DOBELL, CHARLES MACPHERSON, Captain
and Brevet Major, was born 22 June, 1869, son of Richard R Dobell, of Beauvoir
Manor, Quebec. He entered the Army 20 August 1890; served in the Hazara
Expedition, 1891 (Medal with clasp); became Lieutenant 13 July 1892; was
Adjutant, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 7 July 1896 to 6 November 1900; took part in
operations in Crete, 1897-98 (Brevet of Major 8 March, 1899); became Captain
22 February 1899. He served in the South African War, 1899-1900, in command
of a regiment of Mounted Infantry (22 February to 13 July 1900); Relief of
Kimberley; operations in the Orange Free State, February to May 1900,
including operations at Paardeberg (17 to 26 February), actions at Poplar
Grove, Driefontein, Houtnek (Thoba Mountain), Vet River (3 and 4 May) and Zand
River; operations in the Transvaal in May and June, 1900, including actions
near Johan-nesburg, Pretoria and Diamond Hill (11 and 12 June); operations in
Orange River Colony, May to 15 July 1900, including actions at Wittebergen (1
to 13 July). He was mentioned in Despatches [London Gazette, 10 September,
1901]; received the Queen's Medal with six clasps, and was created a Companion
of the Distinguished Service Order [London Gazette, 27 September 1901]:
"Charles Macpherson Dobell, Captain and Brevet Major, Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
In recognition of services during the operations in South Africa". The
Insignia, Warrant and Statutes were sent to the GOC troops in Hong Kong, and
presented by him on 17 March, 1902. He served in China in 1900 (Medal), and
West Africa (Northern Nigeria) in 1906; was mentioned in Despatches [London
Gazette, 18 September 1906, and 2 July 1907]; was given the Brevet of
Lieutenant Colonel (29 Sept, 1907), and received the Medal and clasp. He was
promoted to Major 28 September 1907. He was GS03, HQ of Army, 1 April 1907 to
1 February 1909; was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, Bedfordshire Regiment, 4
May 1912; was GSO2, HQ of Army, 2 February 1909 to 31 March, 1911; was
Military ADC to the King 4 November 1910 to 2 June 1915; was given the Brevet
of Colonel 4 November 1910; became Colonel 1 September 1913; was Temporary
Brigadier General and Inspector-General, West African Frontier Force, 1
September 1913 to 22 April 1916, during which time he commanded the Allied
Forces in the Cameroons, having been promoted to Major General 3 June 1915.
General Dobell commanded the Western Frontier Force, Egyptian Expeditionary
Force, 9 June to 18 September 1916; was Temporary Lieutenant General 19
September 1916 to 21 April 1917, commanding No 3 Section, Canal Defences,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force (19 September to 22 October 1916), and commanding
Eastern Frontier Force, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 23 October 1916 to 1 May
1917. He was Divisional Commander, India, from 6 August 1917. He was created
a CMG in 1914, and a KCB in 1916. He was a Fellow of the Royal Geographical
Society.
The following is an extract from
General Dobell's Despatch, dated
War Office, 31st May 1916.
The following Despatch has been received by the Secretary of State for War
from Major General Sir Charles M Dobell, KCB, Commanding the Allied Forces in
the Cameroons:—
General Headquarters,
Cameroons, 1st March, 1916.
My Lord,
I have the honour to forward herewith
a summary of the operations carried out by the Allied force under my command,
covering the period between the capitulation of Duala, 27th September, 1914,
and the termination of active operations.
I have, in this despatch, endeavoured
to maintain a correct perspective, remembering that our operations in this
theatre of war are incomparable in magnitude to those taking place elsewhere.
For purposes of comparison I may, however, add that the number of troops of
both nations at my immediate disposal at the commencement of the campaign
amounted to 4,300 West African native soldiers; on the 21st November, 1915,
this number had been increased to 9,700, including Indian troops. In these
numbers the British and French forces were approximately equal.
