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| Map of the general area |
ASH
helping a wagon over a watercourse en route to Brackenlaagte |
Native scouts who led
Benson's force
to
Brackenlaagte |
Section of Mounted Infantry seizing a
kopje |
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| Boer charge |
Defending the guns |
Cpls Casey and Baker and Pte
Pedrick bringing ammunition to the men on the Western kopje |
Defence of the Western Kopje |
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| Trench |
Scottish Horse graves |
Benson's grave |
Lloyd's grave |
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Trench dug by the
LNLR after the battle |
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The following are high resolution pictures (typically 800KB - 1MB) of the
monuments to the fallen at Brakenlaagte and others commemorated at Primrose
Cemetery.
The following account is taken from Chapter 36 of Conan Doyle's 'The
Great Boer War'. This is followed by the account given in 'After
Pretoria - the Guerila War'. Click here for a list of
officer
casualties.
In October Colonel Benson's force was reorganised, and it then consisted
of the 2nd Buffs, the 2nd Scottish Horse, the 3rd and 25th Mounted Infantry,
and four guns of the 84th battery. With this force, numbering nineteen
hundred men, he left Middelburg upon the Delagoa line on October 20th and
proceeded south, crossing the course along which the Boers, who were
retiring from their abortive raid into Natal, might be expected to come.
For several days the column performed its familiar work, and gathered up
forty or fifty prisoners. On the 26th came news that the Boer
commandos under Grobler were concentrating against it, and that an attack in
force might be expected. For two days there was continuous sniping,
and the column as it moved through the country saw Boer horsemen keeping
pace with it on the far flanks and in the rear. The weather had been
very bad, and it was in a deluge of cold driving rain that the British set
forth upon October 30th, moving towards Brakenlaagte, which is a point about
forty miles due south of Middelburg. It was Benson's intention to
return to his base.
About midday the column, still escorted by large bodies of aggressive
Boers, came to a difficult spruit swollen by the rain. Here the wagons
stuck, and it took some hours to get them all across. The Boer fire
was continually becoming more severe, and had broken out at the head of the
column as well as the rear. The situation was rendered more difficult
by the violence of the rain, which raised a thick steam from the ground and
made it impossible to see for any distance. Major Anley, in command of
the rearguard, peering back, saw through a rift of the clouds a large body
of horsemen in extended order sweeping after them. 'There's miles of
them, begob!' cried an excited Irish trooper. Next instant the curtain
had closed once more, but all who had caught a glimpse of that vision knew
that a stern struggle was at hand.
At this moment two guns of the 84th battery under Major Guinness were in
action against Boer riflemen. As a rear screen on the farther side of
the guns was a body of the Scottish Horse and of the Yorkshire Mounted
Infantry. Near the guns themselves were thirty men of the Buffs.
The rest of the Buffs and of the Mounted Infantry were out upon the flanks
or else were with the advance guard, which was now engaged, under the
direction of Colonel Wools-Sampson, in parking the convoy and in forming the
camp. These troops played a small part in the day's fighting, the
whole force of which broke with irresistible violence upon the few hundred
men who were in front of or around the rear guns. Colonel Benson seems
to have just ridden back to the danger point when the Boers delivered their
furious attack.
Louis Botha with his commando is said to have ridden sixty miles in order
to join the forces of Grobler and Oppermann, and overwhelm the British
column. It may have been the presence of their commander or a desire
to have vengeance for the harrying which they had undergone upon the Natal
border, but whatever the reason, the Boer attack was made with a spirit and
dash which earned the enthusiastic applause of every soldier who survived to
describe it. With the low roar of a great torrent, several hundred
horsemen burst through the curtain of mist, riding at a furious pace for the
British guns. The rear screen of Mounted Infantry fell back before
this terrific rush, and the two bodies of horsemen came pell-mell down upon
the handful of Buffs and the guns. The infantry were ridden into and
surrounded by the Boers, who found nothing to stop them from galloping on to
the low ridge upon which the guns were stationed. This ridge was held
by eighty of the Scottish Horse and forty of the Yorkshire MI, with a few
riflemen from the 25th Mounted Infantry. The latter were the escort of
the guns, but the former were the rear screen who had fallen back rapidly
because it was the game to do so, but who were in no way shaken, and who
instantly dismounted and formed when they reached a defensive position.
