A combined force under Generals de la Rey, Beyers and Smuts,
successfully attacked the British defences and overran the camp
at Nooitgedacht under the command of General R A P Clements on
13th December 1900. This was rated as one of the most
successful Boer actions of the Boer War.
For the British, the reverse at Nooitgedacht provoked an
enquiry into the failure.
From General Lord Kitchener to the Secretary of State for
War.
Army Head-quarters, South Africa,
Sir, Pretoria, 21st December 1900.
I have the honour to forward the attached report by
Major-General Clements on his action with the enemy at
Nooitgedacht on the 13th December, together with Captain
Yatman's account, received by telegram, of what occurred on
the summit of the Magaliesberg where he was in immediate
command.
I have pointed out to Major-General Clements that, by
remaining from the 8th stationary with his mobile column in
a position that was not thoroughly defensible, and in the
immediate vicinity of the enemy under Delarey, whom he did
not feel strong enough to attack and drive off, he showed in
my opinion too great confidence, and failed to correctly
appreciate the situation. Moreover, by his inaction, he
enabled the enemy to make complete plans for attacking his
position on the 13th.
Owing to intelligence received of Beyer's movements, I
telegraphed on the 12th, as follows, to Major-General
Clements:—
"Hope you are looking out and making arrangements for the
commandos reported moving south-west in direction of
Rustenburg."
I do not yet clearly understand how General Broadwood,
with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, took no part in the action,
but this I will thoroughly enquire into as soon as
circumstances admit.
A Court of Enquiry has been ordered to assemble under
Lieut.-General Tucker's supervision to investigate the
circumstances of the surrender of the four companies of the
Northumberland Fusiliers, and on receiving its report I will
determine whether any Officers, non-commissioned officers,
or men should be tried by Court-Martial.
I am glad to be able from all accounts to endorse General
Clements's report on the good behaviour of the men, when
their position became critical owing to the enemy having:
gained the summit overlooking the camp.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
KITCHENER,
General, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa.
From General Clements, Commanding Clements's Force to Chief
of Staff, Army Headquarters, South Africa.
Commando Nek,
Sir, 11th December 1900.
I have the honour to report that on learning of the
attack on a convoy on the Commando Nek, Rustenburg road, I
moved up the Hokpoort valley from Scheerpoort on the 6th
instant, and reached Nooitgedacht on the 8th instant. The
plan I adopted was to have six companies moving along the
Magaleisberg, and Colonel Legge's force and the remainder of
mine in the valley. On arrival at Nooitgedacht I sent back
to Reitfontein for rations, the force left on the
Magaliesberg, consisting of three at first and afterwards
four companies of the Northumberland Fusiliers. While at
Nooitgedacht I co-operated with General Broadwood who was on
the north side of the Magaliesburg in searching the northern
slopes and kloofs, recovering a considerable part of the
stores looted from the convoy. When the convoy was attacked
on the 3rd instant, the Boers of Delarey's, Potgeiter's, and
Van Zyls's Commandoes assembled at the southern ends of the
Damhoek. Nooitgedacht, and Briedt Nek passes and returned
there after the attack with some of their Spoil.
I considered that the best way to prevent a recurrence
was to clear the Magatiesberg, and this I did, driving
Delarey to Zeekoehoek, where I did not consider myself
strong enough to attack him, and wired for more troops from
Krugersdorp, where part of my force had been left. This
force was ordered to join me, and fearing it would not be
sufficiently strong to move via Zeekoehoek, I ordered it to
march to Rietfontoin and thence to join me. They have joined
me here to-day.
It was to march at daybreak on the 10th instant. In the
meantime a force of Boers under Beyers, estimated at least
as 1,500 men with 2 guns and a pompon, encamped just south
of Briedt Nek. On the evening of the 12th I heard of this
force, and was told it was a large force with wagons and
cattle.
On the morning, of the 13th, at about 3.40 a.m., the
Mounted Infantry picquets of Legge's force were attacked.
They held a ridge running south from the western shoulder of
Nooitgedacht Pass, and the attack was made by some 500 men.
The fighting was at close quarters, under 40 yards, in their
jungle, and the Boers were driven off retiring towards
Groblaar's Pass about 4.30 a.m. At such close quarters the
casualties were very heavy on both sides. About 4 a.m.
firing was heard on the top of the Magaliesberg, and the,
Fife and Devon Yeomanry, half a company of the
Northumberland Fusiliers, and eventually 1 company of the
King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, were sent up the pass
to reinforce the companies there. Before these
reinforcements reached the summit, the crest of the pass was
in possession of the Boers. I have no information as to what
occurred on the top of the Magaleisberg, but the Boers
gained the crest of the hills on both sides of the pass by
6.30 a.m.. and firing on the summit ceased except by Boers
at us in camp.
From these positions they opened a very heavy fire on our
camp at distances varying from 3,000 to 1,500 yards. Seeing
the camp was untenable, I ordered the transport to inspan,
and waited for quite 1.5 hours for this to be done, but as
all the native boys had bolted, I found it impossible to get
bullocks and mules for all the wagons, very few men being
left in camp it was impossible to strike tents or load the
wagons, and some of the kits of the men and Officers were
left in camp. I then ordered a general retirement on to a
hill half-way between Hekpoort and Nooitgedacht, where I
took up a fresh position and assembled all the baggage. The
enemy brought a gun and pom-pom into action, but these were
speedily silenced. Colonel Legge's force, at this time under
Lieut .-Colonel Cookson's command, on returning to its camp,
found that it was impossible, owing to the heavy rifle fire
of the Boers, to remove any horses, wagons, or stores. An
attempt was made to remove an ammunition wagon, but all but
one of the team of mules was shot before it had gone 20
yards. Various acts of gallantry wore performed by Officers
and men in removing the 4.7-inch gun, and one gun "P"
Battery R.H.A., and in endeavouring to remove the ammunition
column wagons of both Legge's and my force, but 1 am glad to
say all guns were removed and ammunition burnt before
leaving camp. The hill I had occupied I found too largo to
be effectively held by my attenuated force, and 1 therefore
determined to retire on Rietfontein. This I commenced to do
at 3.30 p.m., and with practically no opposition except
sniping, which I regret to say resulted in four of our men
being killed, I reached Rietfontein at 3.45 am. 14th
instant, meeting General Alderson with a relieving column
east of Schoerpoort on the way.