As Your Lordship is aware, I have kept
the proper authorities informed in some detail as to the proceedings and
progress of the troops under my command. These despatches I have endeavoured
to forward at intervals of about a fortnight; I do not, therefore, propose to
enlarge on such questions as the organization and preparation of the force
placed at my disposal, nor the naval measures that were taken in a campaign to
which the adjective ' amphibious' may be applied in its widest sense. It is
perhaps sufficient to state I fully realized, that the conquest of a country
which is some 306,000 square miles in area, or roughly one and a half times
the size of the German Empire, defended by a well-led and well-trained native
force, plentifully supplied with machine guns, was no light task.
2. On my passage from the United
Kingdom early in September, 1914, I learnt at various ports of call that the
operations which had taken place on the Nigerian frontier had not been as
successful as had been anticipated,
thus confirming my opinion that Duala,
the capital and chief port of th« Cameroons, must be made my immediate
objective. I entertained no doubts as to the ability of the Royal Navy to
overcome the difficulties and make a landing at Duala feasible, and my best
hopes were realized when I was informed that HMS Challenger could force a
passage through the sunken wrecks and other obstructions in the Cameroon
River, and reach a point 7,000 yards from the town. This was made possible
owing to the mine sweeping and other preparatory work which had been carried
out by the Royal Navy and Nigeria Marine, under the direction of Captain
Fuller, RN, HMS Cumberland.
On my summons for the surrender of the
Colony being refused, and after duly notifying the German Commandant of my
intention, I ordered a bombardment of the town to commence early on 26th
September; this in combination with a land demonstration, made by way of one
of the neighbouring creeks, was sufficient to induce the Commandant, on 27th
September, to surrender the towns of Duala and Bonaberi, with a smali strip of
land in their environs. The surrender of Duala secured us a safe and
convenient base for the future absorption of German territory; further, the
capture of stores, supplies, field guns, and the removal of over 400 German
Europeans was a great loss to the German Field Force, whilst the seizure of
the large amount of shipping and numerous small craft in the harbour was an
inestimable advantage to us.
3. My first object was to consolidate
the position already won, and with this object in view an Allied force was
allotted the task of clearing the country up to and including the Japoma
Bridge, Midland Railway, whilst a British force commenced to make headway
towards Maka on the Northern Railway line. Reconnaissances by land and water
were carried out with uniformly successful results. I may remark incidentally
that neither the climate nor the character of the country favoured the
offensive: officers and men were exposed to the most trying conditions;
incessant tropical rains, absence of roads or even paths, a country covered
with the densest African forest—all contributed to the difficulties with which
the troops were faced. Had it not been for the existing railways, which
formed a line of advance as well as supply, it is difficult to see how
progress could have been made.
The country in the immediate vicinity
of Duala is perhaps typical of the greater portion of the Cameroons in which
my troops have operated, excepting beyond Northern railhead where the country
becomes open and, on account of its greater altitude, healthier; but all the
coast line, and for some 150 miles inland, one meets the same monotonous
impenetrable African forest fringed, on the coast line, by an area of mangrove
swamp in varying depth. The zone is well watered by numerous rivers, of which
the Wuri, Sanaga and Njong present serious military obstacles. Once outside
this belt conditions change at once, supplies and live stock are obtainable,
and open grass lands are reached; the one unusual geographical feature is the
Cameroon Mountain, some 13,000 feet high, which rises abruptly from the sea,
its slopes clothed with valuable plantations, and on which the hill station of
Buea, the former administrative capital of the Protectorate, is perched.
4. By the first week in October we
had made good the country as far as Maka and the left bank of the Dibamba
creek. The Japoma railway bridge, 900 yards in length, was broken in two
places, but a fine feat was performed by the French tirailleurs in forcing
this passage under a galling rifle and machine-gun fire. The Royal Navy and
Royal Marine Light Infantry also materially contributed to this success.
I now judged that I could move a force
by the Wuri River on Jabassi, so as to secure Duala from any attack from the
north-east; a mixed Naval and Military force, supported by armed craft, was
organized and an attack was delivered on 8th October. It is regrettable that
this operation was not at first successful, difficult country, novel
conditions and the fact that our native troops encountered machine-gun fire
for the first time are contributory causes to failure; nevertheless it became
necessary completely to reorganize the force and repeat the operation, with
the result that Jabassi was taken on 14th October. From this place a force
was pushed out to Njamtan, and the country around Jabassi was cleared of the
enemy.
