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Inside an armoured
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This page is about railways in the Boer War. It has section on the
use of railways during the Boer War, the locomotive
department and armoured trains. The text
is taken from Maurice's History of the War in South Africa, vol 4.
The main duties of a Director
E P C Girouard, RE of
Military Railways and his staff may be briefly summarised as follows:
(1.) To be the intermediaries between the Army and the
technical working administration of the railway. (2.) To see that the
ordinary working of the railway is carried on in such a manner as to ensure
the greatest military efficiency. (3.) To satisfy the demands of the Army on
the railway without disorganising the working of the railway system as a
whole. In war these services are essential, for the officers of a civil
railway administration cannot discriminate between the demands of the
various branches and departments of the Army, or class them in order of
urgency.
The question of organisation in South Africa had been
deliberated by Brevet-Major , the officer appointed to be Director of
Railways (D.R.) during his voyage to the seat of war. It was tentatively
decided that:
(i.) As regards those lines of railway under efficient
civil control in friendly parts of the country, the Director would act only
as intermediary between the Headquarters Staff of the Army and the Civil
Administration.
(ii.) In disaffected country the Director would assume full control of the
lines, naming them "Communication Sections" for military purposes. To enable
him to ut his duties he was to be in close communication with the Governing
Power, the Railway Boards and the General Managers of the Railways.
(iii) It was necessary to appoint a staff of RE officers acquainted with
technical railway working, whose duty it would be to co-operate with the
civilian staff of the railways in meeting military demands,
(iv) " Communication Sections " were to be controlled by officers styled
Assistant Directors of Railways (A.D.R,) They were to be under the orders of
the General of Communications within whose district their line ran I and
under the D.R., and were to co-operate with the General Managers of lines
within the district,
(v.) Deputy A.D.R.'s were to be stationed at Divisional Traffic points.
These officers were to be under the A.D.R.'s and were to co-operate with the
civil officials,
(vi.) Under the orders of D.A.D.R.'s were to be Railway Staff Officers (R.S.O.),
who were to superintend the movement and transport of troops at railway
stations,
(vii.) An A.D.R. "Communications" was to act for the Director in details of
civil railway policy; it would be his duty also, in consultation with the
officers already named, to formulate and to submit for the approval of the
G.O.C. and of the Director all orders and proposals relating to movements of
troops and stores, diversions of rolling stock, interruptions to ordinary
traffic, and the protection of trains and railway property.
The principle underlying these proposals was the
creation of a Military Staff corresponding grade by grade with the civil
organisation. A lack of properly trained officers was at once felt. For the
Cape lines three D.A.D.R.'s were required, as well as an A.D.R. and an R.S.O.
at Cape Town; whereas only two officers in all were available. Accordingly,
the Eastern and Midland Sections were not provided for.
Nor had there as yet been laid down any clear rules
regarding the relative duties of the General Staff of the Lines of
Communication and the Staff of the Director of Railways, Consequently,
Commandants on the Lines of Communication were ignorant of the position and
duty of the Military Controlling Staff under the D.R. A step towards
regulating matters was therefore made by the publication of the following
order:
LINES OF COMMUNICATION ORDERS. No. 687, DATED DECEMBER
27th, 1899. Duties of Staff Officers, Lines of Communication Railways :—
(1.) The working of the railways is carried out by the civil staff of the
Cape Government Railways with a staff of military officers to assist and
direct the military traffic. This staff forms part of the staff of the L. of
C, and is the only means of communication authorised between the military
authorities and the civil railway officials.
(2.) The Military Railway Staff will consist of:—
(i.) One A.D.R., on the staff of the
Inspector-General Lines of Communication (head office, Cape Town), in
charge of all communications.
(ii.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the Assistant
I.G. L of G, Western Section (head office, De Aar), in charge of Western
Section, Cape Town to Modder River,
(iii.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the A.I.G. L.
of C, Midland Section (head office, Naauwpoort), in charge of Port
Elizabeth to Naauwpoort, Naauwpoort to De Aar, and Rosmead to Stormberg.