I have the honour to be, Sir Your obedient Servant,
R. CLEMENTS, Major-General
Commanding Clements's Force.
General Clements's Force, 8th December 1900
| |
Officers |
Men |
Horses |
Guns |
| Imperial Yeomanry |
9 |
180 |
280 |
- |
| 8th Battery RGA |
3 |
100 |
71 |
4 |
| 5th Company Eastern Division RGA |
2 |
33 |
- |
1 x 4.7
inch |
| 2nd Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers |
16 |
573 |
- |
1 machine
gun |
| 2nd Battalion Yorkshire Light Infantry |
9 |
288 |
- |
- |
Colonel Legge's 2nd Battalion Mounted Infantry
| |
Officers |
Men |
Horses |
Guns |
| 2nd Bn. Mounted Infantry Regiment |
9 |
242 |
251 |
- |
| Kitchener's Horse |
16 |
251 |
227 |
- |
| P Battery RHA |
4 |
94 |
93 |
4 |
| B Section pompoms |
1 |
10 |
18 |
1 pompom |
The following telegraphic report was made by General
Cunningham, Commanding at Rustenburg, after enquiry from the
prisoners who came in there:—
To Lord Kitchener,
16th December 1900, No. CB 330. Your K 607.
Details of attack on 13th, as given by Captain Yatman,
Northumberland Fusiliers, Commanding the four companies,
are as follows :—
Two companies in position west, two companies east of
Nooitgedacht Pass.
All were standing to arms for about an hour when
firing commenced, at 4.15 a.m., in direction of camp at
foot of slopes of Magaiiesberg, and south-west of my
position on summit.
At about 4.30 a.m., left, or western, picquet,
Northumberland Fusiliers, was attacked, and, at same
time, it reported a very large force of Boers advancing
from west. Another large party was also seen advancing
from north.
This party was first noticed riding across green
patch, 1,500 to 2,000 yards away, and later on, about (6
a.m.) 1,000 yards away, advancing, on foot, over rocks
and boulders. Northumberlands were spread out in
picquets and supports. No advantage would have been
gained by pushing picquets further out than they were as
the surrounding ground was very broken, with large
boulders and rocks, affording good cover for either
attack or defence. The enemy closed rapidly, in
overwhelming numbers, attacking from three sides,
fourth, or south, side being precipitous, and by 6.45
were tiring from distance of 50 yards. Our ammunition
being practically expended white flag was put up by
order of Captain Yatman.
The companies on west were surrounded and captured
first, the Boers thus obtaining command of pass and
eastern side.
Some rifles were broken by Boers, others taken away.
Ammunition not expended was thrown amongst rocks by
Northumberland Fusiliers before capture.
Prisoners marched off at 8 a.m., and kept out in open
veldt north side of Magalieaberg, not near any laager,
and did not see anything. They arrived Rustenburg, 7
p.m., 15th, Captain Yatman in charge. Captain Yatman
states his four companies strength was, roughly, 280 men
; estimates casualties at 90, cannot say how many
killed, wounded, and missing.
To Army Head Quarters, South Africa,
Pretoria, 16th January, 1901.
Sir,
In continuation of my report dated 21st December,1900, on
the action of 13th December last at Nooitgedacht, and after
a perusal of the Court of Enquiry and consideration of such
other evidence as I have been able to obtain in connection
with the attack on General Clements' camp, I beg to submit
the following remarks-
The reverse was, in my opinion, mainly due to
over-confidence and lack of Military precautions.
The position, intended for the force to remain in for
some days, was evidently badly selected for defence; nor do
there seem to have been sufficiently strong strategic
reasons for maintaining troops in such a position as that
taken up, and sites better suited for defence existed in the
near neighbourhood.
Co-operation by Broadwood's brigade was not properly
arranged for, and he was allowed to move out of immediate
touch without leaving any force to guard the North of
Magaliesberg Range.
Intelligence was defective. There is no doubt, from
evidence of Boer prisoners, that the enemy thoroughly
reconnoitred and closely examined the position the day
before their attack, and decided on the manner in which it
could best be taken.
The 4 Companies of the 2nd Bn. Northumberland Fusiliers
on the summit of the Magaliesberg appear to have made little
or no effort to entrench, or to improve the natural
defences, during the 2 or 3 days the place was occupied. As
it was essential to the safety of the camp in the position
chosen to hold the hills to the North, closed works to which
the men could retire if pressed should have been constructed
on the summits, and these should have been supplied with
reserves of food, water and ammunition.
The duties of keeping a sharp look out and of patrolling
were so inefficiently performed that the troops, though not
actually surprised, were unprepared for the attack.
To sum up, the loss of the position was, I consider, due
to dispersed forces, vital points too weakly held, no field
of fire, waste of ammunition, no rallying places, no
reserves; a combination of very serious Military errors.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
KITCHENER
General, Commanding in Chief, South Africa
