On
the 27th of November, 1900, our scouts reported that a force of the enemy
was marching from the direction of Pretoria, and proceeding along
Zustershoek. I sent out Commandant Muller with a strong patrol, while I
placed the laager in a safe position, in the ridge of kopjes running from
Rhenosterkop some miles to the north. This is the place, about 15 miles to
the north-east of Bronkhorst Spruit, where Colonel Anstruther with the 94th
regiment was attacked in 1881 by the Boers and thoroughly defeated.
Rhenosterkop is a splendid position, rising several hundred feet above the
neighbouring heights, and can be seen from a great distance. Towards the
south and south-east this kopje is cut off from the Kliprandts (known by
the name of Suikerboschplaats) by a deep circular cleft called
Rhenosterpoort.
On
the opposite side of this cleft the so-called "banks" form a "plateau" about
the same height as the Rhenosterkop, with some smaller plateaux, at a lesser
altitude, towards the Wilge River. These plateaux form a crescent running
from south-east to north of the Rhenosterkop. Only one road leading out of
the "bank" near Blackwood Camp and crossing them near Goun, gives access to
this crescent. On the west side is a great gap up to Zustershoek, only
interrupted by some "randjes," or ridges, near the Albert silver mines and
the row of kopjes on which I had now taken up a position.
The enemy's force had been estimated at 5,000 men, mostly mounted, who,
quite against their usual tactics, charged us so soon as they noticed us.
Muller had to fall back again and again. The enemy under General Paget,
pursued us as if we were a lot of game, and it soon became apparent that
they had made up their mind to catch us this time. I sent our carts into the
forest along Poortjesnek to Roodelaager, and made a stand in the kopjes
near Rhenosterkop.
On
the 28th—the next day—General Paget pitched his camp near our positions,
shelling us with some batteries of field guns till dusk. The same evening I
received information that a force under General Lyttelton had marched from
Middelburg and arrived near Blackwood Camp. This meant that our way near
Gourjsberg had been cut off. All we could do was to keep the road along
Poortjesnek well defended, for if the enemy were to succeed in blocking that
as well, we would be in a trap and be entirely cut up.
There was General Paget against us to the west, to the south there was
Rhenosterkop with no way out, and General Lyttelton to the east, while to
the north there was only one road, running between high chains and deep
clefts. If General Paget were to make a flanking movement threatening the
road to the north, I should have been obliged to retire in hot haste, but we
were in hopes the General would not think of this. General Lyttelton only
needed to advance another mile, right up to the first "randts" of the
mountain near Blackwood Camp, for his guns to command our whole position,
and to make it impossible for us to hold it. I had, however, a
field-cornet's company between him and my burghers, with instructions to
resist as long as possible, and to prevent our being attacked from behind,
which plan succeeded, as luck would have it. My Krupp and pom-pom guns had
been repaired, or rather, patched up, though the former had only been fired
fourteen times when it was done up.
I
placed the Johannesburgers on the left, the Police in the centre, and the
Boksburgers on the right. As I have already pointed out, these positions
were situated in a row of small kopjes strewn with big "klips," while the
assailant would have to charge over a bare "bult," and we should not be able
to see each other before they were at 60 to 150 paces distant.
Next morning, when the day dawned, the watchmen gave the alarm, the warning
we knew so well, "The Khakis are coming!" The horses were all put out of
range of the bullets behind the "randts." I rode about with my officers in
front of our positions, thus being able to overlook the whole ground, just
at daybreak.
It
gave me a turn when I suddenly saw the gigantic army of "Khakis" right in
front of us, slowly approaching, in grand formation, regiment upon regiment,
deploying systematically, in proper fighting order, and my anxiety was
mingled with admiration at the splendid discipline of the adversary. This,
then, was the first act in the bloody drama which would be played for the
next fifteen hours. The enemy came straight up to us, and had obviously been
carefully reconnoitring our positions.
General Paget seemed to have been spoiling for a fight, for it did not look
as if he simply meant to threaten our only outlet. His heavy ordnance was in
position near his camp, behind the soldiers, and was firing at us over their
heads, while some 15-pounders were divided amongst the different regiments.