These men had hardly time to take up their ground when the Boers were on
them. With that extraordinary quickness to adapt their tactics to
circumstances which is the chief military virtue of the Boers, the horsemen
did not gallop over the crest, but lined the edge of it, and poured a
withering fire on to the guns and the men beside them. The heroic
nature of the defence can be best shown by the plain figures of the
casualties. No rhetoric is needed to adorn that simple record.
There were thirty-two gunners round the guns, and twenty-nine fell where
they stood. Major Guinness was mortally wounded while endeavouring
with his own hands to fire a round of case. There were sixty-two
casualties out of eighty among the Scottish Horse, and the Yorkshires were
practically annihilated. Altogether 123 men fell, out of about 160 on
the ridge. 'Hard pounding, gentlemen', as Wellington remarked at
Waterloo, and British troops seemed as ready as ever to endure it.
The gunners were, as usual, magnificent. Of the two little
bullet-pelted groups of men around the guns there was not one who did not
stand to his duty without flinching. Corporal Atkin was shot down with
all his comrades, but still endeavoured with his failing strength to twist
the breech-block out of the gun. Another bullet passed through his
upraised hands as he did it. Sergeant Hayes, badly wounded, and the
last survivor of the crew, seized the lanyard, crawled up the trail, and
fired a last round before he fainted. Sergeant Mathews, with three
bullets through him, kept steadily to his duty. Five drivers tried to
bring up a limber and remove the gun, but all of them, with all the horses,
were hit. There have been incidents in this war which have not
increased our military reputation, but you might search the classical
records of valour and fail to find anything finer than the consistent
conduct of the British artillery.
Colonel Benson was hit in the knee and again in the stomach, but wounded
as he was he despatched a message back to Wools-Sampson, asking him to burst
shrapnel over the ridge so as to prevent the Boers from carrying off the
guns. The burghers had ridden in among the litter of dead and wounded
men which marked the British position, and some of the baser of them, much
against the will of their commanders, handled the injured soldiers with
great brutality. The shell-fire drove them back, however, and the two
guns were left standing alone, with no one near them save their prostrate
gunners and escort.
There has been some misunderstanding as to the part played by the Buffs
in this action, and words have been used which seem to imply that they had
in some way failed their mounted companions. It is due to the honour
of one of the finest regiments in the British army to clear this up.
As a matter of fact, the greater part of the regiment under Major Dauglish
was engaged in defending the camp. Near the guns there were four
separate small bodies of Buffs, none of which appears to have been detailed
as an escort. One of these parties, consisting of thirty men under
Lieutenant Greatwood, was ridden over by the horsemen, and the same fate
befell a party of twenty who were far out upon the flank. Another
small body under Lieutenant Lynch was over taken by the same charge, and was
practically destroyed, losing nineteen killed and wounded out of thirty.
In the rear of the guns was a larger body of Buffs, 130 in number, under
Major Eales. When the guns were taken this handful attempted a
counter-attack, but Eales soon saw that it was a hopeless effort, and he
lost thirty of his men before he could extricate himself. Had these
men been with the others on the gun ridge they might have restored the
fight, but they had not reached it when the position was taken, and to
persevere in the attempt to retake it would have led to certain disaster.
The only just criticism to which the regiment is open is that, having just
come off blockhouse duty, they were much out of condition, which caused the
men to straggle and the movements to be unduly slow.
It was fortunate that the command of the column devolved upon so
experienced and cool-headed a soldier as Wools-Sampson. To attempt a
counter-attack for the purpose of recapturing the guns would, in case of
disaster, have risked the camp and the convoy. The latter was the
prize which the Boers had particularly in view, and to expose it would be to
play their game. Very wisely, therefore, Wools-Sampson held the
attacking Boers off with his guns and his riflemen, while every spare pair
of hands was set to work entrenching the position and making it impregnable
against attack. Outposts were stationed upon all those surrounding
points which might command the camp, and a summons to surrender from the
Boer leader was treated with contempt. All day a long-range fire,
occasionally very severe, rained upon the camp. Colonel Benson was
brought in by the ambulance, and used his dying breath in exhorting his
subordinate to hold out. 'No more night marches' are said to have been
the last words spoken by this gallant soldier as he passed away in the early
morning after the action. On October 31st the force remained on the
defensive, but early on November 1st the gleaming of two heliographs, one to
the north-east and one to the south-west, told that two British columns,
those of De Lisle and of Barter, were hastening to the rescue. But the
Boers had passed as the storm does, and nothing but their swathe of
destruction was left to show where they had been. They had taken away
the guns during the night, and were already beyond the reach of pursuit.