(iv.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the A.I.G. L.
of C, Eastern Section (head office, Queenstown), in charge of East
London to Stormberg.
(v.) One D.A.D.R., on the staff of the Base
Commandant and as S.O. to A.D.R. (head office, Cape Town), in charge
Cape Town only, (vi.) R.S.O.'s on the staffs of the Station Commandants,
at stations as required.
(3) The duties of the various Staff Officers on the
railway are as follows:-
The Assistant Director of Railways is responsible for
the whole working of Railway L. of G, and is the channel through which
should pass all communications on Railway (Communications) matters from the
I.G. L. of G and the D.R. He should keep up a complete account of the state
of traffic and position of rolling stock on the railway, and should keep in
touch with the General Traffic Manager of the system. He should keep himself
informed, through the D.I.G. and A.I.G. L. of C, of the work carried out by
D.A.D.R.'s, and see that proper control is exercised over the districts in
their charge.
(4.) Deputy Assistant Directors of Railways, under the
orders of the D.I.G. and A.I.G. L. of C, should keep themselves completely
informed of the state of traffic in their sections. They should, through the
Station Commandants, exercise a general supervision over the work of the
railway staff in their districts. They should keep careful watch on the
distribution of rolling stock on their sections, and are responsible that it
is utilised in the best way. They should keep in touch with the Traffic
Manager of their sections of the Railway. No work of any nature will be
undertaken by the Civil Railway Department for the Military, unless the
approval of the D.A.D.R. has previously been obtained. The D.A.D.R. is
responsible that any irregularity on his section, which he cannot rectify
himself, is reported to the A.LG. L. of C. The office of the D.A.D.R. should
be located at the same station as that of the District Traffic Manager, and
he is responsible that either himself or his Staff Officer is present at
that station? (5.) Railway Staff Officers, under the orders of the Station
Commandants, are responsible for the traffic at the stations where they are
located. They are responsible that no train is delayed for military
requirements, except in extremely urgent cases on the authority of the
Station Commandant. They are especially responsible for seeing that trucks
loaded with military stores are released as quickly as possible. They should
report immediately to their D.A.D.R; any deficiency or irregularity of
traffic in their stations. They should similarly address their D.A.D.R. on
any questions concerning railway matters on which they require information
or orders. They are responsible for all detraining and entraining operations
at their stations, and the comfort of all troops passing through. They will
furnish such returns on railway matters as may be required to their D.A.D.R.
direct. All communications from R.S.O.'s must be sent through Station
Commandants.
It was thus sought to modify the original organisation
by allotting the A.D.R.'s and D.A.D.R.'s definite positions on the L. of C.
staff- and, though R.S.O's remained on the staffs of Station Commandants,
the circumstances under which they were to refer to D.A.D.R.'s were
specified.
A similar system to that adopted upon the Cape
Government Railways was put in force when Lord Roberts advanced into the
Orange Free State and the Transvaal. The Imperial Military Railways (I.M.R.)
were then created. The obstacles to smooth handling of traffic in the Orange
Free State were at first serious ; the bridges at Norval's Pont and Bethulie
(giving access to the railways of Cape Colony) were broken, all
rolling-stock on the north bank of the Orange river had been withdrawn by
the retreating enemy, and no staffs remained at the stations.
It now became a matter of paramount importance to
centralise into the hands of the D.R. the control of the railway; with this
object in view instructions were issued by Army Headquarters, dated April
23rd, 1900.
As the Orange Free State and Transvaal fell into
British hands, so the mileage under the control of the Imperial Military
Railways increased. New A.D.R.'s were appointed at Bloemfontein and
Johannesburg, with deputies at Kroonstad, Johannesburg and Pretoria.
In the absence of a railway working staff it became
necessary to create one; though many of the members were military officers,
the technical and controlling staffs were kept distinct.