The thought of being involved in such an unequal struggle weighed heavily on
my mind. Facing me were from four to five thousand soldiers, well equipped,
well disciplined, backed up by a strong artillery; just behind me my men,
500 at the outside, with some patched-up guns, almost too shaky for firing
purposes.
But I could rely on at least 90 per cent. of my burghers being splendid
shots, each man knowing how to economise his store of ammunition, while
their hearts beat warmly for the Cause they were fighting.
The battle was opened by our Krupp gun, from which they had orders to fire
the fourteen shells we had at our disposal, and then "run." The enemy's
heavy guns soon answered from the second ridge. When it was broad daylight
the enemy tried his first charge on the Johannesburg position, over which my
brother had the command, and approached in skirmishing order. They charged
right up to seventy paces, when our men fired for the first time, so that we
could not very well have missed our aim at so short a distance, in addition
to which the assailants' outline was just showing against the sky-line as
he was going over the last ridge. Only two volleys and all the Khakis were
flat on the ground, some dead, others wounded, while those who had not been
hit were obliged to lie down as flat as a pancake.
The enemy's field-pieces were out of our sight behind the ridge which the
enemy had to pass in charging, and they went on firing without any
intermission. Half an hour later the position of the Johannesburg Police,
under the late Lieutenant D. Smith, was stormed again, this time the British
being assisted by two field-pieces which they had brought up with them in
the ranks and which were to be used as soon as the soldiers were under fire.
They came to within a hundred paces. One of these guns, I think, I saw put
up, but before they could get the range it had to be removed into safety,
for the attacking soldiers fared equally badly here as on our left flank.
Then, after a little hesitation, they tried the attack on our right flank
again, when Commandant Muller and the Boksburgers and some Pretoria
burghers, under Field-Cornet Opperman held the position, but with the same
fatal result to the attackers. Our fifteen-pounder, after having been fired
a few times, had given out, while our pom-pom could only be used from time
to time after the artilleryman had righted it.
I
had a heliograph post near the left-hand position, one near the centre and
the one belonging to my staff on our extreme right. I remained near this,
expecting a flank movement by General Paget after his front attacks had
failed. From this coign of vantage I was able to overlook the whole of the
fighting ground, besides which I was in constant touch with my officers, and
could tell them all the enemy's movements.
About 10 o'clock they charged again, and so far as I could see with a fresh
regiment. We allowed them to come up very closely again and once more our
deadly Mauser fire mowed them down, compelling those who went scot-free to
go down flat on the ground, while during this charge some who had been
obliged to drop down, now jumped up and ran away. If I remember rightly, it
was during this charge that a brave officer, who had one of his legs
smashed, leant on a gun or his sword, and kept on giving his orders,
cheering the soldiers and telling them to charge on. While in this position,
a second bullet struck him, and he fell mortally wounded. We afterwards
heard it was a certain Colonel Lloyd of the West Riding Regiment. A few
months after, on passing over this same battlefield, we laid a wreath of
flowers on his grave, with a card, bearing the inscription: "In honour of a
brave enemy."
General Paget seemed resolved to take our positions, whatever the sacrifice
of human lives might be. If he succeeded at last, at this rate, he might
find half a score of wounded burghers and, if his cavalry hurried up,
perhaps a number of burghers with horses in bad condition, but nothing more.
Whereas, if he had made a flanking movement, he might have attained his end,
perhaps without losing a single man.
Pride or stupidity must have induced him not to change his tactics. Nothing
daunted by the repeated failures in the morning, our assailant charged
again, now one position and then another, trying to get their field-pieces
in position, but each time without success. At their wits' end, the enemy
tried another dodge, bringing his guns right up to our position under cover
of some Red Cross waggons. The officer who perceived this, reported to me by
heliograph, asking for instructions. I answered: 'If a Red Cross waggon
enters the fighting lines during the battle, it is there on its own
responsibility.' Besides, General Paget, under protection of the white flag,
might have asked any moment or an hour, or longer, to carry away his many
unfortunate wounded, who were lying between two fires in the burning sun.
When the Red Cross waggon was found to be in the line of fire, it was put
right-about face, while some guns remained behind to fire shrapnel at us
from a short distance. They could only fire one or two shots, for our
burghers soon put out of action the artillerists who were serving them.
