a few officers to oppose an
attack from the enemy on the eastern side, and something had to be done to
prevent a general mutiny. I therefore ordered a burgher who seemed loudest
in his complaints to receive 15 lashes with a sjambok, and I placed a
field-cornet under arrest. After this the grumblers remained sullenly
silent.
The only loophole in the enemy's lines seemed to be in the direction of
Pietersburg on the portion held by General Plumer, who seemed far too busy
capturing cattle and sheep from the "bush-lancers" to surround us closely.
We therefore decided to take our chance there and move away as quickly as
possible in that direction, and then to bear to the left, where we expected
to find the enemy least watchful. Shortly before sunset I despatched 100
mounted men to ride openly in the opposite direction to that which we
intended to take, so as to divert the enemy's attention from our scene of
operations, and sat down to wait for darkness.