Such was the action at Brakenlaagte, which cost the British sixty men
killed and 170 wounded, together with two guns. Colonel Benson,
Colonel Guinness, Captain Eyre Lloyd of the Guards, Major Murray and Captain
Lindsay of the Scottish Horse, with seven other officers were among the
dead, while sixteen officers were wounded. The net result of the
action was that the British rear-guard had been annihilated, but that the
main body and the convoy, which was the chief object of the attack, was
saved. The Boer loss was considerable, being about one hundred and
fifty. In spite of the Boer success nothing could suit the British
better than hard fighting of the sort, since whatever the immediate result
of it might be, it must necessarily cause a wastage among the enemy which
could never be replaced. The gallantry of the Boer charge was only
equalled by that of the resistance offered round the guns, and it is an
action to which both sides can look back without shame or regret. It
was feared that the captured guns would soon be used to break the blockhouse
line, but nothing of the kind was attempted, and within a few weeks they
were both recovered by British columns.
See the officer casualties.
The account from "After Pretoria - The Guerilla War"
On
the 26th the enemy were still near at hand. They were, indeed, doing their
utmost to detain the column in the locality till their main force arrived.
Grobler, who was in charge of the detaining operations, attempted a
stratagem. He divided his commando into three bodies and placed one, by far
the weakest, in a position where it could well be seen by the British, and
where it would, he hoped, invite attack. But if the British attacked it, he
was ready to fall upon them with the other two sections, taking them on
either flank. Benson, however, was not to be caught in this way, and,
finding that he had to deal with a "slim" commander, Grobler resumed his
harassing strategy. Sniping went on all day, though at nightfall the Boers
drew off, with a wholesome fear of night marches and sudden dashes—tactics
in which Colonel Benson excelled.
On
the 27th the column marched to Kaffirstad, with the enemy always in touch
and persistently sniping it, yet the only casualty in this painful progress
was one scout killed. On the 28th it moved to Zwakfontein and spent the day
there, after a short march, in examining farms, with the Boers always in
close proximity—an ordeal most dangerous and nerve-trying to the British.
Refugees were collected and some Boer women interrogated. They stated that
seven of the enemy had been killed on the 25th. Two hundred of the enemy
hung on the British rearguard and kept its attention occupied.
Messengers were sent to the railway line with news that the column would
march by way of Brakenlaagte to Brugspruit, and during the 29th, the troops
rested. The weather all this day was terrible, with heavy storms and
tropical downpours of rain, swelling the spruits and rendering the roads
very difficult; moreover, the enemy were steadily growing in numbers and
daring. They had fixed their attack for November 1. When they saw, early on
the 30th, that the British were moving off, they used every effort to retard
the march, in order to give Botha time to arrive. The early morning was as
bad as, or worse than, the previous day had been. A heavy mist overhung the
vast expanse of the high veldt, and yet as the hours went on, the wind blew
a perfect hurricane from the south-west, while the rain came down in floods.
It was about as bad a day for marching as could have been found. Benson's
custom, when on the trek, was to send off his infantry with his waggons and
heavy baggage in advance, the more mobile part of the force following about
an hour later. Generally the second part of the column caught up the first
before any great distance had been covered. These dispositions were
necessary, as oxen trek better before the sun is up.
At
4.30 of that fateful day, the first part of the force moved out. Already
fighting had begun. The heavy beating of the "Pom-Poms" woke the troops at
3.30 a.m., and it was followed by a continuous roar of rifle firing, which
never ceased all day. The enemy were everywhere; in front, on the flanks,
and in the rear, but, as yet, so far as could be seen, not in any
overwhelming or disquieting force. They worked in through mist and rain
until they struck the British outposts now retiring, and engaged them. The
curious double report of their rifles could be heard through the rain, and
then again from out of the pall would come the sputter of the Lee-Enfields.
Plainly it was to be a hard day.
