After the English forces had retreated from Vaalkrantz across the Tugela, a
patrol of my commando under my faithful adjutant, J. Du Preez, who had taken
my place for the time being, succeeded in surprising a troop of fifty
Lancers, of the 17th regiment, I believe, near Zwartkop, east of the Tugela,
and making them prisoners after a short skirmish. Among these men, who were
afterwards sent to Pretoria, was a certain Lieutenant Thurlington. It was a
strange sight to see our patrol coming back with their victims, each Boer
brandishing a captured lance.
Being still in the hospital in feeble health without any prospect of a
speedy recovery, I took the doctor's advice and went home to Rondepoort,
near Krugersdorp, where my family was staying at the time, and there,
thanks to the careful treatment of my kind doctor and the tender care of my
wife I soon recovered my strength.
On
the 25th of February I received a communication from my commando to the
effect that General Buller had once more concentrated his forces on Colenso
and that heavy fighting was going on. The same evening I also had a telegram
from President Kruger, urging me to rejoin my commando so soon as health
would allow, for affairs seemed to have taken a critical turn. The enemy
appeared to mean business this time, and our commando had already been
compelled to evacuate some very important positions, one of which was
Pieter's Heights.
Then the news came from Cape Colony that General Piet Cronje had been
surrounded at Paardeberg, and that as he stubbornly refused to abandon his
convoy and retreat, he would soon be compelled by a superior force to
surrender.
The next morning I was in a fast train to Natal, accompanied by my faithful
adjutant. Rokzak. My other adjutant, Du Preez, had meantime been ordered to
take a reinforcement of 150 men to Pieter's Heights, and was soon engaged in
a desperate struggle in the locality situated between the Krugersdorpers'
and the Middleburgers' positions. The situation was generally considered
very serious when I arrived near the head laager at Modderspruit late in the
evening of the 27th of February, unaware of the unfavourable turn things had
taken during the day at Paardeberg, in the Cape Colony, and on the Tugela.
We rode on that night to my laager at Potgietersdrift, but having to go by a
roundabout way it took us till early next morning before we reached our
destination. The first thing I saw on my arrival was a cart containing ten
wounded men, who had just been brought in from the fighting line, all yellow
with lyddite.
Field-cornet P. van der Byl, who came fresh from the fight near Pieter's
Heights, told me that these burghers had been wounded there. I asked them
what had happened and how matters stood. "Ah, Commandant," he replied,
"things are in a very bad way! Commandant Du Preez and myself were called to
Pieter's Heights three days ago, as the enemy wanted to force their way
through. We were in a very awkward position, the enemy storming us again and
again; but we held our own, and fired on the soldiers at 50 paces. The
English, however, directed an uninterrupted gun fire at our commandos, and
wrought great havoc. Early Sunday morning the other side asked for a truce
to enable them to bury their dead who were lying too close to our positions
to be got at during the fighting. Many of their wounded were lying there as
well, and the air was rent during 24 hours with their agonised groans, which
were awful to hear. We, therefore, granted an armistice till 6 o'clock in
the evening." (This curiously coincided in time with Lord Roberts' refusal
to General Piet Cronje at Paardeberg to bury his dead).
"The enemy," continued the field-cornet, "broke through several positions,
and while we were being fired at by the troops which were advancing on us,
we were attacked on our left flank and in the rear. Assistant-Commandant Du
Preez, and Field-Cornet Mostert, were both severely wounded, but are now in
safe hands. Besides these, 42 of our burghers were killed, wounded, or taken
prisoners; we could only bring 16 of our wounded with us. The Krugersdorpers,
too, have suffered severely. The enemy has pushed through, and I suppose my
burghers are now taking up a position in the "randten" near Onderbroekspruit."
Here was a nice state of things! When I had left my commando 15 days
previously, we had had heavy losses in the battle of Vaalkrantz, and now
again my burghers had been badly cut up. We had lost over 100 men in one
month.
But there was no time to lose in lamenting over these matters, for I had
just received information that General P. Cronje had been taken prisoner
with 4,000 men. The next report was to the effect that the enemy was
breaking through near Onderbroekspruit, and that some burghers were retiring
past Ladysmith. I was still in telegraphic communication with the head
laager, and at once wired to the Commandant-General for instructions. The
answer was:—
"Send your carts back to Modderspruit (our headquarters) and hold the
position with your mounted commandos."