Towards the afternoon some of my burghers began to run short of ammunition,
I had a field-cornet's force in reserve, from which five to ten men were
sent to the position from time to time, and this cheered the burghers up
again.
The same attacking tactics were persisted in by General Paget all day long,
although they were a complete failure. When the sun disappeared behind the
Magaliesbergs, the enemy made a final, in fact, a desperate effort to take
our positions, the guns booming along while we were enveloped by clouds of
dust thrown up by the shells.
The soldiers charged, brave as lions, and crept closer to our positions than
they had done during the day.
But it seemed as if Fate were favouring us, for our 15-pounder had just got
ready, sending his shells into the enemy's lines in rapid succession, and
finding the range most beautifully. The pom-pom too—which we could only get
to fire one or two shells all day long, owing to the gunner having to potter
about for two or three hours after each shot to try and repair it—to our
great surprise suddenly commenced booming away, and the two pieces—I was
going to say the "mysterious" pieces—poured a stream of murderous steel into
the assailants, which made them waver and then retire, leaving many comrades
behind.
On
our side only two burghers were killed, while 22 were wounded. The exact
loss of the enemy was difficult to estimate. It must, however, have amounted
to some hundreds.
Again night spread a dark veil over one of the most bloody dramas of this
war. After the cessation of hostilities, I called my officers together and
considered our position. We had not lost an inch of ground that day, while
the enemy had gained nothing. On the contrary, they had suffered a serious
repulse at our hands. But our ammunition was getting scarce, our waggons,
with provisions, were 18 miles away. All we had in our positions was mealies
and raw meat, and the burghers had no chance of cooking them. We therefore
decided, as we had no particular interest in keeping these positions, to
fall back that night on Poortjesnek, which was a "half-way house" between
the place we were leaving and our carts, from which we should be able to
draw our provisions and reserve ammunition.
We
therefore allowed General Paget to occupy these positions without more ado.
I
have tried to describe this battle as minutely as possible in order to show
that incompetence of generals was not always on our side only.
I
have seen from the report of the British Commander-in-Chief, published in
the newspapers, that this battle had been a most successful and brilliant
victory, gained by General Paget. People will say, perhaps, that it was
silly on my part to evacuate the positions, and that I should have gone on
defending them the next day. Well, in the old days this would have been done
by European generals, but no doubt they were fighting under different
circumstances. They were not faced by a force ten times their own strength;
not restricted to a limited quantity of ammunition; nor were they in want of
proper food or reinforcements. The nearest Boer commando was at Warmbad,
about 60 miles distant. Besides, there was no necessity, either for
military or strategical reasons, for us to cling to these positions. It had
already become our policy to fight whenever we could, and to retire when we
could not hold on any longer. The Government had decided that the War should
be continued and it was the duty of every general to manœuvre so as to
prolong it. We had no reserve troops, so my motto was: "Kill as many of the
enemy as you possibly can, but see you do not expose your own men, for we
cannot spare a single one."
On
the 30th of November, the day after the fight, I was with a patrol on the
first "randts," north-east of Rhenosterkop, just as the sun rose, and had a
splendid view of the whole battlefield of the previous day. I saw the
enemy's scouts, cautiously approaching the evacuated positions, and
concluded from the precautions they were taking that they did not know we
had left overnight. Indeed, very shortly after I saw the Khakis storming and
occupying the kopjes. How great must have been their astonishment and
disappointment on finding those positions deserted, for the possession of
which they had shed so much blood. A number of ambulance waggons were
brought up and were moving backwards and forwards on the battlefield, taking
the wounded to the hospital camp, which must have assumed colossal
proportions. Ditches were seen to be dug, in which the killed soldiers were
buried. A troop of kaffirs carried the bodies, as far as I could
distinguish, and I could distinctly see some heaps of khaki-coloured forms
near the graves.
As
the battlefield looked now, it was a sad spectacle. Death and mutilation,
sorrow and misery, were the traces yesterday's fight had left behind. How
sad, I thought, that civilised nations should thus try to annihilate one
another. The repeated brave charges made by General Paget's soldiers,
notwithstanding our deadly fire, had won our greatest admiration for the
enemy, and many a burgher sighed even during the battle. What a pity such
plucky fellows should have to be led on to destruction like so many sheep
to the butcher's block!