The rearguard was composed of the 3rd Mounted Infantry, regulars, and among
the best of the men on the field. They were perfectly steady, and met the
Boer rushes in the coolest manner. By this time everyone in the column was
so accustomed to perpetual sniping that no one paid much attention to the
heavy firing. The Boers, when they came close, were observed to be dressed
in cavalry cloaks and to be wearing slouch hats, so that they were
indistinguishable from the British mounted men. This added to the difficulty
of repelling their attacks and to the general confusion. It was always
unsafe to permit even a presumed Britisher to come near without compelling
him to put up his hands. In fog and mist identification was quite
impossible.
Three miles from the camp a serious obstacle was encountered. This was a
watercourse 20 feet wide, with steep banks on either side and a boggy
bottom. Here many waggons stuck, and had to be double-teamed or man-handled
before they could be extricated. Interminable delay occurred while this
tedious process was being gone, through. Unfortunately, the waggons were
heavily laden with ten days' supplies, so that they could not be abandoned
or destroyed. Meantime, the attitude of the enemy became more and more
aggressive, and the rain came down in heavier and heavier floods, soaking
the men and reducing the whole column to a condition of sodden melancholy.
The wind howled and drove these floods in our men's faces, and behind the
screen which the elements afforded, the Boer snipers closed in. The British
advance right flankers were first driven in; then the rearguard was assailed
in force, and the artillery had to unlimber and support the mounted
infantry. The two guns and the "Pom-Pom" with the advance guard, and the two
guns and the "Pom-Pom" with the rearguard were now firing, while the Boers
were all around; and, in the midst of all this hubbub, amid a shower of
bullets, men and officers and steaming oxen and mules sweated at the drift,
hauling out the refractory waggons.
It
had been intended that day to march to Onderwacht, but the delay and
fighting had already rendered this out of the question. Colonel Benson
changed his plans, and decided to encamp at the farm of Brakenlaagte, which
lay about four miles ahead. He remained with the convoy, and directed Major
Wools Sampson to go ahead, and select a defensible camping ground. Sampson
was to take with him half the East Kents, the advance guard, and the waggons
which had cleared the drift. He had just moved off when a Boer force, about
500 strong, rode in on the left, attempting to pass in between the main body
of the British and the advance. For a moment, these enemies were taken to be
British; but, discovering their real character, the British guns with the
rearguard dropped three shrapnel among them, though it is to be feared
without any great effect. The object of this dash on the enemy's part was,
of course, to get in front of the column and delay the retreat.
At
last the drift was passed by the bulk of the force soon after noon, when,
hearing very heavy firing from the front, Colonel Benson rode in that
direction to ascertain what was happening. Just as he had ridden off, a
message came to him from the rearguard to say that two waggons had stuck
fast in the drift, and could not be extricated. In the mist, the rearguard
also had been desperately attacked, and though the mounted infantry retired
steadily in alternate companies the men required support — the more so as
the guns, unable to distinguish the enemy in the obscurity, could give but
little assistance. The force was in much the plight of a man fighting in the
dark; and it did not know the ground, while the Boers of the district were
perfectly acquainted with it. The enemy were now, it seem in great force.
Benson sent orders that two mule carts were to be unloaded at the camp and
despatched to lighten the load of the two ox waggons which had stuck in the
drift. These two carts were duly taken to the drift, but there was,
naturally, considerable delay before a part of the load of the waggons could
be transferred to them. During the delay, the enemy closed in on the drift,
driving in the rearguard, and made the most determined efforts to capture
the waggons. Yet, notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and the heavy
fire directed on those working in the drift, the waggons were saved. The
guns withdrew to a ridge, three miles or so from the drift, where they took
position, with the Yorkshire Mounted Infantry as escort. One company of the
East Kents was deployed on the slope which faced the Boers, some distance in
front of the guns, and in front of them again were stationed the bulk of the
Scottish Horse, while on either flank were more of the regular mounted
infantry.
Even now all the waggons did not reach the camp. On the short stretch of
veldt which intervened between the drift and the camp, two waggons stuck,
since, because of the rain, the veldt had become an impassable bog. Nothing
could be done to get them away, as the Boers shot down the teams, and all
who went near them. They had to be abandoned. As to what happened in the
rearguard after this abandonment of the waggons there is some doubt, owing
to the fact that two narratives of those on the spot agree exactly, but it
is quite clear that there was now some confusion. The noise of heavy
fighting could be heard in front, indicating the seriousness of the
position. Major Wools Sampson found that the enemy were attempting to seize
a kopje to the south-west of Brakenlaagte, from which they would have been
able to command the camp, and render it untenable. He therefore sent to
secure this all-important point of vantage first a section, and then a
larger force of mounted infantry, finally supporting them with his guns.