The position indicated was on the Upper Tugela, on a line with Colenso. My
laager was about 20 miles away from the head laager; the enemy had passed
through Onderbroekspruit, and was pushing on with all possible speed to
relieve Ladysmith, so that I now stood in an oblique line with the enemy's
rear. I sent out my carts to the south-west, going round Ladysmith in the
direction of Modderspruit. One of my scouts reported to me that the Free
State commandos which had been besieging Ladysmith to the south, had all
gone in the direction of Van Reenen's Pass; another brought the information
that the enemy had been seen to approach the village, and that a great force
of cavalry was making straight for us.
General Joubert's instructions were therefore inexplicable to me, and if I
had carried them out I would probably have been cut off by the enemy. My
burghers were also getting restless, and asked me why, while all the other
commandos were retiring, we did not move. Cronje's surrender had had a most
disheartening effect on them; there was, in fact, quite a panic among them.
I mounted a high kopje from which I could see the whole Orange Free State
army, followed by a long line of quite 500 carts and a lot of cattle, in
full retreat, and enveloped in great clouds of red dust. To the right of
Ladysmith I also noticed a similar melancholy procession. On turning round,
I saw the English in vast numbers approaching very cautiously, so slowly, in
fact, that it would take some time before they could reach us. Another and
great force was rushing up behind them, also in the direction of Ladysmith.
It
must have been a race for the Distinguished Service Order or the Victoria
Cross to be won by the one who was first to enter Ladysmith. We knew that
the British infantry, aided by the artillery, had paved the way for relief,
and I noticed the Irish Fusiliers on this occasion, as always, in the van.
But Lord Dundonald rushed in and was proclaimed the hero of the occasion.
Before concluding this chapter I should like to refer to a few incidents
which happened during the Siege of Ladysmith. It is unnecessary to give a
detailed description of the destruction of "Long Tom" at Lombardskop or the
blowing up of another gun west of Ladysmith, belonging to the Pretoria
Commando. The other side have written enough about this, and made enough
capital out of them; and many a D.S.O. and V.C. has been awarded on account
of them.
Alas, I can put forward nothing to lessen our dishonour. As regards the
"Long Tom" which was blown up, this was a piece of pure treachery, and a
shocking piece of neglect, Commandant Weilbach, who ought to have defended
this gun with the whole of his Heidelberg Commando, was unfaithful to his
charge. The Heidelbergers, however, under a better officer, subsequently
proved themselves excellent soldiers. A certain Major Erasmus was also to
blame. He was continually under the influence of some beverage which could
not be described as "aqua pura"; and we, therefore, expected little from
him. But although the planning and the execution of the scheme to blow up
"Long Tom" was a clever piece of work, the British wasted time and
opportunity amusing themselves in cutting out on the gun the letters "R.A."
(Royal Artillery), and the effect of the explosion was only to injure part
of the barrel. After a little operation in the workshops of the Netherlands
South African Railway Company at Pretoria under the direction of Mr. Uggla,
our gun-doctor, "Long Tom's" mouth was healed and he could spit fire again
as well as before. As to the blowing up of the howitzer shortly after, I
will say the incident reflected no credit on General Erasmus, as he ought to
have been warned by what happened near Lombardskop, and to have taken proper
precautions not to give a group of starving and suffering soldiers an
opportunity of penetrating his lines and advancing right up to his guns.
Both incidents will be an ugly blot on the history of this war, and I am
sorry to say the two Boer officers have never received condign punishment.
They should, at any rate, have been called before the Commandant-General to
explain their conduct.
The storming of Platrand (Cæsar's Camp), south-east of Ladysmith, on the 6th
of January, 1900, also turned out badly for many reasons. The attack was not
properly conducted owing to a jealousy amongst some of the generals, and
there was not proper co-operation.
The burghers who took part in the assault and captured several forts did
some splendid work, which they might well be proud of, but they were not
seconded as they should have been. The enemy knew that if they lost
Platrand, Ladysmith would have to surrender; they therefore defended every
inch of ground, with the result that our men were finally compelled to give
way. And, for our pains, we sustained an enormous loss in men, which did not
improve in any way the broken spirit of our burghers.