My next objective was Edea, on which
place I determined an advance should be made from three directions, two by
land and one by river. Strong forces were moved from Japoma and by the Njong
River to Dehane, thence by a track towards Edea. The tliird force proceeded
by the Sanaga River; the navigation of this river is most difficult, dangerous
bars hinder entrance into its mouth and sand banks obstruct the passage up to
Edea. The feat performed by Commander L W Braithwaite, RN, in navigating an
armed flotilla on the Sanaga was a remarkable one. Thus the combined
movement, outlined above, was entirely successful and Edea was occupied on the
morning of 26th October. This result had not been achieved without hard
fighting, particularly on the part of the force operating by the line of the
railway. It was during the preliminary operations in this undertaking that
Lieutenant Child, Director of Nigeria Marine, Commander Gray, and Captain
Franqueville, of the French Army, lost their lives through the capsizing of
their boat in the surf at the mouth of the Njong River— valuable lives whose
losses it was difficult to replace.
5. During the latter half of October
the small force under Lieutenant Colonel Hayward was continuously engaged with
the enemy on the line of the Northern Railway, but had made such good progress
that I was in a position to arrange for an attack on Victoria, Soppo, and Buea.
As in previous operations I divided my force, part of which was moved by water
to Tiko, part from Susa by Mpundu on the Mungo River, and the third portion
supplied by the Royal Navy and Royal Marine Light Infantry moved by sea to
Victoria. The opposition met with cannot be described as serious, but the
country was very trying to troops; the energy with which our advantage was
pushed appeared to demoralize the Germans, and by the 15th November we had
secured Buea, with Soppo and Victoria, We inflicted considerable casualties on
the enemy whilst escaping very lightly ourselves.
With the double object of striking an
effective blow at the enemy and at the same time relieving the pressure on the
southern frontier of Nigeria I decided to clear the whole of the Northern
Railway of the enemy, and for this purpose concentrated a force at Mujuka,
under command of Colonel Gorges, oil 30th November. This force gradually
fought its way to the North and reached Nkongsaniba (railhead), which was
surrendered to us on 10th December. It is worthy of remark that we took two
airplanes at this place—the first machines that had ever arrived in West
Africa. The advance was continued to Dschang, which was occupied on lird
January, and the fort destroyed; most of the hostile resistance was met with
at the Nkam River, but our columns rarely remained unmolested and experienced
difficulties in operating in a class of country totally different to that to
which they had by then become accustomed. I decided, as soon as the fort at
Dschang had been destroyed, that the place should be evacuated and Nkongsaniba,
with its outpost at Bare, should be our most advanced position. It was
unfortunate that we could not continue to hold Dschang, as our withdrawal gave
a false impression to the natives and emboldened the enemy. However, with the
troops at my disposal I did not feel strong enough to maintain and supply a
post 55 miles north of railhead, in a difficult and mountainous country.
6. Early in 1915 the situation was as
follows:—
British troops holding Duala, the
Northern Railway with Bare, Victoria, and Dibombe (a defended post south-west
of Jabassi).
French troops on the line of the
Midland Railway up to and including Edea, which place was partially isolated
as one span of the first of the two bridges had been destroyed. A detachment
at Kribi was protecting that seaport from land attack.
Ships and armed craft of the Allied
Navies had visited the whole of the Cameroons seaboard, and had established
bases for small craft to patrol the rivers where navigable.
By this time approximately 1,000 male
Europeans, only 32 of whom were incapable of bearing arms, had been deported
for internment in Europe.
Towards the end of 1914 the French,
under General Aymerich, and Belgian troops based on French Equatorial Africa,
commenced to make their presence felt in the South and South-East, but my
force was separated from them by a distance of approximately 400 miles.
In the North an Allied force was fully
occupied in observing Mora and Garua.
At and near Ossidinge a small British
force from Nigeria and German forces were in contact.