After the occupation of Pretoria, when further
experience had been gained, all applications for the use of the railways
were sent to the Chief of the Staff, who, after consulting the D.R., issued
the necessary permits. At the same time the A.D.R. was informed and he
communicated with all railway officials concerned. At this time the lack of
rolling-stock, and especially of engines, greatly handicapped the
controlling staff,
The strain resulting from lack of these necessaries was
relieved after the occupation of Komati Poort, in September, 1900. By
October 1900, not only had temporary repairs been completed upon every line
of railway in the country, but the makeshifts were being gradually replaced
by repairs of a semi-permanent and permanent type, executed by the Works
Department of the Imperial Military Railways; but the activity of the enemy
made it impossible to run trains by night, and consequently the full
carrying capacity of the line was not available. In order to cope with the
attacks on the lines of railway which occurred at the end of 1900, the D.R.
selected stations throughout the theatre of war where there was siding
accommodation for construction trains, and there a permanent-way inspector
and his gang were quartered, with an R.E. Section whose duty it became to
take charge of the construction train, if necessary.
Every effort was made to ensure rapid transmission to
the construction train of news of any break in the line. Gangers patrolled
the line at dawn, and all military posts reported alarms to the nearest
telegraph station, which in turn informed the Deputy Superintendent of
Works, who telegraphed his orders to the construction train situated nearest
to the break. Officers in charge of construction trains had orders to
proceed with all speed to any reported break, whether or not the report had
been confirmed. It is recorded that in the Orange River Colony alone, during
eight months of the war, seventy-eight destructive raids were made on the
railway. Yet the system of intelligence and the scheme for executing repairs
were equal to every call. For example, on January 1st, 1901, at 2.30 a.m.,
information reached the Deputy Superintendent of Works at Bloemfontein that
the line had been broken at Wolvehoek. The break, which was sixty-three
miles distant, was repaired by 8 a.m. The gradual extension of the
blockhouse system ultimately procured more immunity for the railways, and by
April, 1901, the worst of the actual train-wrecking was over.
THE LOCOMOTIVE DEPARTMENT.
Mention must be made of the work of this department, on which devolved
primarily the duty of repairing engines, coaches and trucks. The department
was also called upon to execute work for the Army, which, under other
circumstances, might have been done by the Army Ordnance Department, e.g.,
the mounting of Vickers-Maxim and 12-pr. Q.F. guns on armoured trucks. As an
illustration of the work of this department, it may be recorded that between
May and October, 1901, the following repairs were effected in their
workshops at Pretoria, Johannesburg and Bloemfontein:
Locomotives 141
Coaches 558
Trucks
1,955
The need of additional engine-power and truckage was
early realised, and during 1901 the rolling stock was increased by 106
locomotives and 1,740 thirty-ton cars.
RAILWAY STAFF DEPOT; EMPLOYMENT OFFICE; NATIVE LABOUR
DEPOT.
The supply of men required to operate the railways had
to be supplemented from outside the ranks of the R.E. companies. A Railway
Staff Depot was therefore formed at Johannesburg in June, 1900, in order to
deal with volunteers from the ranks ot the Army who applied for special
employment upon the railways. A Railway Employment Office was simultaneously
opened in Cape Town; it was freely advertised in the South African
newspapers, and applications poured in fast from the civilian population.
Applications were examined, enquiry was made with regard to the character of
the applicants, and a regular system of registration was instituted, so as
to ensure the admission of none but desirable men to the ranks of the
Railway Staff. This office, to which all departments of the Imperial
Military Railways might apply when in want of additional labour, abundantly
justified its institution. It received 7,500 applications for work during
the succeeding nine months, and engaged some 800 employees-Mention must also
be made of the Native Labour Depots, established at De Aar, Bloemfontein and
Johannesburg. Upon these all departments of the Army were entitled to make
requisition. Large batches of natives were employed in reconstructing the
railway, and in loading and off-loading supplies from trucks. At the end of
1900 some 4,500 native boys were upon the books of the Johannesburg Labour
Depot alone.
ARMOURED TRAINS.
Soon after Lord Kitchener assumed command he decided
regularly to organise the armoured trains as fighting units. He therefore
appointed to his Staff an officer termed the Assistant Director of Railways
for Armoured Trains. This officer was also on the Staff of the Director of
Railways, and was placed in charge of all the armoured trains in South
Africa—some twenty in number.