The kopje was secured, but for the moment we will follow the fortunes of the
rearguard, merely stating that Wools Sampson, though very hotly engaged, was
able to detach three companies of East Kents to its support, since he could
see that it was in a very parlous position. As the Boers pressed it became
necessary to order the screen of mounted troops, Scottish Horse and Mounted
Infantry to retire under cover of the fire of the infantry and the two guns
and "Pom-Pom" composing
the artillery of the rearguard. This withdrawal in the face of an active
enemy is always a dangerous and difficult process. As if to render it more
dangerous and more difficult, a fierce squall burst over the fieldat this
very juncture. The men retiring bent their heads before it; the gunners and
the infantry covering the retirement were blinded by it and the could see
nothing. This was the more unfortunate since the country is full of deep
hollows, which are difficult to search with artllery fire. Such a hollow lay
to the right of the guns as they faced the enemy, and into it, under cover
of the squall, must have poured a large number of men unobserved.
As
the mounted troops came back, the veldt suddenly became alive with Boers.
They seemed to start up as if by magic at the closest quarters. A large body
rode in on the right rear yelling and firing from horseback, and making for
the hollow in which many of their number must have been concealed. As they
came on, the company of infantry forming the rearguard gave way. The Boers
broke upon them and captured most of them. There was then no force between
the guns with their small escort and the Boers. To the rear of the guns, but
on the other side of the crest and unable to see what was happening, were
the three companies of East Kents which Major Wools Sampson had sent back to
the help of the rearguard. As the infantry in the rearguard were seen to
waver and leave their position, Benson, who had now arrived on the scene,
sent Captains Lloyd and Collins to attempt to rally them and lead them back
to the ridge. Both officers were almost at once shot down. But the Scottish
Horse had observed what, was going on, and, gallantly led by their officers,
they turned as they were retiring and hurried back to the guns.
All these events which take so long to present in words were the occurrence
of a few moments. The rearguard guns do not seem so far to have noted the
movement of the Boers towards the hollow, which, considering the blinding
effect of the storm, is no cause for wonder or reproach. But now the storm
of horsemen reached the hollow and there reinforced by at least 700 men. The
whole mass of burghers rode forward, not up to the guns, but to a position
some 40 yards away from them, where they could fire from under the cover
afforded by a hollow, exposing only their heads, and enfilading the guns and
the line of men round them. The British artillery had to change direction,
which with the modern gun is a most troublesome matter in the midst of a
fight, when weapons are anchored with the heavy spades that take the recoil.
It
was while the gunners were endeavouring to wheel their weapons that the
enemy's fire at close quarters struck them. Colonel Guinness of the Royal
Artillery himself worked with his gunners under the blast of death; Colonel
Benson, who was close at hand, also helped. The gunners were not wanting in
bravery and steadiness. It was said then, as it has been often said before,
that there is only one way in which to put a British gun out of action—by
killing or wounding all the gunners. And this was what actually happened. On
the ridge, taken at a terrible disadvantage, the Artillery with their escort
of Yorkshire Mounted Infantry and with the Scottish Horse who had returned
to their aid, suffered and fought and died. The Boers shouted—and their
shout could be heard above the din of the battle—"Surrender!" "Hands up!"
but not a man budged or yielded. It was a magnificent display of heroism on
the part of the common Englishman and his officers. In the brief seconds
under the remorseless Boer volleys, man after man went down; every gunner
was disabled; Colonel Guinness himself as he sought to load the one weapon
which he had at last trained on the Boers, was killed; Colonel Benson was
wounded, first of all in the arm and then more severely in the abdomen; the
Scottish Horse fired till there was no one left to fire; the Yorkshiremen
fell side by side with them, while the summit of the ridge became a shambles
and wound was dealt upon wound among the fallen men, and still the stream of
bullets lashed the summit of the hill, though now there was none to offer
resistance.