Notwithstanding the number of
troops—British, French, and Belgian —in the country it was impossible at tliis
period to co-ordinate their movements, owing to the vastness of the area over
which they were scattered and the impossibility of establishing any means of
intercommunication between the various Commanders. Furthermore, it was
difficult for me to pursue a very active policy, as it was necessary to
maintain comparatively strong garrisons in the places already occupied. Posts
on our lines of communications were also absorbing troops from my somewhat
depleted force, amongst wliich sickness was beginning to play its part.
7. It was on the 5th January that the
German Commander endeavoured to deliver a serious blow to the French force
commanded by Colonel Mayer. Two practically simultaneous attacks were made
against his force; the first at Kopongo, on the railway, the second at Edea.
I had obtained some knowledge of the German Commander's intention, and the
post at Kopongo had been slightly augmented, with the happy result that the
attack on this point was easily repulsed, but not until the railway and
telegraph lines liad both been cut and all communication with Edea severed.
The troops at Edea had, however, to bear the brunt of a more serious
movement. The locality of Edea is by no means easy to defend owing to the
proximity of the forest, the scattered nature of the buildings, and inequality
of the ground; but so skilfully were the defences devised, and so good was the
French marksmanship, that at the termination of the combat the Germans left on
the field 23 Europeans dead and 190 native soldiers killed and wounded. The
French loss consisted of 1 European sergeant and 3 tirailleurs killed and 11
tirailleurs wounded. A machine gun, number of rifles, ammunition and
equipment fell into the French hands. It is significant that this was the
first and last occasion on which the Germans attempted an operation of this
nature on a comparatively large scale.
Towards the end of January, Lieutenant
Colonel (now Brigadier General) Cunliffe arrived at Duala on a mission from
Lagos, and as a result of a conference it was agreed that a more active
prosecution of the campaign in the Northern Cameroons should be undertaken. I
detached Major (now Lieutenant Colonel) W D Wright, VC, a most able officer,
from the staff of the British Contingent under my command and placed his
services at the disposal of the Officer Commanding the Allied Forces at Garua.
I also arranged with Captain Fuller, RN, for the despatch of a naval field gun
to Yola, via the Niger and Benue Rivers, for eventual use against the forts at
Garua.
The early days of February were marked
by great hostile activity in the neighbourhood of Northern Railhead.
Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn, commanding a battalion of the Nigeria Regiment,
had a serious encounter with the enemy at Mbureku on the morning of the 3rd
February, resulting in the capture of the hostile camp, a large quantity of
small-arm ammunition, and equipment. We were, however, unable to reap the
full advantage of our success, as Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn was obliged to
transfer his force to the neighbourhood of Harmann's Farm, where the Sierra
Leone Battalion was engaged with the enemy. During these two incidents we
lost nearly 120 native soldiers killed, wounded, or missing; but, after we had
consolidated our position at Bare, the enemy did not follow up the slight
advantage he had gained.
“Constant activity during February had
failed to gain for us any material advantage to the north of the railway, and
there were a series of small incidents which culminated in the second attack
by our troops on the points known as Stoebel's and Harmann's Farms on 4th
March. I regret that this attack was not successful and we lost some valuable
lives, including Major (Lieutenant Colonel) G P Newstead, commanding the
Sierra Leone Battalion, and Captain C H Dinnen, Staff Captain, an officer of
great promise. The enemy must, however, have suffered in a similar degree, as
it was later found that he had evacuated his defensive position and retired
further north.
During February I received valuable
reinforcements from French and British West African Colonies, and I was
enabled to reconstitute my force and place a more homogeneous unit at the
disposal of Lieutenant Colonel R A de B Rose, commanding the Gold Coast
Regiment.