The principal duties of these trains may be said to
have been the following:—
(1.) In conjunction with columns in the field, to
intercept the enemy whom the columns were driving on to the line.
(2.) To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the train being
well advanced so as to prevent the enemy breaking to that flank.
(3.) To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which were threatened by
the enemy.
(4.) To escort ordinary traffic trams.
(5.) To reconnoitre.
(6.) To patrol by day and night.
(7.) The general protection of traffic routes.
The ADR. for Armoured Trains was held responsible for
the efficiency of the garrisons, armaments concerted action of the whole.
The garrison of an armoured train was composite. In
addition to the infantry escort, it contained R.A. and R.E. detachments. The
latter consisted of one N.C.O. and six Sappers, skilled in railway repairing
work and in re-setting derailed engines and trucks; two telegraph linesmen,
one telegraph clerk, two engine drivers and two firemen. All the men of this
detachment were counted as effective rifles when the train was engaged, with
the exception of the driver and fireman on the footplate j even the latter
carried rifles in the engine cab to drive off an enemy endeavouring to gain
possession of their engine. It was important that the officer commanding the
train should be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often called upon
to act on his own responsibility. His strong armament and defences enabled
him to attack superior forces. Yet his vulnerable points were many. He had
ever to be alert that the enemy did not cut the line behind him. In addition
to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in war time, he had to
contend with skilfully used automatic and observation mines, and had to keep
his head even amid the roar which followed the passage of his leading truck
over a charge of dynamite, and then to deal with the attack which almost
certainly ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from men of no
common stamp. The danger from contact mines was to a certain extent obviated
by a standing order that each train should propel a heavily-loaded bogie
truck. Such trucks had low sides and ends; they in no way obstructed the
view, or fire, from the train ; and they performed the double purpose of
exploding contact mines and carrying the railway and telegraph materials.
The necessity for this propelled unoccupied bogie was exemplified on several
occasions, For example, No 6 Armoured Train exploded a mine near Kroonstad,
when, through some unfortunate oversight, it was not propelling its material
truck; the Officer Commanding was killed instantly, the leading fighting
truck was overturned, and several men in it were injured. This would
undoubtedly have been avoided if a loaded bogie had been in front. A few
days later this same train, having again been put in commission, ran over a
contact mine near Heilbron. On this occasion the propelled bogie fired the
mine, and a length of three feet of rail was blown out; but as the mine was
laid on a straight portion of the line, the whole train bumped across the
break and kept the rails. Three minutes after the explosion it engaging the
enemy with the 12-pr. Q.F. gun. There were no casualties on the train.
No 5 Armoured Train was similarly blown up west of
Middelburg, Transvaal, when running to reinforce Uitkyk, which the Boers had
attacked by night. Again the propelled bogie fired the mine ; but in this
case two box trucks in rear of the engine were thrown off by the broken
rail, the officer commanding promptly disconnected these, and steamed
forward with the front portion of his train to assist in the defence of
Uitkyk.
All trains carried a special gun-truck, on which was a
pedestal-mounted Q.F. gun. They carried also a machine gun at each end,
arranged with a lateral sweep, to allow the fires to cross at either side of
the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards.
Armoured trains were officially recognised as moving
telegraph offices, and equipped with field sounders, vibrators, phonophores
and telephones; and whenever trains stopped away from a regular office,
which they did nearly every night, they were never out of communication with
the neighbouring stations and blockhouses.
When several trains patrolled one section, it was found
advisable especially at night, that they should all halt at fixed intervals
and connect up with the telegraph wires to receive instructions and news.
Such a train carried out the whole of Brigadier-General
Plumer's telegraph work when he crossed the railway near Houtkraal in Cape
Colony in pursuit of De Wet.
One of the later improvements made to armoured trains
was the addition of a strong electric light. The steam from the engine and
turbines working the dynamos was supplied by a flexible pipe from the engine
dome, the pipe being fairly protected by steel plates.