Eight days after my commando had been stationed in my new position under
General Erasmus, I received instructions to march to Potgietersdrift, on the
Upper Tugela, near Spion Kop, and there to put myself at Andries Cronje's
disposal. This gentleman was then a general in the Orange Free State Army,
and although a very venerable looking person, was not very successful as a
commander. Up to the 14th of December, 1899, no noteworthy incident took
place, and nothing was done but a little desultory scouting along the Tugela,
and the digging of trenches.
At
last came the welcome order summoning us to action; and we were bidden to
march on Colenso Heights with 200 men to fill up the ranks, as a fight was
imminent. We left under General Cronje and arrived the next morning at
daybreak, and a few hours after began the battle now known to the world as
the Battle of Colenso (15th December, 1899).
I
afterwards heard that the commandos under General Cronje were to cross the
river and attack the enemy's left flank. This did not happen, as the
greatest confusion prevailed owing to the various contradictory orders given
by the generals. For instance, I myself received four contradictory orders
from four generals within the space of ten minutes. I, however, took the
initiative in moving my men up to the river to attempt the capture of a
battery of guns on the enemy's left flank which had been left unprotected,
as was the case with the ten guns which fell into our hands later in the
day. I had approached within 1,400 paces of the enemy, and my burghers were
following close behind me when an adjutant from General Botha (accompanied
by a gentleman named C. Fourie, who was then also parading as a general)
galloped up to us and ordered us at once to join the Ermelo commando, which
was said to be too weak to resist the attacks of the enemy. We hurried
thither as quickly as we could round the rear of the fighting line, where we
were obliged to off-saddle and walk up to the position of the Ermelo
burghers. This was no easy task; the battle was now in full swing, and the
enemy's shells were bursting in dozens around us, and in the burning sun we
had to run some miles.
When we arrived at our destination Mr. Fourie (the pseudo general) and his
adjutant could nowhere be found. As to the Ermelo burghers, they said they
were quite comfortable, and had asked for no assistance.
Not a single shell had reached them, for a clump of aloe trees stood a
hundred yards away, which the English presumably had taken for Boers,
judging by the terrific bombardment these trees were being subjected to.
By
this time the attack was repulsed, and General Buller was in full retreat to
Chieveley, though our commando had been unable to take an active part in the
fighting, at which we were greatly disappointed. It is much to be regretted
that the retreat of the enemy was not followed up at once. Had this been
done, the campaign in Natal would have taken an entirely different aspect,
and very probably would have been attended by a more favourable conclusion.
I consider myself far from a prophet, but this I know; and if we had then
and on subsequent occasions followed up our successes, the result of the
Campaign would have been far more satisfactory to us.
After I had assisted in bringing away through the river the guns we had
taken, and seen to other matters which required my immediate attention, I
was ordered to remain with the Ermelo commando at Colenso, near Toomdrift,
and to await there further instructions.
A
few weeks of inactivity followed, the English sending us each day a few
samples of their shells from their 4.7 Naval guns. Unfortunately, our guns
were of much smaller calibre, and we could send them no suitable reply. As a
rule we would lie in the trenches, and a burgher would be on the look-out.
So soon as he saw the flash of an English gun, he would cry out; "There's a
shell," and we then sought cover, so that the enemy seldom succeeded in
harming us.
One day one of these big shells fell amongst a group of fourteen burghers
who were at dinner. The shell struck a sharp rock, which it splintered into
fragments, and was emitting its yellow lyddite; but, fortunately, the fuse
refused to burn, and the shell did not explode, so we had a narrow escape
that day from a small catastrophe.
My
laager had been at Potgietersdrift all this time, and for the time being we
were deprived of our tents. We were not sorry, therefore, when we were
ordered to leave Colenso and to return to our camp.