8. On the 12th March a mission from.
French Equatorial Africa, at the head of which was Monsieur Fourneau,
Lieutenant-Gouverneur du Moyen Congo, reached Duala. Its object was to invite
my co-operation in an immediate advance, in conjunction with the troops under
General Aymerich from south-east and east, against Jaunde. Since the
occupation of Duala, Jaunde had been transformed into the temporary seat of
the Colonial Administration. I fully realized the political and strategic
importance of Jaunde, but demurred embarking on such an operation at that
moment. It was late in the season and the rains were already beginning,
besides which the troops I was able to employ were insufficient to ensure
success in the absence of effective co-operation, in the immediate vicinity of
Jaunde, by the troops under General Aymerich. Owing to the difficulty of
communication it was quite unsafe to count on this. However, in view of the
great advantage which would follow an early occupation of Jaunde, I consented
to co-operate with all nay available strength, and the 20th April was fixed as
the date on which an advance should be made from the line Ngwe-So Dibanga, on
the Kele River. I consequently entrained a British force, commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Haywood, on 7th April, which was to commence a methodical
advance in co-operation with the French troops under Colonel Mayer. The
forcing of the line of the Kele River and the position at Ngwe, both of which
places were obstinately defended, occasioned my troops some losses. I further
found it necessary to despatch a force to Sakbajeme to deny the crossing of
the Sanaga River at that place to the enemy. It soon became evident that the
enemy was withdrawing troops from other and more distant parts of the Colony
to resist our further advance.
At midnight 23rd/24th April the
blockade of the Cameroons was declared, and every artifice was used to deceive
the enemy, and incessant and unremitting activity was maintained by the Royal
Navy on the coast line, so as to induce the enemy to believe that
disembarkation would be made at a point from which a force could be marched on
Jaunde. Campo had been occupied by a Naval detachment, and boat patrol of the
river as far as Dipikar was maintained.
The advance from the line already
mentioned was subsequently postponed till 1st May on which date the French and
British columns moved forward to make good Eseka and Wum Biagas respectively.
The French advance on Eseka was
conducted with some difficulty, as broken bridges denied them the use of the
railway line for supply trains. Commandant Mechet, who conducted the advance,
successfully overcame all difficulties, and after being seriously opposed at
Sende, reached Eseka on llth May.
Turning to the British advance, on 1st
May Lieutenant Colonel Haywood recommenced his march eastwards from Ngwe, and
driving in the hostile outposts at Ndupe, on the 3rd May his force was facing
the formidable position which the enemy had established on the left bank of
the Mbila River at Wum Biagas. We captured the position on 4th May but not
without serious losses in European officers. A warm tribute is due to the
bravery and steadiness displayed by our native troops, and to the
pluck and endurance of the European ranks in face of such stubborn resistance.
As previously arranged, the French
force at Eseka now moved north and joined the. British at Wum Biagas, and
Colonel Mayer left Edea to assume command of the Allied expedition. Stores
and supplies were pushed forward by road, and a naval 12-pounder gun was
despatched to reinforce our artillery.
“Owing to the heavy casualties which
had occurred in the ranks of the two battalions of the Nigeria Regiment and
the inability of Nigeria, owing to the many calls made by General Cunliffe's
troops, to supply me with trained soldiers, I decided towards the end of May
to establish a training depot at Duala. The recruits were enlisted in
Nigeria, and transferred to Duala for training. This proved a great success,
and by its means 536 soldiers were trained and passed into the ranks.
9. On 11th May I received a message
from the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, which informed me that
the progress of the troops under General Aymerich had not been as rapid as
expected, and that as neither Dume nor Lomie had been captured, no definite
date could be given for the advance from those places. As I realized that the
advance on Jaunde, if delayed for any length of time, would be seriously
interfered with by the rains, and the sickness among both Europeans and
natives,, which was already causing me some anxiety, would rapidly increase, I
instructed Colonel Mayer to push on with all vigour, in consequence of which
he left Wum Biagas on 25th May.
I regret that supply difficulties soon
made themselves evident; the country was barren, and with all available
carriers and the few motor vehicles at my disposal, at that time only three, I
was unable to transport food for Europeans and natives with sufficient
rapidity. Handicapped by the almost impenetrable bush and a terrain which
afforded many defensive positions, the advance became exceedingly slow. At
every turn of the road the advance was met by machine-gun fire, so that during
the 25th and 26th May only 5 miles was made good. It took two days to force
the enemy from Njok. The enemy evidently had received reinforcements and
commenced to interfere with our line of communication, which was peculiarly
susceptible to attack, while the long convoys of carriers were singularly
prone to panic. I received an appeal from Colonel Mayer for reinforcements,
as in addition to other disabilities dysentery had broken out in his force. I
sent forward such troops as were available and took measures to obtain more
carriers from the West African Colonies.
