During the first days of November, 1900, we went from Pietersburg to Witnek,
about nineteen miles north of Bronkhorst Spruit, in the Pretoria district.
We had enjoyed a fortnight's rest, which had especially benefited our
horses, and our circumstances were much more favourable in every respect
when we left Pietersburg than when we had entered it.
The Krugersdorp Commando had been sent to its own district, from Pietersburg
via Warmbad and Rustenburg, under Commandant Jan Kemp, in order to be placed
under General De la Rey's command. Most of the burghers preferred being
always in their own districts, even though the villages scattered about were
in the enemy's hands, the greater part of the homesteads burnt down and the
farms destroyed, and nearly all the families had been placed in British
Concentration Camps; and if the commanding officers would not allow the
burghers to go to their own districts they would simply desert, one after
the other, to join the commando nearest their districts.
I
do not think there is another nation so fondly attached to their home and
its neighbourhood, even though the houses be in ruins and the farms
destroyed. Still the Boer feels attracted to it, and when he has at last
succeeded in reaching it, you will often find him sit down disconsolately
among the ruins or wandering about in the vicinity.
It
was better, therefore, to keep our men somewhere near their districts, for
even from a strategical point of view they were better there, knowing every
nook and cranny, which enabled them to find exactly where to hide in case of
danger. Even in the dark they were able to tell, after scouting, which way
the enemy would be coming. This especially gave a commando the necessary
self-reliance, which is of such great importance in battle. It has also
been found during the latter part of the War to be easier for a burgher to
get provisions in his own district than in others, notwithstanding the
destruction caused by the enemy.
Commandant Muller, of the Boksburg Commando, one of those who were lucky
enough to escape the danger of being caught through the half-heartedness of
the previous commandant (Dirksen), and had taken his place, arrived at
Warmbad almost the same moment. He proceeded via Yzerberg and joined us at
Klipplaatdrift near Zebedelestad.
I
had allowed a field-cornet's company, consisting of Colonial Afrikanders, to
accompany President Steyn to the Orange Free State, which meant a reduction
of my force of 350 men, including the Krugersdorpers. But the junction with
the Boksburg burghers, numbering about 200 men, somewhat made up for it.
We
went along the Olifant's River, by Israelskop and Crocodile Hill, to the
spot where the Eland's River runs into the Olifant's River, and thence
direct to Witnek through Giftspruit.
The grass, after the heavy rains, was in good condition and yielded plenty
of food for our quadrupeds. Strange to say, nothing worth recording occurred
during this "trek" of about 95 miles. About the middle of November we camped
near the "Albert" silver mines, south of Witnek.
Commandant Erasmus was still in this part of the country with the remainder
of the Pretoria Commando. Divided into three or four smaller groups, they
watched in the neighbourhood of the railway, from Donkerhoek till close to
Wilgeriver Station, and whenever the enemy moved out, the men on watch gave
warning and all fled with their families and cattle into the "boschveldt"
along Witnek.
It
was these tactics which enabled the British Press to state that the Generals
Plumer and Paget had a brilliant victory over Erasmus the previous month;
for, with the exception of a few abandoned carts at Zusterhoek, they could
certainly not have seen anything of Erasmus and his commando except a cloud
of dust on the road from Witnek to the "boschveldt."
I
had instructions to reorganise the commandos in these regions and to see
that law and order were maintained. The reorganisation was a difficult work,
for the burghers were divided amongst themselves.
Some wanted a different commando, while others wanted to keep to Erasmus,
who was formerly general and who had been my superior, round Ladysmith. He,
one of the wealthiest and most influential burghers in the Pretoria
district, did not seem inclined to carry out my instructions, and altogether
he could not get accustomed to the altered conditions. I did all I could in
the matter, but, so far as the Pretoria Commando was concerned, the result
of my efforts was not very satisfactory. Nor did the generals who tried the
same thing after me get on with the reorganisation while Erasmus remained in
control as an officer. A dangerous element, which he and his clique
tolerated, was formed by some families (Schalkwyk and others) who, after
having surrendered to the enemy, were allowed to remain on their holdings,
with their cattle, and to go on farming as if nothing had happened. They
generally lived near the railway between our sentry stations and those of
the enemy. These "voluntarily disarmed ones," as we called them, had got
passes from the enemy, allowing them free access to the British camps, and
in accordance with one of Lord Roberts' proclamations, their duty, on seeing
any Boers or commandos, was, to notify this at once to the nearest English
picket, and also to communicate all information received about the Boers.
All this was on penalty of having their houses burnt down and their cattle
and property confiscated. Sometimes a brother or other relative of these
"hands-uppers" would call on them. The son of one of them was adjutant to
Commandant Erasmus, and shared his tent with him, while the adjutant often
visited his parents during the night and sometimes by day; the consequence
being that the English always knew exactly what was going on in our
district. This situation could not be allowed to go on, and I instructed one
of my officers to have all these suspected families placed behind our
commandos. Any male persons who had surrendered to the enemy out of
cowardice were arrested.