A
few days after we were told off to take up a position at the junction of the
Little and the Big Tugela, between Spion Kop and Colenso. Here we celebrated
our first Christmas in the field; our friends at Johannesburg had sent us a
quantity of presents by means of a friend, Attorney Raaff, comprising cakes,
cigars, cigarettes, tobacco and other luxuries. Along this part of the
Tugela we found a fair quantity of vegetables, and poultry, and as their
respective owners had fled we were unable to pay for what we had. We were
obliged, therefore, to "borrow" all these things for the banquet befitting
to the occasion.
But General Buller had not quite finished with us yet. He marched on Spion
Kop, but with the exception of a feint attack nothing of importance happened
then. One day I went across the river with a patrol to discover what the
enemy was doing, when we suddenly came across nine English spies, who fled
as soon as they saw us. We galloped after them, trying to cut them off from
the main body, which was at a little distance away from us, and would no
doubt have overtaken them, but, riding at a breakneck speed over a mountain
ridge, we found ourselves suddenly confronted with a strong English mounted
corps, apparently engaged in drilling. We were only 500 paces away from
them, and we jumped off our horses, and opened fire. But there were only a
dozen of us, and the enemy soon began sending us a few shells, and prepared
to attack us with their whole force. About a hundred mounted men, with
horses in the best of condition, set off to pursue us.
We
were obliged to ride back by the same path we had come by, which was
fortunate for us, as we knew the way and could ride through crevices and
dongas without any hesitation. In this way we soon gave our pursuers the
slip.
Buller's forces seemed at first to have the intention of forcing their way
through near Potgietersdrift, and they took possession of all the "randts"
on their side of the river, causing us to strengthen the position on our
side. We thus had to shift our commando again to Potgietersdrift, where we
soon had the enemy's Naval guns playing on our positions. This continued day
and night for a whole week.
It
seemed as if General Buller were determined to annihilate all the Boers with
his lyddite shells, so as to enable the soldiers to walk at their leisure to
the release of Ladysmith. Certainly we suffered considerably from lyddite
fumes.
The British next made a feint attack near Potgietersdrift, advancing with a
great clamour till they had come within 2,000 paces of us, where they
occupied various "randts" and kopjes, always under cover of their artillery.
Once they came a little too close to our positions, and we suddenly opened
fire on them. The result was that their ambulance waggons were seen to
become very busy driving backwards and forwards.
This "feint," however, was only made in order to divert our attention, while
Buller was concentrating his troops and guns on Spion Kop. The ruse
succeeded to a large extent, and on the 21st January the memorable battle of
Spion Kop (near the Upper Tugela) began.
General Warren, who, I believe, was in command here, had ordered another
"feint" attack from the extreme right wing. General Cronje and the Free
Staters had taken up a position at Spion Kop, assisted by the commandos of
General Erasmus and Schalk Burger.
The fight lasted the whole of that day and the next, and became more and
more fierce. Luckily General Botha appeared on the scene in time, and
re-arranged matters so well and with so much energy that the enemy found
itself well employed, and was kept in check at all points.
I
had been ordered to defend the position at Potgietersdrift, but the fighting
round Spion Kop became so serious that I was obliged to send up a field
cornet with his men as a reinforcement, which was soon followed by a second
contingent, making altogether 200 Johannesburgers in the fight, of whom nine
were killed and 18 wounded. The enemy had reached the top of the "kop" on
the evening of the second day of the fight, not, however, without having
sustained considerable losses. At this juncture one of our generals felt so
disheartened that he sent away his carts, and himself left the battlefield.
But General Botha kept his ground like a man, surrounded by the faithful
little band who had already borne the brunt of this important battle. And
one can imagine our delight when next morning we found that the English had
retreated, leaving that immense battlefield, strewn with hundreds of dead
and wounded, in our hands.
"What made them leave so suddenly last night," was the question we asked
each other then, and which remains unanswered to this day.
General Warren has stated that the cause of his departure was the want of
water, but I can hardly credit that statement, as water could be obtained
all the way to the top of Spion Kop; and even had it been wanting it is not
likely that after a sacrifice of 1,200 to 1,300 lives the position would
have been abandoned on this account alone. Our victory was undoubtedly a
fluke.