Meanwhile, General Lyttelton's columns had not got any nearer, and it
appeared to us that he had only made a display to confuse us, and with the
object of inducing us to flee in face of their overwhelming strength.
On
the 1st of December General Paget sent a strong mounted force to meet us,
and we had a short, sharp fight, without very great loss on either side.
This column camped at Langkloof, near our positions, compelling us to graze
and water our horses at the bottom of the "neck" in the woods, where
horse-sickness was prevalent. We were, therefore, very soon obliged to move.
About this time I received a report to the effect that a number of women and
children were wandering about near Rhenosterkop along the Wilge River. Their
houses had been burnt by order of General Paget, and we were asked to
protect these unfortunate people.
Some burghers offered to ride out at night time to try and find them, and
the next morning they brought several families into our camp. The husbands
of these poor sufferers were on duty in the neighbourhood, so that they were
now enabled to do the needful for their wives and children. I put some
questions to some of the women, from which it appeared that although they
had besought the English not to burn their clothes and food, yet this had
been done. Some Australians and Canadians, who had been present, had done
their best to save some of the food and clothes, and these Colonials had
shown them much consideration in every respect, but, the women added, a gang
of kaffirs, who were ordered to cause this destruction, were behaving in the
most barbarous and cruel manner, and were under no control by the British
soldiers.
I
felt bound to protest against these scandalous acts of vandalism, and sent
two of my adjutants to the English camp next day with a note of about the
following tenour:—
"To GENERAL PAGET, commanding H.M's. forces at Rhenosterkop.
"It is my painful duty to bring under your Honour's notice the cruel way in
which the troops under your command are acting in ill-treating defenceless
women and children. Not only their homes, but also their food and clothes,
are being burnt. These poor creatures were left in the open veldt, at the
mercy of the kaffirs, and would have died of starvation and exhaustion but
for our assistance. This way of treating these unfortunate people is
undoubtedly against the rules of civilised warfare, and I beg to emphasise
that the responsibility for this cruelty will be entirely yours. You may
rest assured that a similar treatment of our families will not shorten the
duration of the War, but that, on the contrary, such barbarities will force
the burghers to prolong the struggle and to fight on with more bitterness
and determination than ever."
The two despatch carriers whom I sent to the British General under a white
flag were taken for spies, and however much they tried to establish their
identity, General Paget was not to be convinced, and had them arrested,
detaining them for three days. Their horses were used every day by the
English officers, which I consider far from gentlemanly. On the third day my
two adjutants were again taken before the general, and cross-examined, but
no evidence could be found against their being bona-fide messengers. Paget
told them that my despatch was all nonsense, and did not give them the
right to enter his lines under the white flag, adding, while he handed them
a letter addressed to me:
"You can go now; tell your General that if he likes to fight I shall be
pleased to meet him at any time in the open. You have killed some of my Red
Cross people, but I know it was done by those 'damned' unscrupulous
Johannesburgers. Tell them I shall pay them for this!"
Before my adjutants left, a certain Captain —— said to one of them:
"I
say, what do your people think of the fight?"
"Which fight do you mean?" asked the adjutant.
"The fight here," returned the captain.
"Oh," remarked the adjutant, "we think it was rather a mismanagement." To
which the captain replied: "By Jove! you are not the only people who think
so."
The contents of General Paget's letter were short and rough; "The
responsibility for the suffering of women and children rests on the
shoulders of those who blindly continue the helpless struggle," etc., etc.
I
may say here that this was the first time in this War the English officers
treated my despatch riders under the white flag in such a manner, giving me
at the same time such a discourteous answer.
No
doubt we have had generals acting like this on our side, and I admit that we
did not always stand on etiquette.
As
already stated, part of the enemy's forces were camping out near
Poortjesnek, so close by that we had to shift our laager and commando to a
more healthy part on account of the horse-sickness. The enemy installed a
permanent occupation at Rhenosterkop, and we moved into the Lydenberg
district, where we knew we should find some wholesome "veldt" on the
Steenkamps Mountains. We went through the forest near Maleemskop via
Roodekraal, to the foot of Bothasberg, where we had a few weeks' rest.