Most of them were court-martialled for high treason and desertion, and
giving up their arms, and fifteen were imprisoned in a school building at
Rhenosterkop, which had been turned into a gaol for the purpose. The court
consisted of a presiding officer selected from the commandants by the
General, and of four members, two of whom had been chosen by the General and
the President, and two by the burghers.
In
the absence of our "Staats-procureur," a lawyer was appointed public
prosecutor.
Before the trial commenced the President was sworn by the General and the
other four members by the President. The usual criminal procedure was
followed, and each sentence was submitted for the General's ratification.
The court could decree capital punishment, in which case there could be an
appeal to the Government.
There were other courts, constituted by the latter, but as they were moving
about almost every day, they were not always available, and recourse had
then to be taken to the court-martial.
The fifteen prisoners were tried in Rhenosterkop churchyard. The trial
lasted several days, and I do not remember all the particulars of the
various sentences, which differed from two and a half to five years'
imprisonment, I believe with the option of a fine. The only prison we could
send them to was at Pietersburg, and there they went.
The arresting and punishing of these people caused a great sensation in the
different commandos.
It
seems incredible, but it is a fact that many members of these traitors'
families were very indignant about my action in the matter, even sending me
anonymous letters in which they threatened to shoot me.
Although there was less treason after the conviction of these fifteen
worthies had taken place, there always remained an easy channel in the shape
of correspondence between burghers from the commandos and their relatives
within the English fighting lines, carried by kaffir runners. This could
not be stopped so easily.
On
the 19th of November, 1900, I attacked the enemy on the railway
simultaneously at Balmoral and Wilgeriver, and soon found that the British
had heard of our plan beforehand.
Commandant Muller, who was cautiously creeping up to the enemy at Wilgeriver
with some of his burghers, and a Krupp gun, met with a determined resistance
early in the morning. He succeeded, indeed, in taking a few small forts, but
the station was too strongly fortified, and the enemy used two 15-pounders
in one of the forts with such precision as to soon hit our Krupp gun, which
had to be cleared out of the fighting line.
The burghers, who had taken the small forts in the early morning, were
obliged to stop there till they could get away under protection of the
darkness, with three men wounded. We did not find out the enemy's losses.
We
were equally unfortunate near Balmoral Station, where I personally led the
attack.
At
daybreak I ordered a fortress to be stormed, expecting to capture a gun,
which would enable us to fire on the station from there, and then storm it.
In fact we occupied the fort with little trouble, taking a captain and 32
men prisoners, besides inflicting a loss of several killed and wounded,
while a score more escaped. These all belonged to the "Buffs," the same
regiment which now takes part in watching us at St. Helena. But, on the
whole, we were disappointed, not finding a gun in the fort, which was
situated to the west of the station. Two divisions of burghers with a
15-pounder and a pom-pom were approaching the station from north and east,
while a commando, under Field-Cornet Duvenhage, which had been called upon
to strengthen the attack, was to occupy an important position in the south
before the enemy could take it up, for during the night it was still
unoccupied.
Our 15-pounder, one of the guns we had captured from the English, fired six
shells on the enemy at the station, when it burst, while the pom-pom after
having sent some bombs through the station buildings, also jammed. We tried
to storm over the bare ground between our position and the strongly
barricaded and fortified station, and the enemy would no doubt have been
forced to surrender if they had not realised that something had gone wrong
with us, our guns being silent, and Field-Cornet Duvenhage and his burghers
not turning up from the south. The British, who had taken an important
position from which they could cover us with their fire, sent us some
lyddite shells from a howitzer in the station fort. Although there was a
good shower of them, yet the lyddite-squirt sent the shells at such a slow
pace, that we could quietly watch them coming and get under cover in time
and therefore they did very little harm.
At
eight o'clock we were forced to fall back, for although we had destroyed the
railway and telegraphic communications in several places over night, the
latter were repaired in the afternoon, and the enemy's reinforcements poured
in from Pretoria as well as from Middelburg. I observed all this through my
glass from the position I had taken up on a high point near the Douglas coal
mines.
Amongst the prisoners we had made in the morning was a captain of the
"Buffs," whose collar stars had been stripped off for some reason, the marks
showing they had only recently been removed. At that time there were no
orders to keep officers as prisoners-of-war, and this captain was therefore
sent back to Balmoral with the other "Tommies," after we had relieved them
of their weapons and other things which we were in want of. I read
afterwards, in an English newspaper, that this captain had taken the stars
off in order to save himself from the "cruelties of the Boers."
This, I considered, an unjust and undeserved libel.