It
was at this juncture that the wounded Colonel gave an order which
illustrated at once his iron spirit and his unflinching courage. His life
was slowly ebbing out into the night; the death which had spared him on that
dreadful dawn of Magersfontein was near at hand ; yet there might be hope if
only medical help came quickly. Many men would have sent for that help; in
the pain and mental depression caused by mortal wounds, even the dearest
intellect may be clouded and the most stubborn determination bent until it
yield. But the Colonel as he lay there bleeding out his life, called a
devoted private of the Scottish Horse named Grierson and bade him make his
way back to the camp with this order to the artillery of the advance guard.
They were to fire shrapnel at the guns near which he lay; to fire without
regard for him and those near him, with the one object of saving the guns
and preventing the Boers from removing them. Vital it was in that great
soldier's mind to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of the
enemy, with, as he doubtless reasoned within himself, danger to the
blockhouses and dishonour to the fair fame of the army which he loved so
well. But the order is and will always remain an instance of the highest
abnegation and of the deepest self-sacrifice of which man is capable. And
for this, if for no other reason, should the name of Colonel Benson be
inscribed by the British nation in letters of gold upon any monument with
which that nation may decide to commemorate its heroic dead. He further gave
strict injunctions that the ambulances were not to be sent out to the relief
of the wounded, stating that the Boers would certainly use the opportunity
to remove the guns.
His orders were obeyed by Major Wools Sampson. The guns in camp maintained
their fire, bursting shrapnel on the crest of the hill, and for some time
prevented the Boers from occupying it. Near the guns, the Yorkshires and the
Scottish Horse had maintained a stubborn front up to the last Of the 40
Yorkshiremen in the escort, 27 were killed or wounded, and when afterwards
found, many of them had three wounds, and some as many as eight or nine.
When the ammunition of the survivors gave out, and they could no longer
reply to the Boer fire, they waited, hoping to get a chance of using the
bayonet as the Boers closed. They were lying there perfectly still, with
this intention, when a Boer rush was made. As the enemy came on, one or two
moved, and disclosed to the enemy the ambush. Those who had moved, in
anxiety to see what was happening, were instantly shot down by the enemy's
sharpshooters; the others were covered by the Boer rifles, and the Boers
shouted to them from a distance of less than 30 yards to put up their hands,
or they would kill every one. Just as determined were the artillerymen. Of
the 32 on the ridge, only 4 escaped unscathed.
Nor was the conduct of the regulars, superb though it was, better than that
of the Scottish Horse. Scotland may well be proud of the men who, on this
bloody field, upheld the honour of her name, and showed how bravely they
could die, when all was lost but honour. Of the squadron on the ridge, not a
single man came back unwounded. Only a few of the horse holders escaped
unharmed.
Nine officers in this gallant corps were hit; of eighty men, but seven were
without a wound. So splendid was their conduct that Colonel Benson declared,
as he lay dying, that every man of them deserved the Victoria Cross; Even
the horse holders, who were in a donga some 200 yards to the rear, did not
come off without casualties. The Boers worked round to a position whence
they could command the donga, and suddenly poured into it a deadly volley
which brought down many of the horses and several of the men. Seeing that to
remain was a useless waste of life, those who survived this attack made a
dash for safety. Some who let go their horses were shot down as they raced
for the camp, but a half-dozen who kept their horses between them and the
enemy's rifles managed to rejoin Major Wools Sampson.
At
last, after repeated repulses, the enemy made their way to the guns, and the
greater part of the ridge was in their hands. Around and about on the ridge
lay two hundred British. For some hours the Boers constantly renewed their
attempts to withdraw the guns, but owing to the fact that the ridge was
swept by the fire of the remnant of the column in the camp, they were not
able to do this. There was, in fact, a deadlock. They Boers could not use
their victory, nore were the British in the camp strong enough to drive them
from the ridge and retake the guns. At the extreme western end of the ridge,
from the kopje to the west of the camp, where a small body of regular
mounted infantry held out and could not be dislodged, a deadly fire was
directed on every Boer who appeared near the guns. To rush this small party
of men was apparently beyond the power of the enemy, who had lost many of
their best men, and by this time had exhausted the energy of their attack.
As
the day wore on to night, Major Wools Sampson seems to have taken it upon
himself to disobey his commander. Something like an informal truce came into
operation, and the ambulances were at last sent out to rescue the wounded
who lay upon the ridge, in peril from every British projectile. No doubt the
Major thought that enough had been sacrificed for honour. It was now that,
profiting by the lull in the firing, the enemy removed the guns. They are
said to have used the Red Cross flag to cover the withdrawal of the
artillery, but they were perfectly justified in carrying off the weapons
while our ambulances were at work, and this is the probable foundation of
the story. For other actions which took place on this stricken field there
was no excuse, except the lawlessness and disorganisation of the commandos.
