A
few days after we had arrived before Ladysmith we joined an expedition to
reconnoitre the British entrenchments, and my commando was ordered near some
forts on the north-westerly side of the town. Both small and large artillery
were being fired from each side. We approached within 800 paces of a fort;
it was broad daylight and the enemy could therefore see us distinctly, knew
the exact range, and received us with a perfect hailstorm of fire. Our only
chance was to seek cover behind kopjes and in ditches, for on any Boer
showing his head the bullets whistled round his ears. Here two of my
burghers were severely wounded, and we had some considerable trouble to get
them through the firing line to our ambulance. At last, late in the
afternoon, came the order to retire, and we retired after having achieved
nothing.
I
fail to this day to see the use of this reconnoitring, but at Ladysmith
everything was equally mysterious and perplexing. It was perhaps that my
knowledge of military matters was too limited to understand the subtle
manœuvres of those days. But I have made up my mind not to criticise our
leader's military strategy, though I must say at this juncture that the
whole siege of Ladysmith and the manner in which the besieged garrison was
ineffectually pounded at with our big guns for several months, seem to me an
unfathomable mystery, which, owing to Joubert's untimely death, will never
be explained satisfactorily. But I venture to describe Joubert's policy
outside Ladysmith as stupid and primitive, and in another chapter I shall
again refer to it.
After another fortnight or so, we were ordered away to guard another
position to the south-west of Ladysmith, as the Free State commando under
Commandant Nel, and, unless I am mistaken, under Field-Cornet Christian de
Wet (afterwards the world-famous chief Commander of the Orange Free State,
and of whom all Afrikanders are justly proud), had to go to Cape Colony.
Here I was under the command of Dijl Erasmus, who was then General and a
favourite of General Joubert. We had plenty of work given us. Trenches had
to be dug and forts had to be constructed and remodelled. At this time an
expedition ventured to Estcourt, under General Louis Botha, who replaced
General L. Meyer, sent home on sick leave. My commando joined the expedition
under Field-Cornet J. Kock, who afterwards caused me a lot of trouble.
I
can say but little of this expedition to Estcourt, save that the
Commander-in-Chief accompanied it. But for his being with us, I am convinced
that General Botha would have pushed on at least as far as Pietermaritzburg,
for the English were at that time quite unable to stop our progress. But
after we got to Estcourt, practically unopposed, Joubert, though our
burghers had been victorious in battle after battle, ordered us to retreat.
The only explanation General Joubert ever vouchsafed about the recall of
this expedition was that in a heavy thunderstorm which had been raging for
two nights near Estcourt, two Boers had been struck by lightning, which,
according to his doctrine, was an infallible sign from the Almighty that the
commandos were to proceed no further. It seems incredible that in these
enlightened days we should find such a man in command of an army; it is,
nevertheless, a fact that the loss of two burghers induced our
Commandant-General to recall victorious commandos who were carrying all
before them. The English at Pietermaritzburg, and even at Durban, were
trembling lest we should push forward to the coast, knowing full well that
in no wise could they have arrested our progress. And what an improvement in
our position this would have meant! As it was, our retirement encouraged the
British to push forward their fighting line so far as Chieveley Station,
near the Tugela river, and the commandos had to take up a position in the "randjes,"
on the westerly banks of the Tugela.