From 31st May till 4th June Colonel
Mayer was held up at a position at Mateni which presented more than usual
difficulties owing to the swamps, which rendered a turning movement
impossible. By the 5th June only 12 miles from Wum Biagas had been made
good. About this date Colonel Mayer informed me that owing to sickness,
especially amongst Europeans, and to the stubborn resistance of the enemy, he
was of opinion that the further advance of his column on Jaunde was
impracticable, and he proposed, pending further instructions, to establish
himself on the Puge Kiver, where he could await the approach of General
Aymerich's troops. I immediately informed the Governor-General of Equatorial
Africa of the situation, adding that unless he had recent news of General
Aymerich's advance I should be obliged to withdraw Colonel Mayer's force to
the line of the Kele River. On 7th June Governor-General Merlin informed me
by telegraph that he had received no further news from the Southern Cameroons.
I thereupon decided to withdraw our force to the Ndupe River preparatory to
holding a line So Dibanga-Ngwe. A serious attack on one of our convoys of 500
carriers, and the consequent loss of food supplies, decided Colonel Mayer to
retire without further delay. During the 16th and 17th June our rearguards
were harassed, but never broken, and the enemy suffered considerably in his
attacks. I deemed it advisable to send forward a reinforcement of the last
troops at my disposal so that the pressure on our withdrawal could be
relieved; these troops, after leaving Duala on the morning of the 15th June,
bivouacked the following day at Ngui, 35 miles beyond Edea, having completed
much of the distance in heavy tropical rains. On the following morning, after
resuming their march, they reached Colonel Mayer's column at a most opportune
moment during a heavy attack on the rearguard. Not till 28th June did the
hostile activity cease, when our posts were firmly established at Ngwe and on
the Kele River at So Dibanga. In comparison to the size of our force the
casulaties were serious, 25 per cent, being either killed or wounded. I
regret that this operation was not more fruitful in results, and I fully
recognize the fact that Colonel Mayer was not in a position to undertake,
single-handed, an advance on Jaunde, but I had hoped that the pressure that
was being brought on the hostile forces in the Southern Cameroons would have
had the effect of preventing a concentration against us.
During this period our troops near
Northern Railhead were not in a position to undertake any serious offensive
action.
10. There was now an unavoidable lull
in the operations caused by the rains. I seized this opportunity to send as
many British officers and non-commissioned officers as possible to the United
Kingdom for a few weeks' rest, and I arranged that most of the native troops
from Nigeria and the Gold Coast should, in turn, visit their own Colonies. I
managed, however, to send detachments to operate near the Njong and Campo
Rivers respectively. A French detachment from Ngwe also carried out a
successful reconnaissance in July.
It was on 25th and 26th August, 1915,
at a conference which took place at Duala between Governor-General Merlin,
General Aymerich, and myself, that the plan was decided on by which the
Cameroons as eventually conquered.
The fall of Garua, in the north, early
in June enabled a British and French force to be set free which could move
through the highlands of the Cameroons to the south.
General Aymerich, whose troops were
now established at Bertua and Dume, promised definite co-operation, with
Jaunde, as before, the objective, whilst a force under Lieutenant Colonel le
Meillour moved parallel to the eastern frontier of Muni, and was to cross the
Campo River and move in the direction of Ebolowa. It was also arranged that I
should show such activity as was possible from Northern Railhead so as to
assist the British force at Ossidinge in its attempt to link up with other
troops from Nigeria, and further that a force should land at Campo and move
parallel to the northern frontier of Spanish Guinea.
It was unfortunate that Brigadier
General Cunliffe was unable to attend this conference, but all details were
communicated to him, and he was asked to exercise all possible pressure from
the north. His role was most admirably carried out.