Where the Boer leaders were present in person the wounded were well treated
and shielded from insult and plunder. But where the leaders were not the
rank and file of the enemy behaved with absolutely inexcusable barbarity. No
less than 75 of the wounded lodged serious complaints against the Boers;
nearly all these men had been robbed of all that they possessed. In the
words of a report made to Lord Kitchener by Major Young of the Royal
Artillery, "A very large proportion stated that their boots had been
removed, and in those cases where the leg had been broken, this caused
intense agony ... Many had been deprived of other articles of clothing,
hats, jackets and socks; in some cases being left with an old shirt and a
pair of drawers only ... Sergeant Ketley, of the 7th Hussars, attached to
the Scottish Horse, after being wounded in the head and hip, was shot by a
Boer with his own carbine, because he did not raise his hands when ordered
to do so," he being at the time disabled and helpless by reason of his
wounds. Round the guns the enemy appear to have put to death many wounded
and, perhaps, one or two unwounded men, after all resistance had ceased. "I
... was lying on the ground," says a private of the Scottish Horse, "when
the Boers came up and stripped me of my hat and coat, boots, fifteen
shillings, and a metal watch. I saw them fire at another wounded man as he
was coming to me for a drink. The ambulances were detained till twelve
o'clock at night before returning to camp."
Several men deposed to the murder of a private of the Rifle Corps, named
Forster. "I saw" one says, "an old Boer with black beard and whiskers ...
whom I should be able to recognise again .. shoot my friend ... by putting
the muzzle of his rifle to his side ... When any of the wounded moved on the
field, after we had ceased firing, they kept sniping at them." The immense
mass of evidence officually collected will show how total was the absence of
discipline in the Boer forces, how incomplete was the control of their men
by the commandants, and how brutal was the temper of those who could thus
maltreat and murder the suffering. The officers were no more exempt from
their cruelties than the humblest private. Colonel Benson's last hours were
tormented by those who sought to rob him of his private papers, of his spurs
and gaiters. The enemy had no respect for rank, for bravery, or for the hand
of death, before which most stand awed. They stripped Lieutenant Seymour,
and left him lying wounded without any assistance. They stripped in the most
brutal manner Lieutenant Bircham, who lay on the ground with a shattered
leg, and to their ruffianly violence his death must be ascribed, since in
taking off his spurs they wrenched his shattered leg clean round. These
things must be remembered, when we are told that the Boers fought as brave
men should fight. And let it be also recalled that for these crimes no sort
of punishment, so far as we know, has ever been inflicted by the leaders.
They, too, must share the responsibility, and their fair fame must be
irrevocably tarnished by such acts as these.
Meantime, about the camp, where the rest of the British column was
entrenched itself with might and main, a fierce encounter was going forward.
The troops were steady and met the onset with the utmost coolness. The hill
above the farm of Brakenlaagte was occupied, and hasty shelter trenches
constructed for the sharpshooters who manned it; the small kopje which had
been siezed by the Mounted Infantry was strengthened by a gun. A few men who
had escaped from the catastrophe in the rear were placed in line, and all
details including cooks, officers' servants and Kaffirs were set to work to
dig or to fight.
In
the midst of the turmoil, with the rain still descending in floods from the
darkened sky, Major Sampson moved coolly to and fro, and made the
dispositions which were eventually rewarded with success. More than once the
Boers attempted to rush the camp; the most determined effort was made about
12.30, when a heavy fire was directed by them from all sides upon the
position, under cover of which, and obscured by the torrents of rain, they
strove to charge. But they were unable to produce any effect upon the
troops. Major Young was in command of the hill of Brakenlaagte; on a kopje
to the east, Major Anley was in charge; and the small kopje to the west, the
prolongation of the ridge where stood the two captured guns, was stubbornly
defended by two officers and 15 men of the King's Royal Rifles. It was on
the flanks that the fighting was hardest at this stage. The enemy as they
attacked were with difficulty distinguished from the Scottish Horse. They
were dressed in khaki, wore slouched hats, and in them had plumes of the
same appearance as those of the British irregulars. The most charitable will
find it hard to explain away this assumption of British uniform.
