We
spent the next few weeks in entrenching and fortifying our new positions.
General Botha had left with some men for the Orange Free State which Lord
Roberts, having relieved Kimberley, was marching through. General Joubert
died about this time at Pretoria, having been twenty-one years
Commandant-General of the South African Republic. He was without doubt one
of the most prominent figures in the South African drama.
General Botha now took up the chief command and soon proved himself to be
worthy of holding the reins. He enjoyed the confidence and esteem of our
whole army, a very important advantage under our trying circumstances.
Assisted by De Wet he was soon engaged in organizing the commandos in the
Orange Free State, and in attempting to make some sort of a stand against
the British, who were now marching through the country in overwhelming
numbers. In this Republic the burghers had been under the command of the
aged General Prinsloo, who now, however, had become so downhearted that the
supreme command was taken from him and given to General De Wet. Prinsloo
surrendered soon after, in doing which he did his people his greatest
service; it was, however, unfortunate that he should have succeeded in
leading with him 900 burghers into the hands of the enemy.
In
the Biggarsbergen we had nothing to do but to sleep and eat and drink. On
two separate occasions, however, we were ordered to join others in attacking
the enemy's camp at Elandslaagte. This was done with much ado, but I would
rather say nothing about the way in which the attacks were directed. It
suffices to say that both failed miserably, and we were forced to retire
considerably quicker than we had come.
Our generals, meantime, were very busy issuing innumerable circulars to the
different commandos. It is impossible for me to remember the contents of all
these curious manifestos, but one read as follows:—
"A
roll-call of all burghers is to be taken daily; weekly reports are to be
sent to headquarters of each separate commando, and the minimum number of
burghers making up a field-cornetship is therein to be stated. Every 15 men
forming a field-cornetship are to be under a corporal; and these corporals
are to hold a roll-call every day, and to send in weekly detailed reports of
their men to the Field-Cornet and Commandant, who in his turn must report to
the General."
Another lengthy circular had full instructions and regulations for the
granting of "leave" to burghers, an intricate arrangement which gave
officers a considerable amount of trouble. The scheme was known as the
"furlough system," and was an effort to introduce a show of organisation
into the weighty matter of granting leave of absence. It failed, however,
completely to have its desired effect. It provided that one-tenth of each
commando should be granted furlough for a fortnight, and then return to
allow another tenth part to go in its turn. In a case of sick leave, a
doctor's certificate was required, which had to bear the counter-signature
of the field-cornet; its possessor was then allowed to go home instead of to
the hospital. Further, a percentage of the farmers were allowed from time to
time to go home and attend to pressing matters of their farms, such as
harvesting, shearing sheep, etc. Men were chosen by the farmers to go and
attend to matters not only for themselves but for other farmers in their
districts as well. The net result of all this was that when everybody who
could on some pretext or other obtain furlough had done so, about a third of
each commando was missing. My burghers who were mostly men from the
Witwatersrand Goldfields, could of course obtain no leave for farming
purposes; and great dissatisfaction prevailed. I was inundated with
complaints about their unfair treatment in this respect and only settled
matters with considerable trouble.
I
agree that this matter had to be regulated somehow, and I do not blame the
authorities for their inability to cope with the difficulty. It seemed a
great pity, however, that the commandos should be weakened so much and that
the fighting spirit should be destroyed in this fashion. Of course it was
our first big war and our arrangements were naturally of a very primitive
character.
It
was the beginning of May before our friends the enemy at Ladysmith and
Elandslaagte began to show some signs of activity. We discovered
unmistakable signs that some big forward movement was in progress, but we
could not discover on which point the attack was to be directed. Buller and
his men were marching on the road along Vantondersnek, and I scented heavy
fighting for us again. I gathered a strong patrol and started out to
reconnoitre the position. We found that the enemy had pitched their camp
past Waschbank in great force, and were sending out detachments in an
easterly direction. From this I concluded that they did not propose going
through Vantondersnek, but that they intended to attack our left flank at
Helpmakaar. This seemed to me, at any rate, to be General Buller's safest
plan.
Helpmakaar was east of my position; it is a little village elbowed in a pass
in the Biggarsbergen. By taking this point one could hold the key to our
entire extended line of defence, as was subsequently only too clearly shown.
I pointed this out to some of our generals, but a commandant's opinion did
not weigh much just then; nor was any notice taken of a similar warning from
Commandant Christian Botha, who held a position close to mine with the
Swaziland burghers.
We
had repeated skirmishes with the English outposts during our scouting
expeditions, and on one occasion we suddenly encountered a score of men of
the South African Light Horse.
We
noticed them in a "donk" (a hollow place) thickly covered with trees and
bushes, but not before we were right amongst them. It appears they mistook
us for Englishmen, while we thought at first they were members of Colonel
Blake's Irish Brigade. Many of them shook hands with us, and a burgher
named Vivian Cogell asked them in Dutch: "How are you, boys?"
To
which an Englishman, who understood a little Dutch, answered: "Oh, all
right; where do you come from?"
Vivian replied: "From Viljoen's commando; we are scouting."
Then the Englishman discovered who we were, but Vivian gave the man no time
for reflection. Riding up to him, he asked: "What regiment do you belong
to?"
"To the South African Light Horse," answered the Englishman.
"Hands up!" retorted Vivian, and the English-Afrikander threw down his gun
and put up his hands.
"Hands up! Hands up!" was the cry now universally heard, and although a few
escaped, the majority were disarmed and made prisoners. It had been made a
rule that when a burgher captured a British soldier he should be allowed to
conduct him to Pretoria, where he could then obtain a few days' leave to
visit his family. This did much to encourage our burghers to make
prisoners, although many lost their lives in attempting to do so.
The next day, General Buller marched on Helpmakaar, passing close to our
position. We fired a few shots from our Creusot gun, and had several light
skirmishes. The enemy, however, concentrated the fire of a few batteries on
us, and our guns were soon silenced.
General L. Meyer had arrived with some reinforcements close to Helpmakaar,
but the position had never been strengthened, and the sole defending force
consisted of the Piet Retief burghers, known as the "Piet Retreaters,"
together with a small German corps. The result was easy to predict. The
attack was made, and we lost the position without seriously attempting to
defend it. Buller was now, therefore, in possession of the key to the Boer
position in Natal, a position which we had occupied for two months—and could
therefore, have fortified to perfection—and whose strategic importance
should have been known in its smallest details. I think our generals, who
had a sufficient force at their disposal, of which the mobility has become
world-famed, should have been able to prevent such a fiasco as our
occupation of the splendid line of defence in the Biggarsbergen turned out
to be.
Here, for the first time in the war, General Buller utilised his success,
and followed up our men as they were retreating on Dundee. He descended by
the main waggon track from Helpmakaar, and drove the commandos like sheep
before him. I myself was obliged to move away in hot haste and join the
general retreat. Once or twice our men attempted to make a stand, but with
little success.
When we reached Dundee the enemy gradually slackened off pursuit, and at
dark we were clear of them. Satisfied with their previous day's success, and
sadly hampered by their enormous convoys, the English now allowed us to move
on at our leisure.