The arrival of the 5th Light Infantry
of the Indian Army strengthened my command, and further reinforcements from
French West Africa were promised. The General Officer Commanding at Freetown
and the Governors of Nigeria and the Gold Coast agreed to send me the carriers
I required and to maintain them by monthly drafts. It was thanks to these
officers that, in spite of a rather heavy sick roll among carriers, an
efficient transport service was maintained throughout. My requirements in
motor transport were also met; this service proved invaluable and far exceeded
my expectations. Thus by 22nd September preparations were sufficiently far
advanced for a move to be made in an easterly direction. Many of the earlier
operations were a repetition of those which had taken place in May and June,
but the general plan differed in so much that I arranged for the British and
French lines of supply to be kept distinct, whilst I also determined that
Eseka should be made the French advanced base from which operations could be
carried forward to the Jaunde-Kribi road, and that our general advance should
be carried out by means of parallel columns by road and railway. Our
communications needed much repair, including the total reconstruction of a
heavy railway bridge and a deviation necessitating considerable labour on
earthwork. Many other smaller bridges were broken or destroyed; those on the
road were made fit for heavy traffic, those on the railway were practically
rebuilt.
The British force, as previously,
experienced stiff resistance at Wum Biagas, but on 9th October that place was
captured after a lively action, in which the Nigerian and Gold Coast troops
once more distinguished i themselves. From here we were enabled to send out
flanking columns j and render some assistance to the French troops who were
fighting their way to Eseka. The Kele River, in flood, proved a formidable
obstacle and its crossing somewhat delayed the British flanking columns sent
out from Wum Biagas. Sende was occupied by the French on 25th October and the
enemy was driven from Eseka on 30th October. Considerable rolling stock, left
behind after our previous advance, was retaken, and proved a valuable addition
to our exiguous supply of engines and wagons. By 23rd November, both British
and French forces were ready for the final advance, the bush track from Edea
to Wum Biagas had been converted into a good motor road, and through railway
communication, Duala-Eseka, was nearing completion. There were also over
7,000 carriers employed on such sections of the communications as were still
unfit for motor or rail traffic. Dschang Mangas was selected as the primary
objective ol the British force, whilst the French were directed to make good
the line of the Jaunde-Kribi road. Both forces slightly modified their
tactics, and the advance was generally carried out by a main body, with two
wings moving on as wide a front as the nature of the country permitted. The
method of our advance appears to have entirely disconcerted the enemy and,
although he still continued strenuously to resist our advance, it became
apparent that his strength was gradually becoming exhausted. Towards the end
of November the fighting in and around Lesogs by the troops under Lieutenant
Colonel Cockburn was of a very severe nature, but the troops from the Northern
Provinces of Nigeria gallantly rose to the occasion and, despite all
difficulties of the country, were not to be denied in their endeavour to
dislodge the enemy. Much credit is due to these troops and their leaders for
the admirable conduct of this operation. Ngung was reached on the 30th
November, and, up to this place, every defensive position was disputed by the
enemy. On 7th December the advance on Dschang Mangas was continued and both
main and flank columns were subject to opposition. A well executed move by a
small force of the Gold Coast Regiment, under Captain Butler, VC, considerably
disturbed the enemy; the capture of one of his machine guns and several
thousand rounds of ammunition, in addition to important documents, produced
considerable effect. On 17th December the more open and cultivated country
was reached and we took Dschang Mangas.
From 26th November onwards the French
were righting their way through very broken country to Mangeles; they had to
face determined opposition and lost a considerable number of European and
native soldiers, but their tenacity of purpose was rewarded by the capture of
Mangeles on 21st December, after intermittent fighting covering a period of
five days. The column halted at this place for rest and to establish a supply
depot.
11. I must now indicate the turn that
events had taken beyond Northern Railhead. I was informed from Nigeria that
the British force at Ossidinge, under Major Crookenden, would be prepared to
move on Bamenda on 12th October. I therefore ordered a force consisting of
portions of the West African Regiment, 5th Light Infantry, and some artillery,
under Lieutenant Colonel Cotton, 5th Light Infantry, to move on Dschang from
Bare, alsp starting on 12th October. Hostile opposition was experienced at
Mw\i and Nkam Rivers and from an entrenched position at Sanschu. On 6th
November Dschang was occupied. On receipt of information that Major
Crookenden's force had reached Bamenda on 22nd October I ordered Lieutenant
Colonel Cotton to leave a garrison in Dschang and move a force to Bagam to
co-operate with Major Crookenden in an attack on that place. The enemy
had,.however, forestalled us and withdrawn to Fumban, whither we pursued him
after experiencing some difficulty in effecting the crossing of the Nun
River. On 2nd December the important centre of Fumban was occupied and an
abortive effort of the enemy to retake it was frustrated. Brigadier General
Cunliffe, foreseeing the possibility of obstinate resistance at Fumban, had
directed two other small columns to co-operate in our movement on that place.
These columns arrived almost simultaneously with that under Lieutenant Colonel
Cotton. Major Crookenden's troops then continued their advance under
Brigadier General Cunliffe's direction, whilst I placed garrisons in Fumban,
Bana, and Bagam, and the bulk of Lieutenant Colonel Cotton's troops returned
to railhead. I was thus enabled to withdraw a small force to move from
Nkongsamba to Jabassi and penetrate the Bafia country, where I still believed
there were small hostile parties. I also was enabled to detach a force to
assist the French column operating from Campo. I think I may consider our
operations in the Northern area were entirely satisfactory, and the
simultaneous advance of our columns took the heart out of the remnants of the
enemy forces in that district. Furthermore, we had established touch with
Brigadier General Cunliffe's columns, which were now converging on the Sanaga
River, at a point known as the Nachtigal Rapids. Our losses were slight and
the health of all ranks was considerably better than that of the troops
fighting in the lower altitudes.
12. Reverting to the operations of
the main forces. On receiving information that the British force had arrived
at Dschang Mangas, I decided that it would be more advantageous to move on
Jaunde direct, rather than await the French advance to the Jaunde-Kribi road.
In arriving at this decision I was influenced by the fact that the mind of the
native does not understand the meaning nor necessity of delay, and from a
political point of view the early occupation of Jaunde appeared to be all
important. From 22nd December, the hostile resistance gradually weakened,
strongly entrenched positions were abandoned, and on the morning of the 1st
January Colonel Gorges entered Jaunde with his force. The enemy appeared to
have completely broken under the pressure which he was now experiencing from
all sides. Allied troops from the north, troops from French Equatorial Africa
and the Belgian Congo commenced to arrive in Jaunde during the first week in
January. It is, I think, a remarkable feat that troops that had fought and
marched for a period of seventeen months should have converged on their
objective within a few days of one another.
The direct effect of the occupation of
Jaunde was to relieve all pressure in front of the French force advancing from
Mangeles, the Jaunde-Kribi road being reached early in January. British and
French forces were moved during the first week in January to Widemenge and in
the direction of Ebolowa via Olama and Onana Besa crossings of the Njong
River. At Kol Maka, Lieutenant Colonel Haywood succeeded in securing the
release of officers, non-commissioned officers, civilian and native
non-combatants who had been taken prisoners by the Germans at various times
during the war; his force, supported by a strong French column, continued its
advance on Ebolowa, on which place a second Allied column was also advancing.
A French force under Lieutenant Colonel Faucon occupied Ebolowa on 19th
January, after experiencing some slight resistance. The definite move of the
remnants of the German forces towards Spanish territory now became apparent,
and Lieutenant Colonel Haywood proceeded with all despatch to follow them up
as far as Nkan, from which place I diverted him via Efulen on Kribi, in order to
clear the western area of stragglers. A British force was also moved to
Lolodorf.
Colonel Morisson took command of a
strong French force, and, moving towards the Spanish frontier, succeeded in
driving the German force in front of him across the Campo River into neutral
territory. A similar operation was conducted by the French force which had
operated from Campo, so that by the middle of February no Germans were left in
the Cameroons, and the conquest of the country had been completed. . . .
C M Dobell
Major General, Commanding the Allied Forces.
